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PREFACE.
The mystery of the obsolete and forgotten involves the law of real
property more than any other part of the law student’s work; and
most of the solvents of that mystery lie hidden here and there in the
year-books, statutes, and old reports, and locked from the average student
Qin
a dead and barbarous language. This mystery has been a great
1
:‘ embarrassment to me, especially since my attempts to teach the subject;
-9- and most of the modern texts and readings have been found to empha
g
i size the last application of the rules or the effect of late American
;§statutes, rather than to expound. the original doctrines, without knowl
edge of which the statutes cannot be understood. Of all the recent
,5 publications, Professor Digby’s History of the Law on Real Property
1
‘ has been found most helpful.
The following pages have been printed from the notes made from
T time to time while preparing to conduct exercises in the first course
'>‘‘_on real property at the University of Michigan, using Blackstone’s
Commentaries as the text. The design has been to present the great
monuments which mark epochs in the various branches of the subject,
with only an occasional late example. The prolixity of the originals
has often made imperative the alternative to abridge or omit, and
abridgment has been preferred. The present is a temporary edition,
made to try out the serviceability of such a book by use in class, and
trusting to experience to fill the gaps and prune the exuberance of special
topics. The editing has been rather hurriedly done, and the charity
of the reader is requested.
JOHN R. Roon.
Dated, Ann Arbor, March 5, 1909.
(iii)
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DECISIONS, STATUTES, &c., CONCERNING ESTATES IN
LAND.
'
CHAPTER I.
_ TENURES.
MAGNA CHARTA, HENRY III (1217) C. 89.
No freeman from henceforth shall give or sell any more of his land but
so that of the residue of the lands the lord of the fee may have the service
due him which belongs to the fee.
MAGNA CHARTA OF HENRY III (1217) c. 43 011 Mortmain.
It shall not be lawful from henceforth to any to give his lands to any
religious house, and to take the same land again to hold of the same
house. Nor shall it be lawful to any house of religion to take the lands
of any, and to lease the same to him of whom they were received to be
holden. If any from henceforth so give his lands to any religious house,
and thereupon be convict, the gift shall be utterly void, and the land
shall accrue to the lord of the fee.
BRACTON, Book 1, 0. 19, Sec. 2, H. 46 a & b—-A. D. 1260?
Likewise it is to be seen whether he to whom a thing has been given
may further give the thing given to him without prejudice to the chief
lords; and it appears so; because if a donation be further made, although
the chief lord suffers damage by it, nevertheless injury is not done to him,
because all damage does not inflict injury, but on the contrary injury
implies damage. Because the term injury is applied to everything which
is done not rightfully, and upon injury there follows an action to remove
the injury and that from which the injury results; but where there is
damage and no injury an action does not follow to remove the nuisance
from which the damage results. But some person may say, that from
the fact that the donatory further gives and transfers the thing given to
others, that he cannot do this, because the lord through this loses his
service, which is not true, with all due respect and reverence for the chief
lords. And it is generally true that a donatory may give to whom he
pleases realty and land given to himself, unless it be specially provided in
(1)
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the possession that he may not. For when a person has given a tenement
he gives a certain tenement in such a manner, that he is to receive certain
customs and a certain service, according as has been said above. And
hence he cannot claim more of right, if he shall have had what is agreed
upon, and so he takes what is his own and goes his way. * * * It
appears, therefore, from the premises, that when a donation by a lord to
his tenant is perfect and free, absolute and not conditional nor servile, no
injury is done to the lord from the fact, that the tenant has further given
it
, for injury results from the fact if (he has done so) against a mode or a
covenant. If my tenant has made a donation it is asked to whom he has
done an injury? Not to the lord, for the lord has whatever belongs to
himself, and the tenement charged and burdened, whatever may be said to
whomsoever it may have come. Likewise neither the feoffee, for it matters
not to the chief lord whosoever has his fee, since the tenant is his tenant,
although through an intermediate tenant. And if he shall say that he has
entered his fee unjustly, I say not so; because the fee is not his in the
domain, but is his tenant’s, and the lord has nothing in the fee except a
service; and so the tenant will have the fee in the domain, and the lord
will have the fee in the service. And if the lord shall prohibit his tenant
to work his pleasure with the tenement, which he holds in domain, the
lord so enters into the tenement of his tenant and causes him a disseisin,
unless a mode or covenant added to the donation itself induces otherwise,
since anyone may add in a donation a mode or covenant and a law which
shall always be observed. But the fee of the lord is said to be this, homage
and service and not the tenement in domain, and therefore he who enters
upon the homage and his service does him an injury, and not he who
entgrs
upon the tenement, which his tenant holds in domain, as above
sa1 .
BRACTON, Book 2, 0. 35, fol. 81.—A. D. 1260?
In the same way the tie of homage may be dissolved and extinguished
as regards the person of the tenant, and attach to the person of another,
as for instance, where the tenant, when he has done homage to his lord
has altogether relieved himself of his inheritance and has enfeofied
another to hold of the chief lord, and in that case the tenant is released
from the duty to render homage, and the homage is extinguished,
whether with or against the will of the chief lord, and the tie attaches to
the person of the feoffee, who is bound because of the tenement which
he holds, because it is the fee of the chief lord.
STATUTE QUIA EMPTORES 01‘ Statute of VVestminster III, 18, Edw. I,
Statute 1.—A. D. 1290.
c. 1
. For as much as purchasers of lands and tenements of the fees
of great men and other lords have many times heretofore entered
into their fees, to the prejudice of the lords, to whom the freeholders
\
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of such great men have sold their lands and tenements to be holden in
fee of their feoffors and not of the chief lords of the fees, whereby the
same chief lords have many times lost their escheats, marriages and
wardships of lands and tenements belonging to their fees, which thing
seems very hard and extreme unto those lords and other great men, and
moreover in this case manifest disheritance, our lord the king in his
parliament at Westminster after Easter the eighteenth year of his reign,
that is to-wit in the quinzine of St. John Baptiste, at the instance of the
great men of the realm granted, provided, and ordained, that from
henceforth it should be lawful to every freeman to sell at his own
pleasure his lands and tenements or part of them, so that the feofiee
shall hold the same lands or tenements of the chief lord of the same
fee, by such service and customs as his feoffor held before.
c. 2. And if he sell any part of such lands or tenements to any, the
feofiee shall immediately hold it of the chief lord, and shall be forthwith
charged with the services for so much as pertaineth or ought to pertain
to the said chief lord, for the same parcel, according to the quantity of
the land or tenement so sold, and so in this case the same part of the
service shall remain to the lord, to be taken by the hands of the feoffee,
for the which he ought to be attendant and answerable to the same chief
lord, according to the quantity of the land or tenement sold for the
parcel of the service so due.
c. 3. And it is to be understood that by the said sales or purchases
of lands or tenements or any parcel of them, such lands or tenements
shall in no wise come into mortmain, either in part or in whole, neither
by policy nor craft, contrary to the form of the statute made thereupon
of late. And it is to-wit that this statute extendeth_ but only to lands held
in fee simple, and that it extends to the time coming. And it shall begin
to take effect at the feast of St. Andrew the apostle next coming.
NOTE, Yearbooks (Horwood), 21 & 22 Edw. I, p. 640.—A. D. 1294.
Note that a man may enfeofi another to hold to him and the heirs
of his body begotten, to be holden of him (the feoffor) by a certain
service by the year; and in this case there is no need that he be enfeofied
to hold of the chief lord of the fee; for the statute ‘Quia Emptores Ter
rarum,” &c., is understood of the case of one enfeoffing another in fee
simple and not in fee tail.
STATUTE, 12 CHARLES II, c. 24.—A. D. 1660.
An Act for Taking Away the court of Wards and Liveries, and Tenures
in Capite, and by Knight Service, and Purveyance, and for settling a Rev
enue upon his Majesty in lieu thereot.
Whereas it has been found by former experience, that the courts of
wards and liveries, and tenures by knight service, either of the king or
others, by knight service in capite, or socage in capite of the king, and
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the conseqnents upon the same, have been much more burdensome,
grevious, and prejudicial to the kingdom, than they have been beneficial
to the king; and whereas since the intermission of the said court, which
hath been from the four and twentieth day of February which was in
the year of our lord one thousand six hundred forty and five, many
persons have by will and otherwise made disposal of their lands held by
knight service, whereon divers questions might possibly arise, unless
some seasonable remedy be taken to prevent the same; Be it therefore
enacted by the king our sovereign lord, with the assent of the lords and
commons in parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same,
and it is hereby enacted, That the court of wards and liveries, and all
wardships, liveries, primer-seisins, and ousterlemains, values and forfeit
ures of marriages, by reason of any tenure of the king’s majesty, or of
any other by 'knight service, and all mean rates, and all other gifts,
grants, charges incident or arising, for or by reason of wardships,
liveries, primer-seisins, or outerlemains, be taken away and discharged,
and are hereby enacted to be taken away and discharged, from the said
twenty-fourth day of February one thousand six hundred forty-five; any
law, statute, custom or usage to the contrary hereof in any wise notwith
standing. And that all fines for alienations, seizures and pardons for
alienations, tenure by homage, and all charges incident or arising, for
or by reason of wardships, livery, primer-seisin, or ousterlemain, or
tenure by knight service, escuage, and also, aid pur file marrier, and pm
fair fitz chivaler, all other charges incident thereto, be likewise taken
away and discharged, from the said twenty-fourth day of February one
thousand six hundred forty and five; any law, statute, custom or usage
to the contrary hereof in any wise notwithstanding. And all tenures
by lmight service of the king, or of any other person, by knight service
in capite, and by socage in capite of the king, and the fruits and conse
quents thereof, happened or which shall or may hereafter happen or
arise thereupon or thereby, be taken away and discharged, any law,
statute, custom or usage to the contrary hereof in any wise notwithstand
ing; and all tenures of any honours, manors, lands, tenements or here
ditaments, or any estate of inheritance at common law, held either of the
king or of any other person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, are
hereby enacted to be turned into free and common socage, to all intents
and purposes, from the said twenty-fourth day of February one thousand
six hundred forty-five and shall be so construed, adjudged and deemed
to be from the said twenty-fourth day of February one thousand six
hundred forty five, and forever thereafter turned into free and common
socage, any law, statute custom or usage to the contrary hereof in any
wise notwithstanding. * * *
BRADSHAW’ v. LAWSON, in King‘s Bench, Micl1., 32 Geo. 3.-Nov. 18,
. 1791-4 Term. 443.
Action of debt for 2s. 6d. for not attending plaintiff’s court baron
for Halton manor in respect of a customary estate. Till the reign of
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Queen Elizabeth all the lands of the manor were (except the lords
demesne lands) of customary tenure of inheritance, passing by customary
deeds and the lord’s admission. The tenure remains unaltered of several
of these estates. The_defendant’s estate being then parcel of the manor,
an indenture of feofiment with livery indorsed thereon was made Oct.
2, 18 Jac. I, whereby the then lord of the manor enfeoffed it for S01.
to C and his heirs in fee farm, reserving the yearly rent of 1!.
4s. 11d., therein called ancient rent, for all other rents. May 14, 1
Car. I, another deed reciting this deed covenanted that all holders of the
estate should grind at the lord’s mill and do suit at his court as formerly,
and be subject to fines and amercements assessed by homage or jury,
and that for each default 2s. 6d. should be paid. This deed was executed
by C’s son. Defendant’s ancestor became possessed of the estate in
1742, since which time no owner had attended court nor been amerced
except once in 1742. Case reserved.
Loan KENYON, C. J .—Notwithstanding all the industry that has
been exerted on this occasion, I cannot entertain a doubt on the prin
cipal question, which was settled about five centuries ago by a positive
act of parliament, the statute of quia emptores. And the objection to
the plaintiff’s claim, which arises on this statute, decides the merits of
the cause, and renders it unnecessary to consider the other points that
were made by the plaintifi’s counsel, which perhaps upon examination
would be found gqually destitute of all legal principles. It is stated, as
the foundation of the plaintifi’s demand, that the relation between these
parties is that of lord and tenant; as long as that continued, the services
to be rendered by the latter were to be regulated by the custom of the
manor; and among others was that of attending the lord’s court. Now
it is stated in the case that the lord of this manor in the reign of James I,
by competent deeds of conveyance conveyed the property, of which the
defendant is now seized, to the defendant’s ancestor, then a customary
tenant of the manor. But it has been said that the old services were
reserved by the reservation of the fee-farm rent; but if the relation of
lord and tenant absolutely ceased to exist, that rent can no longer be
considered as rent-service, but a rent to be recovered according to the
contract between the parties. After the statute of quia emptores the
lord could not by any deed reserve the old services when he conveyed
away the estate in respect of which those services were due; for the
tenant must hold of the superior lord. By the conveyance the estate
was no longer parcel of the manor, nor held of the manor; neither was
the defendant’s ancestor any longer a tenant of the manor. "Therefore
on that point, on which all the plaintiff’s claim is founded, I am ex
tremely clear that the defendant was not bound to attend the plaintifi’s
court baron as a tenant of the manor. * * * I am of opinion that
the very foundation of his claim totally fails, and that a judgment of
nonsuit should be entered. ASHURST, BULLER, and GRosE, JJ., as
senting. Judgment of nonsuit.
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MATTHEWS v. WARD’S LESSEE, in Md. Ct. Of App., Dec. 1839—10 Gill
' & J. 443.
Ejectment by plaintiff as lessee of Sarah Ward et al., against Henry
Matthews, for a lot of land in the city of Annapolis. From judgment for
plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Leonard Scott and wife being seised of the lot in fee on Oct. 18th, 1817,
by indenture in consideration of five dollars, gave, granted, bargained,
and sold it to Henry Price, “in trust for the use of John Henry Scott
and his heirs forever; and in case the said John Henry Scott should die
without lawful issue, then to have and hold” it for the use of the heirs of
Lucy Ward, daughter of said Leonard Scott. The grantors in the deed
died; John Henry Scott died, intestate, unmarried, and without heirs;
later Lucy Ward died; and plaintiffs lessors claim as her children and
heirs. Defendant claims by virtue of a patent issued to him on an
escheat warrant taken out by him, claiming that the land escheated to
the state on the death of John Henry Scott without heirs. After the
patent to Matthews, but before this suit was commenced, Price and wife
made a deed, reciting the facts and purpose of the first deed, and grant
ing, bargaining, selling, conveying, and enfeoffing to plaintiff’s lessors.
ARCHER, J.—It is contended by the appellant, that the deed from
Scott and wife to Price is a deed of feoffment; and as such, the legal
title of the property vested by the statute of uses in Jqhn Henry Scott
in fee; that the remainder over, as being too remote, was void, and that
upon the death of John Henry Scott without heirs, the property of
course became liable to escheat.
If by the words of the deed and the intention of the parties we could
construe this as a deed of feoifment, there would arise no objection to
such a result, from an absence of evidence of livery of seisin. The
ancient law on the subject of feofiments, which demanded livery of seisin
to give them efficacy, we consider as having been abolished, and that
now enrollment takes the place of livery and is equivalent to it. The
act of 1766 provided for the enrollment of, deeds of feofiment, as well
as other deeds, and the act of 1715 declared that livery should not be
necessary where the deed was enrolled. (*-449)
* * *
If this be a deed of bargain and sale, as we think it is, then the use
was executed in the bargainee, and the limitations to use are merely
trusts in chancery, and the cestui que trusts are seised only of an equi
table estate, and the question has been discussed whether such an estate is
liable in this state to escheat. The case of Burgess v. Wheat, 1 Eden 177,
1 Wm. Bl. 123, may be considered as having settled the English rule on
this subject, though much dissatisfaction (*450) has at various times
been expressed at the decision. That the death of the cestui que trust,
without heirs, did not operate as a forfeiture to the lord was founded on
the feudal idea of tenure, the trustee being in esse, and being the legal
seisinof the land, was the tenant possessing capacities to perform the feudal
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services; as against him the king possessed no equity. Judge Tucker, in
3 Leigh 518, in speaking of Burgess v. Wheat, says, there can be nothing
more unreasonable than this decision of Burgess V. Wheat, if we consider
it in any other light than as a mere question of tenure; that the trustee
should be permitted upon the death of the beneficial owner without heirs,
to hold the estate to his own use, is utterly at variance not only with the
principles of equity, which consider him a mere machine, an instrument, a
conduit, * * * but it seems to me at variance with the natural justice
of the case. It is right and proper, that, when the owner of property dies
without giving it away, and without leaving any objects having natural
claim to his bounty, such as heirs or next ‘of kin, his prosperity should
go to the community of which he is a member. The ground upon which
the English rule on this subject can alone be maintained, and upon
which it was established, is on the principle of tenure; and it becomes
therefore important to inquire, whether the doctrine of that case would
be supported in this state upon the same ground.
The lord proprietary, by the express terms of the charter, held his
lands in free and common socage, and his grantees, or tenants, anterior
to the revolution held by the same tenure. Service of a feudal character,
or of the nature of feudal services, were attached to his grants; and the
incidents of fealty, rent, escheat, and fines for alienation or some
of them, were the necessary incidents thereto. At the revolution, when
the people of the state assumed the powers of government, and the right
theretofore existing in the proprietary, these services and incidents were
in effect abolished; thus the oath of allegiance to the state superseded
the incidents of fealty; quit rents were abolished, and grants were made
without being subject to fine on the alienation of the grantee; and
escheats, though they existed, had essentially changed their nature, no
longer being technically founded on the same principles. Instead of
going to the lord of the fee, who took the land in lieu of the services,
because by the death of the tenant without his heirs there was no one
to perform the feudal services; they reverted to the state as property
without an owner, upon a principle of justice, that the whole community
should hold the direlict property for the benefit of all. After the revo
lution, therefore, lands became allodial, subject to no tenure, nor to any
of the services incident thereto; and if allodial, the supreme power of
the state would succeed to them as the king would succeed to allodial
property in England by the common law, upon the death of the owner
without next of kin. It was said by Lord Mansfield, in 1 Wm. Bl. 163-4,
“In personal estates which are allodial by law, the king is the last heir
where no kin, and the king is as well entitled to that as to any other
personal estate.” * * _
* In analogy, therefore, to the admitted condi
tion of allodial property, and in conformity to the reason and justice of
the thing, when the owner of real estate dies without heir, the state is
ultimus haeres, and takes the property for the benefit of all. * * *
[Here the court discusses the state statutes regulating escheat, and holds
them to apply to equitable interests.]
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If these views be correct, and we think they are, the land held in trust
in this case was liable to escheat. Matthews having taken out an
escheat warrant, and procured a patent thereon, the next inquiry is,
whether it gave him the legal title; and it is insisted that it did, in
virtue of the statute of 1 Rich. 3, c. 1. This statute was confined by its
terms to uses. _ It may therefore be doubted whether it applies to modern
trusts, and_1t is questionable whether it is in force in this state. Cases
coming as it would appear within the terms of the statute, if it applies
at all to trusts, have been excluded. Thus it has (*455) been held, that
this statute does not apply to the trusts of a term. [Goodtitle d. Jones
V. Jones], 7 Term 47.
_So it has been held, that a feoifment by a cestui
que trust of a term, without the consent of the legal termor, does not
destroy the term. Doe ea; dem. Maddock V. Lynes, 3 Barn & Cres. 388.
The universal practice never to rely on the conveyance of the cestui qua
trust for passing the legal title, but to require the conveyance of the trus
tee for that purpose, which practice is admitted to exist, in Cornish on
Uses, 33, is very strong to
’ show that the statute of 1 Rich, 3, c. 1, does not
apply to trusts; for if it did apply to trusts, then the cestui qua trust could
convey the legal title, and the concurrence of the trustee would be wholly
unnecessary.
* * * We are therefore of opinion that the plaintiff
is entitled to recover at law, and that the remedy of the defendant is
in equity.
Judgment ajfirmed.
VAN RENSSELAER v. HAYS, in New York Ct. of App., March, 1859.-—
19 N. Y. 68-99.
‘
Action for rent 16 years arrear under a deed made Feb. 15, 1796 by
plaintiffs father and devisor in consideration of 5s., and the yearly rents
covenants and conditions contained in the deed, which bargained and
sold,‘ released and confirmed, 274 acres to Jacob Dietz (defendant’s
grantor) his heirs and assigns, “yielding and paying therefor yearly and
every year” to the grantor his heirs and assigns the yearly rent of 30
bushels of good wheat, four fat fowls, and a day’s service with carriage and
horses. The grantee covenanted for himself his heirs and assigns to pay
&c. At the close of the trial the court found these facts, and that the proper
portion of the rent and interest for the portion of the granted premises
held by defendant was $485.07, for which he directed judgment for
plaintiff. This judgment was afiirmed by the general term and defendant
appealed here.
DENIO, J. The defendant’s position is, that the covenant for the pay
ment of the rent is
, in law, personal between the grantor and grantee,
or what is sometimes called in the books a covenant in gross, and,
consequently, that after the death of the original parties, no action to
recover rent can be maintained in favor of or against any persons ex
cept their respective executors or administrators. As the law contem
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plates that the estatesO of deceased persons shall be speedily settled,
and in the natural course of things the personal representatives of a
man disappear with the generation to which they belong, the intention
of the parties to the indenture to create a perpetual rent issuing out
of the premises will, if that position can be maintained, be entirely dis
appointed; and the argument is
,
in effect, that the law does not permit
arrangements by which [*71] a rent shall be reserved upon a conveyance
in fee, and that where it is attempted the reservation does not affect
the title to the land, but the conveyance is absolute and unconditional.
The design of the parties to create relations which should survive them,
and continue to exist in perpetuity by being annexed to the ownership
of the estate of the grantee of the land on the one hand, and of the
rent on the other, is manifest from the language of the instrument.
They were careful to declare that the obligation to pay the rent should
attach to those who should succeed the grantee as his heirs and assigns,
and should run in favor of_the heirs and assigns of the grantor; and
the nature of a perpetually recurring payment requires that there should
be an endless succession of parties to receive and to pay it. We have
a legislative declaration, in an act of 1805, passed about ten years after
this conveyance, that grants in fee reserving rents had then long been
in use in this state (Ch. 98); and the design of the legislature by
that enactment was, not only to render such grants thereafter available
according to their intention, but to resolve, in favor of such transactions,
the doubts which it is recited had been entertained respecting their
validity. Still, if, by a stubborn principle of law, a burden in the
form of an annual payment cannot be attached to the ownership of land
held in fee simple, or if the right to enforce such payment cannot be
made transferable by the party in whom it is vested, effect must be
given to the rule, though it may have been unknown to the parties
and to the legislature; unless indeed the interposition of the latter
by the statute which has been mentioned, can lawfully operate retro
spectively upon the conveyance under consideration. It is not denied
but that, by the early common law of England, conveyances in all
respects like the present would have created the precise rights and
obligations claimed by the plaintiff; but it is insisted that the act re
specting tenures, called the statute of quia_ emptores, enacted in the
eighteenth year of King Edward I, and which has been adopted in
this country, rendered such transactions no longer possible. The prin
ciples of that statute have, in my opinion, always been the law of this
[*72] country, as well during its colonial condition as after it became an
independent State. A little attention to the pre-existing state of the
law will show that this must necessarily have been so. In the early
vigor of the feudal system, a tenant in fee could not alienate the fued
without the consent of his immediate superior; but this extreme rigor
was soon afterwards relaxed, and it was also avoided by the practice
of subinfeudation, which consisted in the tenant enfeofiing another to
hold of himself by fealty and such services as might be reserved by
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the act of feoffment. Thus a new tenure was created upon every
alienation; and thence there arose a series of lords of the same lands,
the first, called the chief lords, holding immediately of the sovereign:
the next grade holding of them; and so on, each alienation creating
another lord and another tenant. This practice was considered detri
mental to the great lords, as it deprived them, to a certain extent, of
the fruits of the tenure, such as escheats, marriages, wardships, and
the like, which, when due from the terre-tenants, accrued to the next
immediate superior. This was attempted to be remedied byithe 32d
chapter of the Great Charter of Henry III (A. D. 1225), which de
clared that no freeman should thenceforth give or sell any more of
his land, but so that of the residue of the lands the lord of the fee
might have the service due to him which belonged to the fee. 1 Ruf
head’s Statutes at Large, 8. The next important change was the stat
ute of quid emptores, enacted in 1290, which, after reciting that “for
asmuch as purchasers of lands and tenements (quid eniptores terrarum
et tenementorum), of the fees of great men and other lords had many
times entered into their fees to the prejudice of the lords,” to be holden
of the feofiors and not of the chief lords, by means of which these
chief lords many times lost their escheats, etc., “which thing seemed
very hard and extreme unto these lords and other great men,” etc.,
enacted that from henceforth it should be lawful for every freeman
to sell at his own pleasure his lands and tenements, or part of them,
so that the feoffee should hold the same lands and tenements of the
chief lord of the same fee by such services and customs as his feoffer held
[*73] before. (Id. 122.) The effect of this important enactment was,
that thenceforth no new tenure of lands which had already been granted
by the sovereign could be created. Every subsequent alienation placed
the feofiee in the same feudal relation which his feoffer before occupied;
that is, he held of the same superior lord by the same services, and not
of his feoffor. The system of tenures then existing was left untouched,
but the progress of expansion under the practice of subinfeudation was
arrested. Our ancestors, in emigrating to this country, brought with
them such parts of the common law and such of the English statutes
as were of a general nature and applicable to their situation 1 Kent, 473,
and cases cited in note a to the 5th ed.; Bogardus V. Trinity Church,
4 Paige, 178; and when the first constitution of this state came to
be framed, all such parts of the common law of England and of Great
Britain and of the acts of the colonial legislature as together formed
the law of the colony at the breaking out of the revolution, were
declared to be the law of this state, subject, of course, to alteration
by the legislature. Art. 35. The law as to holding lands and of
transmitting the title thereto from one subject to another must have
been a matter of the first importance in our colonial state; and there
can be no doubt but that the great body of the English law upon that
subject, so far as it regarded the transactions of private individuals,
immediately became the law of the colony, subject to such changes as
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were introduced by colonial legislation. The lands were holden
under grants from the crown, and as the king was not within the
statute quia emptores, a.certain tenure, which, after the act of 12
Charles II, ch. 24 abolishing military tenures, must have been that of
free and-common socage, was created as between the king and his
grantee. I have_ elsewhere expressed the opinion that the king might,
notwithstanding the statute against subinfeudation, grant to his im
mediate tenant the right to alien his land to be holden of himself, and
thus create a‘ manor, where the land was not in tenure prior to the
18th Edward I. The People V. Van Rensselaer, 5 Seld., 334. But with
the exception of the tenure arising upon royal grants, [*74] and such
as might be created by the king’s immediate grantees under express
license from the crown, I am of opinion that the law forbidding the
creating of new tenants by means of subinfudation was always the law
of the colony, and that it was the law of this state, as well before
as after the passage of our act concerning tenures, in 1787. A con
trary theory would'lead to the most absurd conclusions. We should
have to hold that the feudal system, during the whole colonial period,
and for the first ten years of the state government, existed here in
a condition of vigor which had been unknown in England for more
than three centuries before the first settlements of this country. We
should be obliged to resolve questions arising upon early conveyances,
under which many titles are still held, by the law which prevailed in
England during the first two centuries after the Conquest, before the
commencement of the Year Books, and long before Littleton wrote his
Treatise upon Tenures.
The fact that the statute we are considering was re-enacted in this
State in 1787, has no tendency to show that it had not the force of
law prior to that time. Indeed, the contrary inference is nearly irre
sistible, when it is seen how it came to be re-enacted. The compilation
of statutes prepared by Jones and Varick, and enacted by the legisla
ture, embracing the statute of tenures and a great number of other
English statutes was made in pursuance of an act passed in 1786. It
recited the constitutional provision which I have mentioned, and that
such of the said statutes “as had been generally supposed to extend
to the late colony and to this state, were contained in a great num
ber of volumes, and were conceived in a style and language improper
to appear in the statute books of this state. The persons mentioned
were, therefore, authorized to collect and reduce them into proper form,
in order that such of them as were approved might be enacted into
laws of this state, to the intent that thereafter none of the statutes
of England or Great Britain should be in force here. 1 Jones & Var.,
ch. 35, 281. The statute of tenures was not, therefore, understood as
introducing a new law, but wasOthe putting into a more [* 75] suitable
form certain enactments which it was conceived had the force of law
in the colony, and which the constitution had made a part of the law of
the state. My views upon this question correspond with those expressed
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by Mr. Justice Platt, in 18 Johnson, 186. The English crown lawyers
appear never to have doubted but that the statute was the law of the
colonies. Sir John Somers, attorney-general, and afterwards lord
keeper of the great seal in the reign of William III, and who is pro
nounced by Macaulay to have been, in some respects, the greatest man
of his age, together with the solicitor-general, Trevor, gave a written
opinion to the king in council, that all the lands in Virginia were held
immediately of the crown, and that the escheats and tenure accrued
to him and not to the grantors of the lands. The like opinion was
given by Sir Edward Northey, attorney-general to Queen Anne, in
1705, in respect to lands in New Jersey. He said that the grantees
of the proprietors to whom the Duke of York had assigned his patent,
held of the queen and not of these proprietors; and in another opinion,
by the same law oflicer, respecting quit-rents in the colony of New
York, he states that no tenure arose upon grants by the Duke of York
before he came to the crown, he being a subject; but that where the
grant was by the crown there was a tenure, “the crown not being
within the statute of quia emptores terrarum.” Chalmers Colonial
Opinions, 142, 144, 149.
O
These opinions assume that the statute prevailed here to the same
extent as in England, and subject to the same exception in favor of
royal grants, upon which a tenure always arises. Judge Ruggles, in
giving the opinion of the court in DePe-yster V. Michael, 2 Seld. 467,
was led to doubt whether the statute was ever in force in the colonies,
from finding that several patents, issued by the colonial governors, pur
ported to create manors and to authorize the patentees to grant lands
to be holden of the patentees. But if the king could, notwithstanding
the statute, license his immediate tenants to create seigniories, as was
attempted to be shown by one of the opinions in The People V. Van
Rensselaer, and is as I am satisfied is the case, these [*76] instruments
are quite consistent with the idea that the statute was in force in the
colony of New York. Assuming this to have been so, our own law,
in the particular under consideration, is and has at all times, since
the organization of political society here, been the same as the law of
England.
We are then to ascertain the effect of a conveyance in fee reserving
rent, upon the assumption that the statute of quia emptores applies to
such transactions. In the first place, no reversion, in the sense of the
law of tenures, is created in favor of the grantor; and as the right
to distrain is incident to the reversion, and without one it cannot exist
of common right, the relation created by this conveyance did not itself
authorize a distress. The fiction of fealty did not exist. The rent in
terms reserved was not a rent-service. Litt., §§ 214, 215. It was, how
ever, a valid rent-charge. According to the language of Littleton, “if
a man, by deed indented at this day, maketh a feoffment in fee, and
by the same indenture reserveth to him and to his heirs a certain rent,
and that if the rent be behind it shall be lawful for him and his heirs
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to distrain, etc., such a rent is a rent-charge, because such lands or
tenements are charged with such distress by force of the writing only,
and not of common right.” Id., §§ 217, 218. And the law is the same
where the conveyance is by deed of bargain and sale under the statute
of uses. Co. Litt., 143, b. Mr. Hargrave, in his note to this part of
the Commentaries, expresses the opinion that a proper fee farm rent
cannot be reserved upon a conveyance in fee, since the statute of quia
emptores; but he concedes that where a conveyance in fee contains a
power to distrain and to re-enter, the rent would be goodJ as a rent
charge.. Note 235 to Co. Litt., 143, b. Blackstone says that upon such
a conveyance the land is liable to distress, not of common right,
but by virtue of the clause in the deed. 2 Bl. Com., 42. The case of
Pluck v. Diggs, 2 Dow & Clark’s Parl. Rep., 180, much relied on by
the defendant, concedes that rent reserved upon a conveyance of the
grantor’s whole estate may be distrained for by virtue of a clause of
distress. That case turned wholly upon a question of [*77] pleading.
The House of Lords held that the Irish statute, corresponding to the
11 George II, ch. 19, § 22, allowing a general avowry, did not extend
to a rent-charge, but was limited to cases of rent-service, and that the
defendant ought in that case to have set out his title. It was for this
reason that the judgment in his favor was reversed. Lord Wynford
said, “it is a dreadful thing to be obliged, for a defect in form, to give
a judgment contrary to the real merits of the case.”
These authorities establish the position that upon the conveyance
under consideration a valid rent was reserved, available to the grantor
by means of the clause of distress. This rent, though not strictly an
estate in the land, Payn v. Beal, 4 Denio, 405, is nevertheless a heredita
ment, and in the absence of a valid alienation by the person in whose
favor it is reserved, it descends to his heirs. Its nature, in respect
to the law of descents, is explained by Lord Coke, who at the same time
points out the distinction between such a rent as we are considering,
and a rent-service reserved upon a feoffment which .created a tenure.
He says that if a man seized of a manor, as heir on the part of his
mother, before the statute of quia emptores, had made a feoffment in
fee of parcel, to hold of him by rent and service, albeit they [the
services] are newly created, yet for that they are parcel of the manor,
they shall, with the rest of the manor, descend to the heir on the part
of the mother. If a man so seized, that is by inheritance from his
mother, maketh [now] a feoffment in fee, reserving a rent to him
and his heirs, this rent shall go to the heirs on the part of the father.
Co. Litt., 12, b. The reason is given in a case in Hobart, thus: “If,
upon a feoffment of lands which I have on the part of the mother,
or in borough English [where the youngest son is the heir] I reserve
a rent to me and to my heirs, it shall go to my heirs at common law,
for it is not within the custom, but it is a new thing divided from the
land itself.” Uounden V. Clerke, 31, b. The distinction is this: A
rent-service, such as arose upon an alienation of a fee at common law,
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was incident to the reversion, and therefore a part of the estate remain
ing in the feoffor [*78] and upon his death it passed in the same chan
nel of descent as the estate would have done if there had been no
alienation. But where there is no reversion, as in the case of a convey
ance in fee since the statute, the rent reserved is an inheritable estate
newly created, and descends according to the general law of inheritance,
to the heirs of the person dying seized, with regard to
_ the heritable
quality of the estate, the conveyance of which formed the consideration
o
f the rent. Preston states the principle thus: “A rent incident to
the reversion will descend with the reversion as a part thereof; but a
rent reserved on a grant in fee, or limited by way of use in a convey
ance to uses, will be descendible as a new purchase from the person
to whom it is reserved or limited.” 3 Essay on Abstract of Title, 54.
Further on he says that in such cases “the instrument amounts to, 1st.
A grant of the land from the owner of the same; and, 2dly. A grant
of the rent on the part of the grantee.” Id., 55. To the same pur
pose see 3 Cruise, 313 (N. Y. ed. of 1834.) The descendible quality
of these rents was early established in this state in the case of The
Executors o
f Van Rensselaer V. The Executors o
f Platner, decided in
the year 1800. The action was for nine years’ rent to May 1, 1783,
reserved upon a grant in fee by the plaintiffs’ testator to the testator
of the defendants, executed in 1774; and it appeared that the testator
of the plaintiffs died on the 22d of February, 1783, seven days before
the last year’s rent sued for became payable. The plaintiffs, however,
recovered the rent for the whole period; and the defendants moved in
arrest of judgment, on the ground that the recovery embraced one
year’s rent which did not belong to them as executors; and the judg
ment was arrested for that reason. Kent, J ., said, it was clear that
the executor could only go for rent due and payable at the testator’s
death, “where the rent, as in the present case, goes, on the testator’s
death, to his heirs.” 2 John. Ca., 17. There can be no pretense that
the court considered the rent to be a rent-service, on the notion that
the statute of qui emptores had not been enacted in this state when
the deed was executed; for in the next case in the book, which [*79]
was an action for subsequent rent on the same conveyance, and was
decided at the same time, it was expressly declared to be “a fee farm
rent, or rent-charge.” If the annual payments provided for in these
conveyances were merely sums in gross secured by personal covenants,
the action would have been rightly brought by the executors for the last
year’s rent, though it fell due after the testator’s death. The contract,
upon that theory, would have been of the same character as a bond
for the payment of moneys by annual installments in perpetuity, in
which case, if we can conceive of such a security, the personal repre
sentatives of the obligees would have been the proper parties to bring
the action, whether the payments sought to be recovered matured before
or after the testator’s death. It was only upon the assumption that
the right to the rent reserved was a heritable estate, which, so far as it
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had not become payable at his death, descended to the heirs of the
grantor, that the judgment can be sustained. The case was argued by
eminent counsel—the late Ambrose Spencer, and James Emmot—and
appears to have received full consideration; three of the judges deliver
ing opinions. It may therefore be considered an authoritative prece
dent for the doctrine that rents of the character of these we are con
sidering are heritable estates, descending to the heirs of those in whose
favor they are reserved.
But the plaintiff in this case sues as devisee of the grantor, and
must establish the position that he is entitled, in that character, to
sue upon the covenant. In England, it is perhaps a debatable question
at this day, whether the assignee of the grantor can maintain the ac
tion. In Brewster v. Kidgill, 12 Mod., 166, Holt, Ch. J ., said he made
no doubt but that the assignee of the rent should have covenanted
against the grantor, “because,” he said, “it is a covenant annexed to the
thing granted.” It was the case of a rent-charge in Ifee, granted by
the owner of the lands out of which it issued, with a covenant to pay
it. In Milnes V. Branch, 5 Maule & Sel., 411, Lord Ellenborough, Ch.J ., stated that he was inclined to think that the language of Lord Holt,
in this respect, was [*80] extra-judicial ; and putting aside that dictum,
he said he did not find any authority to warrant the position that such
a covenant ran with the rent. There are several other English cases
bearing more or less directly upon the question, which it is unneces
sary particularly to notice, since they have all been examined by Sir
Edward Sugden, in a late edition of his Treatise on the Law of Ven
dors and Purchasers. His conclusion is, that there appears to be no
foundation for shaking Lord Holt’s opinion. The rent-charge, he says,
is an incorporeal hereditament, and issues out of the land, and the
land is bound by it. The covenant, therefore, he adds, may well run
with the rent in the hands of an assignee; the nature of the subject,
which savors of the realty, altogether distinguishes the case from a
matter merely personal. Vol. 2, p. 482, W. Brookfield ed. of 1843.
The great learning of the author—afterwards as Lord St. Leonards,
Lord Chancellor of England—would incline me to adopt his conclu
sion, were it not that we have a precedent the other way in this State.
In The Devisees of Van Rensselaer V. The Executors of Platner, 2 John.
Ca., 26, to which I have already briefly alluded, the plaintiffs made
title to the rent under the will of the grantor of the land, and the
defendants were the executors of the grantee, the grantor of the rent
charge. It was held—Lansing, Ch. J ., giving the opinion—that the
action could not be sustained. The statute 32 Henry VIII, chapter 34,
which had been re-enacted in this state, -it was said did not apply,
as it was limited, as appeared by the preamble, to cases of grants for
life or years, where there was a reversion; and, moreover, by the com
mon law, such covenants did not pass to the assignee of the covenantee.
It was intimated that the difiiculty might not have existed if the action
had been against the owner of the land charged with the rent, as the
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assignee of the original grantee, instead of his executors; for, as it was
suggested, the common ligament—the estate charged—would have
united them in interest as privies. But I do not see that this would
have helped the plaintiffs. The defendants, as executors of Platner,
the covenantor, were liable to an action upon his express covenant,
[*81] at the suit of any one entitled to prosecute upon it
,
and if the
plaintiffs, the devisees, were entitled to avail themselves of the covenant
they could do so, as it seems to me, against any party chargeable upon
it
,
whether the covenantor himself, his personal representatives, or
those who represented him as privies. The question was not whether
the defendants were liable to be sued on the express covenant, for they
clearly were, whether it ran with the land or not. But the doubt was
whether the plaintiffs so represented the original covenantee as to be
able to sue on the contract made to him; and this depended on the
question whether the covenant ran with the rent; and it was held that
it did not. It':was probably in consequence of this decision that the
act of 1805 was passed; and assuming that this case was correctly
decided, the present question must turn upon the effect of that statute.
It seems to have been considered that at common law the assignee
of a reversion expectant upon an estate for life or years could not
maintain an action upon the covenants of his lessee, though such cove
nants ran with his estate. It is so expressly recited in the preamble
to the statute 32 Henry VIII, already mentioned, though it was not
universallly true. Vyvyan V. Arthur, 1 Barn. & Cress, 410; 2 Sugd.,
468. During the reign of that sovereign the charters and estates of
the monasteries, chantries and other religious houses were, by the
coercion of the government, surrendered to the king, or came to his
hands by force of the statutes made for the suppression of these estab
lishments; and the lands were, for the most part, granted by him to
individual subjects. The estates being out on terms for life or years,
there was, upon the assumption of the preamble, no person in existence
by whom an action could be maintained on the covenants in the lease.
After the recital of this matter, the statute proceeds to give an action
upon the covenants, not only to the patentees of the king of the estates
of the religious houses and their heirs and assigns, but to all others
being grantees or assignees of “any other person or persons than the
king’s highness,” and their heirs and assigns. A second section gave
the like remedies by the grantees and their assigns [*82] against the
assignees of the grantors. 2 Stat. at Large, 294. Although the statute
was made to meet a special occasion, which mainly interested the pur
chasers of the confiscated property of the church, the language which
extended its operation to other grantees of reversions, introduced a
valuable amendment into the law of property. When the commis
sioners under our act of 1786 came to report as to the English statutes
suitable to be re-enacted, the act respecting the grantees of reversions
was selected for that purpose, and was re-enacted in 1788, with certain
changes of language——dropping out the reference to the religious
TENURES. 17
houses, and substituting the people of this state for the crown of
England—but retaining the words which adapted it to the case of the
grantees of private persons. 2 Jones & Var., 184. It stood in this
form when the conveyance to Dietz was executed in 1796, and had
not then, as I conceive, any operation upon covenants in conveyances
in fee. The opinion of Sir Edward Sugden, that such covenants as
last mentioned ran with the rent, was not based upon the 32 Henry
VIII, which was admitted to be inapplicable, but upon what was con
sidered the true theory and legal effect of such covenants.
. But while Van Rensselaer, the grantor in the indenture under con
sideration, remained the owner of the rents reserved, and no assignee
of those rents had intervened, the act of 1805 was enacted, by which
it was declared that all the provisions of the act concerning grantees
of reversions, passed in 1788, and the remedies thereby given, should
be construed to extend as well to leases in fee reserving rents as to
leases for life or years. (Ch. 98.) In the subsequent revision of the
statutes, this amendment has been. added as an additional section to the
substance of the act of 1788. 1 R. L., 364, § 3; 1 R. S., 748, § 25.
As the Revised Statutes of 1830 contained the enactment in force when
this grantor died, it will be useful to give the precise language of the
23d section of the title referred to. It is as follows: “The grantees
of any demised lands, tenements, rents or other hereditaments, or of
the reversion thereof, the assignees of the lessor of any demise, and
the heirs and [*83] personal representatives of the lessor, grantee or
assignee, shall have the same remedies by entry, action, distress or other
wise, for the non-performance of any agreement contained in the lease
so assigned, or for the recovery of any rent, or for the doing of any
waste or other cause of forfeiture as their grantor or lessor had, or
might have had if such reversion had remained in such lessor or
grantor.” 1 R. S., 747. This provision is
,
as I have stated, by force
of the 25th section, to extend as well to grants or leases in fee reserving
rents as to leases for life or for years. Thus it appears that the gran
tees of demised lands, and the grantees of rents, and the grantees of
the reversion of demised lands, are to have the same remedies which the
grantors or lessors would have been entitled to if no change in their
title had taken place, and that grants in fee with a reservation of rent
are to be considered as within the provision. Reading the language
in connection, the enactment in terms is
,
that the grantee of rents
reserved upon grants in fee shall have the same remedy which his
grantor had. Applying the statute to this case, the provision is that
the plaintiff shall be entitled to the same remedy which Stephen Van
Rensselaer, the Patroon, would have had if he were alive and were now
suing. It is added—“if such reversion had remained in such grantor;”
and it is argued that as Mr. Van Rensselaer never had a reversion
the provision does not apply. But it applies in express terms to reserva
tions of rents upon conveyances in fee, and in such cases I concede that
there can be no reversion; and it applies equally to rents upon leases,
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for life and for years, where there is a proper reversion. Now, the
qualification which alludes to the reversion may well be taken distribu
tively and be confined to the cases within the provision where a rever
sion existed, reddendo singula singulis. It should be applied, in further
ance of the intention, to the subject-matter to which it appears by the
context most properly to relate. 2 Dwar. on Stat, 617. But independ
ently of this answer, the Legislature had the right to consider the
interest of a grantor in fee reserving rent, as a reversion pro hac vice,
if it thought proper to do so; though by the general [*84] rules of law
lt would not be called by that name. The intent to embrace within
the purview of the enactment a rent reserved upon a grant in fee is
plain and certain; and effect must be given to that intent, though
some of the language should seem to be incongruous.
Two positions were taken at the bar to avoid the effect of this stat
ute upon the case. In the first place, it was assumed that before the
passage of our statute of tenures, a reversion did arise upon a grant of
lands in fee, and that the act of 180.5 should be understood as limited
to conveyances executed prior to 1787, and as having, therefore, no effect
upon the present case. It was in part to furnish an answer to that
suggestion that I have taken pains to show that there was never a
period in this state when conveyances between individuals created a
tenure, except in the special cases of a grant from the crown of a
power to erect a manor. But without reference to that principle, I
am unable to find anything in the statute which countenances the
distinction contended for. The act of 1805, which first brought grants
in fee reserving rents within the remedies of the 32 Henry VIII, chapter
34, recited, as the motive for the enactment, that such grants had long
been in use in this state. The argument supposes that it was intended
to give effect to such only as had been executed in colonial times and
during the first eleven years of the state government. If such were
the intention, it is inconceivable that some idea of the kind was not
expressed. The language used certainly conveys the understanding that
such transactions had been in use up to the time when the legislature
was speaking. I am of opinion that the legislature considered such
conveyances lawful contracts, and intended to render them effectual in
the hands of those to whom they should be transferred equally as when
they belonged to the original parties to whom the rents were reserved,
without regard to the time when the grants were made.
The other answer given to the statute is
,
that these grants in fee
were within the protection of the provision of the Constitution of the
United States which forbids the state [*85] governments to pass
any law impairing the obligation of contracts. But this statute has no
such effect. The parties bound to pay these rents were liable, inde
pendently of the statute, to an action at the suit of the grantor of the
conveyances and of his heirs in perpetuity. Upon the failure of heirs,
the state would take them as an escheat. If it be admitted that they
were not assignable before the statute, so as to give the assignee an
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action in his own name, they were, like other choses in action arising
upon contract, assignable in equity; and if the statute had not been
passed, the assignee could have prosecuted in the name of the grantor
or his heirs for the benefit of the equitable owner. In making them
assignable at law and giving the assignee an action in his own name,
the legislature acted only upon the remedy, which all the cases agree
it was competent for it to do. The same thing in efiect was done by
the Code of Procedure in abolishing the distinction between legal and
equitable remedies, and requiring all actions to be brought in the name
of the real party in interest. 69, 111.)
'
There are several precedents of actions of covenant to recover rents
of the kind in question, by parties claiming by devise or assignment
from the party in whose favor the rent was reserved. Watts V. Cojfin,
11 John., 495, A. D. 1814, was an action for rent reserved upon a
conveyance of land in fee, brought by the assignee of the grantor by
virtue of several mesne conveyances, against the assignee of the grantee,
and a verdict, subject to the opinion of the court, was sustained. Van
Rensselaer V. Bradley, 3 Denio, 135, A. D. 1846, was a like action for
rent on the covenants in a similar conveyance by the devisee of the
grantor, against an assignee of the grantee; and the plaintiff prevailed.
Van Rensselaer V Jones, 5 Denio, 449, A. D. 1848, was another case of
precisely the same character, where the plaintiff had judgment.
Ejectrnent is a remedy given by statute for the recovery of rent.
Stat. 4 Geo. II, ch. 28, § 2; 2 Jones & Var., Laws of N. Y., 238, § 23;
1 K. & R. 134, § 23; 1 R. L., 1813, 440, § 23; 2 R. S. 505, § 30.
The statutes prescribe that it may be brought in cases between landlord
and tenant, where there is [*86] rent in arrear for which no distress can
be found, and the landlord has a subsisting right to re-enter. When we
consider that, at common law, conditions subsequent could only be re
served for the benefit of the grantor and his heirs, and that a stranger
could not take advantage of a breach of them (4 Kent’s Com.. 127;
Litt., § 347 and Coke’s Com. thereon; Nicholl V. The N. Y. and Erie
R. R. Co., 2 Kern. 121), and that the only change which_this principle
has undergone was that wrought by the act of 1805 and its subsequent
reenactment, the cases in which the devisee or grantee of one who
has conveyed in fee, reserving rent with a clause of re-entry, has sus
tained ejectment for non-payment of that rent, are in point to show
the construction which has been given to that act upon the point under
consideration. Such cases have frequently occurred in this state and
many have been reported. In the following cases the action was prose
cuted by the devisee or grantee of the original grantor. It could only be
sustained by virtue of the statute, and yet no objection to the plaintiff’s
title was made. In two of the cases the plaintiff prevailed, and in the
others he was defeated upon grounds not material here. Jackson v.
Collins, 11 John. 1, A. D. 1814; Van Rensselaer V. Jewett, 5 Denio. 121;
The same v. Hayes, id., 477; The same V. Snyder, in the Court of Appeals,
3 Kern. 299.
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We have come to the conclusion that the covenant of Dietz was one
upon which the plaintiff, as the devisee of Van Rensselaer, has a right
to sue any one upon whom that covenant was binding. We do not de
termine whether this would or would not have been so at the common
law, but we place the decision upon the effect of the act of 1805, which,
in our opinion, precisely meets the case. * * *
It is argued by the defendant’s counsel that a reversion in the grantor
is essential to enable an obligation to pay rent to attach to any one
except the party originally bound to pay it
,
or to enure to the benefit
of any one deriving title from the party in whose favor it was reserved;
and the want of a reversion in Van Rensselaer is the circumstance which
is [F99] supposed to create the difficulty under which the plaintiff labors.
But there are several cases in hostility to this doctrine. In McMurphy
v. Minot, 4 N. H. 251, the plaintiff, tenant for life, demised the
premises to the owner of the reversion, reserving an annual rent, which
the latter covenanted to pay, and afterwards conveyed the premises
to another, under whom the defendant entered. The action was cove
nant-for rent in arrear, and it was urged that the lessee, being seised
of the whole estate in fee simple, his covenant to pay the rent could
not be enforced against his grantee; but it was held that a reversion
in the plaintifi was not essential, and the plaintiff had judgment. It
is settled, by a series of adjudications in England and in this country,
that if one possessed of a term for years demise it
,
reserving rent, and
afterwards assign the rent, the assignee may maintain debt for the
rent against lessee. Allen v. Bryan, 5 Barn & Cress., 512; De
marest V. Willard, 8 Cow., 206; Willard V. Tillman, 2 Hill, 274; Childs
V. Clark, 3 Barb. Ch. 52; Kendall V. Carland, 5 Cush., 74.
The result of the examination which we have given to this case is,
that these covenants are available in favor of the plaintiff; and that the
defendant, as the owner under Dietz of a portion of the land granted,
is liable in this action for a breach of them: and we, therefore, affirm
the judgment of the Supreme Court.
JOHNSON, Ch. J ., COMSTOOK, GRAY and Gaovna, Js., concurred;
SELnoN and STRONG, Js., delivered opinions in favor of affirming the
judgment upon grounds differing, in some respects, from those adopted
by the court; ALLEN, J ., being interested in the question, took no part
in the decision.
Judgment affirmed.
MICHIGAN STATUTE, R. S. 1846 c. 66, § 31; C. L. 1857, § 2804; C. L. 1871,
§ 4301; How Ann. St. 1883; § 5771; C. L. 1897; § 9254.
Every person in possession of land, out of which any rent is due,
whether it was originally demised in fee, or for any other estate of free
hold, or for any term of years, shall be liable for the amount or proportion
of rent due from the land in his possession, althoughit be only a part of
what was originally demised.
CHAPTER II.
ESTATES OF INHERITANCE.
Classified and Defined.
BRACTON, Llber 1, c. 6, I0. 17.——A. D. 1256? (1240-1267)
7
[Classification of Fees.] There is another division of donations, for
instance, one is simple and absolute, another is conditional, another is
modified, made to one person or to several successively.
[Fee Simple] It may be termed simple and absolute, when there is
no condition or mode attached to it
,
for it may be said to be given
simply whatever is given with nothing added to. As if it should be said,
I give to such a person so much land in such a vill for his homage and
service, to have and to hold to such a one, and to his heirs, of me and
of my heirs, rendering thence annually, himself and his heirs to me and
my heirs, so much for such terms, for all service and secular custom
and demand, so that the thing may be certain which is given, and the
services certain, and the customs which are due to the lord, although
the other things are uncertain, which are tacitly remitted, and I and
my heirs shall warrant, acquit, and defend forever so-and-so aforesaid
and his heirs, against all persons, through the aforesaid service. And
so thedonatory acquires the thing given by reason of the donation, and
his heirs after him by reason of their succession, and the heir acquires
nothing from the gift made to his ancestor, because he is not enfeoffed
with the donatory. And by the expression, to so-and-so and his heirs
(the word heirs being taken in a wide sense) all heirs are contained as
well near as remote, as well present as future; but nevertheless one of
them, or several who are equivalent to one, and the nearer are preferred
to the more remote, as will be explained hereafter on the subject of
successions.
[Modified Fees—Heirs and Assigns] Likewise, he may increase the
donations and make, as it were, heirs, although in truth they are not
heirs. As if he should say in the donation, to have and to hold to such
an one and his heirs, or to him to whom he shall wish to give or assign
the land; and I and my heirs will warrant to the same so-and-so and his
heirs, or to him to whom he shall wish to give or assign that land, and
to their heirs, against all persons. In which case, if the donatory has
given or assigned that land, if the donatory and his heirs fail, the donor
and his heirs will begin to take the place of the donatory and his heirs,
(21)
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and the donatories will take the place of heirs as far as regards the
warranty to be made to the assigns and his heirs, through the clause con
tained in the deed of the first donor; which would not be the case unless
mention had been made of assigns in the first donation. But as long
as the first donatory or his heirs survive, they are themselves bound to
the warranty and not the first donor.
[Same—Rest1'icted to Special Heirs—Fee Conditional at Common
Law.] Likewise, as heirs may be enlarged in number, as has been afore
said, so they may be narrowed in number by the mode of the donation,
whereby all the heirs are not called generally to the succession. For a
mode sets law to the donation, and a mode is to be upheld against the
common right and against the [general] law, for a mode and an agree
ment must prevail against the [general] law. As if it should be said:
I give to so-and-so that land, with its appurtenances, in N, to have
and to hold to him and to his heirs, whom he shall have procreated from
himself or his espoused wife. Or thus: I give to so-and-so and so-and-so
his wife (or with so-and-so my daughter &c.) to have and to hold to
himself and to his heirs, issuing or procreated or to be procreated, of
the flesh of such wife (or daughter); in which case, if (since certain
heirs are expressed in the donation) it can be seen that the descent is
only made to their common heirs according to the mode appointed in
the donation, all other his heirs being excluded altogether from the
succession, because the donor so willed. Whence if heirs of this kind are
procreated, they only are called to the inheritance; and if a person so
enfeofied has further enfeoffed some person, he holds the enfeofiment;
and his [the first feofEee’s] heirs are held to the warranty since they
can claim nothing except from the succession and the descent of parents;
although it appears to some that they were themselves enfeoffed at the
same time with their parents, which is not true. But if he shall have
no heirs, that land shall revert to the donor, through a tacit condition,
even if there be no mention made in the donation that it should return,
or if express mention has been made in the donation. And so it will
happen, if there have been at some time heirs and they have failed.
But in the first case, where there has been no heir, the thing given to
the donatory will always be a free tenement and not a fee. Likewise,
in the second case, until heirs have begun to exist, it is a free tenement;
but when they have begun to exist, the free tenement begins to be a fee;
and when they have ceased to exist it ceases to be a fee, and again begins
to be a free tenement. And so there will never-be an exaction of dower
unless there be an absolute donation, since there is no mention of an
express reservation.
It is to be noted, that a donor may well impose at the beginning from
the commencement of his donation, a law upon the donation, and of his
own will may exonerate the thing given for the advantage of the dona
tory, and contrary to the law of the land; provided this be not done to
the prejudice of others, who are not at all concerned with their contract.
As if a person has given land for a less service than that by which he
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held it from his lord and his feoffor; provided that he can warrant his
act as regards his own service, so that no prejudice shall be worked to
the chief lord, as respects the service due to him.
Words Sufficient to Limit a Fee.
LIT'.l‘LETON’S TENURES, § 1. (Littleton died in A. D. 1482.)
Tenant in fee simple is he who has lands or tenements to hold to him
and his heirs forever; and it is called in Latin feodum simplex, for
feodum is the same that inheritance is
,
and simplex is as much as to say,
lawful or pure. And so feodum simplex signifies a lawful or pure in
heritance. For if a man would purchase lands or tenements in fee sim
ple, it behooves him to have these words in his purchase: To have and
to hold to him and to his heirs; for these words his heirs make the estate
of inheritance. For if a man purchase lands by these words: To have
and to hold to him forever, or by these words:l To have and to hold to
him and his assigns forever—in these two cases he has but an estate for
term of life, for that there lack these words his heirs, which words only
make an estate of inheritance in all feoffments and grants.
ANON., 32 Hen. 8, A. D. 1541—Br00ke Abr. t. “Conscience” 25.
If a man purchased land, and the vendor execute the estate to the
vendee, habendum to him forever without the word heirs where the
intent of the bargain is to pass a fee-simple, and the vendor on request
refuses to make another assurance, there lies a writ of subpoena on the
liberal principles of the English law; and it was conceded by AUDLEY.
chancellor, clearly, in the time of Henry 8, that if a man sold his land
before the statute of uses this would change a use of the fee-simple; and
the same is the law of vendors by indenture under the statute 27 Hen.
8 [c. 10 of uses] withoutthe word heirs; which note well,
ANON, in K. B, 4 Edw. 6.— A. D. 1550—Br0oke’s New Cases pl. 406, Ma1'sh’s
translation, t. Estates, Brooke's Abr. t. Estates 78.
By opinion of the king’s bench, if a man devise his land to W. N.
paying 10l. to the executors, and dies, the devisee has a fee simple, by
reason of the payment, without the words, heirs or in perpetuity, and this
shall be supposed the intention of the devisor. The same is the law if a
man sell his land to W. N. for 201., this shall be intended a sale in fee
simple without the words heirs, for conscience &c., and it is just and
right, which is a ground in every law.
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ESTOFT’S CASE, in C. B., Hilary, 10 Eliz., A. D. 1568—1 And. 45, pl. 114.
Between Estoft and others, it was adjudged that if land was given to
a man and wife and a third person in fee, and the third person releases
to the man all the right he has in the land without these words to him
and his heirs, the man has a fee-simple without words of enlargement.
BALD\VIN v. MARTON, Paschae, 31 Eliz., in Common Pleas.—A. D. 1589
1 And. 223, Abridged.
Trespass for breaking close, on not guilty, and special Verdict. Earl
W., by indenture made a grant of land to Agnes and Anthony Baldwin
(now plaintiff) “and to the heirs of the said Anthony from the date, &c.,
to the end of 99 years, and from 99 years to 99 years, till such time as
300 years be spent and expired,” reserving rent one penny yearly, cove
nanted to be paid, and with covenant to renew the lease at the end of
the 300 years, and without impeachment of said earl or his heirs. After
many arguments and citing many cases similar, it was held to be a lease
for years only and not a fee or freehold.
DICKINS v. MARSHALL, in Queen’s Bench, Trinity, 36 Eliz.—A. D. 1595.—
_ Cro. Eliz., 330.
Toby devised land and goods, after his debts and legacies paid, to R.
and M., his children, equally to be divided between them.
The court resolved that an estate for life only passed; for although the
devise of land and goods are coupled together, and it be a devise forever
of the goods; yet for the land, there being no words to pass the inherit
ance, only an estate for life passes. And although it was objected that
the devise of the land is after his debts and legacies paid, so this is
limited after he has made an end of disposing of anything; and though
it was to his children, of which his heir was one, so that he intended to
give as much to one as to the other; yet the court held, that only an
estate for life passed. POPHAM, C. J ., said he doubted if any land did
pass, in case he had a term for years in any lands, so that the devise of
land shall be supplied.
WHITLOCK v. HARDING, A. D. 1614?-—M00r 873.
One devised his lands for 99 years, and after, by these words: “I give
Agnes, my daughter, all my lands of inheritance, if the law will per
mit.” It was adjudged that Agnes should have the fee simple of the
land before devised for the 99 years, without the words to her heirs,
The words refer to the land and not to the estate in strict construction;
but from the whole the intent appears to pass the inheritance, for the
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estate for life after the 99 years would be of small value, and it cannot
be so understood.
SCEAL v. OXENBRIDGE, in Common Bench, Trinity 12 Jae. I, A. D. 1615.
-—M0or 871..
In waste the plaintifi made title by a certain feofiment to another to
the use of the plaintiff and his heirs, and omitted that he enfeoffed the
other and his heirs; and on view of the precedents the writ was adjudged
good.
MICHIGAN LAWS of 1881, N0. 187. HOW Stat. § 5730, Comp. Laws, 1897,
§ 9016. .
It shall not be necessary to use the words “heirs and assigns of the
grantee” to create in the grantee an estate of inheritance, and if it be
the intention of the grantor to convey any lesser estate, it shall be so
expressed in the deed.
To same effect New York, R. S. 1829. Part II, c. I, Title V, § 1.
Base Fees.
KING ALEXAN])ER’S CASE, 1272-1307—Hargrave’s note 6 to Coke Lit.
27a, 1 Cruise Dig. 24; Hale’s MSS.
King Henry III gave the manor of Penreth and Sourby to Alexander
King of Scots and his heirs kings of Scotland; and Alexander, having
daughters of which one was married to the Earl of Hunt, died not having
any heir king of Scotland; and for this reason King Edward I recovered
seisin, and the coheirs of Alexander were excluded. Lib. Parl. E I, 134,
308.
FIRST UNIVERSALIST SOCIETY OF NORTH ADAMS v. BORLAND, in
Sup. Judicial Ct. of Mass, Jan. 6, 1892—1-55 Mass. 171, 29 At]. 524.
Bill in equity to enforce a contract to purchase land of plaintiff. De
cree for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
ALLEN, J. The limitation over, which is contained in the deed of
Clark to the plaintiff in 1854, is void for remoteness. Wells v. Heath,
10 Gray, 17, 25, 26. Brattle Square Church V. Grant, 3 Gray, 142. 152.
The fact that the grantor designated himself as one of the persons
amongst many others to take under this limitation, does not have the
effect to make the _limitation valid. He was to take with the rest, and
stand upon the same footing with them.
Where there is an invalid limitation over, the general rule is that
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the preceding estate is to stand, unatfected by the void limitation.
The estate becomes vested in the first taker, according to the terms in
which it was granted or devised. Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3
Gray, 142, 156, 157. Sears V. Russell, 8 Gray, 86, 100. Fosdick V.
Fosdick, 6 Allen, 41, 43. L0vering v. Worthington, 106 Mass. 86, 88.
Lewis on Perpetuity, V657. There may be instances in which a void
limitation might be referred to for the purpose of giving a construction
to the language used in making the prior gift, provided any aid could be
gained thereby. In the present case, we do not see that any such aid can be
gained. The estate given to the first taker does not depend at all upon
the validity or invalidity of the limitation over, and the construction
of the language used is not aided by a reference thereto.
The grant to the plaintifi was to have and to hold, etc., “so long as
said real estate shall by said society or its assigns be devoted to the uses,
interests, and support of those doctrines of the Christian religion,” as
specified. “And when said real estate shall by said society or its as
signs be diverted from the uses, interests, and support aforesaid to any
other interests, uses, or purposes than as aforesaid, then the title of
said society or its assigns in the same shall forever cease, and be forever
vested in the following named persons,” etc. These words do not grant
an absolute fee,_ nor an estate on condition, but an estate which is to
continue till the happening of a certain event, and then to cease. That
event may happen at any time, or it may never happen. Because the
estate may last forever, it is a fee. Because it may end on the
happening of the event, it is what is usually called a determinable or
qualified fee. The grant was not upon a condition subsequent, and
no re-entry would be necessary; but by the terms of the grant the
estate was to continue so long as the real estate should be devoted to the
specified uses, and when it should no longer be so devoted, then the
estate would cease and determine by its own limitation. Numerous
illustrations of words proper to create such qualified or determinable
fees are to be found in the books, one of which, as old as Wals£ngham’s
Case, 2 Plowd. 557, is “as long as the church of St. Paul shall stand.”
Brattle Square Church V. Grant, 3 Gray, 142, 147; Easterbrooks V.
Tillinghast, 5 Gray, 17; Ashley v. Warner, 11 Gray, 43; Attorneys
General V. Merrimack Manuf. C0., 14 Gray, 586, 612; Fifty Associates
v. Howland, 11 Met. 99, 102; Owen v. Field, 102 Mass. 90, 105; -1
Washb. Real Prop. (3d.) 79; 2 Washb. Real Prop. (3d ed.) 20, 21;
4 Kent Com. 126, 127, 132, note; 2 Crabb, Real Prop. §§ 2135, 2136,
2 Flint. Real Prop. 230, 232; Shep. Touchst. 121, 125.
A question or doubt, however, has arisen, though not urged by counsel
in this case, whether after all there is now any such estate as a qualified
or determinable fee, or whether this form of estate was done away with
by the statute Qurla Emptores. See Gray, Rule against Perpetuities,
§§ 31-40, where the question is discussed and authorities are cited.
We have considered this question, and whatever may be the true solution
of it in England, where the doctrine of tenure still has some significance,
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we think the existence of such an estate as a qualified or determinable
fee must be recognized in this country, and such is the general con
sensus of opinion of courts and text writers. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct
V. Chandler, 9 Allen, 159, 168; Leonard V. Burr, 18 N. Y. 96; Gil
lespie v. Broas, 23 Barb. 370; State v. Brown, 27 N. J. L. (3 Dutch.)
13; Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Penn. St. 335; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio
zfi Mississippi Railway, 94 Ill. 83, 93; 1 Washb. Real Prop. (3d ed.) 76
78; 4 Kent Com. 9, 10, 129 ; See also, of English works in addition to ci
tations above, Shep. Touchst. 101; 2 Bl. Com. 109, 154, 155; 1 Cruise
Dig. tit. 1, §§72-76; 2 Flint. Real Prop. 136-138; 1 Prest. Est. 431,
441; Challis, Real Prop. 197-208.
Since the estate of the plaintiff may determine, and since there
is no valid limitation over, it follows that there is a possibility of re
verter in the original grantor, Clark. This is similar to, though not
quite identical with, the possibility of reverter which remains in the
grantor of land upon a condition subsequent. The exact nature and
incidents of this right need not now be discussed, but it represents what
ever is not conveyed by the deed, and it is the possibility
that the land may revert to the grantor or his heirs when
the granted estate determines. Challis, Real Prop. 31, 63-65,
153, 174, 198, 200, 212; 1 Prest. Est. 431, 471; Newis v. Lark,
2 Plowd. 403, 413; [post—] Shep. Touchst. 120; 2 Washb. Real Prop.
(3d ed.) 20, 579; 4 Kent Com. 10; Smith VI ‘Harrington, 4 Allen,
566, 567; Attorney General v. Merrimack Manuf. Co., 14 Gray, 586,
612; Brattle Square Church V. Grant, 3 Gray, 142, 147-150; Owen
v. Field, 102 Mass. 90, 105, 106; Gillespie V. Broas, 23 Barb. 370; Gray,
Rule against Perpetuities, §§ 33, 34, 39, and cases cited.
Clark’s possibility of reverter is not invalid for remoteness. It has
been expressly held by this court, that such possibility of reverter upon
breach of a condition subsequent is not within the rule against perpet
uities. Tobey V. Moore, 130 Mass. 448; French V. Old South Society,
106 Mass. 479. If there is any distinction in this respect between such
possibility of reverter and that which arises upon the determination of
a qualified fee, it would seem to be in favor of the latter. But they
should be governed by the same rule. If one is not held void for remote
ness, the other should not be. The very many cases cited in Gray, Rule
against Perpetuities, §§ 305-312, show conclusively that the general
understanding of courts and of the profession in America has been
that the rule as to remoteness does not apply; though the learned
author thinks this view erroneous in principle.
We have no occasion to consider whether the possibility of reverter
would or would not ‘pass to an assignee in bankruptcy or insolvency,
because the plaintiff expressly waived any right it might have under
the second deed from Clark, and we have not, therefore, felt at liberty
to consider the second deed, and have been confined to the construction
and effect of the first deed. See Rice V. Boston & Worcester Railroad,
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12 Allen, 141. This being so, the plaintiff’s title must be deemed im
perfect, and the entry must be.
Bill dismissed.
WEED v. WOODS, in New Hampshire Sup. ca, Dec. 4, 1902-11 N. H. 581,
53 Atl. 1024.
_ Trespass quare clausum for entry by defendant into the chapel enclos
ure and removing fences, sheds, &c., claiming under a deed by which
plaintiff conveyed to defendant her farm with the reservation stated in the
opinion. Case transferred from Superior Court.
BINGHAM, J . A construction of the clause in the deed, “reserving,
however, the building situated on the last described premises, known as
the chapel, together with the right to the land on which such building
stands, said building'to remain so long as the association owning the
same may want it” necessitates a determination of the extent of territory
in which the plaintifi retained a property interest and the nature of that
interest. * * * :
It matters not whether this clause is technically a reservation or an
exception; such a classification lends no aid to its interpretation. The
estate retained by the plaintiff in the lot is a fee, not because as a matter
of law it “is an exception and not a reservation,” but because the clause,
“understood in the ordinary and popular sense of its terms,” reserves
an estate which may be of perpetual continuance. Cole V. Lake Co.,
54 N. H. 242, 277, 27s; Smith v. Furbish, es N. H. 123, 141-5, 44 Atl.
398, 47 L. R. A. 226; 1 Wash. R. P. (6th ed.), s. 162. It is not an estate
for the life of the plaintiff, for the particular limitation agreed upon
by the parties might happen either before or after her decease, or it
might never happen. For the same reasons, it is not an estate for
years or for any shorter period. It is an estate in fee, determinable
upon the association ceasing to want it for chapel purposes. It is
not “an absolute fee, nor an estate on condition, but an estate which
is to continue till the happening of a certain event, and then to cease.
That event may happen at any time, or it may never happen. Because
the estate may last forever, it is a fee. Because it may end on the
happening of the event, it is what is usually called a determinable or
qualified fee.” First Universalist Society v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171,
174; 15 L. R. A. 231, note; 1 Wash. R. P., s. 167. By such a con
struction, the intention of the parties will be carried out and effect
given to this clause of the deed. So long as this estate continues, and
the plaintiff and her successors in title retain the possession. they will
have all the rights in respect to it which they would have if they were
tenants in fee simple. 1 Wash. R. P., s. 168.
All concurred.
Judgment for the plaintifi.
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Fee Conditional at the Common Law.
NEVIL’S CASE, before all the judges of England, Mich., 2 Jae. I.—A. D.
1605—7 Coke 33.
In this_ term, this case by the command of the king, was propounded
to all the judges. Anno 21 Ric. II, Ralph Nevil, Lord of Raby, was by
letters patent under the great seal created Earl of Westmoreland, to him
and the heirs males of his body; which Ralph, by Margaret Staflford his
first wife, had issue Ralph, Earl of Westmoreland, to whom Charles,
late Earl of Westmoreland, was lineal male heir of the body of said Ralph
the first donee; and the said Ralph the first donee, by Joan daughter
of John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, had issue George, Lord Latimer
(for all his elder brothers were dead without issue male) from whom
was lineally descended. Edward Nevil, who now is the nearest issue male
to the said donee; and afterwards Charles, Earl of Westmoreland, was
attained by outlawry and by parliament, of high treason, and died
without issue male; and now the said Edward Nevil claimed to be Earl
of Westmoreland.
'
And in this case three questions were moved to all the judges of Eng
land: 1. If the said limitation of the said dignity to the said Ralph
and the heirs males of his body be within the statute De donis condi
tionalibus, or a fee-simple conditional at the common law. 2. Admit
ting that it was an estate-tail within the said statute, if by the attainder of
treason the estate-tail was forfeited by a condition in law tacite annexed
to the state of the dignity. 3. If the estate of the dignity was for
feited by the act of 26 Hen. VIII, c. 13, or that the said Edward Nevil
as heir male of the body of the first donee ought to be Earl of Westmore
land.
'
_
And these three points were argued and debated at Sergeant’s Inn in
Fleet street by the king’s attorney and by the counsel of the said Edward
Nevil. And as to the first it was objected that the said dignity was not
within the said statute de donis, &c., for diverse causes: (1) Because it
was a great dignity, derived from the king as the fountain of all dignity,
and therefore it is not within the said act, which speaks only of tenement’
quae multotens dantur sub conditions, viz: cum aliquis terr’ suam dat
alicui 'uir0 &c.; so this dignity cannot be included within the words tene
ments or land. (2) The statute saith in omnibus praedict’ casibus post
prolem suscitatam hujusmodi feofajfati habuerunt potestatem alienandi,
&c. But this dignity was adherent in the blood of the donee, and could
not be alienated or granted, neither after nor before issue; and therefore
such cases of dignities were out of the mischief, the words and the intent
of the makers of the act de donis, &c. And the opinion in Manxel’s Case
in Pl. Com. the grant of a thing which doth not concern land or tene
ments, nor exercisable in lands and tenements, as an annuity, which is
personal, is not within the statute, de donis, &c. * * *
As to the second point it was resolved that although this dignity be
within the statute de donis conditionalibus, yet by the attainder of
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treason, if the statute 26 Hen.‘ VIII‘ (c. 13) had not been made, this
dignity had been forfeited by force of a condition in law tacite annexed
to the estate of the dignity. * * *
As to the third point it was resolved by all the justices that if it had
not been forfeited by the common law, that by the statute of 26 Hen.
VIII, c. 13, the said Charles had forfeited the dignity. * * _*
At the common law before the statute de donis conditionalibus, if land
had been given to one and the heirs males of his body, in that case, as
well the donor as the donee had a possibility—the donor of a reverter
if the donee died without issue male, and the donee to have power to alien
if he had issue male. For if the donee had issue a son, now to some
intent the condition was performed, for post prolem suscitatam he had
potestatem alienandi; and the reason thereof was because he having a
fee-simple and having issue, his issue could not avoid the alienation,
because he claimed fee-simple, whereof his father might bar him. And
although the donee and his issue also after such alienation died without
issue, yet the donor who had but a possibility or condition in law and
no reversion or estate in him, could not recover the land against the
alienee; for by the having of issue the condition was performed to this
intent, scil. to make an alienation. But in the same case at the common
law, if the donee had issue a son and died, yet the son had not an abso
lute fee-simple in him, but only the same power which his father had,
scil. to alien; and if such issue died without issue, and without any
alienation made, the land should revert to the donor, as Brian held, 12
Edw. IV, 3, and 18 Edw. III, 46, by Huse. For a collateral heir who is
not heir of the body of the donee is not within the form of the gift, the
limitation being to the heirs males of the body of the donee, which limita
tion of heirs males of the body doth exclude all collateral heirs to inherit.
But the policy of the law was to give power after issue to alien for two
causes: 1, that the estate of a purchaser should not be avoided by a
remote possibility, scil. if the donee and his issue also should die without
issue; 2, if he having a fee-simple should not have power after issue to
alien it would be in a manner a perpetuity and a restraint of alienation
forever, which the common law for many causes will not suffer. And
in 4 Hen. III, (Fitz. Abr.) Formedon 64 it is adjudged, that where
lands are given in frank-marriage, and the donees had issue and died,
and afterwards the issue died without issue, that his collateral heir
should not inherit, for the donor recovered the lands in a formedon in
the reverter; and in the said case if the donee had issue two sons and
died, and the elder son had issue a daughter and died without issue male,
the younger son should inherit a fee-simple per formam doni at the
common law. So if lands were given to one and to his heirs females of
his body, and he had issue a son and a daughter and died, the daughter
should inherit an estate in fee-simple per formam doni. And mark well
the statute de donis, &c., doth not create an estate tail but of such
estate as was fee-simple conditional and descendible in such form at the
common law, as now by the statute the land shall descend ; and the only
)
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mischief was that the donee after issue had power to alien in disinherison
of his issues, and bar of the reversion. But it doth not appear by the said
act that although the donee had issue, yet he had not an absolute fee,
so that the collateral heir of the issue should inherit; for the words of
the act are Ft praeterea cum deficiente exitu de hujusmodi feoffatis,
tenementum sic datum ad donatorem vel ad ejus haeredem reverti debuit
per formam in carta de dono expressam, licet ezvitus, si quis fucrit obisset,
per factum et feofiamentum ipsoram, quibus tenementum sic fuit datum
sub conditione, exclusi fuerunt hucusque dc reversione, &c.; by which
it appears that if the heir in tail dies without issue, and without any
falienation male, that the land shall revert, and by consequence shall not
descend to the collateral heir; 30 Edw. I, (Fitz. Abr.) Formedon 65.
If the donee in tail had aliened before the statute and afterwards had
issue, and then the issue had died without issue, the land should revert;
for he had not power to alien at the time of the alienation, but such
alienation should bar the issue as it is adjudged in 19 Edw. II, (Fitz.
Abr.) Formedon 61, because he claimed fee-simple. N. B.—These rules
yet hold place in case of a grant of an annuity to one and the heirs males
of his body, and all other inheritances which are not within the statute
ole donis conditionalibus.
Estates Tail.
STATUTE DE DONIS CONDITIONALIBUS, Westm. 2, 0- 1, 13 Edw. I.—
A. D. 1285.
First, concerning lands that many times are given upon condition.
that is
,
to wit, where any giveth his land to any man and his wife,
and to the heirs begotten of the bodies of the same man and his wife,
with such condition expressed that if the same man and his wife die
without heir of their bodies between them begotten, the land so
given shall revert to the giver or his heir; in case also where one giveth
lands in free marriage, which gift hath a condition annexed, though
it be not expressed in the deed of gift, which is this, that if the husband
and wife die without heir of their bodies begotten, the land so given
shall revert to the giver or his heir; in case also where one giveth land
to another and the heirs of his body issuing, it seemed very hard and
yet seemeth to the givers and their heirs, that their will being expressed
in the gift was not heretofore nor yet is observed. In all the cases afore
said after issue begotten and born between them, to whom the lands were
given under such condition, heretofore such feoffees had power to aliene
the land so given, and to disinherit their issue of the land, contrary to the
minds of the givers, and contrary to the form expressed in the gift.
And further, when the issue of such feoffee is failing, the land so
given ought to return to the giver or his heir by form of gift expressed
in the deed, though the issue, if any were, had died; yet by the deed
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and feoffment of them, to whom land was so given upon condition, the
donors have heretofore been barred of their reversion of the same tene
ments which was directly repugnant to the form of the gift: wherefore
our lord the king, perceiving how necessary and expedient it should
be to provide remedy in the aforesaid cases, hath ordained, that the
will of the giver according to the form in the deed of gift manifestly
expressed shall be from henceforth observed, so that they to whom the
land was given under such condition shall have no power to aliene the
land so given, but that it shall remain unto the issue of them to whom
it was given after their death, or shall revert unto the giver or his
heirs if issue fail, either by reason that there is no issue at all, or if
any issue be, it fail by death, the heir of such issue failing. Neither
shall the second husband of any such woman from henceforth have any
thing in the land so given upon condition after the death of his wife,
by the law of England, nor the issue of the second husband and wife
shall succeed in the inheritance, but immediately after the death of the
husband and wife, to whom the land was so given, it shall come to their
issue or return unto the giver or his heir as before is said. And for
asmuch as in a new case new remedy must be provided, this manner
of writ shall be granted to the party that will purchase it. * * * The
writ whereby the giver shall recover when issue faileth is common enough
in the chancery. And it is to wit that this statute shall hold place
touching alienation of land contrary to the form of gift hereafter to
be made, and shall not extend to gifts made before. And if a fine be
levied hereafter upon such lands it shall be void in the law, neither
shall the heirs or such as the reversion belongeth unto, though they be
of full age, within England, and out of prison, need to make their
claim.
BRITTON, 1 Libel‘ c. 5, Sec. 2, p. "93.-—-A. D. 1275—1300.
If any one purchase to himself and his wife and their issue begotten
in lawful matrimony; by such a purchase the purchasers have only a
freehold for their two lives, and the fee accrues their issue if there be
any already born; and if not, then the fee remains in the person of the
donor until they have issue.
Some have thought that this was written after the statute de donis was
passed but before it was understood.
ANON., in the Common Pleas, 2 Edw. 2, A. D. 1308-9—Selden Soc. Year
books, Vol. 1 (1 & 2 Edw. 2), case No. 19, pp. 70-72, also noted in Fitzher
bert’s Abr. t. Resceit 147. _
'
This case is a writ of dower. The tenant has made default after
default. Now here comes A and says that the tenements were given to
his father and the heirs of his body begotten, and that he (A) is the
/
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eldest son and heir apparent; and he prays to be received to defend
his right. .
B1-ransom), C. J .* Heir you cannot be during your father’s life, for
you cannot know which of you will be the survivor. And I put the case
that lands are given to a man in fee-tail, and he to whom the gift is
“tailed” engenders a daughter, and is afterwards impleaded, and the
daughter comes and prays to be received to defend her right and she
is received, and then pending the plea he engenders a son, and then the
daughter makes default, and the son comes into court and prays to be
received :—How can he be received, and how could the right jump across
to the male when she has been received as heir? And it is certain that
the daughter cannot be heir so long as there is a male; thence it follows
[in the present case] while his ancestor is living he cannot be heir.
Toudeby [sergeant arguing for A]. These tenements were given to
[his father] and the issue of his body, and he is issue and is the eldest.
Herle [sergeant for the plaintiff.] You will never make out that he is
“heir ;” and if you leave out this word heir, then he will not be within
the statute [Westm. II, c. 3], for the statute says the heirs shall be
admitted. a
Toudeby. These tenements are given to [the father] and to the heirs
of his body engendered, so that the father is only tenant for his life, and
for [a mere] freehold, and the right dwells in the person of the issue.
Passeley [also for the plaintiff]. I will show that that is not so; for
the father by himself can vouch to warranty in the right, and the war
rantor in the right can join battle and the grand assize, and if he [the
father thus] loses, he [the son] never shall have recovery of the same
land. _
Toudeby. If no issue issues he to whom the reversion belongs shall be
received, and (what is more) so shall a remainderman who is a total
stranger. Why not then the issue, who is more privy?
BEREFORD, C. J . If the tenements were given to the father and mother
and the heirs of their two bodies begotten, and the one of them died and
the survivor was impleaded, in that case peradventure the issue should
be received, for in that case one can know for certain that an heir there
cannot be other than one who is begotten of their two bodies.
Toudeby. There may be just the same uncertainty in the one case that
there is in the other, for albeit [in the case that you put] one of the two
donees is dead, it may be that he has issue three or four sons, and we
cannot say which of them will be the heir.
Passeley. If the father desired to pray aid of the son he should not be
received, and no more shall the issue [be received in this case].
Toudeby. We have seen before now that a linen-draper of London
purchased tenements to himself and his wife and to the heirs of their two
‘Whether Bereford was chief justice when this case was decided does not appear
from the report, but I take it that he was from the fact that he alone speaks for the
court. He became chief justice March 15th, 1309.
/‘
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bodies begotten; and [the husband and wife] were impleaded and made
default; and, because there was no issue, he to whom the reversion
belonged came and prayed to be received; and pending the plea a son
was born, who was brought into the bench before you in a cradle and
prayed to be received and was received; and yet the father and mother
were in full life, as they are to this day. Wherefore we pray to be
received.
And he was received, etc.
HIELTON v. BRADIPTON, in Common Bench, Mich. term, 18 Edw. III,—
A. D. 1344.—-Yearbooks (Pike) 18 & 19 Edw. III, p. 194-206; also reported
in 18 Lib. Ass. 5, Fitzh. Abr. t. Talle 16.
John, son of William de Holton, brought an assise of novel disseisin
against two men and their wives and others in the county of Westmore
land. The men and their wives pleaded in bar on the ground that one
John De Halton, grandfather of the wives, had two sons, John the elder,
and Thomas, the younger. John, the ancestor, &e., gave the tenements
to his younger son, Thomas, in fee simple. After the death of Thomas
(John), who died seised, Thomasl entered as son and heir and died
without issue of his body, and after his death the wives, with their
husbands, entered as sisters and heirs. John, the plaintiff, as cousin,
abated, claiming as heir. We ousted him; judgment whether the assize,
&c. To this the plaintiff said that the gift was made to Thomas [John]
and the heirs male of his body, and inasmuch as Thomas, the son of
Thomas [John], died without heir male of his body, he entered, as heir
of the donor, upon his reversion. And he prayed the assise for damages.
The tenants not denying the gift in tail as above, demanded judgment
inasmuch as the plaintifi admitted the issue in tail to have been seised,
and so the limitation was brought to an end, and the wish of the donor
accomplished, and consequently a fee simple adjudged in the issue by
force of this gift confessed by the plaintifi; and (said the tenants) we.
demand judgment whether there ought to be an assise. And thereupon
they were adjourned into the bench by reason of difficulty.
* * * R. Thorpe. Anyone who is a female is a stranger to such
a fonn of gift; and this is not like Multon’s Case, on which judgment
was given in parliament, and in which the sisters had the inheritance,
because in that case the gift was to him and his heirs male, so that his
collateral heirs as well as the lineal heirs had the capacity of inheriting,
wherefore on such a gift he had a fee simple. Not so in the case before
us, in which the reversion of the fee simple was saved by the gift.
HILLARY (J .) : Then will you say that in this case in which you are,
the daughters, if he had any, would not have the inheritance?
R. Thorpe: It is certain that they would not. * * * S'roNoRE
(C. J.): It is necessary to look at the statute which states the case
‘John’s son Thomas apparently.
._\\
"'\
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of entail, and this particular case is not among any of the cases expressly
mentioned by the statute, and therefore it is at common law and conse
quently a fee simple. Seton: Certainly, Sir, we rely greatly on that on
our side. Sadelyngstanes: We understand that in case of such a gift the
issue had at the common law, an inheritance in fee simple, for it is certain
that they could have aliened; and although alienation is restrained by stat
ute, the estate, when it continued remains as it was at common law, that is
to say, one of fee simple. Maubray: This limitation by which the gift is
made to a man and the heirs male of his body is more restricted, and does
not give inheritance so largely as if the gift were made to one and the
heirs of his body; in which case the twentieth in descent would have only
a fee tail, and in default of issue the land would be revertible, &c.; and
all the more in this case. -
WILLOUGHBY (J .) [to the plaintiff]. It is still necessary to~take the
assise, because another tenant has, in the same assise, pleaded to the
assise with respect to a part of the land; therefore as to this sue an
assise in respect to the damages, and as to the rest sue an assise also.
And so note that female issue will not inherit by such a gift, even though
the issue male -was seised.
ABRAHAM v. T\VIGG, in B. R., Trinity, 38 Eliz.—A. D. 1597.—Cro. Eliz.
478, Moor 424. Abridged from Croke.
Avowry for rent. On demurrer. Peter, seised in fee, made a feoff
ment to the use of himself and the heirs of his body, and in default of
such issue to Gabriel and his heirs males, and in default of such issue,
to the right heirs of Peter. Peter died without issue; Gabriel entered,
devised the rent out of the land to the avowant, and died having issue.
It was argued that Gabriel had an estate tail, though it was not limited
to the heirs of his body; because it is by way of use, which is to be
expounded according to the intent, and as wills, citing 9 Edw. 3, “Tail”
21; 5 Hen. 6, pl. 6.
All the Justices (Popham, C. J ., absent) held that it was an estate
in fee in Gabriel; and although it were by way of use, it difiers from other
gifts by deed, and shall not have any other construction. And it cannot
be an estate tail, because there is not any body from whom this heir male
should come. And so it is in a case by devise, as appears by 9 Hen. 6 pl.
25. Wherefore it was adjudged for avowant.
VVILLION v. BERKLEY, in Common Bench, Trinity, 4 Eliz.—A. D. 1562
Plowd. Com. *223-252.
Abridged.
[Ejectione Firmae. It appears by the record that Henry Willion sues
Henry Lord Berkley and Richard Knight, for ejecting him from seven
acres of wood in Weston, and declares that Henry Cook, being seised in
fee of the land, May 5th, in the 4 & 5 years of Phil. & Mary, demised
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to the plaintiff for seven years, by virtue of which plaintiff was pos
sessed, and the next day, May 6th, of said year, defendants ejected him.
Defendants plead in bar, that long before the time of the supposed eject
ment, one Wm. Berkley was seised in fee of the manor of Weston, of
which the land in dispute is a part; and being so seised, levied a fine in
the king’s court 5 Hen. 7, A. D. 1490, by which the land was limited to
said Wm. Berkley and the heirs of his body, remainder to King Henry 7,
and the heirs of his body, remainder to the right heirs of said Wm.
that afterwards said William died without issue, after whose death
King Henry 7 entered in his said manor in his estate tail, male and
died leaving issue his son, King Henry 8, who entered and was seised
in the same estate and died leaving issue his son, King Edward 6, who
entered and was seised likewise in tail male and died without issue male;
and then the late King Henry 7 being dead without issue male, these
defendants lawfully entered in their remainder as heirs of said William
Berkley, on whom said Henry Cook entered and made the said lease
to the plaintiff, on whom defendants rightfully re-entered; and so they
demand judgment. Plaintiff rejoined confessing the matter alleged in
the plea, and alleging an act of parliament, 35 Hen. 8, and alleging
that by birth of issue to King Henry 7 the land became his in fee-simple.
Defendants demurred. Many points were argued that are not given in
this abridgment, which the curious reader will find reported at large
by Mr. Plowden. One point made was that the replication does not
state that there was office found on the death of Wm. Berkley, without
which King Henry 7 could not lawfully enter.]
ANTHONY BROWN (J.) said: If land is leased to the king for his
life, upon condition that if the lessor dies his heirs shall enter, and the
lessor dies; there his heir shall not enter without oflice finding the death,
and without ouster le main sued. But if it was upon condition that if
the king, who is lessee, dies, the lessor shall enter; there if the king dies,
the lessor shall enter without oflice, or ouster lemain sued. For in the
first case the condition is merely a condition, which abbreviates the
estate, but in the other case the condition is joined to the limitation of the
estate, and the condition and the limitation tend to one end, and the
condition does not abridge the limitation as it does in the other case.
And therefore when the king dies, the freehold is by act of law cast
upon the lessor before entry. So in our case, when King Edward 6
died without heir male, the freehold was cast upon the Lord Berkley,
and his entry was lawful without ofiice or ouster le main; and the bar
reciting that he entered is good enough in this point. Which was agreed
by the whole court. Also admitting that an oflice was necessary here,
yet the defendants, by their plea in bar, have amended the fault which
they have excepted to. For they themselves, in conveying their title to
them have shown that the marquis died without issue, and that King
Henry 7 entered. * * *
[Counsel for the plaintiff argued at length that a grant to the king and
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the heirs male of his body is not a fee-tail, but a fee conditional at com
mon law, and the statute de donis conditionalibus does not extend to
him; which the defendant’s counsel denied. The judges took time to
consider, and later in Trinity 4 Eliz. argued upon the matter as follows] :
WESTON, justice. It seems to me that the plaintiff shall recover.
* * * By the common law before the statute de donis conditionalibus,
there were two estates of inheritance, the one a fee-simple absolute, as
where a man had lands to him and his heirs generally, and the other a
fee-simple conditional, as where a man had lands given to him and to
his heirs of his body, which estate to him and to his heirs of his body
was greater than an estate for life, for the word heirs makes it greater
than for ‘life, so that if he had aliened before issue the donor should not
have entered for a forfeiture, as the lessor shall do upon the feoffment of
tenant for life. * * * It seems to me that the estate shall be
adjudged a fee-simple conditional in the king, and that the remainder
shall be void, and that the king shall not be bound by the statute de donis
conditionalibus. For inasmuch as all justice, tranquility, and repose are
derived from the king, as the fountain thereof, the_law shows him special
favor in all his business [*243] as being the cause and origin thereof.
* * * If the king, should be restrained he would be in a worse condi
tion than any other; for every one else may suffer a common recovery,
and so make the most of the land and bar their issues, but no recovery
can be had against the king, for no praecipe lies against him. * * *
ANTHONY BROWN, justice: I am of opinion to the contrary. * * *
The person of the king is not to be respected in gifts of land, but the
quality of the estate is to be considered; and the person of the king
shall not rule the estate in the land. * * * When [*248] the statute
ordained that the will of the donor should be observed, from thence it
followed consequently that the donee was restrained from alienating
lawfully the fee-simple, and from doing other acts which a tenant in
fee-simple might do. And when he was thereby restrained from doing
lawfully those acts which attended the fee-simple estate, and from
meddling with the fee-simple; from thence they took it to be the intent
both of the legislature and of the donor, that he should not have a fee
simple; for it would have been an idle intent to have adjudged the fee
simple in him; when he could not lawfully do anything with it. And
therefore upon this reason they took it that the fee-simple was left in the
donor, and yet that the estate of the donee was an estate of inheritance,
because the heirs of his body should inherit it; but this inheritance
could not be a fee-simple, for then there would be two fee-simples of the
same land; but they took it to be a baser estate of inheritance, and gave
it the name of an estate tail, which is an estate of inheritance certainly
limited. So that upon good reason, in order to perform the will of the
donor and of the legislature also, they took it by the perview that the
estate was divided, and that the donee had an estate tail and the donor
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the fee-simple, which he might grant over to another, or give to another
by way of remainder, and that he could not do before the statute; for
then the donee had a fee-simple, and one fee-simple cannot depend upon
another. For in 3, Edw. 3 a man levied a fine sur conusance de clro'it
come ceo que it ad de son done, and he could not make a remainder over
upon such fine, because the gift shall be as a fee simple. [See H. 42 Ed.
3, 5b, per Finchd., Brooke Abr. t. Estates 65 in fine.] But now that the
estate is divided, the donor may grant a the fee-simple over by way of
remainder. So that the reason of the purview of the act instructed the
expositors of it to divide the estate, and continual use ever since has con
firmed the exposition. Wherefore the estate is divided by the intent of
the act without precise words, as fully and perfectly as if the act had
expressly divided it; for that which is done by the intent of the act,
without precise words, is equivalent to that which is done by precise
words. So that now the estate is restrained and abridged and altered
by the act; and therefore when the king took the estate, he took it
restrained and abridged, and he could not take it otherwise. * * *
And, sir, if the king would say that the estate was not divided at common
law, and that as to him it shall be at this day as it was at the common
law, whereby he would have a fee-simple, and [*249] the remainder
would be void; by this, I say, he destroys his own estate for the estate
tail precedes his remainder, and if it should be a fee-simple conditional,
then the remainder of the king would be void, for a remainder cannot
be limited upon a fee-simple precedent. And if the king would say that
his remainder is a fee-simple, he cannot say otherwise but that the estate
precedent is also a fee-simple; for both estates are made by one same
fine at one same time, and both estates are by the donor limited to be in
tail. And the king cannot say that the one is in tail and the other in
fee, for thereby he afiirms and disaffirms at the same time. * * *
He is bound by the statute as well as another; and as proof that it has
been so taken before, the case of P. 4 Hen. 6 [19 pl. 6; Fitz. Abr. t. Gard
50; Brooke Abr. 52 Tenures 21] has been well cited; where the tenant,
who held of the king in capite by knight’s service, made :1 gift in tail,
and the donee died, his issue within age, and it was there adjudged that
the king should not have the ward, but the donor should have it; for
the estate is divided, and the reversion is in the donor, and the donee
held of him. * * *
DYEB, chief justice: As to the matter in law, I am of the same
opinion. * * *
Afterwards on the quinzaine of St. Martin, in the fifth year of the
reign of Queen Elizabeth, the justices at the prayer of the Lord Berkley,
who had often prayed their judgment after their arguments, gave judg
ment for him against the plaintiff.
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HISTORY OF RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION BY LIDIITING THE FEE.
Heir’s Right to Fee Simple Against Alienation by Ancestor.
LAWS OF ALFRED THE GREAT, c. 37.—A. D. 871-901.
Si quis terram haereditariam habeat, cam. mm 1:-ed/it a cognitis haeredi
bus suis, si illi viro prohibitum sit qui eam ab initio acquisivit, ut eta
facere nequeat. If any have hereditary land he may not sell it from
his kindred heirs if he who acquired it in the beginning provided that it
should be impossible to do so.
Laws of Alfred the Great (cir. A. D. 890) c. 41. The man who has
bocland, and which his kindred left him, then ordain we that he must
not give it from his maeg-burg, if there be writing or witness that it
was forbidden by those men who at first acquired it
,
and by those who
gave it to him, that he should do so; and then let that be declared in the
presence of the king and of the bishop before his kinsmen.
LAWS OF HENRY I, c. 70.—-A. D. 1100.
Si bockland _habeat, quam e
i
parentes dederint, non mittat eam extra
cognationem suam. If one has bookland which the parents gave to him
he shall not alienate it from his kindred.
GLANVIL (Tractatus de Legibus et Consuetudinibus*) Liber 7, c. 1.—A. D.
1180?
[By Livery]. Every free-man possessed of land may give a certain
part of it with his daughter, or with any other woman in marriage-hood,
whether he has any heir or not; or whether his heir, supposing he has
one, consent to such a disposition or not_; nay, though the heir expressly
dissent from, and forbid it. Every one may also give a certain part of his
freehold estate to any person he chooses, in remuneration for his services,
or to a religious establishment in free-alms; that, if seisin follow up the
donation, the land shall perpetually remain to the person to whom it is
given and his heirs, if the terms of the gift go to that extent. But. if
such a donation should not be followed up by seisin, nothing can, after
the death of the donor, be claimed with effect in virtue of it contrary to
the will of the heir; because such a disposition is usually interpreted by
the law of the realm, rather as a naked promise, than a real promise or
donation.
[By Will.] It is thus, generally speaking, lawful for a man, in his
lifetime, freely to dispose of the reasonable part of his land in such
manner as he may feel inclined, yet the same permission is not allowed
"VVritten about A. D. 1180, when the author was Chief Justicar of Eng
land. This is one of the first treatises on English Common Law.
40 ESTATES or INHERITANCE.
to anyone on his death-bed; because the distribution of the inheritance
would, probably, be then highly imprudent, were such an indulgence
conceded to men, who, in the glow of sudden impulse, not unfrequently
lose both their memory and reason. Hence, it is to be presumed, that if
a man laboring under a mortal disease, should then for the first time set
about making a disposition of his land, a thing never thought of by him
in the hour of health, that the act is rather the result of the mind’s
insanity than of its deliberation. But yet a gift of this description, if
made to any one by the last will, shall be valid, if done with the consent
of the heir, and confirmed by his acquiescence in it.
[Distinction of Purchased from Inherited Land.] If he possesses
inheritable land only he may, as we have already observed, give a certain
portion of it to any stranger at his pleasure. But if he has many sons
born in wedlock, he cannot, correctly speaking, without the consent of
his heir, give any part of his inheritance to a younger son, because if this
were permitted, it would then frequently happen that the eldest son
would be disinherited, owing to the greater affection which parents often
feel toward their younger children. But it may be asked whether a man
having a son and heir, can give any part of his inheritance to his
illegitimate son? If he can, it follows, that the condition of the illegiti
mate son would, in this respect, be preferable to that of the younger son
born in wedlock; and yet the law is so. But if a person desirous of
making a donation of part of his lands possess only such as he has pur
chased, he may then make such gift; provided it does not extend to the
whole of his purchased lands, because he cannot disinherit his son and
heir. Yet, if he has not any heir, male or female, of his own body, he
may, indeed, consult his own inclination in making an absolute gift,
either of part or of the whole of his purchased lands. And if the
person to whom the gift be made obtain seisin of it during the life of
the donor, it is not in the power of any more remote heir to invalidate
such gift. Thus a man may give in his lifetime the whole of his pur
chased land. But he cannot make anyone an heir of it
,
neither a college,
nor any particular individual, it being an established rule of law, that
God alone, and not man, can make an heir. If, however, a man possess
both inheritable and purchased lands, it is then unquestionably true,
that he may absolutely give any part or the whole of the latter to such
persons as he pleases; and of his inheritance, he may notwithstanding
dispose, according to what we have already observed, provided such
disposition be a reasonable one. It should be observed, that if a man
having lands in free socage, has many sons, who are all in equal propor
tions to be admitted to the inheritance, then i
t is unquestionably true,
that their father cannot give a greater part of his inheritable land, or of
his purchased if he possess no inheritable, to any one of the sons, than
the reasonable part which would fall to such son of the whole inheritance.
But the father can in his lifetime give to either of his sons such part only
of his inheritable free socage land as such son would be entitled to upon
the death of his father by the rule of succession.
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Establishment of Doctrine That Heir Takes by Descent.
WILLIAM DeARUNDEL’S CASE, Pleas at Westminster, Hilary Term, 9 Hen.
IH.—A. D. 1225—Bracton’s Note Book, Cas 1054.
Radulfus, son of Roger, demanded of William de Arundel five and
a half acres of land with appurtenances at Trelley, three acres with
appurtenances in Treberned, two acres with appurtenances in Tredeiset,
and one acre with appurtenances in Hendr, as his right, of which Roger,
his father, was seised as of right in fee and demesne in the time of Henry,
king, &c., and which right of Roger to this land descended to said
Radulfus as his son and heir. And William came and defended his
right; and said that this Roger, plaintifi"s father, rendered all this land
with appurtenances as his sole and peaceable inheritance to William, the
defendant’s father, and in the court of our lord the king quit-claimed
for himself and his heirs in perpetuity to said William and his heirs;
and he produced the charter of Roger which witnessed it. And Radulfus
came and acknowledged his father’s charter and said quit-claim ; but he
demanded judgment whether his father could give all the land which he
held by knight service reserving no service to himself or his heirs. And
because Radulfus acknowledged his father’s charter. and the charter
proved that Roger, his father, rendered this land and quit-claimed it for
himself and his heirs it is held that William go hereof discharged and
that Radulfus be in mercy.
Note that in writing his treatise later-—-1250-6.7 ?--Bracton lays down the
law in accord with this case as unquestioned. See ante p. 21.
BRITTON, Libel‘ II, c. 5, Sec. 1, p. *93.—A. D. 1275-1300.
Notwithstanding heirs are named in a purchase, yet no purchase
thereby accrues to the heirs. And it must be understood that where any
one purchases to himself and his heirs, he purchases to himself and his
heirs near and remote, and to have and to hold from heir to heir, as well
to those begotten as to those which are to be begotten.
Alienation Restrained by Creating a Fee Conditional At Com.mon Law.
ANON, Cornish Iter, 30 Edw. I.—A. D. 1302:—FitzHerbert Abr. Formedon
65, 1 Gray’s Cases on Property p. 412.
Formedon in reverter because the donee died without issue.
Asseby: The donee alienated before the statute (13 Edw. I. c. 1)
and had issue. Heyham : He had no issue when he made the alienation.
Asseby: It may be that he had no issue when he alienated but that he
had issue afterwards, and then is the alienation good. Heyham : No.
Asseby: He had had issue. PER CURIAM: It is nothing to the point
that he had had issue alive when he alienated; for there might have been
issue and the issue might have died; by that alienation the plaintiff will
'1
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not be barred. Asseby: He had issue alive when he made alienation. And
the others said the contrary.
The following cases at the same term, if not different reports of the same
case, seem to be to the same effect: Kilcart v. I-Ievys, 30 & 31 Ed. I. p.
196; Waryn de Traneryon V. Thomas de Traneryon, 30 & 31 Edw. I. p.
128; Anon., Id. 384.
BRIAN’S CASE, Trinity term, 32 Edw. I.—-A. D. 1304.—Year-books (Hor
wood) 32 & 33 Edw. I, p. 278. Abridged.
Formedon because the donee had died without issue. Touthby (for
the defendant) : Robert (the donee, to him and the heirs of his body)
had issue, and alienated before the statute (of Westm. 2, c. 1), ready, Ste.
Friskney (for the demandant) : The statute states “that such feoffees
had power to alienate after issue begotten,” and we will aver that Robert
had not any issue at the time of or before the alienation, ready, &c.
* * * Malberthorp (also for defendant) : Our case is at the common
law; so it seems that it is sutficient for us to say that he had issue and
alienated, &c. HENGHAM (J.) : They say that at the time when Robert
alienated he had no issue; and this they ofier to aver; Do you accept the
averment or not? * * * (Holding the previous answer insuflicient.)
Land was given to a man and woman and the heirs of their bodies and
thereafter they had issue and later the wife died, the statute de donis was
passed, he married again and died, and the second wife was endowed of this
land. Year-books (Pike) 33 & 35 Edw. III, p.- 286.
Alienation Restrained by Creating Estate Tail.
NOTE in Yearbook of 20 & 21 Edw. 1, p. 302.—A. D. 1292.
One Adam purchased a tenement, to hold to him and the heirs of his
body begotten, and afterwards took a wife with a good estate, and begot
a son. Adam aliened the land so purchased, in despite of the form, &c. ;
and afterwards he and his wife died; then came the son and brought a
writ of formedon against the tenant, and the tenant vouched him to war
ranty by virtue of his father’s deed, and the son said that it was not due
course of law to vouch the demandant. And so in this case the voucher
was of no avail. But can the objection in this case avail against the
father’s deed? I say no, because the alienation was made against the
form of the gift, unless he has something by descent ex parti patris.
'1‘ALTARUM’S CASE, Mich. Term, 12 Edw. IV.—A. D. 1473—Year-Books
12 Edw. IV, 19.
In a writ of entry on the statute of 5 Rich. II, (c. 8) ‘Ubi inyressus
non datur per legem,’ &c., sued against one J . Smith, the defendant said
that the plaintiff ought not to have his action, for before the alleged
entry one T. B. was seised of the tenements in fee, and gave them to
one W. Smith to have and to hold to him and to the heirs of his body
‘
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begotten, by force of which he was seised, &c., and had issue one Richard
and died so seised, and the tenements descended to Richard, and he
entered and was seised, and had issue the said J. Smith, and died seised,
and the tenements descended to the said J . ; and the plaintiff claiming
by color of a deed of feoftment, before the gift, &c., entered, on whose
possession the said J ., as son and heir of the said R. at the time of the
alleged entry, entered, &c., on which entry the plaintiff had based his
action. To which the plaintiff said, true it is that T. B. gave the tene
ments as above, &c. ; but he said that the said W. had issue one Humphrey
an older (son,) and the said Richard, the younger, and died, after whose
death H. entered and was seised by the form of the gift, &c., and being
so seised, one T. Taltarum sued a writ of right against said Humphrey,
returnable, &c. ; on which day the parties appeared, and said Taltarum
counted on his possession, and the said H. made defense, and vouched to
warranty one R. King, who was ready and entered into the warranty,
and joined issue on the mere right; and the said Taltarum imparled
(with him) and then returned (into court) and the tenant by the war
ranty did not return but in contempt of court made default, by which
the demandant had final judgment against said H., and he over against
the tenant by the warranty; by force of which said Taltarum entered and
was seised, &c.; and then said H. died without heirs of his body, &c.;
and later Taltarum enfeoffed the present plaintiff, &c., whereby he was
seised when the defendant entered, &c. To which the defendant said, true
it is that the said W. had issue Humphrey the elder and R. the younger,
and died; and that after his death the tenements descended to Hum
phrey as son and heir, and he entered and was seised as son and heir by
the form of the gift, &c.; but he said that the aforesaid Humphrey
before the writ purchased (in Taltarum’s suit) enfeofied the said tene
ments to one Tergos in fee, who before said writ purchased gave the
tenements back to said H. and one Jane his wife to have and hold to
them and to the heirs of their bodies begotten, remainder to the right
heirs of said H. in fee, &c., by force of which they were seised, &c. ; and
later Jane died, after whose death H. was sole seised of said tenements
as tenant in tail after possibility, &c. ; and while he was so seised said
Taltarum sued his writ of right, and recovered against said H. in manner
and form as he had alleged; the which H., continually after the said judg
ment during his life was seised of said tenements by force of the gift to
him and his wife, and died without issue; after whose death said Richard
as brother and heir of said H., of the body of W. begotten, entered and
was seised by force of the gift made to W., and died seised, and it
descended to said J . Smith, and he entered and was seised by force of the
gift, &c.; without this that the said T. Taltarum, after the said recovery
in the life of the said H. entered on the said tenements as he had alleged;
and without this that the said H. had any other estate in the said
tenements at the day of the purchase of the writ of right or afterwards,
except that by force of the gift to him and his wife, &c.; and without
this that the said Taltarum was seized of the said tenements as of fee
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and of right at the time of the king, as he had alleged; and so the said
recovery was false and feigned in law. * ‘* *
In place of the long and confusing argument given in the original, the
following synopsis of the decision is given from Challis on Real Property
*250: “It would appear, so far as the rambling obscurity of the report
allows anything to appear, that in the present case the question at issue
was whether a person claiming under the original entail, which had been
discontinued by Humphery Smith’s (*251) feofiment to Tergos was
barred by this recovery. And it appears to have been held that he was
not barred, upon the ground that Humphery Smith (who was really
seised under the tortuous seisin acquired by his own feoffment to Tergos)
had not been seised by force of the original entail, which was now sought
to be barred, at the time when the recovery was suffered. From this the
inference is deduced, that if Humphery Smith had been so seised by force
of the original entail, the recovery would have been a good bar to the
issue in tail claiming thereunder. And this inference being acted upon
in practice, was subsequently recognized by the courts, and became the
foundation of common recoveries.”
ANON., before all the judges, Easter, 19 Hen. 8.-—A. D. 1528—Dyer 2b.
Before all the judges at Sergeant’s Inn, a great question was agitated,
which was this: Tenant in tail levied a fine of his land with proclama
tions, and the five years passed during his life-time, and [*3a] after
wards he died. Whether his issue should be barred by this fine or not?
ENGLEFIELD, SHELLY and OONINGSBY, thought that the issue shall not
be barred; for the statute 4 Hen. 7, c. 24, is, that such fine shall be
final, and shall conclude as well privies as strangers to it, saving
to all persons and their heirs (other than such as shall be parties to the
fine) their right interest, &c., which they had on the day of engrossing
the fine, so as they bring their action or enter lawfully within five years
after the engrossing; saving also to all other persons such right, title,
and interest in the said tenements as should first grow, remain, descend,
or come to them after the fine engrossed, or proclamations made by
force of any estate-tail, or other cause and matter made before the fine
levied; so by this last saving, &c., the issue in tail is aided, for he is the
first to whom the right descends after the fine engrossed. * * *
FrrzaAmns, BRUNDEL, FITZHERBERT, BaooxE, and Mooas, to the
contrary, for the intent of those who made the statute was (as appears by
the words of the said statute) that such fine, &c., should be a final end;
and besides that such fine, &c., shall conclude as well privies as strangers.
* * * And the intention of the makers of the statute was, not that
such as claim by the same title that his ancestor, who levied the fine,
had, shall be aided, &c., for such issue in tail is privy to the fine levied
by his ancestor, through whom he shall make his descent, although he
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be not party to the fine, and all privies are concluded by such fine; and
so such issue in tail shall be barred by a fine by his ancestor, &c. And
in this case it was agreed by all the judges, that if he who is a stranger
to the fine, to whom a remainder in tail, or other title, first accrues after
the fine, do not put in his claim within five years after, &c., his issue
is barred by that fine forever. Which note.
JACKSON & DARCYES CASE, in Common Bench, Mich. 16 Ellz.—-A. D.
- 1574. 3 Leon. 57.
In a writ of partition facienda between Jackson and Darcy, the ease
was: tenant in tail, remainder to the king, levied a fine, had issue, and
died; in that case, it was adjudged that the issue was barred, and yet,the
remainder which was in the king was not discontinued; for by that fine,
an estate in fee-simple determinable upon the estate tail, did pass unto
the conusee.
MARY PORTING-TON’S CASE, in C. B., Trinity, 11 James 1, A. D; 1614—
Abridged from 10 Coke 35 b.
Speaking of this case in the preface to the report. Lord Coke said: “Then have
I published in Mary Portington’s case, for the general good both ot the prince and
country, the honorable funeral of fond and new-found perpetuities—a monsterous
brood carved out of mere invention, and never known to the ancient sages of the law.
I say monsterous, for that the naturalist saith, quod monstra generantur propter
corruptionem alicujus principii; and yet I say honorable, for these vermin have crept
into many honorable families. At whose solemn funeral I was present, accompanied
the dead to the grave of oblivion. but mourned not, for that the commonwealth
rejoiced, that fettered tree-holds and inheritances were set at liberty, and many and
mariiifoéd
inconveniences to the head and all the members of the commonwealth thereby
avo e ."
Trespass by Mary Portington against Robert Rogers and Thomas
Barley for breaking a close and house in York County. Defendants
pleaded in bar, that Herceus Sanford, being seised in fee in socage of
the land devised it in writing to Elizabeth, his youngest daughter, in
tail, when she should be 18; that the testator died when she was five
years old, and when she was of age and seized under the devise she
married defendant Rogers, &c. Plaintifi replied that the testator had
issue, Mary, the plaintiff, his eldest daughter, Helen, his second, and said
Elizabeth, and that for want of issue of said Elizabeth, the same will
limited the remainder to said Mary in tail, remainder to Helen in tail,
with divers remainders over in tail; “Provided always, that if my said
daughters or any of them * * * jointly or severally, by themselves
or together with any other person or persons, willingly, apparently, and
advisedly conclude and agree to” any act to alienate the land or bar
or destroy the entails, such person shall immediately lose and forfeit
and be utterly barred and excluded from every estate, remainder, and
benefit that she or they might claim by virtue of the will, immediately
from such act as if she or they were dead without heirs, and that said
Elizabeth and Robert had bargained for and suffered a recovery; where
l
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fore the plaintiff entered for the said forfeiture, as in her remainder.
Upon which the defendant demurred. This Plea was entered, Mich.
7 James, in the common bench, and had depended fourteen terms and
been argued at the bar more than half as many times; and now it was
argued by the judges, and at last unanimously resolved by the whole
court that judgment should be given against the plaintiff.
On the Plaintifi’s Part divers objections or rather declamations were
made: 1. That from the time of the making of the act of 13 Edw.
1, c. 1, de D0nis Conditionalibus, till Taltarum/s Case, 12 Edw. 4, 19,
there was no opinion that a recovery against the tenant in tail with
voucher over would bind the estate tail on the pretense of a feigned
recompence, which was then newly invented and never before imagined
by any of the sages of the law in so many generations and ages incurred
after the act. 2. Although the donor cannot restrain the common
recovery after it is suffered and executed, he may restrain the conclusion
and agreement to suffer, and so prevent the bar by the recovery, and
preserve his remainder or reversion. 3. Such recoveries are by divers
acts of parliament marked and branded with the blemish of fiction
and falsity, as in 34 H. 8, c. 20, they are styled feigned and untrue
recoveries; and so in 11 H. 7, c. 20; 32 H. 8, c. 31; 14 Eliz. c. 8, &c.
And therefore it stands with law and reason to provide for the preser
vation of reversions and remainders against such feigned, false, and
covinous recoveries. 4. That this opinion that a common recovery
cannot be restrained by condition or limitation was new and of late inven
tion, and never heard of before Mildm_ay/’s Case. 6 Coke 40. For it was
admitted to be restrained in the Case of Earl of Arundel, 17 El., Dyer,
342, and in the argument of Sc0lastica’s Case. [post ] And there
fore it was thought to stand with the honor and gravity of the court that
this point had been so often argued at the bar, and therefore now was
ripe for judgment.
The Court confuted all the said objections, and thereby the point
in judgment was confirmed. As to the first objection two questions were
moved and resolved: 1, that judgment given against a tenant in tail
with voucher and recompense in value would bind the estate tail, not
withstanding the said act of 13 Edw. 1, c. 1, be the recovery upon good
title or not; 2, that the judgment given in such case for the tenant in
tail to have in value, would bind the estate tail, although no recompense
be had.
It appears by our books, that the opinion that a recovery against tenant
in tail with voucher would bar an estate tail, and was not restrained by
the statute de D0nis Conditionalibus was not newly invented in 12 E.
4, but often affirmed for law by the most knowing of the law that ever
were; for Sir Wm. Thirning in the time Hen. 4, C. J. of the Com. Pl.,
anno 12 Hen. 4, 13 b, saith that the most learned of the law that ever
were, were in the reign of Edward 3, which also were near the making
of the statute. Let us see then how the law was held in their days on this
point. By 15 Ed. 3, Brief 324, by recovery in value by the tenant in tail
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the estate tail is barred, and he shall have a formedon of the land so
recovered in value. And therewith agrees 42 Ed. 3, 53; for there it is
held that in some case a man shall have a writ of formedon of land which
was never given—as if tenements in tail be lost, and the tenant in tail
recover other land in value, the issue shall have a formedon of the land
recovered in value, and yet that land was not given. In Octavian
L0mbard’s Case, 44 Edw. 3, 21, 22, tenant in tail grants a rent charge
to one in consideration that the grantee having right to the land in tail
releases to him, it shall bind the issue in tail. In Jefiery Bencher’s
Case, 48 Edw. 3, 11 b, a recovery in value by tenant in tail shall bind
the tail, and a formedon lies of the land recovered in value; and there
with agree 1 Ed. 4, 5; 5 Ed. 4, 2b. And that also appears by the like
cases: For if a tenant in tail aliens with warranty, and leaves assets to
descend it is a bar to the issue, by reason of the warranty and assets
descended; but neither the warranty without the assets, nor the warranty
and assets without judgment in a formedon shall bar the estate tail;
and therewith agree Temp. Ed. 1, tit. Garr. 89; 34 Ed. 1, tit. Garr. 88;
11 Ed. 2, tit. Garr. 83; Hen. Sommefs Case, 4 Ed. 3, 24; 3 Ed. 4, 14;
40 Ed. 3, 9; 14 Hen. 4, 39a; 24 Hen. 8, Br. Tail 33; 4 Mary, Dyer 139.
Therefore these resolutions and opinions of law produced the judgment
in Taltarum’s Case, 12 Ed. 4, which was not of any new invention, but
proved and approved by the resolutions of the sages of the law at all
times after the said act until 12 Ed. 4; and the judges of the law then
perceiving what contentions and mischiefs had crept into the quiet of
the law by these fettered inheritances; upon consideration of the said act,
and of former expositions thereof by the sages of the law, gave judgment
that in such case the estate tail should be barred.
As to the second objection, it is absurd to say, that the recovery
itself cannot be prohibited by any condition or limitation and yet that
the conclusion and agreement to suffer a recovery shall be prohibited;
and such condition to prohibit a conclusion or agreement savors of a
new device or invention; for till now of late, none ever heard of any
condition or limitation to prohibit goings about, nor any conclusion or
agreement, but they are altogether unknown to the law. The makers
of the statute de Donis ought to be taxed with great ignorance, and the
act was not necessary, if the going about or conclusion to alien might
have been prohibited, for then when a man had made a gift to one and
the heirs of his body, he might have added the condition that if the
donee in tail at the common law after the donation had gone about or
concluded to alien, that then the donor should re-enter, and so have pre
served his possibility of reverter.
As to the third objection and aspersion of a scandal upon common
recoveries, which is one of the main pillars which supports the estates
and inheritances of the kingdom, it was answered that there was never
anything by the wisdom of man so well devised, or so surely established
upon law and reason, which the wit and craft of those who are subtle
and wicked has not abused. In the great case betwixt T. Vernon and
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Sir Ed. Herbert, which was argued by learned counsel before the lords
in parliament, there Hoord, an utter barrister of counsel with Vernon,
who was barred by a common recovery, rashly and with great ill will
inveighed against common recoveries, not knowing the reason and foun
dation of them; who was with great gravity and some sharpness reproved
by Sir James Dyer, then Chief Justice of the common pleas, who said he
was not worthy to be of the profession of the law, who durst speak against
common recoveries, which were the sinews of assurances of inheritances,
and founded upon great reason and authority. As to Sch0lastioa’s Case,
I respect much the reporter, and attribute due honor and reverence to the
judges who argued in the case; but the resolution in the case is founded
upon two authorities in law, which do not warrant the conclusion which
is made upon them arguendo in the said case, but to say the truth the
contrary.
The Rule in Shelley's Case.
ABEUS CASE, Mich. term, 18 Edw. II.—A. D. 1325—Year-books (May
nard) 18 Edw. II, f. 577. Abridged.
John Abel, having two sons, Walter and John, purchased the manor
of Fortysgray in Kent; to hold to himself and Matilda his wife, and
Walter Abel, his eldest son, and to the heirs of the body of Walter be
gotten; and, if Walter died without heir of his body, the manor should re
main to the right heirs of John the father. Matilda, the wife, died; and
Walter, the son, also died without heir of his body. John, the father, be
came bound in a statute merchant to pay £100 to B. at a day certain; and
died, leaving his younger son John his heir. After the day of payment
was elapsed the creditor sued out a writ to the sheriff of Kent, to extend
and deliver to him all the lands which John Abel the father had, on the
day of acknowledging the statute. The sheriff returns,_ that he had deliv
ered to other creditors upon recognizances all the lands which John Abel
had in fee, except the manor of Fortysgray, in which he had only an estate
for term of life. Upon this return it was argued, that John the father
had only the freehold for term of life, the fee simple being limited to his
heirs, who therefore took by purchase and not by descent. But the court
held the contrary; for which this reason (among others) is given by
Stonor, J . viz., because otherwise the fee and the right after the death of
Walter, the eldest son, would have been in nobody. And therefore Bere
ford, C. J., gave the rule, that execution should be awarded upon this
manor of Fortysgray.
ANON., in G. B., Trinity, 6 Eliz.-—A. D. 1564—1 And. 42, pl. 105.
Grandfather, father, and son; and land held of the king in capite by
knight-service was given to the grandfather for life, remainder to the
father for life, remainder to the son for life, remainder to the right heirs
THE RULE IN SHELLEY’S CASE. 49
of the grandfather, father, and son. The grandfather died, and the ques
tion was whether the father should sue livery; and the opinion of the
justices of the common bench was that the father need not sue livery; for
he and his son had the fee-simple by survivorship and not by descent.
SHELLEY’S CASE, in B. R., Trinity, 23 Eliz.—A. D. 1581. 1 Coke 93b, 1
Anderson 69, Moor 136, 3 Dyer 373, Abridged from 1 Coke 93b.
Nicholas Wolfe brought ejectione firmae of land in Sussex against
Henry Shelley, declaring on a lease to him by Richard Shelley. Plea
not guilty. It was found by special verdict that Edward Shelley and
Joan, his wife, being seised of the land in question, in special tail, to
them and the heirs of their two bodies, Joan died, leaving by him two
sons, Richard, the younger, under whom the plaintiff claims, and Henry,
defendant’s father, who died before defendant was born. After Henry’s
(Sr.) death Edward convenanted by indenture to suffer a recovery
to his own use for life, then to the use of one Carill and others for 24
years, then to the use of the heirs male of the body of said Edward,
with remainder in tail over. Said Edward died while the land was in
possession of a tenant for years, and later on the same day the said
recovery passed with a voucher over, and, immediately after judgment
given habere facias seisinam was awarded and ten days later the recovery
was executed. Edward died Oct. 9th, A. D. 1553, and Henry, the defend
ant, was not born till Dec. 4th following. After the death of said
Edward said Richard entered and leased to the plaintiff, on whom
defendant entered and ejected him.
The principal questions in the case were four: 1, whether execution
may be sued against the issue in tail if the tenant in tail suffers a com
mon recovery with voucher over and dies before execution; 2, whether the
reversion is in the recoverer presently by the judgment before execution
sued when a recovery is sufiered while a tenant for years is in possession;
3, whether the entry by Henry was lawful under the facts of this case,
and this was the great doubt in the case; and, 4, whether Richard may
take as a purchaser in this case, for as much as the elder brother
(Henry) had died leaving a daughter living, who was general right
heir of Edward at the time of the execution of the recovery.
Anderson, queen’s sergeant, and Gawdy and Fenner, sergeants, for the
plaintiff, argued, that, this use originally vested in Richard Shelley, and
never vested in Edward Shelley; and therefore it vested in Richard by
purchase, for that which originally vests in the heir and was never in
the ancestor always vests in the heir by purchase. That the use never
vested in Edward is manifest, for the use ought to rise out of the estate
of the recoverers, which could not arise during his life, for it was not
executed during his life. This case is like the case in 5 Edw. 4, 6a,
where the wife consents to a ravisher, having issue a daughter the daugh
ter enters by the statute of 6 R. 2, a son is afterwards born, he shall never
devest it, for it vested in the daughter by purchase; so in the case agreed
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in 9 Hen. 7, 25a, if a lease be made to one for life, the remainder to the
right heirs of J. S., if J. S. dies leaving a daughter, his wife with child
with a son, the daughter claims it by purchase, and therefore the son
born afterwards shall never devest it. But they relied principally upon
the case in 9 Hen. 7, 25a, that if a condition descends to a daughter,
and she enters for the condition broken, the son born afterwards shall
never enter upon her, and yet there she is in by descent and has the
condition and right of entry as heir, which is a stronger case than ours.
It was further argued that the manner of the limitation of the use
ought to be observed in this case, for it is to the heirs male of the body
of Edward and the heirs male of the body of said heirs male. If heirs
male of the body of Edward should be words of limitation, then the
subsequent words would be void, for words of limitation cannot be added
to words of limitation, but to words of purchase; and such construction
is always to be made of a deed that all the words, if possible, agreeable
to reason and conformable to law, may take effect according to the intent
of the parties. If a man makes a feofiment in fee to the use of himself
for life, and after his decease to the use of his heirs, the fee simple is
executed; but if the limitation be to the use of himself for life, and after
his decease to the use of his heirs and their heirs female of their bodies,
his heirs in this case are words of purchase and not of limitation, for
then the subsequent words would be void.
Therefore they concluded that no use could arise till execution sued,
and then it vested in Richard as purchaser before defendant was born
as heir of the elder son; and admitting the recovery had been executed
the use first settled in Richard as a mere purchaser.
Popham, solicitor general, Cowper and Coke, for the defendant. Ex
ecution could not be sued against the issue in tail. He who vouches shall
never have execution against the vouchee before execution sued against
him; so that the judgment to recover over in value is not material, as this
case is
,
unless execution may be sued‘ against the issue, which cannot be
in this case. For he who is in of an estate in possession by title para
mount to a recovery shall not be bound by the same recovery; and the
issue in tail in our case is in of an estate in possession which he had para
mount the recovery, and therefore he shall not be bound.
For as much as the land was in lease for years, the recovery was exe
cuted by operation of law without execution; in which there is a differ
ence between lands in possession and lands in lease for years. Because
the recoverer cannot sue execution, the law will adjudge him in execution
presently. Those things which lie in grant pass to the conusee immedi
ately by a fine levied; and so in case of a common recovery. If the
judgment was executed by operation of law, then the estate tail to his
heirs male o
f his body was in Edward Shelley, and consequently the entry
of the defendant was without doubt lawful.
But if execution may be sued against issue in tail, and if the recov
ery was not executed by operation of law in the life of Edward, still the
entry of the defendant was lawful. 1. If everything be performed with
\
THE RULE IN SHELLEY Js CASE. ‘ 51
out laches that the parties could perform, they shall not be prejudiced by
those things which the act of God made inevitable. 2. Where the heir
takes anything which should have vested in the ancestor, then although
it first vests in the heir and never in the ancestor, yet the heir shall take
it in the nature and course of a descent. In the case here the use might
have vested in Edward, and if it had vested in him Richard would have
taken it by descent, and therefore he ought to take this use in the nature
and course of a descent. Otherwise it is when the remainder is limited
to‘the right heirs of J. S. &c., for there it begins in the son by name
of purchase, and never could have vested in the brother, as the book,
9 Hen. 7, 25a, cited on the other side is agreed. So it is in the case of
ravishment, 5 Edw. 4, 6a, which was cited on the other side.
What is it that governs and directs the use raised after the execution
was had? The answer is
,
the indentures. Andwhat is their direction?
That Edward shall have it
,
and after his death the heirs male of his
body. But the indentures direct that the heirs male of the body shall
take it by limitation of estate and not by name of purchase, and there
fore Richard ought to have it as heir by limitation of estate and not by
name of purchase; so the entry by the afterborn son of his elder brother
was lawful.
Admitting the remainder had been limited to the right heirs of the
body of Edward, yet Richard could not have it; for he must have both
qualities, male and right heir, but the daughter of his elder brother was
right heir, so he could not take by purchase. And so is the opinion of
Ellerker, J., expressly in 9 Hen. 6, 24a, if a man makes a lease for life,
remainder to the right heirs female of the body of J. S., who has issue
a son and daughter and dies; in this case the daughter shall not take the
remainder, for she is not right heir female. _
As to the objection that the limitation was to the heirs male of the
body of Edward and the heirs male of the body of the heirs male, and
so the heirs male of the body of Edward should be purchasers; the
defendant’s counsel answered, that it is a rule of law, that, when the
ancestor by any gift or conveyance takes an estate of freehold, and in
the same gift or conveyance an estate is limited, either mediately or
immediately, to his heirs, in fee or in tail, that always in such cases,
“the heirs” are words of limitation of the estate, and not words of pur
chase. And that appears in 40 Edw. 3. 9a and b, in the Provost of
Be'uerley’s Case, in 38 Edw. 3, 31 d; 24 Edw. 3, 36 b
;
2'7 Edw. 3, 87 a;
and in divers other books. So inasmuch as in this case Edward Shelley
took an estate of freehold, and after an estate is limited to his heirs
male of his body, the heirs male of his body must of necessity take by
descent and cannot be purchasers. Otherwise it is where an estate for
years is limited to the ancestor, remainder to another for life, remainder
to the right heirs of the lessee for years; there his heirs are purchasers.
If the right heirs male should have by purchase to them and their heirs
male, a violence would be done to the words and meaning of the party,
for then all the other male issue of the body of Edward would be ex
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eluded to take anything by the limitation, which would be against the
express words of the party.
Lastly if Richard should not take in nature and course of descent
he cannot take at all; for when an estate is made to a man, and after
in the same deed, to limit the quality of the estate, another limitation
is made to his heirs, or to the heirs of his body; in all these cases
his heirs or the heirs of his body shall never take as purchasers. In
this case the words “heirs male of the body of Edward Shelley” were
words of limitation; and therefore his heir male cannot take as a.
purchaser. This proposition is proved by the reason of the book in 40
Assize pl. 19, and by the case put by Littleton § 128, that if a man
grant a reversion of a seigniory by deed to J . S. and his heirs, and the
grantee dies before attornment, attornment to his heirs is void, for if
it should be good the heir would take by purchase under words of limita
tion in the grant. On the same reason Brett v. Ridyden, Plow. Com.
342, is a stronger case than this; for a man devised lands to a man
and his heirs, and the man died before the devisor, and it was adjudged
that the heir should not take by the devise, for in that case the word
“heirs” is not named as a word of purchase, but only to limit the estate
which the devisee should have. So in our case the words heirs male of
the body of Edward Shelley are only to give him an estate tail, and not
to make any other a purchaser; and therefore Richard cannot claim the
land by purchase. _
After the case had been argued, openly and at large, by counsel on
both sides, on three several days, in the queen’s bench, the queen hear
ing of it (for such was the rareness and difficulty of the case, being
of importance, that it was generally known), of her gracious disposition,
to prevent long, tedious, and chargeable suits between parties so near
in blood, which would be the ruin of both, being gentlemen of good
and ancient family, directed her gracious letters to Sir Thomas Bromley,
lord chancellor of England, who was of great and profound knowledge
in the law, thereby requiring him to assemble all the justices of Eng
land before him, and upon conference had between them touching the
questions, -to give their resolutions and judgments thereof. And there
upon the lord chancellor, in Easter term, 23 Eliz., called before him
at his house, called York-house, Sir Christopher Wray, lord chief justice
of England, and all his companions justices of the queen’s bench; Sir
James Dyer, lord chief justice of the court of common pleas, and all
his companions justices of the same court; Sir Roger Manwood, chief
baron of the exchequer, and the barons of the exchequer; before whom
the questions aforesaid were moved and shortly argued by Fenner ser
jeant for the plaintifi, and by one on the defendant’s part.
Opinion of the Judges. At this time the lord chancellor was of opin
ion for the defendant, and openly declared his opinion before all the
justices, that the third question of law was for the defendant, and
therefore the defendant’s entry upon his uncle was lawful. But the
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questions were not resolved at that time, the justices desiring time to
consider. Eight or nine days after in the same term, all the said jus
tices and barons met together in Serjeants’ Inn in Fleet street, for the
resolution of the case, and there it was argued by them shortly; after
which arguments the justices at that time conferred amongest them
selves, and took further time to consider till the trinity term follow
ing. Accordingly at the beginning of trinity term, after great study
and consideration, all the justices and barons met again in Serjeants’
Inn in Fleet street; at which time, upon conference amongst themselves,
all the justices of England, the lord chief baron and the barons of the
exchequer, except one of the puisne justices of the common pleas, agreed
that the defendant’s entry upon the said Richard the uncle was lawful.
Four or five days after their last meeting, one of the defendant’s coun
sel came to the bar in the queen’s bench, and moved the justices to
know their resolution in the case, for their resolution was not before
known to the defendant nor his counsel. WRAY, C. J . answered, that
they were resolved, and asked plaintiffs counsel if they could say any
more, who answered that they had said as much as they could; and like
wise asked defendant’s counsel if they had any new matter to say for
defendant, who said: “No.” And then the chief justice gave judg
ment that the plaintiff take nothing by his bill. Because counsel on
both sides were desirous to know on which of the points their resolu
tion did depend, the chief justice openly declared, that as to the first
point the greater part of the justices and barons held that execution
might be sued against the issue in tail, because the right of the estate
tail was bound by the judgment against the tenant in tail, and the
judgment over to have in value. As to the second point, they were all
agreed, that the reversion was not in the recoverers immediately by the
judgment. But he said that all the justices of England and barons of
the exchequer, except one of the justices of the common pleas, were
agreed as to the third point, viz: that the uncle was in in course and
nature of descent, although he should not have his age, nor be in ward:
(1) because the original act, the recovery, out of which the uses and
estates'had their essence, was had in the life of Edward, to which the
execution after had retrospect; (2) because the use and possession might
have vested in Edward, if execution had been sued in his life; (3) be
cause the recoverers by their entry, nor the sheriff by doing the execu
tion, could not make whom they pleased inherit; and (4) because the
uncle claimed the use by force of the recovery, and of the indentures
by words of limitation and not of purchase. And it was resolved by
them all that the recoverywas good enough, notwithstanding the death
of Edward in the morning on the same day. And judgment was given
accordingly.
At the end of his report of this case, Judge Anderson says judgment was given tor
Henry, and agreed that he should have the land; but the reason was not published by
the court. Then he adds a note, saying that Coke has now made report in print of
this case with arguments and the agreements of the chancellor and judges, but noth
ing ot this was said in the court nor in the report of the judges.
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CLERK v. DAY, in B. R3, Hilary, 36 El1z.—A. D. 1593.—C1'0. Eliz. 313.
The case on special verdict was, Joan Marsh devised land to Rose,
her daughter, for life; and, “If she marry after my death, and have
heir of her body then lawfully begotten, I will that the heir after my
daughter’s death shall have the land, and to the heirs of their body be
gotten; and if my daughter die without issue of her body begotten,
then Philip shall have it to him and his heirs.” Joan died. Rose mar
ried Silly and had issue. The question was, if Rose had an estate tail
or for life only?
First, it was agreed by all the judges that a devise to one and the
heir of his body, is an estate tail, and shall go to all the heirs of her
body; for heir is nomen collectivum, and one can have but one heir
at a time, and this shall go from heir to heir. GAWDY and FENNER,JJ ., held that Rose had but an estate for life, for so it is limited by
express words that she shall have for life; and then her heir shall take
as a purchaser, and it shall not execute in Rose. POPHAM, C. J ., contra,
for the estate is limited to the ancestor, and after limited to the heir,
and shall execute in the ancestor; especially, the words being, “if she
hath any heir,” and therefore intended that any heir should have it. Et
adjournat.
No judgment was entered on the roll, yet Moor (593) says the opinion of the court
was given. Hale cites it as such a case in King v. Melleng, 1 Ven. 214, 225.
The true name of this case is Cheat v. Day. See 2 Stra. 804.
SPARK v. SPARK, begun in C. B., Mich. 40 & 41 Eliz.—A. D. 1599. Cro.
Eliz. 666.
Ejectione Firmae. Upon special verdict the case was, Nicholas Spark
seised in fee, by indenture let it to William Spark for 80 years, if he
live so long, the remainder after his decease to the executors or assigns
of said William Spark for 40 years. William Spark died intestate,
his wife (now plaintiff) took letters of administration, and entered,
claiming the term. The lessor (now defendant) ousted her. The sole
question was whether this remainder for 40 years vested in William
Spark, or failed because he had not made any executor.
All the Justices delivered their opinions severally, that this term
vested in William, and that the plaintiff should have it as administratrix
to him, and it should be assets in her hands; for the intention of the
lessor appears, that the executors or assigns of William should have it.
So by the word “assigns” it is intended that William may dispose and
make an assignment thereof; and therefore it vested in him, and shall
go to his executors or administrators as assigns in law, and as a thing
which came to them from their testator, and not as a perquisite by
themselves. WALMSLEY, J., said it never yet was questioned by any,
that if these two terms had been in one clause, but that they should
have vested in William as if it had been habendum for 80 years, if he
THE RULE IN sHELLEY’s CASE. 55
lived so long, and for 40 years after his decease to his executors. But
it is here demised to William for 80 years, if he live so long, remainder
to his executors for 40 years; yet notwithstanding it is all one, and the
executor shall have it as executor, and it shall be assets in his hands,
it being in the testator to dispose of. And it was afterwards adjudged
accordingly. In this case WALMSLEY, J ., said, the difference betwixt
this case and Cranmer’s Case, 14 Eliz., Dyer 309, Moore 100, is be
cause it is there limited by way of use, and by the party himself, so
he shows his own intent that it should not vest in himself, but in his
executors. But here the limitation is by a stranger, wherein there is
not any intention appears, but that it should vest in the lessee him
self. And by this difference all the books are reconciled.
ARCHER’S CASE. In fiommon Pleas, Mich. 39 & 40 Ellz.—A. D. 1598—1
Coke 66b, Skinner 430.
Between Baldwin and Smith in the common pleas, in a replevin ; upon
a special verdict, the case was such: Francis Archer was seized of land
in a fee, and held in socage, and by his will in writing devised the land to
Robert Archer the father for his life, and afterwards to the next heir
male of Robert, and to the heirs males of the body of such next heir
male; Robert had issue John, Francis died, Robert enfeoffed Kent with
warranty, upon whom John entered, and Kent re-entered, and after
wards Robert died, &c.
And first it was agreed by ANDERSON, WALMSLEY & Totam Cur’. that
Robert had but an estate for life, because Robert had an express estate
for life devised to him, and the remainder is limited to the next heir
male of Robert in the singular number; and the right heir male of Rob
ert cannot enter for the forfeiture in the life of Robert, for he cannot be
heir, as long as Robert lives: Secondly, that the remainder, to the right
heir male of Robert is good, altho’ he cannot have a right heir dur
ing his life, but it is suflicient that the remainder vests eo instan te that
the particular estate determines. And so it is agreed in 7 H. 4. 6. b. and
Crammer’s Case, 14 Eliz. Dyer 309 a. _ Thirdly, (which was the prin
cipal point of the case, it was agreed per totam Cu-r’, that by the feoff
ment of the tenant for life the remainder was destroyed, for every con
tingent remainder ought to vest, either during the particular estate, or
at least eo instants that it determines: for if the particular estate be
ended, or determined in fact, or in law before the contingency falls, the
remainder is void. And in this case, inasmuch as by the feoffment of
Robert, his estate for life was determined by a condition in law annexed
to it, and cannot be revived afterwards by any possibility; for this reason
the contingent remainder is destroyed against the opinion of Gascoigne
in 7 Henry 4. 23 b. But if the tenant for life had been disseised, and
died, yet the remainder is good, for there the particular estate doth re
main in right, and might have been revested, as it is said in 32 H. 6.
But otherwise is it in the case at the bar, for by his feoffment no right
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of the particular estate doth remain. And it was said it was so agreed
by POPHAM, chief justice, and divers justices in the Argument of the
case between Dillon and Frein, [Pop. '70, And 309, 1 Coke 120 a,Jenk. Cent._276 post ] and denied by none. See [Fitz. Abr.l 11 R. 2.
Tit. Detinue 46. And note the judgment of the book, and the reason
thereof, which case there adjudged is a stronger case than the case at
the bar. But note reader, that after the feofiment, the estate for life to
some purpose had continuance; for all leases, charges, &c., made by the
tenant for life shall stand during his life, but the estate is supposed to
continue as to those only who claim by the tenant for life before the for
feiture; but as to all others who do not claim by the tenant for life him
self, the particular estate is determined: And by the better opinion the
warranty shall bind the remainder, altho’ the warranty was created
before the remainder attached or vested, and altho’ the remainder was
in the considerationof the law, and he who shall be bound by it, never
could have avoided it by entry, or otherwise.
GOODRIGHT v. PULLIN, in K1ng’s Bench, Mich., 13 Geo. 1,-II.—A. D. 1727
—2 Strange 729, 2 L. Raym. 437.
Special verdict in ejectment on this devise: “I, Nicholas Liste give and
bequeath unto my wife all that my messuage or tenement called Hatters
field, to hold for the term of her natural life, and after her decease, then
to my kinsman Nicholas Liste, for and during the term of his natural
life, and after his decease unto the heirs males of the body of the said
Nicholas lawfully to be begotten and his heirs forever; but in case the
said Nicholas die without such heir male, then I give and bequeath the
said premises unto my kinsman Edward Liste, for and during his natural
life, and after his decease to the heirs males of his body lawfully be
gotten and his heirs forever,”_and for default of such heir male, remainder
over. Edward Liste, the lessor of the plaintiff claims as heir male to
Edward Liste the remainder man in the will, supposing this to be only
an estate for life to Nicholas, and that therefore a recovery suffered bv
him and Mary (the widow) could not bar the remainders. The defendO
ant claims as heir in fee to Nicholas.
Bootle, for the plaintiff, argued, that it appeared plainly to be the in
tontion of the devisor, that Nicholas should take an estate for life only;
for the premises are expressly limited to him for life ; and if the testator
had intended him an estate tail, why is this restriction?
RAYMOND, G. J. It will be a diflicult thing to make this an estate for
life; and’the case of King v. Melling, (1 Vent. 225, 2 Lev. 58) answers
all the objections as to the limitation to Nicholas for life. The word
issue is a proper word of purchase, but the word heirs is always a word of
limitation; and the word heirs being used in this case, the words after
his decease are of no force. The words heirs and heirs male are nomina
collectiya, and include all the heirs of the devisee, and in Archcr"s Case
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it was the word next which confined it to one particular person, for with
out that word, it would have been a limitation, and not a purchase. The
word his is the word which makes the difliculty in this case ; but I think
that it may very properly be referred to Nicholas himself. Suppose
Nicholas had had several sons; if the eldest had been madea purchaser
by this will, the other sons could not have taken; and there must be
stronger words than these to control the words heirs male and make them
words of purchase. I therefore think this clearly to be an estate tail in
Nicholas. FORrnscnE, REYNOLDS and PROBYN, JJ ., of the same opin
ion; and judgment was given for the defendant by the whole court.
PERRIN v. BLAKE, in the English Court of Exchequer Chamber.—A. D.
1771.—-Hargrave’s Law Tracts 489, 10 English Ruling Cases 689.
This is a feigned action of trespass brought in the Court of King’s
Bench by Perrin and Vaughan, as surviving trustees for Sarah, the
widow of John Williams, against Hannah Blake, for forcibly entering a
plantation in Jamica, with videlicet to lay the action in Middlesex. De
fendant pleaded not guilty as to the force and claimed title under the will
mentioned below. Plaintiff’s replied setting up the will at length and
alleging a common recovery sufiered by John Williams as tenant in tail
under the will and a subsequent conveyance by him to the plaintiffs. To
this defendant demurred. From a judgment for defendant in the Court
of King’s Bench (See 4 Burrows 2579, 1 Wm. Blackstone 672), plaintiffs
bring the case here by writ of error. Reversed.
This action was brought at the suggestion of the committee of the
King’s Privy Council to obtain an adjudication by the courts of West
minster Hall upon the point arising on the will mentioned below in
volved in an appeal before the Privy Council from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals of the Island of Jamaica affirming a judgment of the
Supreme Court of Judicature at St. Jago, Jamaica, in favor of defendant
in an action of ejectment by the plaintiffs herein against the defendant
herein. The committee advised that this course be pursued because Lord
Mansfield, who was the only law lord then attending the Council, pre
ferred that a question of so much importance on the land titles of all
England should not be decided by his sole opinion.
The facts involved in the ejectment suit were these: William Will
iams, of Jamaica, Esq., being seised in fee of a plantation in that island,
and having one son and three daughters, duly executed his will bearing
date March 13, 1722. On February 4, 1723, the testator died, leaving
issue John Williams his only son and heir, and the three daughters
named in the will. His wife died March 1, 1723. In February, 1743,
John came of age; and conceiving himself to be seised in fee tail under
the will of his father, he immediately made such conveyance of the de
vised plantation in Jamaica as by the law of that island is equivalent to
a common recovery here. In March following John Williams executed
a settlement in pursuance of marriage articles made whilst he was under
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age: and by this settlement the plantation entailed by his father’s will
was conveyed to trustees and their heirs to the uses following: namely, to
the use of John Williams for life; remainder to the use of trustees, dur
ing his life, to preserve contingent remainders; remainder to the use and
intent that Sarah, his wife, if she survived him, might receive out of the
premises, during her life, a clear yearly rent charge of £1000, British
money, payable at the Royal Exchange, London, quarterly, with powers
of distress and entry; and subject to this rent-charge to the use of John
Sharpe, William Perrin and Thomas Vaughan, their executors, admin
istrators, and assigns for 400 years, for securing the rent-charge; re
mainder to the first and other sons of John Williams by the said Sarah
his wife, successively in tail male; remainder to Jolm Williams in fee.
Dec. 31, 1744, John Williams died without issue, leaving Sarah his
widow, and his two sisters, Bonella, the wife of Norwood Wilter, and
Hannah, the wife of Benjamin Blake, his co-heirs, Anna, the other sister,
having died unmarried in his lifetime. In 1745, immediately after the
death of John Williams, the husbands of his two surviving sisters and
co-heirs in their right entered into the plantation so devised and settled
and became seised. The wife of Wilter died, leaving William Wilter her
son and heir; and Benjamin Blake also died, leaving the said Hannah
his widow. Both William Wilter and Hannah Blake controverted the
validity of the jointure of £1000 a year to Mrs. Williams the widow, on
the ground, that her deceased husband John Williams was a mere ten
ant for life under the will of his father, and therefore could not bar the
entail thereby created. Perrin and Vaughan, (the surviving trustees of
the term of 400 years), brought the action of ejectment mentioned above,
to try this point.
The feigned case was several times argued before the Court of Ex
chequer Chamber and lastly in May 1771. After several months the
judges of the Exchequer Chamber disposed of the case, each delivering a
separate opinion as follows: For reversal: Lord Chief Justice Parker,
Mr. Baron Adams, Mr. Baron Perrott and the Justices Nares, Black
stone and Gould. For aflirmance: Lord Chief Justice De Grey. The
following opinion of Mr. Justice Blackstone, according to Mr. Hargrave,
is generally accepted as expressing the reason of the decision in the Ex
chequer Chamber:
BLACKSTONE, J . Upon the fullest consideration which I have been able
to give to this case, I am of opinion, that the judgment of the Court
of King’s Bench is erroneous and ought to be reversed.
I conceive that the great and fundamental maxim, upon which the
construction of every devise must depend, is “that the intention of the
testator shall be fully and punctually observed, so far as the same is con
sistent with the established rule of law; and no further.”—If it did not
go so far, it would be an infringement of that liberty of disposing
of a man’s own property, which is the most powerful incentive to honest
industry, and is, therefore, essential to a free and commercial country.
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If it went farther, every man would make a law for himself; the metes
and boundaries of property would be vague and intermediate, which must
end in its total insecurity.
But there is
, I will acknowledge, a distinction to be made, though too
often confounded or forgotten, in what is meant by those rules of law,
which must co-operate with the intention of the testator, in order to efiec
tuate his devise. Some of these rules are of an essential, permanent, and
substantial kind; and may justly be considered as the indelible landmarks
of property, irrevocably established by the well-weighted policy of the
law, which have stood the test of ages, and which cannot be exceeded or
transgressed by any intention of the testator, be it ever so clear and
manifest. Such as, that every tenant in fee-simple or fee-tail shall have
the power of alienating his estate, by the several modes adapted to
their respective interests; that no disposition shall be allowed, which
in its consequence tends to a perpetuity; that lands shall descend
to the eldest son or brother alone, or to all the ‘daughters or sisters in
partnership. These, and a multitude of other fundamental rules of prop
erty in this kingdom, are founded on the great principles of publie_con
venience or necessity, and therefore cannot be shaken or disturbed by any
whim or caprice of a testator, however, fully or emphatically expressed.
A condition not to aleniate is void, when annexed to a devise in fee, or
in tail: an executory devise which tends to a perpetuity, by depending on
so distant a contingency as the general failure of issue, is toally null
from the beginning; and no man would be suffered to direct, that his
lands shall be descendible for the future to all his male issue, or only to
the eldest of his female. But there are also certain other rules of a more
arbitrary, technical, and artificial kind, which are not so sacred as these,
being founded upon no great principles of legislation or national policy.
Some of these are only rules of interpretation or evidence, to ascertain’._ a ,
_
Gui0!
the intention of parties, by annexing particular ideas of property tof. |.
particular modes of expression: so that when a testator makes use of any
._
of these technical modes of expression, it is evidence prima facie, that he, U J
' _
means to express the self-same thing which the law expresses by the self- '
same form of words. Thus, if a man devises his land, being freefold,"
to another generally, without specifying the duration of his estate, the
devisee shall be only tenant for life: if he deyises in like maner a chattel
interest, thedevisee shall have the real property: a devise to a man and
his heirs shall give him the full and absolute dominion; to a man and the
heirs of his body, shall give him a more limited inheritance. Lastly,
there are some rules, which are not to be reckoned among the great fun
damental principles of judicial policy, but are mere maxims of positive
law deduced by legal reasoning from some or other of these great fun
damental principles._ Such as, that a man cannot raise a fee-simple to
his own right heirs, by the name of heirs, as a purchase; or, to bring it
home to the case now before the court, that a devise of lands to a man
for his life, and afterwards in any part of the same will a devise of the
r._.
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same land to the heirs of his body, shall constitute an estate tail in the
first devisee for life.
But some of these rules, of the second and third class, are rules of a
more flexible nature than those of the preceding kind, and admit of many
exceptions; whereas those admit of none. For, if the intention of the
testator be clearly and manifestly contrary to the legal import of the
words, which he has thus hastily and unadvisedly made use of, the tech
nical rule of law shall give way to this plain intention of the testator.
This has been clear law for four centuries at least, if not longer. It is
said by the judges in 9 Hen. VI. fol. 24, that a devise is marvelous in its
operations; and many instances are given, where it may countervail the
ordinary rules of law. The like doctrine is to_ be met with in every re
porter since; and is the same that obtained in equity for the construc
tion of uses before the statute. In the case of uses (says Lord Bacon of
Uses, 308, 8vo. edit.), the chancellor will consult with the rules of law,
where the intention of the parties does not specially appear. But then,
this intention of the testator, which is to ride over and control the legal
operation of his own words, must be “manifest and certain and not ob
scure or doubtful,” as was resolved by all the judges of England in
Wild’s Case, 6 Coke 16 [post 73]. Or, according to the emphatical words
of Lord Hobart 33, “the intent must not be conjectural, but by declara
tion plain.” Which words of Lord Hobart, as they are adopted and con
strued by Lord Hardwicke in Garth v. Baldwyne, 2 Ves. Sen. 646, must
mean, “plain expression or necessary implication of his intent. But if
that intent be uncertain, if it be in wquilibrio, or even in suspense or
doubt, then (he afterwards adds) the legal operation of the words must
_, take effect.” And most certainly his lordship has laid down and ex
'_
'
plained the rule with that sagacity and caution, which so eminently dis
3- .'_‘ ',“-'tinguished his decisions. For as, on the one hand, it would be very un
- -- -'~reasonable to control the plain intent of a testator by technical rules,
.' -j which were principally contrived to ascertain it; so, on the other hand,
~'
_ _ _ _where the intent is obscure or even doubtful, and liable to a variety of
"
conjectures, it is the best and the safetst way to adhere to these criterions,
. . .:'
'
‘which the wisdom of the law has established for ages together, for the
certainty and quiet of property. Every testator, when ‘he uses the legal
idiom, shall be supposed to use it in its legal meaning, unless he very
plainly declares that he means to use it otherwise. And if the contrary
doctrine should prevail; if courts either of law or equity (in both of
which the rules of interpretation must be always the same), if these or
either of them should indulge an unlimited latitude of forming conjec
tures upon wills, instead of attending to the grammatical or legal
construction, the consequence must be endless litigation. Every
title to an estate, that depends upon a will, must be brought into
Westminster Hall; for if once we depart from the established rules
of interpretation, without a moral certainty that the meaning of the
testator requires it
,
no interpretation can be safe till it has received
the sanction of a court of justice. For how -can a client or purchaser
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be assured that the conjectures of the most able counsel, or the most
experienced conveyancer, will be in all points the same as ‘the con
jectures of the judges or the chancellor? A civilian of some emi
nence, Mantica, has written a learned treatise on their law, which he
has entitled, de conjectnris ultimarum volnntatum; but I hope never
to see such a title in the law of England. For, should such a doctrine
ever prevail in this country, it were better that the statute of wills
should be totally repealed than be made the instrument of introducing
a vague discretionary law, formed upon the occasion from the cir
cumstances of every case; to which no precedent can be applied, and
from which no rule can be deducted.
The principles being thus cleared, upon which I have endeavored
to found my present opinion, I shall now proceed to state what is the
legal and technical import of the words made use of in this devise;
and will then consider whether there is any plain and mainfest inten
tion of the testator, to be gathered from any part of his will, which
may control and overrule the legal operation of the words, and at
the same time be consistent with the fundamental and immutable rules
of law.
The words which are material to be considered, in the event that
has happened (when stript of all embarrassment from the contin
gency, which never arose, of the birth of a posthumous son) are the
following :—“Item, and it is my intent and meaning, that none of
my children should sell and dispose of my estate for longer time
than his life; and to that intent I give, devise, and bequeath all the
rest and residue of my -estate to my son John Williams for and during
the term of his natural life; the remainder to my brother-in-law
Isaac Gale and his heirs, for and during the natural life of‘ my said son
John Williams; the remainder to the heirs of the body of my said son
John Williams, lawfully begotten or to be begotten; the re
mainder to my daughters for and during the term of their natural
lives, equally to be divided between them; the remainder to my
said brother-in-law Isaac Gale and his heirs during the natural lives
of my said daughters respectively; the remainder to the heirs of the
bodies of my said daughters, equally to be diveded between them.
And I do declare it to be my will and pleasure, that the share or
part of any of my said daughters, that shall happen to die, shall im
mediately vest in the heirs of her body in manner aforsaid.”
It is necessary to take notice, that Isaac Gale died in the lifetime
of the testator, whereby the remainder limited to him and his heirs
for the life of John Williams became, in point of law, a lapsed devise.
The disposition, therefore, at the death of the testator, stood thus:
“To John Williams for the term of his natural life; the remainder
to the heirs of his body,” without any interposing estate. The legal con
sequence of which is
,
that if this be an estate tail in John Williams,
it is an estate tail in possession, by immediately uniting with the
A
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life-estate; and not an estate tail in remainder, as in the cases of
Duneomb v. Duncomb (3 Levinz, 437), and Coulson v. Coulson (2
Atk. 250), it was held to be, by reason of the interposing estate,
which subsisted in both these cases. And indeed, were it otherwise,
the plaintiff’s replication could not be supported upon this general
demurrer; for therein he pleads, that “by virtue of the said will,
John Williams entered into the close in question, and became seised
thereof in his demense as of fee tail, to wit, to him and to the heirs
of his body issuing.” How far the interposition of this estate to Isaac
Gale and his heirs, though it never took effect, is an evidence of the
testator’s intention, will afterwards come to be considered. At present
the only question is, what estate is by these words devised to John
Williams, according to the general rule of law, uncontrolled by other
considerations? And I apprehend there is no doubt, but that the
words, in their legal construction, convey an estate tail to John Williams.
For the rule of law, as laid down in Shelley’s Case, 1 Coke 104,
[ante] and recognized in Co. Litt. 22, 319, 376, is
,
that, “where
the ancestor takes an estate of freehold, with a remainder, either
mediate or immediate, to his heirs, or the heirs of his body, the word
‘heirs’ is a word of limitation of the estate and not of purchase;” that
is, in other words, that such remainder vests in the ancestor himself, and
the heir (when he takes) shall take bydescent from him, and not as a
purchaser. This rule, though too plain and positive to be openly ques
tioned, or denied has yet been obliquely reflected on; and insinuations
have been thrown out, that it is a strict and a narrow rule,-—-founded
upon feodal principles, which have long ago ceased ;—that in Shelley’s
Case it is only laid down arguendo by the counsel, and not by the court;
—and that too in the _case of a deed and not of a will. It will not there
fore be foreign to the present question, to make a short inquiry into the
reason, the antiquity, and the extent of the rule.
Were it strictly true, that the origin of this rule was merely feodal,
and calculated solely to give the lord his profits of tenure (either ward
ship or relief) upon the descent of the heir from the ancestor, of which
the lord might be defrauded if the heir was to-take by purchase, of which
(by the way) I have never met with a single trace in any feodal writer;
still it would not shake the authority of the rule, or make us wish for an
opportunity to evade it. There is hardly an ancient rule of real prop
erty, but what has in it more or less of a feodal tincture. The common
law maxims of descent, the conveyance by livery of seisin, the whole ‘doc
trine of copyholds, and a hundred other instances that might be given,
are plainly the offspring of the feodal system ; but, whatever their paren
tage was, they are now adopted by the common law of England, incor
porated into its body, and so interwoven with its policy; that no court
of justice in this kingdom has either the power or (I trust) the inclina
tion to disturb them. The benefit of clergy took its origin from prin
ciples of popery; but is there a man breathing that would therefore
now wish to abolish it? The law of real property in this country, wher
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ever its materials were gathered, is now formed into a fine artificial sys
tem, full of unseen connections and nice dependencies; and he that breaks
one link of the chain, endangers the dissolution of the whole.
But it is by no means clear, that this rule took its rise merely from
feodal principles. I am rather inclined to believe, that it was first estab
lished to prevent the inheritance from being in abeyance. For, though it
has been the doctrine of modern times, in order to effectuate executory
devises, that, where a limitation of the inheritance depends in contingency,
an interim estate may descend to the heir until the contingency happens,
yet it is manifest to any one the least conversant in our ancient books,
that during the pendency of a contingent remainder in fee or in tail, the
inheritance was formerly always (and in some case is to this day) held to
be in abeyance, or in nubibus, as they then expressed it. Thus, if a gift
be made to one for life, remainder to the right heirs of J. S., then living,
the fee simple is in suspense or *abeyance during the life of J . S. Bro.
t. Done. 6. And so is Co. Litt. 342 b. But this state of abeyance was
always odious in the law; and therefore the whole freehold or frank-tene
ment could not be in abeyance, except in the single case of the death of
a parson, or other corporation sole. Dyer 71; Hob. 338. For in that
interval there could be no seisin of the land, no tenant to a praecipe, no
one of ability to protect it from wrong or injury, or to Oanswer its bur
thens or services. And this is one principal reason, why a particular es
tate for years is not allowed to support a contingent remainder; that
the freehold may not be in abeyance: as is laid down in Hob. 153.
But when the first or particular estate was a freehold, there in some
cases the law allowed the inheritance to be put in abeyance, by the
creation of a contingent remainder; but this very sparingly and with
great reluctance. For, during such abeyance of the inheritance, many
operations of law were totally suspended. The particular tenant was
rendered dispunishable for waste; for the writ of waste can only be
brought by him who is entitled to the inheritance. The title, if
attacked, could not be completely defended; for there was no one in
being, of whom the tenant of the freehold could pray in aid to support
his right. The mere right itself, if subsisting in a stranger, could not
be recovered in this interval; for, upon a writ of right patent, a lessee
for life cannot join the mise upon the mere right. 1 Roll. Abr. 686.
For these among other reasons, the law was extremely cautious of ad
mitting the inheritance to be in abeyance, unless in very particular
cases; as is laid down by Hobart and Doddridge, 2 Roll. Rep. 502,
506, Hob. 338. Indeed, where the particular estate was made to A.
for life, with ‘remainder to the right heirs of B. then living, there till
the death of B. the inheritance was necessarily in abeyance; for B.
the ancestor was entitled to nothing. But, where sthe ancestor had
already an estate of freehold limited to him, the law, (to prevent such
abeyance) adjudged that a subsequent remainder to his heirs (who,
during his life, are imcertain) was a remainder vested in the ancestor
himself, and that his heirs shall claim by descent from him. For, as
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Hankford, J ., says in 11 Hen. IV. 74: “If land be given to a man for
term of his life, the remainder in tail, and for default of issue the
remainder to the right heir of the first tenant, the remainder in fee
simple takes its being by the possession which the first tenant hath.”
And though in this case it was argued at the bar, that the fee was
in nubibus, or in suspense, yet this was strongly denied both by
him and by Hill, another of the Judges. And, indeed, if we consider
it attentively, the whole of this rule amounts to no more than what
happens every day in the creation of an estate in fee or in tail, by
a gift to A. and to his heirs forever, or to A. and to the heirs of his
body begotten. The first words (to A.) create an estate for life: the
latter (to his heirs, or the heirs of his body) create a remainder in
fee or in tail; which the law, to prevent an abeyance, refers to and
vests in the ancestor himself; who is thus tenant for life, with an im
mediate remainder in fee or in tail; and then, by the conjunction of
the two estates, or the merger of the less in the greater, he becomes
tenant in fee or tenant in tail in possession. Hence therefore I am
induced to think, that one principal foundation of this rule was to
obviate the mischief of two frequently putting the inheritance in sus
pense or abeyance.
Another foundation might be, and was probably, laid in a principle
diametrically opposite to the genius of the feodal institutions; namely,
a desire to facilitate the alienation of land, and to throw it into the
track of commerce, one generation sooner, by vesting the inheritance
in the ancestor, than if he continued tenant for life, and the heir was
declared a purchaser. Therefore, where an estate was limited to the
ancestor for life, and afterwards (mediately or immediately) to his
heirs, who are uncertain till the time of his death; the law considered
the ancestor as the first and principal object of the donor’s bounty; and
therefore permitted him (who, as it is said, Co. Litt. 22, beareth in his
body all his heirs, and who had the only visible and notorious freehold
in the land) to sell it
,
devise it
,
where the custom would permit, or
charge it with his debts and incumbrances. And however narrow and
illiberal the original establishment of this rule, or the adhering to it
in later times, many have been represented in argument, I own myself
of opinion, that those constructions of law, which tend to facilitate the
sale and circulation of property in a free and commercial country, and
which make it more liable to the debts of the visible owner, who derives
a greater credit from that ownership; such constructions, I say, are
founded upon principles of public policy altogether as open and as
enlarged as those which favor the accumulation of estates in private
families, by‘ fettering inheritances till the full age of posterity now
unborn, and which may not be born for half a century.
Then as to the antiquity of the rule in question, it hath been said,
that in Shelley’s Case,.it is only urged by the counsel for the de
fendant in their argument, and not relied on by the court. But the
determination of the Court is grounded on this rule, as well in
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Shelley’s Case, as in the Case of the Earl of Bedford, Moor. 720, where
the same rule is likewise argued from by the counsel as a known and
undeniable maxim. And Lord Coke in his Commentary on Littleton
(the great result of all his experience) has often adapted and relied
upon it; and has cited, in his margin, to support it
,
a long list of
authorities from the Year Books; chiefly those of Edward the Third.
I have looked into all these, and into some besides; and shall only say
that they do most explicitly warrant the doctrine extracted from them
b
y that great and learned judge.
There is one case which I have never seen cited, and which is by far
the earliest of ‘any that have occurred to me upon a diligent search. In
this the question before the court was, whether an estate thus circum
stanced (that is, settled on a man for life, and after an immediate
remainder in tail, to the right heirs of the tenant for life) was, on
failure of the remainder in tail, liable to the debts of the tenant for
life; and it was determined to be liable, upon the ground of its being
a fee simple vested in the ancestor; and therefore vested in him, in
order to prevent the inheritance from being in abeyance. This, I
believe, is the Very first case in our books, wherein this principle was
established. It is in the Year Book of Edward II. published by Ser
jeant Maynard, M. 18 Edw. II. fol. 577. [Abel’s Case ante 48,, stating
it in full] * *
* The rule of law, deducible from hence, is well and
emphatically collected by Fitzherbert, in his abridgment, tit. Feoffment,
pl. 109, who refers (I presume) to this case (although it was not then
in print) when he says, that it was resolved in M. 18 Edw. II. “that if
a man give land to B. for term of life, remainder to C. in tail, remainder
to the right heirs of B. in fee, this remainder in fee vests in B. as
much as if the remainder was limited to B. and his right heirs in fee;
and the right heir of B. shall have this by descent and not as purchaser.”
And from all these authorities I infer, that the rule in question is
a rule of the highest antiquity; not merely grounded on any narrow
feodal principle, but applied, in the first instance we know of, to the
liberal and conscientious purpose of facilitating the alienation of the
land by charging it with the debts of the ancestor.
However, it hath been urged, that though the rule must be allowed
with respect to estates created by deed; yet it doth not follow, that it
also extend to devises: and so the master of the rolls is said to have
declared (in the case of Papillon V. Voice, 2 Wms. 477) “that he knew
of no case, where lands being devised to A. for life, remainder to the
heirs of the body, this (in case of a will) had been construed an estate
tail in A.” But either the reporter has misapprehended his honour’s
meaning or else he had surely forgotten the cases of Whiting V. Wilkins,
1 Bulstr. 219, Rundle V. Healy, Cart 170, and Broughton V. Langley,
Lutw. 814, wherein that point is resolved in terminis. It will therefore
be sufficient to observe upon this head, that the rule in Co. Litt. 22,
319, is laid down in general terms, “where and wheresoever the an
cestor taketh an estate for life, &c.,” and in Co. Litt. 376, and also in
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Shelley’s Case, and in Moor. 720, Earl -o
f
Bedford’s Case, it is extended
to all conveyances. And devises of land ( which differ totally from
testaments of chattels) are held in all our books, and particularly in
Widnham v. Chetwynd, 1 Burr. 429, to be a species of conveyance; and
this is the reason why lands purchased after the execution of it can
not pass by such a devise.
But, however strongly this rule may be founded in antiquity, and
supported by reason and authority, I have in the outset conceded, that
when it is applied to devises, it may give way to the plain and manifest
intent of the devisor; provided, that intent be consistent with the
great and immutable principles of our legal policy; and provided it
be so fully expressed in the testator’s will, or else may be collected from
thence by such cogent and demonstrative arguments, as to leave no
doubt in any reasonable mind, whether it was his intent or no. Which
leads me to the last consideration. Whether there is any such plain
and manifest intent of the devisor, expressed in or to be collected from
any part of this devise, as may control the legal operation of the words,
and at the same time be consistent with the fundamental rules of law?
And I am of opinion, that there is no such plain intent.
In order to decide this question clearly, it is necessary to state it
accurately. And first, let us see what the question is not. The question
is not, whether the testator intended that his son John should have
a power of alienation. If that was all, the dispute would be soon at
an end; for his intention is most clearly expressed (and it is the only
clear intent I can find) that the son should not have such a power. And,
if a conveyance were now to be directed of this estate by a court of
equity, it would probably be in strict settlement, according to the case
of Lennard v. Earl of Sussex, 2 Vern. 526. But that and all similar
cases (of directing a conveyance by a court of equity) must be laid out
of the present question; for we are now in the case of a legal estate,
executed either one way or the other, and not of an executory trust.
And if the testator has in fact devised an estate to John, with which such
a restriction of alienationis incompatible by the fundamental rules of
law, the restriction is null and void. Again: the question is not, whether
the testator intended that his son John should have only an estate for life.
I believe there never was an instance, when an estate for life was ex
pressly devised to the first taker, that the devisor intended he should
have anything more. But if he afterwards gives an estate to the heirs
of the tenant for life, or to the heirs of his body, it is the consequence
or operation of law that in this case supervenes his intention (as Lord
Hale expresses it
,
1 Ventr. 225, 379), and vests a remainder in the an
cestor: which remainder, if it be immediate, merges his estate for life, and
gives him the inheritance in possession: but if mediate only, by reason
of some interposing estate, then it vests the inheritance in the tenant
for life, as a future interest, to take effect in possession when the in
terposition is determined. And therefore it has been frequently ad
judged, that though an estate be devised to a man for life only, or for
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life et non aliter or with any other restrictive expressions; yet, if there be
afterwards added apt and proper words to create an estate of inheritance
in his heirs or the heirs of his body, the extensive force of the latter
words shall overbalance the strictness of the former, and make him
tenant in tail or in fee. These therefore are not the true questions in
the present case.
But I apprehend the true question of intent will turn, not upon the
quantity of estate intended to be given to John the ancestor; but upon
the nature of the estate intended to be given to the heirs of his body.
That the ancestor was intended to take an estate for life, is certain:
that his heirs were intended to take after him, is equally certain: but
how those heirs were intended to take, whether as descendants, or as
purchasers, is the question. If the testator intended they should take
as purchasers, then John the ancestor remained only tenant for life. If
he meant they should take by descent, or had formed no intention about
the matter, then, by operation and consequence of law, the inheritance
first vested in the ancestor. The true question therefore is,—Whether
the testator has or has not plainly declared his intent, that the heirs
of the body of John Williams shall take an estate by purchase, entirely
detached from an'd unconnected with the estate of their ancestors? or,
in other words, Whether he meant to put an express negative on the
general rule of law which vests in the person of the ancestor (when
tenant of the freehold) an estate that is given to the heirs of his body?
But, in order to say this, we must suppose, that the testator was ap
prised of this rule, and meant an exception to it; of which there is no
evidence whatsoever. And here lies the great difiiculty, which the
defendant in error must encounter. It is not incumbent on the plaintifi
to show, by any express evidence, that this testator meant to adhere to
the rule of law; for that is always supposed till the contrary is clearly
proved: but it is incumbent on the defendant to show, by plain and
manifest indications, that the testator intended to deviate from the gen
eral rule; for that is never supposed, till made out, not by conjecture but
by strong and conclusive evidence.
Let us therefore see what evidence has been usually required to
demonstrate such a devious intention, and what the evidence is that is re
lied on in the present case. I am far from maintaining, that by a devise
to a man’s heirs or the heirs of his body, they shall never take as pur
chasers in any case. But I-have never observed it to be allowed, ex
cepting in one of these four situations; not one of which will apply to
the present case.
'
1. Where no estate at all, or (which is the same thing in the idea
of our ancient law) where no estate of freehold is devised to the ancestor.
Here the heirs cannot take by descent, because the ancestor never had
in him any descendible estate. And this must always be the case,
where the ancestor is dead at the time of the devise, as in the known
case of John de Mandeville (Co. Litt. 26), the heir then taking a
68 ESTATES OF INHERITANCE.
vested estate by purchase. It is also the same, if the ancestor be living
and has no sort of estate devised to him; only that then the estate of
the heir is contingent, because nemo est haeres viventis. And, if the
ancestor has only the devise of a chattel interest, with a subsequent
estate to his heirs,- the heirs must likewise take as purchasers, or not take
at all. For, if between the term of the ancestor and the estate of his
heirs, there is 'no vested freehold remainder, the heirs can only take by
way of executory devise; which, ex vi termini, implies an estate not ex
ecuted in the ancestor. Or, if there be any such vested estate of free
hold, interposed between the ancestor’s term and the contingent re
mainder to his heirs, that contingent remainder is supported entirely
by the interposed estate, and does not derive its being or any degree of
assistance from the chattel estate of the ancestor.
2. The next case is, where no estate of inheritance is devised to the
heirs; as in the case of White v. Collins, Com. 289 (cited by the counsel
for the defendant). There the devise was to Frank Mildmay for life,
with a power of jointuring, and after his death (and jointure, if any be)
to the heir male of his body lawfully begotten, during the term of his
natural life; remainder over. Common sense will here tell us, that
when no estate of inheritance is devised to the heir male of the body,
he cannot take by descent as heir.
3. The third case is
,
where some words o
f explanation are annered
by the devisor himself to the word heirs, in the will; whereby he dis
covers a consciousness, distrust, or apprehension that he may have used
the word improperly, and not in its legal meaning; and therefore he in
a manner retracts it
,
he corrects the inaccuracy of his own phrase, and
tells every reader of his will how he would have it understood. Thus,
in Burchel v. Durdant, (2 Ventr. 311, Carth. 54), the devise was, “in
trust for Robert Durdant for life, and after his decease to the heirs
male of his body, now living.” As if the testator had said, “I do not
mean a perpetual succession in the male line of Robert Durdant, which
perhaps may be the legal sense of heirs male of his body; but I mean by
that expression only such of his sons as are at present born and known
to me.” And accordingly the court held that George Durdant, the
son of Robert, and living when the will was made, should take the
estate as a purchaser. So in Lisle v. Gray (2 Lev. 223), the words
were, “to Edward for life remainder to his first, second, third and fourth
sons in ta'il male; and so to all and every other the heirs male of the
body of Edward.” Which words “and so” (together with the manifest
reason of the thing) plainly showed'that the “other heirs male of the
body” in the subsequent clause of the will, were to be understood just
so as the “first, second, third and fourth sons” were to be understood in
the preceding. And in Lowe v. Davis (Lord Raym. 1561), when the
testator had first devised, in a loose unguarded manner, to “his son
Benjamin and his heirs lawfully to be begotten,” he immediately recol
lects himself and adds, by way of explanation, “that is to say, to his
1
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first, second, third, and every other son and sons successively, lawfully
to be begotten of the body of the said Benjamin, &c.” This devise to
the heirs, thus explained was held to be by way of purchase. So in the
case of Doe on demise of Long v. Laming, (Burr. 1100), the devise
was of gravelkind lands, “to Anne Cornish and the heirs of her body be
gotten, as well female as male, to take as tenants in common.” Now,
since gravelkind lands cannot descend to heirs female as well as males
(as is expressly declared by the statute De Prooerog. Regis, 17 Edw.
II. c. 16), nor can heirs, as such, be tenants in common but coparceners,
it is clear, that by the words heirs of the body (thus explained by the
words female as well as male, and to take as tenants in common), the
devisor could only mean to describe the children of Anne Cornish.
4. The last case, wherein heirs of the body have been held to be
words of purchase, is where the testator hath superadded fresh limita
tions, and grafted other words of inheritance upon the heirs to whom
he gives the estate: whereby it appears, that those heirs were meant by
the testator to be the root of a new inheritance, the stock of a new des
cent; and were not considered merely as branches derived from their
own progenitor. Where the heir is thus himself made an ancestor, it
is plain, that the denomination of heir of.the body was merely de
scriptive of the person intended to take, and means no more than “such
son or daughter of the tenant for life, as shall also be heir of his body.”
The cases of Lisle v. Gray, and Lowe V. Davis and Long v. Laming,
fall under this head as well as the other; these having also words of
limitation superadded to the word heirs, as well as the explanatory
words I before took notice of. Thus too in Cheek v. Day (which, as
Lord Raymond observes, Fitzg. 24, Fortesc. 77 is the true name of the
case usually called Clerk v. Day), the devise, as there cited from the
roll, was “to my daughter Rose for life, and if she marry after my
death, and have any heirs lawfully begotten, I will that her heir shall
have the lands after my daughter’s death, and the heirs of such heir.”
So likewise Areher’s Case, 1 Coke, 66, is “to the right and next heir.”
of Robert Archer (the tenant for life), and to the heirs of his body
lawfully begotten for ever.” And the case of Baekhouse v. Wells, 2
Wms. 476, is “from and after the decease of the tenant for life to the
issue male of his body, and to the heir male of such issue male.”
All the cases therefore that have hitherto occurred, from the statute
of wills to the present time (a period above two centuries)—all the
cases, I say, in which heirs of the body have been construed to be words
of purchase, are reducible to these four heads: either where no estate
of freehold is given to the ancestor; or where no estate of inheritance is
given to the heir ; or where other explanatory words are immediately sub
joined to the former; or, lastly, where a new inheritance is grafted on the
heirs of the body,—none of which is the present case. We have therefore
no authority from precedents to warrant such a construction as is now
contended for. I do not however say, that this construction can never
be made under other circumstances than those which I have now men
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tioned, but only that at present I am not aware of any other circum
stances that can warrant the same construction. At the same time I
allow, that the same construction may and ought to be made, whenever
the intent of the testator is equally clear and manifest.
What then is the evidence of this intention in the present case? It
may be resolved into two particulars: 1. The testator’s previous declared
intention, “that none of his children should sell or dispose of his
estate for longer term than his own life,” together with his consequent
disposition “to that intent ;” and, 2, The interposed estate of Isaac
Gale, and his heirs, during the life of the testator’s son. For, as to
what was mentioned at the bar, of his making the daughters and the
heirs of their bodies tenants in common, and directing the share of
each daughter immediately upon her death to vest in the heirs of her
body ;—that is plainly done to prevent the inconvenience of survivorship
among the daughters; which must otherwise have been the consequence,
according to the rules laid down, Co. Litt. 25 b, that “where there is
a gift to two women, and the heirs of their bodies, they have a joint
estate for life, and several inheritances.”
Nor indeed do I think much stress can be laid on the second par
ticular, the interposed estate of Isaac Gale, and his heirs. For had
that been expressly created to preserve contingent remainders, the
case of Coulson v. Coulson (2 Atk. 250), is an express authority, that
this will not make the heir of the body a purchaser. Much has been said,
and much has been insinuated at the bar to discredit that case. But I
hold it to have been determined upon sound legal principles. For the
misapprehension of a testator, in thinking the remainders were con
tingent when they were not so, cannot alter the rule of law. But were
it otherwise, had the case of Coulson v. Coulson been decided upon
dubious grounds, I should tremble at the consequence of shaking its
authority, after it has now been established for thirty years, and half
the titles in the kingdom are by this time built upon its doctrine. But
there is no occasion, upon the present question, to disturb the case of
Coulson V. Coulson, by either affirming or denying it. For, in the de
vise to Isaac Gale and his heirs, there is no such purpose avowed as the
preserving contingent remainders: it is only to be conjectured and
guessed at. The purpose of the testator might be (as in the case of
Duncomb V. Duncomb), to prevent dower in the wife of his son, or
tenancy by the curtesy in his daughters’ husbands :-—especially as he had,
by another clause in his will, destroyed the joint-tenancy of his daughters,
which would otherwise (according to 2 Roll. Abr.'90), have prevented the
curtesy of their husbands. And where it is possible there may be more
intents than one, the selecting of the true intent is at best but probability
and guess-work; and does not amount to that declaration plain, which
Lord Hobart and Lord Hardwicke require, before it shall set aside a
positive rule of law.
If this be so, we are driven back to the introductory words as the
only evidence of this intent: and then the result of the whole matter is,
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that the testator, having declared his intent, that his son shall not alien
his land, he to that extent gives his son an estate to which the law
has annexed the power of alienation: an estate to himself for life, with
remainder to the heirs of his body. Now, what is a court of justice
to conclude from hence? Not, that a tenant in tail, thus circumstanced,
shall be barred of the power of alienation; this is contrary to funda
mental principles. Not, that the devisee shall take a difierent estate
from what the legal signification of the words imports; this, without
other explanatory words, is contrary to all rules of construction. But,
plainly and simply this: that the testator has mistaken the law, and
imagined that a tenant for life, with first an interposed estate, and then a
remainder to the heirs of his body, could not sell or dispose of this in
terest. _
My Lord Chief Baron on the argument put a question to the counsel
for the defendant, to which no satisfactory answer was or could be
given. Suppose, after the like declaration of his intent, the testator
had devised the premises to his son and his heirs for ever: Would that
have made the son tenant for life only, and his heirs take as purchasers?
Most clearly not. This case is the same in kind, and differs only in
species. The words now used are as apt legal words to create an estate
tail, as those an estate in fee. And as I conceive, that when a testator
has devised a vested estate, his creation of a trust to preserve contingent
remainders will not turn it into a casual executory interest; so also I
think, that when he has (though ignorantly) devised an estate that is
alienable, no previous or concomitant intent to prevent his devisee from
alienating shall alter the nature of that devise.
'
Will it be said, that when the testator’s intent is manifest, the law will
supply the proper means to carry it into execution, though he may have
used improper ones? This would be turning every devise into an ex
ecutory trust, and would be arming every court of law with more than
the jurisdiction of a court of equity; a power to frame a conveyance
for the testator, instead of construing that which he has already framed.
Will it then be said, that because the means marked out by the testator
will not answer the end proposed, therefore he intended to use other
means and not those which he has marked out? This consequence, I
apprehend, will not follow by any rules of law or logic. For then it must
be supposed, that every man, who has so in view a particular end, knows
also and is sure to employ the most effectual means to carry it into ex
ecution ; which is paying too great a compliment to human wisdom. Let
us see how this argument will stand in form. Thettestator intended to
use those which were the most effectual means to prevent his son from
selling his estate; that the son’s heir should take by purchase was the
most effectual means: therefore the testator intended that the heir should
take by purchase. Here the first proposition will not be granted, that
he intended to use those which were the most eifectual means; for this
intent implies his knowledge of what were the most effectual, of which
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there is no shadow of evidence. Or, put it otherwise; the testator in
tended to use what he thought the most effectual means: but he thought
the heir’s taking by purchase was the most effectual; therefore he in
tended that the heir should take by purchase. Here the second pro
position can never be proved; that the testator thought any such thing.
The true consequence I conceive to be this: that because the means
marked out by the testator are not adequate to the end proposed, there
fore he was mistaken in their efficacy.
If a man proposes to qualify a son to sit in the House of Commons,
and to that intent devises to him an annuity of £300 per annum for
99 years, if he so long lives; we cannot argue from this declared intent
of the testator, that this term of years shall be construed to be a free
hold estate for life, because otherwise it would not answer the intent.
We should rather conclude, that the testator was ignorant of the dis
tinction between the two estates, and had unfortunately chosen that
which was unfit for his purpose.
The case of Popham V. Bamfield (as the two parts of it are reported
in. 1 Vern. 79, 1 Wms. 54), was in this respect stronger than the present.
One Rogers had devised a large estate to the testator’s (Popham’s) son, on
condition that his father would also settle two-thirds of his estate on the
son and his heirs male. Now, though the testator was under a strong
obligation, by this condition, to give an estate to his son and his heirs
male; though he recited in his codicil that he had devised the lands to
his son and heirs male of his body; which were indisputable evidences of
his intention to give his son an estate in tail male; yet, having in his
will by express words made his son only tenant for life, with remainder
to his first and other sons, in tail, the lord keeper, assisted by the two
chief justices, the master of the rolls, and Mr. Justice Powell_. all
agreed that the estate must remain in strict settlement. And, if an
intention of the testator (so manifestly and directly proved) was not in
that case suflicient to make the words “first and other sons” be construed
“heirs male of the body,” much less in the present instance shall it turn
the words “heirs of the body” into “first and other sons.”
Upon the whole, I conclude, that though it does appear, that the
testator intended to restrain his son from disposing of his estate for any
longer term than his life, and to that intent contrived the present de
vise; yet, it does not appear by any evidence at all, much less by dec
laration plain, that in order to effectuate this purpose he meant that
the heirs of the body of his son should take by purchase and not by
descent, or even that he knew the difference.
The consequence is, that by the legal operation of the words, which are
not in my opinon controlled by any manifest intent to the contrary,
the heir could only take by descent, and of course John Williams, the
son, was tenant in tail of the premises, and duly authorized to suffer
the recovery, that has been pleaded; and therefore I am of opinion that
the judgment below should be _
Reversed.
THE RULE IN wILn’s CASE. 73
Rule in Wild’s Case.
ANON., in Common Bench, Hilary, 6 El1z.—-A. D. 1564—1 And. 43, pl. 110.
One devised his land to William his son for term of life, and after
his decease to the men-children of his body, and if the said William die
without any man-child of his body then the land should remain over,
&c. The testator died, William died without any issue male of his body ;
and on this the question was what estate he had. The justices held
that he had an estate to him and the heirs male of his body.
VVILD’S CASE, in B. R., Hilary, 41 Eliz.-—A. D. 1599-6 Coke 16b, Moor
397, Golsb. 139, 1 Vent. 225, 2 Lev. 5s. From Coke.
Ejeetione Firmae between Richardson and Yardly, and on not guilty
pleaded the jury gave a special verdict to this effect. Land was devised
to A for life, remainder to B and the heirs of his body, the remainder ~to
Rowland Wild and his wife, and after their decease to their children,
Rowland and his wife then having issue a son and daughter; and after
wards the devisor died, and after his decease, A died, B died without
issue, Rowland and his wife died, and the son had issue a daughter
and died. If this daughter should have the land or not was the ques
tion: and it consisted only upon the construction what estate Rowland
Wild and his wife had, viz. if they had an estate tail, or an estate for
life with remainder to their children for life. The case for difliculty
was argued before all the judges of England, and it was resolved, that
Rowland and his wife had but an estate for life, with remainder to their
children for life, and no estate tail.
In the construction of the will the judges first considered the judg
ment of the common law, if the conveyance had been made by the de
visor in his life, and second the reason and cause that the judgment shall
not be according to the rule of law. And it was resolved without ques
tion, that at the common law they had but an estate -for life, the re
mainder to their children for life. Then what shall be the reason and
cause to give them an estate tail by construction in this case? It will
be answered, the intent of the testator. But it was resolved, that such
intent ought to be manifest and certain, and not obscure and doubtful;
for at the common law lands were not devisable, but only by custom,
and that in ancient cities and boroughs, of houses and small things,
* * * for the ancient common law did favor him whom the common
law made heir, because he was to sit in the seat of his ancestor, and to
serve the king and commonwealth. * * * And therefore this dif
ference was resolved for good law, that if A devises his lands to B and
to his children or issue, and he hath not any issue at the time of the
devise, that the same is an estate tail; for the intent of the devisor is
manifest and certain that his children or issue should take, and as im
mediate devisees they cannot take, because they are not in reruni natura,
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and by way of remainder they cannot take, for that was not his intent,
for the gift is immediate. Therefore there such words shall be taken
as words of limitation, scil, as much as children or issues of his body;
for every child or issue ought to be of the body, and therewith agrees a
case in Trinity 4 Eliz.( ) where one devised land to husband and wife
and to the men-children of their bodies begotten, and it did not appear in
the case that they had any issue male at the time of the devise, and there
fore it was adjudged that they had an estate tail to them and their heirs
male of their bodies.
But if a man devises land to A and his children or issue, and they
then have issue of their bodies, there his express intent may take effect,
according to the rule of the common law, and no manifest and certain
intent appears in the will to the contrary. And therefore in such case,
they shall have but a joint estate for life. '
_
But it was resolved that if a man as in the case at bar, devises land
to husband and wife, and after their decease to their children, or the
remainder to their children; in such case, although they have not any
child at~ the time, yet every child which they shall ever have after, may
take by way of remainder, according to the rule of law; for his intent ap
pears that their children should not take immediately, but after the de
cease of Rowland and his wife.
The rules declared in this case are generally known in the law as the Rule
in Wild’s‘Case.
The statutes enacted in all of the states, declaring that the devisee shall
take as large an estate as the testator could give at the time of his death un
less a different intent appears, result in a modification of the rules in this
case to the extent that the children will take in fee if they take as pur
chasers.
OATES v. JACKSON, in King’s Bench, Mich. 16 Geo. II.—A. D. 1743—2
Strange 1172.
Upon a case made at the assises, it was stated, that Ralph Clay being
seised in fee of an estate called W0lf’s Park, devised it in these words,
“As to Wolf Park I give it to my wife Annabella for her life, and after
her death ‘to my daughter Isabella Addibell and her children on her
body begotten or to be begotten by William Addibell her husband, and
their heirs for ever.” That the wife is dead, and Isabella at the
time of making the will had one daughter Elizabeth, and afterwards
two sons and one daughter,‘ who are all dead without issue: that
Elizabeth had issue the lessor of the plaintiff: that Isabella survived
William Addibell and married Jackson, by whom she had a son the
present defendant, who entered on her death.
The question was, what estate passed to Isabella and her children by
William Addibell: the plaintiff insisting, that Isabella was only tenant
for life, and the children of that marriage had the reversion in fee: the
defendant insisting, that Isabella was jointly seised in fee with the chil
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dren, and having survived them all, and left him her son and-heir, he
is entitled.
And after several arguments the Chief Justice delivered the resolu
tion of the court: that Isabella took as joint-tenant. It being stated, that
at the time of making the will she had a child, which has been con
strued to be equal to children. 2 Vern. 106. C0. Lit. 9. is express, that
to A. et liberies suis and their heirs, is a joint fee to all. And it is
no objection, that by this means the several estates may commence at
difierent times. C0. Lit. 188. Pollexf. 373. M0. 220.
As Isabella therefore survived all the children she had by William
Addibell, the whole fee vested in her, and descended to her son the
defendant. Who had judgment accordingly.
BUFFAR v. BRADFORD, in English High Court of Chancery, Nov. 27,
1741—2 Atkyns 220.
Bill to have personal estate secured and the deeds and writings, in
volved in a will providing among other things: “I give the use of the
whole to my sister Mary Bradford, for her support and maintenance
during the time she shall remain a widow, sans waste, so as the same
be divided on her marriage; two eights to herself, two other parts to
her daughter my niece Ann, and the remaining four parts to my niece
Buffar, and the children born of her body.”
Loan CHANCELLOR HARDWICKE2 The question is what estate the
testator’s niece Buffar and herchildren take. She had no child at the
time the will was made, _but the plaintiff was born afterwards in the
life-time of the testator ; the mother of the plaintiff died in the testator’s
life-time. It is insisted on the part of the defendant Mary Bradford,
who had the estate for life, and who is likewise the heir at law, that it
is a lasped devise, for that the plaintiff’s mother took an estate-tail,
and her children are words of limitation and not of purchase where the
devisee had none at the time the devise was made; and therefore, as
the plaintiff’s mother died before the testator, no estate vested in her,
and consequently it is a lapsed legacy; and for an authority her counsel
relied on Wild’s Case, 6 Coke 17 (ante 73). On the other hand it
must be admitted that children in their natural import are words of
purchase and not of limitation, unless it is to comply with the in
tention of a testator, where the words cannot take efiect in any other way.
But suppose that a devise was to A and after his death to his children,
here it is a word of purchase.
'
O
'
It has been admitted very candidly by the counsel that as to the
personal estate the children, though born after the making of the will,
must take equally with the mother as joint-tenants; for where a man
gives personal estate to A and his children, to construe the word
children to be a word of limitation and not of purchase would be a
strained and remote construction, and would defeat the children entirely,
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and the first taker would have all. Vide Cook V. Cook, 2 Vern. 545;
and Forth V. Chapman, adjudged on the same words in Lord Maccles
field’s time, 2 P. Wms. 663. _
It is the time of possession in the present case which takes it out of
the reasoning in Wild’s Case ,-' for here Mrs. Bufiar and her children are
to have four eights, and to take at the same time as joint-tenants. The
will in this case confines it to such children as should_be born in the
life-time of the testator, and therefore is not liable to the objection
made by the defendant’s counsel, that the remainder must divide and
split as in common marriage settlements where there is an estate tail
to daughters and one is born in the life-time of the father and another
after his death. See Stevens v. Stevens, Cas. Temp. Talb. 228.
The plaintiff being born in the life time of the testator, would have
taken with his mother as a joint-tenant if she had lived; and as she
is dead, he shall take the whole by way of remainder. * * *
COURSEY v. DAVIS, in Pa. Sup. Ct., 1863—46 Pa. St. 25, 84 Am. Dec. 519.
Seire Faeias to revive a judgment recovered by Wm. Davis and Mildred
Ann Davis for damages, $512.10 for breach by defendants of their con
tract to buy from plaintiffs the land mentioned in the opinion. The
defense was that plaintiffs’ title was not a fee. Judgment below was for
the plaintiffs. Writ of error by defendants.
READ, J . The rule in Wild’s Case, 6 Coke, 16 b, by which where lands
are devised to a person and his children, and he has no child at the time
of the devise, the parent takes an estate-tail,'has no application to the
present case, in which there was a child or children of the mother living,
at the time of the execution of the deed. The word “children” is not
therefore a word of limitation, but of purchase, and the question is,
What is the estate taken by the mother and children respectively?
The deed was executed on the 23rd of October, 1843, and was a con
veyance by Peter Mowen and wife to Mildred Ann Davis, a married
woman, by whom the consideration of eight hundred dollars is said to
have been paid. In the premises it is stated to be “unto the said Mildred
Ann Davis and her children exclusively, and their heirs and assigns,”
and the habendum-, although not strictly formal, is “unto the said Mildred
Ann Davis and her children exclusively, and their heirs and assigns
forever, to them and their only proper use, benefit, and behoof, and to
and for no other use, intent, meaning, or purpose whatsoever.” The
warranty is special, and is “to and with the said Mildred Ann Davis and
her children, and their heirs and assigns.
At the execution of the deed, Mrs. Davis had an illegitimate child born
before her marriage, and a legitimate child by her present husband, Will
iam Davis, by whom she has since had four children who are now living.
The illegitimate child has released to its mother, and the child living at
the execution of the conveyance is dead.
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In construing this deed, it is necessary to collate the authorities, both
in England and in this state, in order to ascertain the legal as well as the
natural meaning of the words used to describe the estate of the mother
and of the children. In Jefirey V. Honywood, 4 Madd. 398, Vice
Chancellor Leach held that a devise to the testator’s daughter, a married
woman, and to all and every the child and children, whether male or
female, of her body lawfully begotten, and unto his, her, and their heirs
or assigns forever, as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants, gave
a life estate to the mother and a remainder in fee to the children. The
mother died in the lifetime of the testator, leaving ten children, and it is
probable that some of the children were living at the date of the will,
although it is not so expressly stated.
In Broadhurst V. Morris, 2 Barn. & Adol. 1, a case stated by the master
of the rolls for the opinion of the court of king’s bench, the devise, which
was of land, was in these words: “My will likewise is
,
that at the decease
of my son-in-law, John Broadhurst, the same, the whole legacy to him,
shall go to my grandson William Broadhurst, and to his children lawfully
begotten, forever, but in default of such issue, at his decease, to my
grandson Alexander Bridoak, natural son of my daughter, Rebecca
Bridoak, him, his heirs and assigns forever.” Until the testator’s death,
William Broadhurst had not been, nor was married. The court,- Lord
Tenterden and Justices Parke and Taunton, certified that _William
Broadhurst took an estate-tail, but assigned no reasons for their opinion.
Mr. Jarman says (2 Jarman on Wills, 371): “The case of Jefirey V.
Honywood, 4 Madd. 398, seems to be inconsistent with, and must there
fore be considered as overruled by, the case of Broadhurst V. Morris, 2
Barn. & Adol. 1.” And in Webb V. Byng, 2 Kay & J. 673, V. C., said:
“The contention was, that the devise was to the mother for life, with
remainder to her children, as joint tenants in fee. The only authority
for such a construction is the case of Jefirey V. Honywood, 4 Madd. 398,
and even that has been overruled by Broadhurst V. Morris, 2 Barn. & Adol.
1
.
Independently, however, of that consideration, what I chiefly rely
upon is this: that the Quendon Hall estate,—the subject of this devise,—
is the estate by means of which the testatrix intends by her will, to per
petuate the name of Cranmer; and if I were to hold that devise to have
been a devise to Mary Ann Byng for life, with remainder to her children
as joint tenants in fee, the estate would be divisible into eight separate
estates, and as the parties who are to take the property are also to take the
name and arms, the result would be to found as many small families,
all bearing the name and arms of Cranmer, whereas the testatrix speaks
of her estate as one and indivisible, and to be enjoyed in its entirety. In
rejecting such a construction in favor of one which will treat the word
‘children’ as a word of limitation, and not of purchase, I do not depart
from the spirit of the rule in Wild’s Case, 6 Coke, 16 b,—-—the real rule in
that case being that it is lawful, as Lord Hardwicke puts it
,
to construe
the word ‘children’ as a word of limitation when the will necessitates
such a construction. This is a case of that description, and as the only
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means of keeping the property which the testatrix has described as her
Quendon Hall estates in one mass, which is clearly the general intention
of the will. I am compelled to hold that in this will the word ‘children’
is a word of limitation, and that the devise created is an estate-tail.” In
addition to the name and arms, there were various chattels, as a striking
watch and her diamond ear-rings, and pins devised as heir-looms with her
estate, and the vice-chancellor commences his opinion with this sentence:
“However bold the decision may appear, I must hold this devise of the
Quendon Hall estates to be estate-tail.”
Upon appeal, the lords justices (26 L. J ., N. S., 107), considered the
construction of the devise to be one of great difficulty Lord Justice
Knight Bruce said-: “The inclination of his opinion was, that notwith
standing the fact of Mrs. Byng having to the knowledge of the testatrix,
when she made her will, several children, that lady was made by the
devise, tenant in tail of the Quendon Hall estate. The vice-chancellor
had adopted that view, and his lordship could not give his voice for vary
ing that decision, as he was not pursuaded that the effect of the devise
was to make Mrs. Byng tenant for life, or joint tenant with her children.”
Lord Justice Turner said: “As to the other point, the devise of the Quen
don Hall estate, he had rarely seen a will more diflicult to interpret. Two
things are, however, clear: that Mrs. Byng was the principal object of the
bounty of the testatrix, and that she intended the Quendon Hall estate to
be a family estate, with which the name of Cranmer was to be perpetuated.
The first appeared from the whole will, and the other from the gift of the
heirlooms, and the name and arms clause. Both these circumstances led
to the conclusion that the children were to take through Mrs. Byng,
not with her or after her.” No observations, according to this report, were
made by the lord justices upon either of the cases of Jeyffrey v. Hon;/wood,
4 Madd. 398, or Broadhurst V. Morris, 2 Barn. & Adol. 1. Upon appeal
to the House of Lords, the decision of the lords justices was aflirmed, and
is reported under the name of Byng v. Byng, 31 L. J . Ch. 470. Lord
Chancellor Westbury placed his opinion upon the peculiar terms of the
will, and the evident intention of the testatrix, whilst lords Cranworth
and Kingsdown, taking similar grounds, certainly expressed opinions
hostile to the construction of the words we have been considering as giving
a life estate to the mother with remainder to the children, and in favor of
a joint tenancy, between the mother and children, without saying whether
after-born children were to be included or not.
It is clear that Webb v. Byng, 2 Kay & J . 673, was decided upon the
intention of the testatrix, which required the devise to be held toOcreate
an estate-tail, and it_in no manner conflicts with the case of Jefirey v.
Honywood, 4 Madd. 398; nor does Broadhurst V. Morris, 2 Barn. & Adol.
1, which was a case where the father was not married until after the death
of the testator. In arguing this case, Cowling said: “If the devise
stopped at the words ‘lawfully begotten forever,’ the case would be gov
erned by the rule in Wild’s Case, 6 Coke, 16 b, viz., that where lands are
devised to a person and his children, and he has no child at the time of
’
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the devise, the parent takes an estate-tail ;” and so little was it supposed
to interfere with Jefirey v. Honywood, supra, that it was neither cited nor
referred to by either Mr. Cowling or Mr. Preston, both gentlemen of great
learning and research. In Bowen V. Scowcroft, 2 Younge & C. 640, Mr.
Campbell, in argument (p. 656), said: “There is a total distinction
between this and Wild’s Case, 6 Coke, 16 b. In that case the devise was to
A and his children; in the present, the words are, ‘to the children and
their heirs’. This distinction was taken in Ives v. Legge [cited in 1
Fearne on Remedies, 377] ; and the principle was acted upon in Jefirey
v. Hon;/wood, 4 Madd. 398.” Baron Alderson (p. 661) adopted this con
struction, and said: “Lastly, as to Lucy Bowen’s share. It was con
tended as to this that she took an estate-tail, having no children at the
time of the testator’s death. But I think this is not so, and that it is
distinguishable from Wild’s Case, 6 Coke, 16 b, on the same grounds as
were taken by Sir John Leach, in Jefirey V. Honywood, 4 Madd. 398.
Indeed, on this point of the case, Jefirey v. Honywood seems precisely in
point.”
After some doubt and hesitation, it has been determined in England
that Wild’s Case, 6 Co. 16 b, does not apply to personalty. In Audsley
v. Horn, 28 L. J ., N. S. c. 293, the master of the rolls decided that a
bequest of leasehold premises to A and her children (after a prior life
estate), gave a life estate to A, with remainder to her children, although
she had no children at the death of the testator, or of the tenant for life,
and this decision, upon appeal, was affirmed by the lord-chancellor: 29
L. J., N. S. c. 201.
In Haskins v. Tate, 25 Pa. St. 249, this court held, the present chief
justice delivering the opinion, that a devise by a testator in these words:
“I further will that the plantation I bought of my son Robert, lying
near Hill’s mill, shall be equally divided amongst my son Robert’s chil
dren, he and them enjoying the benefits of it whilst he lives,” gave
Robert a life estate, with remainder to all the children born before or
after the death of the testator. The court did not determine whether
Robert took a life estate in the whole or not, but they decided that the
period of division was the death of Robert, and that the limitation to his
children was to a class,—the time of distribution defining the members
that were to constitute the class. In Gernet v. Lynn, 31 Pa. St. 94,
where a testator devised land to his son J ., to hold the same to him during
his natural life, and after his decease to his children lawfully begotten,
share and ‘share alike, it was held that J . took an estate for life with a
vested remainder in fee to his children in being at the death of the testa
tor, which opened to let -in after-born children. At the date of the will,
the son_had four children, and afterwards, four other children, some of
whom were born after the death of the testator. The children, therefore,
took as a class. In Brink v. Michael, 31 Id. 165, my brother, Woodward,
for sufiicient reasons on the face of the case, confined the word “children”
to the then living children of William Brink by his first wife, he being
a widower living on the farm conveyed by the deed, with his children.
1
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He said: “The natural love and affection which constituted the consider
ation of the deed, and maintenance, and education, which were among the
objects it aimed to promote, had reference, and in the nature of things
must have had exclusive reference, to the children then in being; they
were before the grandfather’s eyes, and were more manifestly the objects
of his bounty.”
In White V. Williamson, 2 Grant Cas. 249, there was a declaration of
trust for the use of Mary M. Weaver and her children, and a subsequent
declaration of trust by Benjamin F. Weaver, to whom the premises had
been afterwards conveyed, that he held the same in trust for Mary M.
Weaver and her children, and their heirs. The question, as stated by my
brother Strong, was, What interest did Mrs. Weaver take under the
original declaration of trust? “Was it a life estate with remainder to her
children, or was it a tenancy in common with them?”
The court adopted the first view, and held that the gift to the children
was as a class, and not individually. This is the natural construction,
and is now the established rule as to personal property; and we have
seen that such has been the view taken as to real estate in two leading
cases in England which have never been distinctly overruled. In this
state, the only case cited for a contrary doctrine is Shirlocle V. Shirlock,
5 Pa. St. 367, where the mother and all her children were living at the
date of the conveyance. The court below held that they were tenants in
common, and the mother taking one eleventh, her husband, the defendant
below, on her death, became tenant by the curtesy of her share. The
defendant, the husband, took a writ of error, on the ground that his
wife’s estate was a tenancy in tail of the premises conveyed. In a per
curiam opinion, the court say: “There is no error in the record of which
the defendant below can avail himself ;” and here the case really termi
nated, for if not an estate-tail, which it clearly was not, then the decision
below was the most favorable for him; for if his wife’s interest was only
a_ life estate, then he had no claim whatever to any part of the premises.
The rest of the opinion is extrajudicial, but sustains the view taken by
the court below. The subsequent cases, however, have sustained what
appears to be the true construction, and with the light afforded by them,
we proceed to examine the case before us.
The words used are, “unto the said Mildred Ann Davis, and her chil
dren exclusively, and their heirs and assigns.” By giving the mother
a life estate, and regarding her children as a class, we provide not only
for those in existence at the date of the conveyance, but for those, also,
a married woman might reasonably expect to have, and the period of
distribution would be the termination of the life estate by her death.
This would give effect to the word “exclusively,” for upon the construc
tion adopted by the court below, her husband would have a curtesy
estate, if he survived his wife, in the whole or a part of the premises.
Any other construction would cut off the subsequently born children,
which we do not feel disposed to do, ilI1less compelled by a settled rule of
law, which we do not find to be the case. Adopting, therefore, this
:
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benign construction of this conveyance, the judgment is reversed, and
judgment entered for the defendant for costs upon the case stated.
A life estate to the grantee first named and remainder to his children born
and to be born was held to be created by a deed in these words: “This
March 21 day 1885: This indenture made and entered into between Eli Hall
and Polly Hall of the first part and Joseph Hall and his children of the
second part. * " * Know all men that I Eli Hall and Polly Hall of the
first part hath this day bargained and sold unto Joseph Hall of the second
part a certain tract * * * We the party of the first part doth bargain
sell and convey the above named tract of land and will warrant and defend
the title of the same from us and our heirs and assigns and from all other
unto the said Joseph Hall and his children forever,” &c. Hall v. Wright
(1905), 121 Ky. 16, 27 Ky. L. R. 1185, 87 S. W. 1129, reviewing the Kentucky
decisions. .
A devise of land in trust for testator’s daughter “and all her children if
she shall have any” was held to give the daughter a fee, she having no
children at testator's death. Silliman v. Whitaker (1896), 119 N. C. 89, 25
S. W. 742, reviewing several decisions.
The stepmother and her children were held to take jointly under a devise
of the residue “to my first husband’s stepmother and her children," Gordon
v. Jackson (1899), 58 N. J. Eq. 166, 43 Atl. 98.
“I leave to my dear wife and our sweet little children all that I possess,”
made them joint-tenants. Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick (1902), 100 Va. 552, 42
S. E. 306.
It was held that the daughter took a life estate with remainder in fee to
the children in the following devise to her “in trust for her sole use and
benefit, and of her children and their children thereafter. But in the event
that my daughter should die and leave no children as heirs to the within
mentioned property, then it is my will and desire that all of said property
shall go to my brother.” Schaefer v. Schaefer (1892), 141 Ill. 337, 31
N. E. 136.
The statute having abolished estates-tail, a fee simple was given by a
devise “to said W. and his heirs being his own children.” Moore v. Gary
(1897), 149 Ind. 51, 48 N. E. 630.
CHAPTER III.
ESTATES OF FREEHOLD NOT OF INHERITANCE.
For Several Lives.
ANONYMOUS, in Common Pleas, Trinity Term, 3 Edw. 6.-—A. D. 1550.—
Moor 8.
Land was leased to I. S., habendum to him for life and for the lives
Jane his wife and William his son. HALES, J. It seems that he shall
have an estate for his own life, and that the limitation for the lives of
the others is void, and that there was no right to the occupant in the
case. BROWN, J ., agreed that there was no right of occupant, but he
held that this inured by way of remainder, the one after the other.
MONTAGUE, C. J ., held that they should have an estate for the lives of
all, and that the occupant had right.
UTTY DAIJES CASE, in Common Pleas, 32 E1lZ.—A. D. 1591, Cro. Eliz. 182.
A lease was made to J. S. “to have and to hold to him and his assigns
for his own life, and for the life of A and B.” J. S. died. Is his estate
determined, because one cannot have a greater estate of freehold than
his own life?
ANDERSON, C. J ., and the court held clearly that it is a good limita
tion, and he has an estate for all their three lives; for although he him
self cannot have an estate but for his own life, yet he may have it to
grant to another, and the habendum for their three lives is a good limit
ation, and by his death the estate is not determined, but occupanti con
ceditur.
HILLS v. HILLS, Moor 876. Jac. I.—-A. D. 1605-15?
A man made a lease for years rendering rent during his life and the
life of his wife. This is during the life of the longest liver of them. So
adjudged.
ROSSE’S CASE, in K1ng’s Bench, }flch., 41 & 42 Eliz.-—A. D. 1600—5 Coke
13, Moor 398, 399, Gold. 157, Cro. Eliz. 491.
Ejectione firmae between Peter Rosse and Aldwick. A lease is made
to A and his assigns, habendum to him during his own life and the
lives of B and C. If this limitation during the lives of B and G was
(82)
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void or not was the question. It was adjudged that the limitation was
good. It was objected that when a man has two estates in him, the
greater shall drown the less, and that an estate for his own life is higher
than for the life of another; and therefore an estate for his own
life and for lives of others cannot stand together. It was answered and
resolved, that in the case at bar the lessee had but one estate, which has
limitation during his own life and the lives of two others, and he had
but one freehold; and therefore there cannot be any drowning of
estates in the case, but he had an estate of freehold to continue during
these three lives and the survivor of them.
\Vaste by Life Tenant.
ANON, In the Common Pleas.—A. D. 1303, Mich., 31 Edw. I, H0rw00d’s
Year Books 480.
In a writ of waste of a mill, if the defendant say that the post and
other timbers were carried away by an inundation, and can aver it
,
he
shall not answer for the waste. per BEREFORD.
BOLT v. LORD SOMMERVILLE, in English High Court of Chancery, Trin
ity Term.-—A. D. 1737-—2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 759. _
A very considerable real estate was limited to Mrs. Rolt (who after
wards married the defendant the Lord Somerville) for life, without im
peachment for waste, remainder to the plaintiff Rolt for life, without
impeachment for waste, with several remainders over. The defendant the
Lord Somerville, to_ make the most of this estate during the life of his
wife, pulled down several houses and out-buildings upon the estate, and
sold the same, and took up lead water pipes that were laid for the con
veyance of water to the capital messuage and disposed thereof; and he
also cut down several groves of trees that were planted for the shelter
and ornament of the capital messuage. Upon this a bill was brought by
the plaintiff to compel the defendant to account for the money raised
by the particulars before mentioned, and to put the estate in the same
plight and condition that it was before. To this the defendant demurred,
and thereby insisted that this waste was committed by tenant for life
without impeachment for waste, and therefore he was not liable to be
called to account for what he had done, either in law or in equity; and if
he was, yet the plaintiff could not call him to account, because he was not
a remainder man of the inheritance.
Loan CHANCELLOR HARDWICKEZ——-Tl1ough an action of waste will not
lie at law for what is done to houses or plantations for ornament or con
venience by tenant for life without impeachment for waste, yet this court
hath set up a superior equity, and will restrain the doing such things on
the estate. In Lord Barnard’s Case the court restrained him and ordered
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the estate to be put in the same condition. In Sir Blundel Charletorfs
Case the master of the rolls decreed that no trees should be out down that
were for the ornament of the park; but Lord Chancellor King reversed
that, and extended it only to trees that had been planted in rows. My
only doubt is as to the trees that have been cut down, for if this bill had
been brought before such trees had been cut down as were for the orna
ment and shelter of the estate, this court would have interposed. But
here the mischief is done, and it is impossible to restore it to the same
condition as to the plantations, and therefore it can lie in satisfaction
only; and I cannot say the plaintiff is entitled to a satisfaction for the
timber which is a damage to the inheritance; yet as to the pulling down
of the houses and buildings and laying the lead pipes, they may be re»
stored, or put in as good condition again. In the case of my Lord Ber
nard there were directions for an issue at law to charge his assets with
the value of the damages, he not having performed the decree in his
life-time.
The demurrer was allowed as to satisfaction on account of the timber,
but overruled as to the rest.
CLEMENCE v. STEERE, R. I. Sup. Ct., 1850.-—1 R. I. 272, 53 Am. Dec. 621.
ACTION of waste. The defendant was devisee of a life estate in the
premises under the will of W. C. Steere. The plaintiff, who was also
executor of the will, claimed under a conveyance from a devisee of the
reversion. The facts sufficiently appear from the charge of the court.
By Court, GREENE, C. J. This is an unusual form of action in our
courts; but it is an action well known to the law, and established in
our state by statute nearly two centuries ago. And it is a wise pro
vision; for unless there were some such remedy provided, the owner
of the reversion, having no right to enter upon the premises, would be
left at the mercy of the tenant for life. Although very stringent, causing
a forfeiture of the estate wasted, it was designed to promote good hus
bandry, and should be fairly and reasonably enforced. You are, there
fore, to entertain no prejudices on account of the nature of the suit,
nor on account of the relations of the parties. They should stand be
fore you divested of everything calculated to move either sympathy or
prejudice. _
The question for you is, Has waste been committed in any or all the
ways in which it has been charged? I will go over the charges separately.
The defendant is charged with having converted meadow land into
pasture land. In England this would be waste. But we are not to apply
the English law too strictly. Our lands are, in many respects, cultivated
differently from land in England; and this difference is to be taken
into account. Here it is necessary to show that the change is detri
mental to the _inheritance, and contrary to the ordinary course of good
husbandry. If in this case the change injured the farm, or was such
a change as no good farmer wouldmake, it was waste: Greenl. Cruise,
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tit. 3, c. 11, sec. 18; 3 Dane’s Abr., c. 78, art. 5; Harrow School V.
Alderton, 2 Bos. & Pul. 86.
It is said that the pastures have been permitted to become overgrown
with brush. In England that would be waste, but you would not ex
pect so high a state of cultivation in Burrillville as in England, or as
in the vicinity of a populous city. There must be such neglect in
cutting the brush as a man of ordinary prudence would not permit;
and if there was in this case such neglect, it is waste.
Another item is the cutting and selling off the farm fifteen cords
of wood. The tenant for life has a right to cut only so much wood
as is necessary for fuel and repairs. Therefore to cut wood and sell
it off the farm is waste, beyond a doubt. The defense set up is that the
plaintiff assented to it. If he has assented, either before or after the
cutting, he has no right to claim a forfeiture of the estate on that ac
count. You will consider in connection with this point the relations
sustained by the parties. This estate was charged with the comfortable
support of the defendant. As owner of the reversion, the plaintiff is
bound to provide for her ; and as executor, the will obliges him to sell
the estate for her maintenance if necessary. Now if the sale of the
wood went for the support and so relieved the estate of the charge for
her support, this is a fact for you to consider in connection with other
facts bearing upon the question of his assent.
Another charge is cutting hoop-poles. Hoop-poles are timber trees
in the earlier stages of their growth. This would be waste, unless it
is the ordinary mode of managing the farm. It may be as usual for
tenants to cut hoop-poles, when of the proper size, as to harvest the
potatoes or fruit; and it would be wrong to make that waste which would
not be waste in an ordinary tenant for a term of years: Greenl. Cruise,
tit. 3, c. 11, sec. 5, and note; 4 Kent’s Com. 76, 77._
Then there is a charge not only for not repairing the house, but also
for tearing it down. Now, in regard to the question of repairs, if the
life tenant receives a house in such a state as not to be reparable, or so
dilapidated that the expense of repairing would be beyond the value
of the house, he is not bound to repair, and may leave it to its natural
destruction. But if the house is such that repairs would make it
tenantable, he is bound to make them. But in regard to the charge
of tearing the house down, the fact that it was not tenantable is no
excuse. Whatever may have been its value the reversioner had a right
to it. If he consented to the demolition, that indeed alters the case;
and you are to look to all the circumstances of the transaction and the
parties for the evidence of the consent. If the house was torn down
after she left the premises, and neither by her direction nor permis
sion, she is responsible: Greenl. Cruise, tit. 3, c. 11, secs. 21, 30;
4 Kent’s Com. 77; Fay V. Brewer, 3 Pick. 203.
She is charged with removing the crib. The defense is that it did
not belong to the inheritance, that it was placed by the life tenant
upon a rock and not aflixed to the freehold. If this was the case, it
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is not waste. She is charged with tearing down the barn. This is an
important part of the farm. The defense set up is that it was so old
and unstable that she feared it would fall upon her cow. If there was
any such danger she had a right to tear it down, unless its dilapidated
condition resulted from her neglect to repair. There are also charges
of tearing boards from the buildings and destroying the fences, which
if proved amount to waste.
You will perceive that there are various portions claimed to be
wasted. Waste in any particular place forfeits the place, as waste in
the woods forfeits the woods, in the meadow forfeits the meadow. A
destruction of the dwelling-house forfeits the whole place. You are
to find the place forfeited where the waste was committed. And, in
addition, you are also to assess the damages for the place wasted, over
and above the value of the place.
Verdict for the plaintiff, in that there has been waste of hoop-poles
in the pasture, with damages in the sum of twenty-five dollars.
CALVERT v. RICE, in Ky. Sup. Ct., May 12, 1891.—91 Ky. 533, 16 S. W.
351, 34 Am. St. Rep. 240.
PRYoa, J. This is a controversy between the appellants who are
the life tenants, and the appellees, who own the inheritance, and arc
entitled to the possession when the tenancy expires. It is a petition
in equity, with an injunction to stay waste. W. H. Duvall owned at
his death a tract of three lll111dI'e(l and twenty-five acres of land lying
on the Maysville and Mt. Sterling Turnpike, in the county of Mason.
At his death seventy-five acres of this tract including the dwelling, was al
lotted to his widow as her dower. She subsequently married the ap
pellant, Jesse Calvert, who has been cutting the timber on the dower
land, and converting it into rails for the use of the dower tract. The
first husband, Duvall, left one child surviving him, who married the
appellee, Rice, and they instituted this action, asking that the appel
lants be enjoined from cutting any trees on the dower and from com
mitting waste.
The testimony is conflicting as to the number of trees cut- and used
on the premises by the appellants in repairing the buildings and the
fencing. The appellant admits the cutting about fifteen trees, and the
appellees say that he cut at least twenty. The main contention arises
from the scarcity of timber on the entire farm, it appearing that all
the timber is on the dower tract, and covers only about ten or twelve
acres of the dower land, and some of that timber is in the yard. It
appears that only one tree was cut that was standing in the yeard, and
that seems to have been decayed, and in such close proximity to the
dwelling as subjected it to danger if the tree should fall.
If this case is to be determined upon the idea that there is not a
sufliciency of timber on the dower to keep in repair the entire tract,
then the injunction ought to go, for it is evident that there is not more
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than a sufiiciency of timber to keep up and continue in permanent re
pair the dower tract. The scarcity of timber, however, does not prevent
its use by the life tenant in repairing the buildings and fencing on the
premises. It only requires that he should be the more careful in its
use, and only cut so much as would be used by a prudent man when in
possession and the owner of the fee, and necessary to keep the premises
in repair. It is the duty of the life tenant not to permit the premises
to go to destruction for the want of repairs, and particularly when th.ere
is timber on the place from which the repairs may be made. It is
better for those in remainder that the life tenant should keep the prem
ises in repair, so that when the term expires the owner of the fee re
ceives it in good condition, than to be compelled to receive it as a
ruined and dilapidated farm. There is no doctrine better settled than
that of the right of the tenant for life to take reasonable estovers
from the estate, but not to such an extent as to work an injury to the
inheritance; and what is meant by this injury is, that the tenant shall
not make an unreasonable use of this right. The right to timber for
firewood and repairing buildings is an incident to every life estate to
be used for such purposes when on the land. The tenant has no right
to cut and use rail timber for firewood when there is other timber that
might be used for that purpose, or to even cut and use young and grow
ing timber that would not make more than four or five rails to the cut
for fencing purposes. This would be an unreasonable use of it. The
proper use of the timber by the tenant, as is said in the text-books
and reported cases, “is to give the tenant necessary fuel that he may
remain on the premises, and suflicient timber to keep the fences and
buildings in repair”: 2 Bla. Com., Padelford v. Padelford, 7 Pick.
152; Miles V. Miles, 32 N. H. 147; 64 Am. Dec. 362.
Why is it not to the advantage of the remainder-man that the prem
ises should be kept in repair? It is not required or expected of the
tenant that he shall expend his money in buying plank or lumber to
improve fences and keep the premises in repair, so that the timber
may pass from him to the inheritance untouched, although its judicious
use may lessen the value of the estate. The owner of the fee would
use this timber if without means to purchase other material, and so
would any prudent farmer. He would not cut the timber in the yard
left for ornamental purposes, nor could the tenant, without being guilty
of waste; but ordinary woodland can be used in a prudent manner for
the use of the premises, and that use or the right to use the
timber not having been abused by the tenant, we see no reason for an
injunction, the effect of which would be to enrich the inheritance at
the expense of the life tenant.
The judgment is
,
therefore, reversed, with directions to dismiss the
petition.
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MARSHALL v. MELLON, in Pa. Sup. Ct., Jan. 4, 1897—179 Pa. St. 371, 86
Atl. 201, 57 Am. St. Rep. 601, 35 L. R. A. 816.
Assumpsit for rent due on an oil lease. Judgment for defendants.
Plaintiff appealed.
GREEN, J. In Stoughton’s Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 198, we said: “Oil,
however, is a mineral, and, being a mineral, is part of the realty:
Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. St. 229. In this it is like coal or any other
mineral product which in situ forms part of the land.” In Gill v. Weston,
110 Pa. St. 312, we said of petroleum, “It is a mineral substance ob
tained from the earth by a process of mining, and lands from which
it is obtained may with propriety be called mining lands.” In West
moreland Nat. Gas Co. V. De Witt, 130 Pa. St. 235, we said: “Gas,
it is true, is a mineral, but it is a mineral with peculiar attributes.”
In Blakely V. Marshall, 174 Pa. St. 425, a lease for oil and gas pur
poses was made by lessors who were tenants for life and also as trustee
for those in remainder. The leased premises proved to be productive. A
question arose upon a case stated as to the interests respectively of the life
tenants and those in remainder. The life tenants claimed the whole of the
oil, and for those in remainder the same claim was made. The court below
appointed a trustee to receive all the oil due to the lessors, and to invest
the proceeds, and pay the interest annually realized therefrom to the life
tenants during their joint lives and the life of the survivor, and, at the
death of the latter, to pay the principal to the remaindermen. This court
sustained the court below and said: “As was said in Stought0n’s Appeal,
88 Pa. St. 198, and other cases in the same line, oil in place is a mineral,
and, being a mineral, is part of the realty. An oil lease investing the
lessee with the right to remove all the oil in place in the premises, in
consideration of his giving the lessors a certain per eentum thereof,
is, in legal effect, a sale of a portion of the land, and the proceeds rep
resents the respective interests of the lessors in the premises. If there
be life tenants and remaindermen, the former are entitled to the en
joyment of the fund (interest thereon) during life, and at the death of
the survivor the corpus of the fund should go to the remaindermen.”
This distribution was made because all the interests concurred in
making the lease, and it was to the manifest interest of all that the oil
should be taken from the land lest it should be drawn
away by other wells on adjacent premises. In that respect,
of course, there is a difference between oil and gas, and solid
minerals, but in respect of the interests of life tenants, as contrasted
with those in remainder, there was no departure from the common-law
rule that tenants for life only may not open new mines or take minerals
from the premises, except in case of mines opened by the former owner.
This was recognized in Westmoreland Coal Co’s Appeal, 85 Pa. St.
344, where we held that while the life tenant’s right to work previously
opened mines was undoubted, there was no right in a life tenant of sev
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eral tracts to open a new mine on one of the tracts upon which no
previous opening had taken place. Mercer, J ., said, in the opinion:
“Neither tract is appendant or appurtenant to the other. If she had
a life estate in the distant tract only, the fallacy of claiming a right
to remove the coal therefrom would be most manifest. The unanswer
able reason would be that the mine on that tract had never been opened.”
We see no difference between the present case and those cited, so far
as this question is concerned. The plaintiff was but a tenant for life
of the premises in question. There-had never been any oil or gas op
erations commenced on the land before her estate for life accrued.
She had no right therefore, to operate for oil or gas herself,
and she could not give such a right to any lessee from her. Neither
the original lessee nor the defendants, his assignees, ever held any such
right. They would have been trespassers if they had undertaken to
exercise such a right. The lease was “for the sole and only purpose
of drilling and operating for petroleum, oil, or gas,” and “to have and
to hold the said premises for the said purpose only.” All the terms
and conditions of the lease relate to that purpose alone, and no right
to the use of the surface for any other purpose is conferred. It is
manifest, therefore, that as no interest whatever was acquired under
the lease, the lessees are under no obligation to pay for a right or
privilege which they never obtained, or in damages for not performing
an illegal covenant therein. We think the judgment entered by the
court below was entirely right.
It seems to us, however, in view of the .peculiar character of oil and
gas as being fugacious in their nature, and liable to be diverted by
operations upon other adjoining or near-by lands, in order to preserve
the interests of both life tenants and remaindermen, it would be well
for the legislature to make such enactments as would enable the owners
of this class of lands to secure to themselves the benefits of such minerals
as these. As it is now, the law is not eflicacious to that end.
Judgment afiirmed.
To the same effect see Swayne v. Lone Acre Oil Co. (1905), 98 Tex. 597,
86 S. W. 740; Keon v. Bartlett (1895), 41 W. Va. 559, 23 S. E. 664, 56 Am.
St. Rep. 884, 31 L. R. A. 128.
Acquiring Adverse Title.
WHITNEY V. SALTER, in Minn. Sup. Ct., Nov. 22, 1886-86 lflnn. 103, 30
N. W. 755, 1 Am. St. Rep. 656.
Ejectment by the administrator of Ann Salter; who died possessed of
a term for 100 years subject to a mortgage for $555 and a mechanic’s lien
for $884, and left a will by which she devised the term to the defendant
William Salter, her husband, for life. After her death the liens were
foreclosed and the purchasers at the sale conveyed their interests to de
fendant William. The court directed a verdict for defendant, and plaint
ifi appeals from an order denying a motion for a new trial.
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BY Couar, MITCHELL, J . The established doctrine is, that a tenant
for life in possession, in the purchase of an encumbrance upon, or an
adverse title to, the estate, will be regarded as having made the pur
chase for the joint benefit of himself and the reversioner or remainder
man. The law will not permit him to hold it for his own exclusive benefit,
if the reversioner or remainderman will contribute his share of the
sum paid. If the life tenant in such case pays more than his propor
tionate share, he simply becomes a creditor of the estate for that
amount: 1 Washburn on Real Property, 96; Daviess o. Myers, 13
B. Mon. 511. It is also the settled doctrine, that if a life tenant of a
renewable leasehold estate renews the lease, the law will not permit
him to do so, for his own exclusive use, but will make him a trustee
for the reversioner or remainderman. And this is so even although he
was not required to renew: Bissett on Estates for Life, [26 Law Lib.]
248. The renewed lease in such a case is subject to the same equities
as the original. Thus far we agree with the appellant. But this is not
the whole law applicable to the facts of this ease. Salter, the life tenant,
was under no obligation to pay off or buy up these outstanding claims
against the estate. The will under which he held the life estate imposed
no such duty upon him. Neither did the law: 1 Washburn on Real
Property, 96.
Whether in this case the life tenant should contribute towards the
amount paid to remove these encumbrances is not here important. Un
doubtedly, the general rule in regard to the apportionment of the con
tribution towards paying off encumbrances between the life tenant and
the remainderman is
,
that the life tenant shall contribute in proportion
to the benefit he derives from the liquidation of the debt: Story’s Eq.Jur., sec. 487 ; 1 Washburn on Real Property, 96, 97.
In view of the fact that this life estate was given to Salter “in lieu
of all estate, right, title, or interest” he might otherwise have in the
estate of his wife, the testatrix, there may be some question whether
he would be bound to contribute anything towards taking up these
outstanding claims against the estate: See Brooks V. Harwood, 8 Pick.
497. But as the point is not really before us, we neither decide nor
consider it. It is, however, certain, in any event, that Salter became a
creditor of the estate for the amount he paid out, less his proportionate
share, if any. To that extent he would be subrogated to the rights of
the parties from whom he bought, and would be entitled to hold the
property until the other parties interested paid their share. He and
those claiming under him would occupy a position analogous to a
mortgage in possession after condition broken, who cannot.
be ejected until all sums due on the mortgage have been paid.
Order afiirmed.
That the life tenant cannot acquire and use an adverse title against the
remainderman: De Freese v. Lake (1896), 109 Mich. 415, 67 N. W. 505, 63
Am. St. Rep. 584, 32 L. R. A. 744, tax-title; Boynton v. Veldman (1902), 131
Mich. 555; 91 N. W. 1022; Stewart V. Matheny (1888), 66 Miss. 21, 5 S0. 387,
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14 Am. St. Rep. 538, tax-title; Cockrill v. Hutchinson (1896), 135 Mo. 67, 36
S. W. 375,58 Am. St. Rep. 564; Weaver v.Wib1e (1855), 25 Pa. St. 270, 64
Am. Dec. 696.
Numerous decisions to the effect that possession by or under a life tenant
cannot be set up as adverse to the remainderman or reversioner are collected
in 19 L. R. A. 839, in a note to Gindrat v. Western Ry. of A., 96 Ala. 162,
11 So. 372. See also King v. Rhew, post.
Time for Executors of Life Tenant to Remove.
STODDEN v. HARVEY, in King’s Bench, Trinity, 5 Jae. 1.—A. D. 1608
Cro. Jac. 204.
Trespass. Upon demurrer the case was, lessee for life of a house and
pasture land dies, his executors suffer his cattle to go there for six days
after his death, and then remove them, and in trespass justify for that
time, averring that in that time of six days they could not procure any
other land or place to put in the cattle; whereupon it was demurred.
And whether that were a convenient time to remove them was the ques
tion. The court seemed to incline that six days is but a convenient time
to remove the cattle; and the law allows a convenient time for their re
moving, especially it being averred that they had not any other place to
remove them. See 18 Edw. 4; 22 Edw. 4, pl. 27. But for a fault in the
plea * * * it was adjudged for the plaintiff.
Curtesy Initiate.
ANON., in Common Bench, Hilary, 28 Hen. VIII.—A. D. 1537—1 And. C. P.
35 (Case 88), Dyer 25b, Bendloes 21.
If a man espouse a woman and have issue, which issue is born in life
and baptised, and the issue dies not yet heard to cry; or if the issue is
born in life and not baptised nor heard to cry; yet the husband shall be
tenant by the curtesy. By opinion of the justices of the common bench.
Dower—How Barred. In Hereford, in Eyre, 20 Edw. 1, A. D. 1292, p. 21.
If a woman covert make quit-claim of her dower for her whole life it
is worth nothing. Otherwise, if she is single.
0
CHAPTER IV.
ESTATES LESS THAN FREEHOLD.
ESTATES FOR YEARS.
Nature of Terms for Years.
BRAGTON, book 11, c. 9, fol. 27.—1260?
If, moreover, a gift be made for a term of years, though of exceeding
length longer than the life of man—nevertheless this will not give the
donee a freehold, since a term of years is fixed and certain, and the limit
of life is uncertain, and because, although nothing is more certain than
death, nothing is more uncertain than the time of death. Moreover, if
land be granted to a person for a term of years, the grantor may dur
ing the same term grant the same land to another or to the same person
in fee ; thus, if he enfeoffs the lessee, changing one kind of possession for
another. If, however, he enfeoffs another, both kinds of possession will
continue, because the term and feoffment of the same land may well
coexist, since in that case there are different sorts of rights; the owner
ship of the fee and the freehold belong to the feoffee, while the lessee
can claim nothing for himself except the usufruct, that is to say, he may
freely and without hinderance on the part of the feoffee take the pro
duce. Further one may give to another land to hold at will, or so long
as he pleases, from term to term, or from year to year, in which case
the donee has no freehold, for the lord of the fee may reclaim land thus
granted as from one holding by mere grace and favor.
LITTLETON’S TENURES. (Llttleton died in 1482.)
§ 58. Tenant for term of years is where a man lets lands or tene
ments to another for a term of certain years, after the number of years
that is accorded between the lessor and the lessee. And when the lessee
enters by force of the lease, then is he tenant for term of years. * * *
§ 59. And it is to be lmderstood, that in a lease for years, by deed or
without deed, there need be no livery of seisin made to the lessee, but he
may enter when he will by force of the lease. * * *
§ 66. Also, if a man lets land to another for term of years, although
the lessor die before the lessee enters into the tenements, yet he may enter
into the same tenements after the death of the lessor, because the lessee,
by force of the lease, has presently a right to have the tenements accord
ing to the form of the lease. But if a man makes a deed of feoffment to
(92)
,__
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another, and a letter of attorney to one to deliver to him seisin by force
of the same deed; yet if livery of seisin be not executed in the life of
him who made the deed, this avails nothing.
* * * .
Original Remedies of Ejected Termors.
BRACTON, Book 4, c. 36, fol. 220.—A. D. 1260?
I must now speak of thecase of a person being ejected from the use
and occupation of any tenement which he holds for a term of years before
the expiration of his term. For in one and the same tenement one man
may have a freehold and another use and occupation. The usual remedy
open to such lessees, when they are ejected before the expiration of their
term is by action of covenant. But inasmuch as this action is not avail
able except as between lessor and lessee, and third persons could not be
bound by the covenant, and even as between lessor and lessee it was an
insuflicient and inconvenient mode of determining the matter, by the
advice of the Curia Regis a remedy was provided which the farmer could
avail himself of as against any person whatsoever who should turn him
out of possession. This was by means of the following writ: ‘The king,
to the sheriff greeting. Command A that he duly and without delay do
restore to B so much land with the appurtenances in such a township,
from which the said A who demised the land to B’ (had wrongfully
ejected him, &c.), Or thus: ‘If A gives proper security, summon B to
show cause why he ejects and keeps ejected A from so much land with
the appurtenances which C demised to A for a term which is not yet
passed, and within the said term the said C sold the said land to B, by
reason of which sale the said B afterwards ejected A from the said land
as he saith ;’ &c. And if such a writ is available against a stranger on
account of a sale to him, much more is it available against the lord him
self who demised to and without reason ejected the lessee, than against a
stranger who had no sort of excuse if at the time of the sale made to
him his vendor ejected the farmer, or if on any other ground any one
other than the original lessor has ejected the lessee. In that case the
writ speaks of ‘the land which C of N demised for a term which has not
yet expired, within which term the aforesaid A or C wrongfully ejected
B from the said land as he alleges ;’ &c. * * * No one can eject a.
farmer from his farm any more than he can eject a tenant from his free
hold. Hence if it be the lessor who ejects the farmer let him restore the
possession with damages for such a right of restitution does not differ
much from the case of disseisin. But if the ej8CiJo1'b8 some person other
than the lessor, if he have done the wrong by the authority and at the
bidding of the lessor, both of them are liable to judgment, one because
he did the act, and the other because he authorized it. But if the act
was done against the will of the lord, then the wrongdoer is liable both
to the lord of the fee and to the farmer, to the farmer by the writ which
I have mentioned, to the lord of the fee by the assize of novel disseisin,
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so that the one may recover the term with damages, and the other his
freehold without damages. Further if the lord of the fee gives to anyone
a tenement to hold in demesne which has been granted to another for a
term of years, he may well grant to him the seisin without prejudice to the
term of the farmer. For the lord may confer upon the grantee the seisin
which he vacates so far as relates to himself and those claiming under
him, and he can cause the farmer to attorn to the grantee and to render
to him services, provided always that the feoffee may not enter into the
occupation of the land itself, nor take any part of its produce, and in
particular may not hinder the farmer in his enjoyment, nor eject him.
STATUTE, 21 HENRY VIII, c. 15.—A. D. 1529.
Fermors shall enjoy their leases against recoveries by feigned titles, &c..
Vlrhere afore this time divers persons have made leases of their manors,
lands, tenements, and other hereditaments, sometime by their indentures,
and sometime without writings, to other persons for term of years, tak
ing of them great fines for the incomes of the same leases; and after the
same leasors, their heirs, or assigns, have caused and suffered recoveries
to be had against them in the court of our sovereign lord the king,
and in other lords courts, upon feigned and untrue titles, by craft or
covin to put the same termers from their said terms; and after such
recoveries had the same recoverees, by reason of such recoveries and
judgments, have entered into the same manors, lands, tenements, and
other hereditaments so to ferm letten, and thereof have expulsed the
said fermers, contrary to their said leases, covenants, and agreements; and
because it was doubted to some persons, whether the said termers might
falsify such recoveries, or not:
2. Be it therefore enacted, * * * that all such termers shall and
may falsify, for his term only, such recoveries, as well heretofore had
as hereafter to be had, in such wise and form as a tenant of a freehold
shall and may do by the course of the common law, where such tenant
of freehold was neither privy nor party to the same recovery.
3. And that the same termers, their executors and assigns, notwith
standing such recoveries so had, shall retain, hold, and enjoy their said
terms, according to their said leases, against all such recoverees, their
heirs and assigns, as they should or might have done against the said
lessors, if such recovery had not been had he suffered; and that the said
recoverers, their heirs, and assigns, after such recovery so had, shall have
like remedy against 'the said termers, their executors or assigns, by
avowery or action of debt, for the rents and services reserved upon the
same leases, being due after the same recoveries; and also like actions
against them for waste done, after the same recoveries so had; in like
manner and form as the said leasors should or might have had, if the
same recoveries had never been had. * * *
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Term Void for Uncertainty.
ANON, in Common Bench, 7 Edw. 6.—A. D. 1553.—Brooke Abr. t. Leases, 66.
A man possessed of a lease for a term of 40 years granted to J . N. as
many of these years as should be arrear at the time of his death. This
grant was held void by HALES and all the other justices, because of the
uncertainty; for this is not like where a man leased land for the term
of his life and four years more; this is certain that his executors shall
have it for four years after his death. But in the other case the grantor
may live the whole 40 years, and then nothing would be in arrear at the
time of his death.
NOTE, by BROMLEY and the other justices, 2 Mary.—A. D. 1555-Brooke
Abr. t. Leases 67.
If I lease land to W. N. habendum until it should pay 100 l and
without livery this is merely a tenancy at will for the imcertainty, but if
livery is made the lessee thereby shall have it for life on condition to
cease when he has made the 100 l. And in Easter term 3 Mary, this
lease was held good by all.
ANON., in chancery. A. D. 1583?—1 And. 122.
W. Kingswell, possessed of a lease for years, gave it in these words:
“I give my lease of and in” &c., “after my decease to my son Swithin
and his wife.” The question was if this manner of grant was void or
not; and this in the chancery, was referred by the chancellor to the
chief justices of the king’s bench and common pleas to consider; who
thought that the assignment or grant of the lease was void, and cannot
take efiect according to the words of it; for to make a lease so com
mence or end, as one had a lease in possession, may not be, and it is no
more than to grant so much of his term as shall be to come after the
death of the father; which is entirely void, for this that there is no
knowing what thing in this case passes, and this for the uncertainty;
and to hold that these words, after the death, &c., shall be void and on
this to say that it is an assignment or gift of his term, viz., the residue,
is against reason; for this is not the intent of the grantor. And of
this opinion also were Mead and Peryam, JJ .
SAY v. SMITH, in Common Pleas, Easter term, 6 E1iz.—A. D. 1564-—-1
Plowd. Com. 269. Abridged.
Replevin by William Say against John Smith and Thomas Fuller, for
taking nine cows. The defendants justified the taking as bailiffs of
Edmond Smith in whose freehold of 20 acres the cows were doing
damage. Say rejoined that said Edmond had the freehold by devise
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in writing of William Norton, who in his lifetime, viz, 4 Hen. 8, leased
the same to John Kirton, whose executor assigned said lease and term
to Say, which lease produced in court demised the land to the lessee
and his assigns for the term of ten years reserving to the lessor and his
heirs and assigns a yearly rent of 4 l. 16 s. 8 d., and a rent of 10,000
tiles, or their value in money payable at the end of said term; and
further by said lease it was agreed and granted that, if at the end of
said term and every succeeding term, the rent should be duly paid,
said lessee, his heirs and assigns, should have a perpetual demise, farm,
and grant of the premises from ten years to ten years on like rent con
tinually and ensuing out of the memory of man. It was further alleged
that the rent had been duly paid, and that by virtue of the lease and as
signment the plaintiff was lawfully possessed of the premises, and being
so possessed, the defendants wrongfully entered and took the cows.
To this the defendants demurred.
OPINION. I heard the arguments of all the justices except WALsH,
the latter end of whose argument I only heard; but they all argued
to one effect, and agreed that the title of the plaintiff was not good,
and that the defendants should have a return. * * * Then as to the
principal matter, every contract suflicient to make a lease for years ought
to have certainty in three limitations, viz. in the commencement of the
term, in the continuance of it
,
and in the end of it. So that all these
ought to be known at the commencement of the lease, and words in a
lease which don’t make this appear are but babble, as BROWN said. And
these three are in effect but one matter, showing the certainty of the
time for which the lessee shall have the land, and if any of these fail
it is not a good lease, for then there wants certainty. * * * So here
the first term of ten years is good without question, but the term after
wards for other ten years is limited to commence after the per
formance of a condition, so that until the condition is performed
the term cannot commence. And then if the condition ought first to be
performed, it is first to be considered whether or no it is possible to be
performed, and if it is now performed. And Baown said that it is not
possible to be performed, because the words of it are, that he shall
have the lease if he pay the tiles_ or the value of them in money at the
end of every ten years from thence next following. So that every ten
years which shall next follow ought to precede the payment, and the pay
ment the lease. And if the next ten years be passed he cannot pay the
tiles or the value of them, for the payment ought to be at the end of
every ten years. * * * So that until all ten years are passed the end
of every ten years next following the date of the said indenture is not
passed; and all ten years are not passed until the end of the world.
Wherefore the end of the world ought to come before the payment, and
the payment ought to come before the lease, and so the lease shall never
commence. * * *
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Then as to the certainty of the time of the continuance of the lease,
although it should be here admitted that there is a certainty of the com
mencement of it
,
yet there is no certain space of time expressed by which
the length of the term may be known, for it is appointed that upon the
payment the lessee shall have a perpetual demise from ten years to
ten years, which is as much as a demise for 20 years, and which words
would have made a good lease for 20 years if he had stopped there, but
he has coupled them with other words which make the whole uncertain,
viz. that the demise shall be perpetual, and from ten years to ten years
continually and out of the memory of man, which words, perpetually,
continually, and out o
f memory, don’t contain any certain term, but time
without a term. * * *
From the above cases it will be seen that if it had not been for the fact
that the form of the conveyance was insufficient to pass a freehold the titles
of the lessees would have been sustained as creating estates for life, in which
the uncertainty of duration is a common element. Therefore, since livery is
no longer necessary to pass a freehold, and the word heirs is made unneces
sary to pass a fee by deed, the questions discussed in these cases will now
seldom arise. They might arise on a contest between the heir and the ad
ministrator as to whether it was a freehold or a chattel real. But that un
certainty as to the term would not now avoid the contract and estate is
shown by the following cases: Reed v. Lewis (1881), 74 Ind. 433, 39 Am.
Rep. 88; School Dist. No. 5 v. Everett (1883), 52 Mich. 314, 17 N. W. 926;
D’Arcy v. Martyn (1886), 63 Mich. 602, 30 N. W. 194; Horner v. Leeds
(1855), 25 N. J. L. 106; Lemington v. Stevens (1875), 48 Vt. 38.
“Said Crow hereby agrees to lease unto said Meinhart the following piece
of ground [describing it] for the purpose of carrying on the business of a
creamery thereon, and for the term of so long as said creamery is carried
on as said business, for the sum or rent of one dollar for said lease in full,”
was held not to create a term nor any interest in the land, but a mere
license; and therefore an attachment of the interest of the licensee as a
leasehold was not sustained. Melhop v. Meinhart (1886), 70 Iowa, 685.
28 N. W. 545. To the same effect see also: Western Transp. C0. v. Lan
sing, 49 N. Y. 499.
ST. AUBY’S CASE, in the Exchequer, Easter, 31 Eliz.—A. D. 1590.-Cro.
Eliz. 183.
Earl of Arundel being possessed of a term for years in lands, grants
a rent to St. Auby for his life, issuing out of said lands, and dies. This
is found by oflice, and the land now being in the queen’s hands, Drew
prays an allowance of this rent, the term yet having continuance for
divers years. Popham, Att. Gen., moved that it was void to charge the
land, for he cannot have a frank-tenement out of a chattel, and if he has
not a frank-tenement according to the word of the grant, he can have no
other estate, for it is not granted for any time certain.
MANWOOD, Chief Baron.—Although this cannot be a grant to make
a freehold, yet it shall be a grant as it may be, viz., a grant for so many
years as the term endures, if he live so long; for it is not a frank-tene
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ment in law, but a chattel. To this opinion were GENT and CLERK, Bar
ons, inclined, but said they would advise.
For the later history of this question see the cases on executory devises
post—.
Validity of Oral Lease.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 29 Car. II. c. 3, Secs. 1-3.—A. D. 1676.
For prevention of many fraudulent practices which are commonly en
deavored to be upheld by perjury and subornation of perjury be it en
acted by the kings most excellent majesty by and with the advice and
consent of the lords spiritual and temporal and the commons in this
present parliament assembled and by the authority of the same that
from and after the four and twentieth day of June which shall be in
the year of our Lord one thousand six hundred seventy and seven. All
leases, estates, interests of freehold or terms of years or any uncertain
interest of in to or out of any messuages, manors, lands, tenements or
hereditaments made or created by livery and seisin only or by parole
and not put in writing and signed by the parties so making or creating
the same or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized by writing, shall
have the force and effect of leases or estates at will only and shall not
either in law or equity be deemed or taken to have any other or greater
force or efiect. Any consideration for making any such parole leases or
estates or any former law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.
SEO. 2. Except nevertheless all leases not exceeding the term of
three years from the making thereof whereupon the rent reserved to the
landlord during such term shall amount unto two-third parts at the least
of the full improved value of the thing demised.
SEC. 3. And moreover that no leases, estates or interests either of
freehold or terms of years or any uncertain interest not being copyhold
or customary interest of in to or out of any messuages, manors, lands,
tenements or hereditaments shall at any time after said four and twen
tieth day of June be assigned, granted or surrendered unless it be by
deed or note in writing signed by the party so assigning, granting or sur
rendering the same or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized by writ
ing or by act and operation of law.
WHITING v. OI-ILERT, in Dflch. Sup. Ct. 1884—52 Mich. 462, 18 N. W/219,
50 Am. Rep. 265.
Assumpsit. Plaintiff brings error from judgment for defendant.
CAMPBELL, J . This was an action by a tenant against his landlord
for disturbance in his enjoyment. The main dispute was concerning
the validity of the lease. The testimony tended to show an agreement
by parol in April for a year’s tenancy from the beginning of May. The
court below held that an agreement by parol for a full term of a year,
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to begin in the future, was void under the Statute of Frauds. That
statute provides that all contracts for the leasing for more than one
year of lands shall be void unless in writing. Comp. L. § 4694? [How.
St. § 6181.] The only other provision supposed to be involved is that
which declares that every agreement which by its terms is not to be
performed within one year must be in writing. Comp. L. § 4698.
The distinction between an agreement for a lease and the lease itself
was pointed out in Tillman v. Fuller 12 Mich. 113. It is very well settled
that a lease may be made to take effect in future, and that the estate
does not begin wth the contract, but with the future period. Young v.
Dake 5 N. Y. 463; Trull v. Granger 8 N. Y. 115; Wood v. Hubbell
10 N. Y. 479. It is held in New York, under a statute corresponding
to ours, that an agreement by parol for a future term not exceeding
one year is valid, and not within the statute, Young v. Dake 5 N. Y.
463. That case is well considered, and is
,
we think, a fair construction
of the statute, which ought not to be given a strained meaning. The
same doctrine has been adhered to in that state, and is re-aflirmed em
phatically in Becar v. Flues 64 N. Y. 518, where a tenant was held
liable for the agreed rent, who had never gone into possession, and had
declined to do so.
Concurring, as we do, in this view of the law, we think the court
below erred in its ruling, and should have allowed a recovery of damages , _ _
for the injury done plaintiff. We note further in the record that the _ __ . ,
right of possesion seems to have been determined in plaintiff’s favor ' . .'
- ~
in proceedings before a commissioner, and we cannot understand why 7- .- -
on any theory his recovery, to some extent at least, was questionable. .;'I
But as tenant for a year he was of course entitled to larger damages. . . _ _
' '
Judgment reversed. _ ‘ _ _I
Accord: Sears v. Smith, 3 Colo. 277; Steininger v. Williams, 63 Ga. 475;
n '°
Huffman v. Starks, 31 Ind. 474; Gregory, J., dissenting; Sobey v. Brisbee, 20
Iowa, 105; Paulton v. Kreiser (1904), 18 S. Dak. 487, 101 N. W. 46.
The weight of authority is against this case. Bain v. McDonald, 111 Ala.
272, 20 So. 77; Wickson v. Monarch Cycle Mfg. Co. (1900), 128 Cal. 156,
60 Pac. 764, 79 Am. St. Rep. 36, and cases there cited. Wheeler v. Franken
thal, 78 Ill. 124; Wolf v. Dozer, 22 Kan. 436; Mathews v. Carlton (1905),
189 Mass. 285, 75 N. E. 637; Jellett v. Rhode, 43 Minn. 167, 45 N. W. 13, 7
L. R. A. 671; Johnson v. Albertson, 51 Minn. 335, 53 N. W. 642; Whiting v.
Pittsburgh Opera, 88 Pa. St. 100, “from the making thereof."
Tenant or Servant.
‘
HAYVVOOD v. MILLER, in N. Y. Sup. Ct., May 1842-3 Hill 90.
Miller sued Haywood in trespass for ejecting his goods from a dwell
ing house on Haywood’s lower farm, which plaintiff occupied under an
agreement that he would labor on the farm for a year and that his wife
would do the house-keeping; for all of which Haywood agreed to pay
him $160. Haywood asked Miller to work on the upper farm, which
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Miller refused to do, whereupon Haywood discharged him, gave him
notice to leave, and finally entered and put out his furniture. From
judgment for $200 for plaintiff, Haywood brings error.
PER CURIAM. The contract was not in the nature of a lease. Whether
the lower farm was intended as the place of labor or not, the relation
between these parties was merely that of master and servant. True,
it is assumed by the contract that the defendant below should furnish
a house; and so does every master agree to furnish a house, or house
room, which is the same thing, for his domestic servants. It does not
follow that, when he becomes dissatisfied and gives his servant warning
to depart, and the latter refuses, that the master may not turn the
servant away and remove his goods. To be sure, the master does this
under the peril of paying damages for a breach of the contract with
his servant, if he cannot show good grounds for dismissing him. But
he is not a trespasser, whether he have good cause or not. Here the
labor was to be on a salary of so much for the year. Suppose the plaint
ifi below had refused to work and held over the year; could the de
fendant have distrained for rent, or sued for use and occupation? Or
could the plaintiff have had ejectment for the ouster within the year?
Clearly neither; and that shows there was no more a tenancy created,
than there would be under any other retainer for a year’s service. The
mistake lies in the form of action—in bringing trespass, and not as
sumpsit. The judgment must be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
LIGHTBODY v. TRUELSEN et al., in Bllnn Sup. Ct-, Nov. 2, 1888—39 Minn.
310, 40 N. W. 67.
The plaintiff claiming to be tenant of some boarding houses, sues the
defendant sheriff and under-sheriff for wrongfully ejecting him.
The Minnesota Granite & Stone Co., needing some place to house its
employees at its quarry, built these houses, and the plaintiff went into
possession under a contract with the company, by which he agreed to
furnish the house and board and lodge all the men sent him by the com
pany for $4.50 per week, to be paid him by the company and by it de
ducted from the men’s wages, the company also deducting from the board
money $60 per month for the rent of the houses. The plaintiff agreed
to give personal and constant supervision to the house and not to be
absent without the consent of the company’s superintendent. The su
perintendent becoming dissatisfied, ordered plaintiff to leave and re
move his goods. This being refused, he had the defendants remove them.
The court below gave plaintiff judgment for $1,000 damages and the
defendants appeal.
_ _
MITCHELL, J . * * * If plaintiff was merely the servant of the Com
pany, employed to manage the boarding-houses for them, there could be
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very little doubt but that his use or occupancy of the buildings was also as
servant, and not as tenant, being merely accessory to the more convenient
performance of his duties as servant. If the use or occupancy be as
servant, the law is well settled that the master does not part with the
possession, the servant’s possession being the master’s. If the serv
ant is discharged, he must, on request, quit the premises; and, if he
refuses to go, the master may eject him, and for that purpose use
such force as is reasonably necessary. The master’s right in this re
spect does not depend upon the question whether the servant is right
fully or wrongfully discharged, but exists in the one case as well as the
other; the master incurring the risk of paying damages for breach of
the contract of employment, which would be the servant’s only remedy.
But the question here is
,
was plaintiff the servant of the company at
all, or was he their tenant? A tenant may be defined to be one who
has possession of the premises of another in subordination to that
other’s title, and with his consent. No particular form of words is
necessary to create a tenancy. Any words that show an intention of
the lessor to divest himself of the possession, and confer it upon
another, but of course in subordination to his own title, is suflicient.
While, of course, the existence of certain things is necessary to con
stitute a lease, there is no artificial rule by which the contract is to
be construed. It is largely a question of the intention of the parties,
to be collected from the whole agreement. It seems to us that the
agreement in the present case all looks to a leasing of these boarding
houses to plaintiff, and not to an employment of him as agent to
manage them for the company. Every provision of the contract con
templates his occupancy as landlord or proprietor. There is nothing
to indicate that his possession of the buildings was not to be exclu
sive; on the contrary, the nature of the business, and the manner in
which it was to be run, necessarily imply that it was to be exclusive.
He was to run the business, not for the benefit of the company, but
for himself; the profits, if any, being his, and the losses, if any, he
would have to stand. He took his chances on the number of boarders
he would get; the company did not obligate themselves to furnish
any particular number. He furnished the houses and provided the
supplies at his own expense, just as any boarding-house keeper would
do, if running the business as principal, and not as agent for another.
What was paid him was for boarding the men, and not as compensa
tion for services as agent. Moreover, he had to pay a fixed rent for
the use of the buildings, the amount of which was not at all depend
ent upon the number of boarders the company furnished. It was to
be the same whether they furnished one or one hundred. The man
ner in which the board-bills of the men or the rent for the buildings
were paid is unimportant. That was a mere question of convenience.
The fact that plaintiff was obligated to board the company’s men,
and that he was to give his time to the supervision of the boarding
houses, is not at all inconsistent with the idea of a lease. In short,
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the whole contract, in our judgment, shows an intention, not to em
ploy plaintiff’s services as agent, but to lease the buildings to him,
with just such covenants and conditions as to the manner of their
use and the mode of conducting the business as would naturally be
incorporated into a lease, in vicw of the relation the buildings bore
to the company’s business. * * *
Judgment afiirmed.
BOWMAN v. BRADLEY, in Pa. Sup. Ct., Oct. 3, 1892—-151 Pa. St. 351, 24
Atl. 1062, 17 L. R. A. 213.
Action in trespass. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
WILLIAMS, J . The question on which this case turns is one of consid
erable practical importance, and in this state it seems to be an open one.
The learned trial judge finding no precedent in our own reports to guide
him turned to the English courts, and followed what he believed to be
the rule held by them. He stated at the same time that the question
was one that could “only be settled by a decision of the supreme
court.” The facts on which the question arises are mainly undisputed.
They show that Bradley owned a farm in Dauphin county containing
about twenty-nine acres. About four or five acres of this were occupied
by a mill and pond operated by the owner. To care for the balance
and the stock upon it he hired Bowman and his family. The farm
work and the care of the cattle were to be looked after by Bowman. His
wife was to milk the cows. His son was to deliver the milk each
morning to Bradley in the city of Harrisburg. For this labor Bowman
was to receive one dollar per day and the use of a house upon the
premises to be occupied by himself and family. The only fact in dispute
was the duration of the contract. The plaintiff alleged it was to
continue for one year. The defendant asserted that it was terminable
at his pleasure. ‘He says that he told Bowman
“ I will try you, and on
your terms, and if you don’t suit me I will discharge you and expect you
to leave the premises on sight.” Which was the true version was a ques
tion of fact for the jury. If they found with the defendant that was
an end of the plaintiffs case unless by some arbitrary rule of law the em
ployee was turned into a tenant for years. On the other hand if they
found the contract was for one year the plaintiff was entitled to re
cover unless the defendant could show a sufficient reason for terminat
ing it sooner. The first question therefore that presented itself on
the trial was over the nature and extent of Bowman’s right to the house
from which he was ousted by the defendant. Was that right an in
cident of the hiring and dependent on the continuance of the relation
of employer and employee, or had it an independent separate existence,
so that he was to be treated as a tenant for years with a right to remain in
possession for one whole year whether he remained in the employment of
the owner of not?
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This was a question of law. The terms of the contract, so far as
the parties differed, it was the duty of the jury to determine; but the
terms being fixed, their legal import was for the court to declare. This
should be determined upon a consideration of the nature and purpose
of the contract, and the character of the business to which it relates;
and analogies furnished by cases arising under the poor laws in Eng
land or in this country, while they may be helpful in some respects,
ought not to be controlling. The subject of this contract was labor.
Labor was what Bradley needed and undertook to pay for. It was what
Bowman offered to furnish him at an agreed price. The labor was to
be performed upon the land in its cultivation, in the care of the cows,
and the delivery of the milk. As Bowman was not a cropper, or tenant
paying rent, his possession of the land and the cows, and the implements
of farm labor, was the possession of his employer. The barn was used to
stable the cattle and store their feed. The house was a convenient place
for the residence of the laborer. The house, the barn, the land, the cattle,
the farming tools were turned over into the custody of the man who had
been hired to care for the property; but he had no hostilepossession, no
independent right to possession. His possession was that of the owner
whom he represented, and for whom he labored for hire.
This is not denied as to the farm, the barn, the stock, or the tools,
but an attempt is made to distinguish between the house and everything
else that came into the possession of the employee in pursuance of the con
tract of hiring. There is no solid ground on which such a distinction
can rest. If the possession of the house be regarded as an incident
of the hiring, the incident must fall with the principal. If it be re
garded as part of the compensation for labor stipulated for, then the
right to the compensation ceased when the labor was discontinued.
Bowman had the same right to insist on the payment of the cash part
of his wages as on that part which provided his family a place to
live. His right under the contract of hiring was like that of the porter
to the possession of the porter’s lodge; like that of the coachman to his
apartments over the stable; like that of the teacher to the rooms he or she
may have occupied in the school buildings; like that of the domestic
servants to the rooms in which they lodge in the house of their employers.
In all these cases and others that might be enumerated the occupancy
of the room or house is incidental to the employment. The employee
has no distinct right of possession, for his possession is that of the
employer, and it cannot survive the hiring to which it is incidental,
or under which it is part of the contract price for the services per
formed. So in this case, if the contract was simply a contract for labor
at one dollar per day and a house to live in, the plaintiff held the house
by the same title and for the same purpose that he did the land or the
cattle in the care of which his labor was to be performed. When his
contract ended, his rights in the premises were extinguished, and it
was his duty to give way to his successor. The jury might have found
the disputed term of the contract in the plaintifi’s favor and that the
\
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contract was made in express words for one year. In this case the de
fendant would be called upon to explain his conduct in discharging the
plaintiff before the time for which he was hired had expired; and the
jury would have to determine whether his conduct was a violation of
the contract on his part, or was justified by the reasons assigned. But
the plaintiff’s declaration is not drawn upon this basis. It does not
allege a violation of contract but a trespass. It asserts that the plaint
iff was “in the lawful and peaceful possesion of a certain dwelling
house, messuage and tract of land,” and that the defendant “with a
high hand entered upon said close * * * and forcibly threw out
of said dwelling the furniture and property of said plaintiff and exposed
the same to the weather and broke and injured the same.” The damages
alleged are for injury to the furniture, and money paid to secure an
other house for himself and family. The case seems to have been begun,
and tried, by the plaintiff on the theory that his right to the possession
of the house was superior to his right to remain in the defendant’s
service; and that while his employer might dismiss him from the one
at any time, he could not oust him from the other until the expiration
of one full year. Such a theory cannot be sustained by proof of a con
tract for labor at a fixed price per day and a house to live in. It can
only be supported by proof of a contract for one year’s occupancy of the
house. Both parties agree that the contract in this case was one of
hiring. There is no pretense of a separate lease for the house. The
compensation for its use was in the labor to be performed on the prem
ises. When the labor ceased on the nineteenth of July, the plaintiff
ceased to pay for his occupancy. By ceasing to labor without remon
strance or objection he must be held to acquiesce in the defendant’s
right to terminate the contract for labor. If that contract was right
fully terminated then the plaintiff’s right to the house was at an end
and he could be lawfully put out of possession.
These views sustain the first and second assignments of error. The
fifth assignment is also sustained. It is not necessary that occupation
of a house, or apartments, should be a necessary incident to the service
to be performed in order that the right to continue in possession should
end with the service. It is enough if such occupation is convenient for
the purposes of the service and was obtained by reason of the contract
of hiring.
For the reasons thus given the judgment in this case is reversed.
Farm Hand in C0ttage.—-A tenant under a lease containing a condition
not to sublet, employed a man to work on the farm, and gave him posses
sion of a house on it. The court held this was not a subletting within the
terms of the lease, and no forfeiture, because the man let into the house was
there as servant and not as tenant. Vincent v. Crane, (1903), 134 Mich. 700,
97 N. W. 34, citing Kerrains v. People, and Chatard v. O'Donovan, below.
A Mill Hand hired for the year at thirteen shillings per day was furnished
a cottage near the mill for his family, so he could be near his work, paying
no rent. The employer discharged him, and in an attempt to remove him
and his goods from the house was resisted. This is a prosecution of the
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servant for assault with intent to kill. The case turned on whether the
defendant was tenant, in which case he could use all force necessary to pro
tect his house from unlawful intrusion; or whether he was a servant merely,
in which case he could make no resistance except to avoid bodily harm to
himself or family not avoidable by retreat. The court held he was a mere
servant. Kerrains v. People (1875), 60 N. Y. 221, 19 Am. Rep. 158, Finch
Cas. 713.
_
A Methodist Parson was removed from the parsonage by the trustees of
the church, leased to the church ladies guild and occupied by the parson
without rent. In a suit by him in trespass for the removal, the court held
that defendants were liable, because he was tenant, not servant—certainly
not their servant because not employed by them but sent by the conference.
Bristor v. Burr (1890), 120 N. Y. 427, 24 N. E. 937; 8 L. R. A. 710.
A roman catholic priest was removed from office by the bishop in charge
of the diocese, who owned the parsonage in fee in trust for the congrega
tion; and was given notice to quit, which was too short if he was tenant at
will. In an action to recover possession, the court held that he was servant
and not tenant, and so entitled to no notice to quit. Chatard v. O’Donovan
(1881), 80 Ind. 20, 41 Am. Rep. 782.
License or Lease.
KITCHEN v. PRIDGEN, in N. Car. Sup. Ct., Dec., 1855-3 Jones Law 49,
64 Am. Dec. 593.
Trespass quare clausum fregit. Plaintiff claimed possession imder one
Herring, and alleged that he had occupied a house on the land for sev
eral months where he lived, had a cook, and employed several men
cutting wood, and that he was in possession of the land. A witness
testified that he saw plaintiff pay Herring $7, and heard him say:
“You can go on and cut as long as you choose, paying 25 cents per cord.”
The jury were charged that plaintiff was a tenant from year to year
and entitled to notice to quit, and in absence of evidence of such notice,
plaintiff was entitled to recover. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff.
Defendant appealed. _ _
~
BY COURT, BATTLE, J . A tenancy from year to year is a species of
term for years, from which, however, it is distinguished, inasmuch
as the duration of the term is not limited. It is distinguished from
a tenancy at will, inasmuch as it is raised only by construction of
law as a substitute for an estate at will ; therefore, although prlma facie
all leases for uncertain terms create a tenancy at will, courts of law
have for a long time construed such leases to constitute a tenancy from
year to year, especially where an annual rent is reserved. Thus, where
land was leased to A. for a year, and so from year to year, as long
as both parties should agree; so, a general parol demise at an annual
rent ; so, where the occupier, under an agreement for a lease at a certain
rent, pays the rent; so, where a tenant for life, under a limited power
of leasing, granted a lease exceeding his power, but the remainderman
accepted the rent; so, a tenant who holds over after his term has ex
pired, and the lessor accepts rent; so, a parol demise for a longer term
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than three years, which is void by the statute of frauds: 2 Crabbe on
Real Estate, 416, 417 ; 55 Law Lib. 265, 266. All these are cases where
the law will, by implication, raise a tenancy from year to year; and it
will be seen that in them all there is a reference to an annual occupa
tion of the premises, and a corresponding payment of rent. The mode
of determining this tenancy by a notice to quit is what properly dis
tinguishes it from an estate at will; for, although this latter estate
cannot, as a. rule, be determined without a demand of possession, yet
this is for the most part all that is necessary, though there are cases
still occurring where the estate is so strictly at will that even a de
mand of possession is not required: 2 Crabbe on Real Estate, 418. A
tenancy from year to year can be put an end to only by either party’s
giving a'regular notice to quit, which must be given half a year pre
vious to the expiration of the current year of tenancy, so as to expire
at the period of the year at which the tenancy was commenced: Id.
423. Tenancies from year to year do not determine by the death of
the tenant, but devolve on his personal representative, who must have
half a year’s notice to quit: 1 Cru. Dig., tit. Estate at Will, 285; Doe
v. Porter, 3 Term 13.
Such being a tenancy from year to year, we shall look in vain for
anything in the testimony set out in the bill of exceptions which shows,
or has a tendency to show, that it existed in the present case. Neither
of the plaintiffs witnesses says a word about a lease, an annual occu
pation, or the payment of an annual rent. One of them does indeed
state that Herring, who then owned the land, and from whom the de
fendant soon afterwards purchased it
,
complained that, the plaintiff
had not paid him “the rent which he had agreed to pay ;” but this we
soon afterwards learn was not for the occupation of the land, but for
wood for which Herring had permitted him to cut at twenty-five cents
per cord; and then, upon his paying seven dollars, Herring told him
he might cut as long as he chose upon the same terms. This agree
ment certainly did not constitute a lease for a year, or a tenancy from
year to year, even of the trees which were to be cut into wood. No
particular time is mentioned at which it had commenced, or was to com
mence. There was no reference to a year, or a number of years, for its
continuance, or for the payment of an annual rent. It did not seem
to be contemplated that the plaintiff should be compelled to continue
the business until he had given half a year’s notice of his intention to
quit; and we can hardly think that he had such an interest as would,
upon his death, have devolved on his executor or administrator. In
the absence of these qualities, the agreement between Herring and the
plaintiff could not create a tenancy from year to year. If this be so,
the purchase of the land by the defendant did not alter the nature of
the transaction. At most, it was but a tenancy at will of the trees,
and such portion of the land as was necessary to enable him to cut them;
and it may well be doubted whether it was anything more than “a
mere personal contract, not attaching to the land, or passing, or in
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tending to pass, any estate in it, but resting entirely in contract :” See
Mhoon v. Drizzle, 3 Dev. L. 414. It is suflicient for us to say that it
was not a case of tenancy from year to year; which puts an end to the
action, without reference to any other question. The judgment must
be reversed and a venire de novo awarded.
_ Judgment reversed.
. Farming on Shares.
KELLY v. RUMIIERFORD, in Wis. Sup. Ct., May 8, 1903-117 Wis. 630, 94
N. W. 649, 98 Am. St. Rep. 951. .
Replevin for half of crop of potatoes raised by defendant on plaintiffs
land. Defendant at the time of digging notified the plaintiif of his in
tention to divide the crop in the field, and accordingly left half in a pile
in the field and took half away as his own, for which this suit is
brought. Plaintiff objected to the right of the defendant to divide
the crop, but not to the manner of division. Defendant had judgment
for the return of the property or its value ($30) and costs. Plaintiff
appeals.
CASSODAY, C. J . It is sometimes difficult to determine whether
a person who works the land of another on shares is a tenant in Co111
mon of the crop with the owner of the land or a mere cropper. Much
depends upon the wording of the contract between the parties. Lan
yon v. Woodward, 55 Wis. 652, 13 N. W. 863; Carrier v. Atwood,
63 Wis. 301, 24 N. W. 82; Wood v. Noack, 84 Wis. 398, 54 N. W.
785; Rowlands v. Voechting (Wis.) 91 N. W. 990; Warner v. Abbey,
112 Mass. 355. In the case at bar there is practically no dispute as to
the facts. The plaintifi furnished the land and the seed. The de
fendant was to plow the ground, plant and care for and harvest the
potatoes, and have one-half of what should be raised. After plowing
the ground and planting the potatoes, the defendant moved away. Fin
ally, his son-in-law came, and went over the potatoes with a cultivator
one way and partly over them the other way. But the potatoes be
came badly damaged for want of care, and finally the plaintifi got
another man to care for the potatoes, and agreed to give him a share
of the crop for doing so. The defendant testified to the efiect that
the plaintifi was to furnish the land and the seed, and that he was to
cultivate the ground and have half of the crop, provided he stay there;
and, if he did not stay, and no one else would buy, then the plaintifi
would buy his share of the potatoes. The trial court manifestly held
that the parties were tenants in common of the crop. If such was the
relation of the parties, then the decision may be justified. Section
4257, Rev. St. 1898; Foley v. The S. L. C-0., 94 Wis. 329, 68 N. W. 994;
Sullivan v. Sherry, 111 Wis. 476, 87 N. W. 471, 87 Am. St. Rep. 890;
Orcott v. Moore, 134 Mass. 48, 45 Am. Rep. 278. If, on the other
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hand, the defendant was a mere cropper, then the decision was wrong.
The general rule is that: “The legal possession of the land, as well as
the title to the entire crop, is in the owner of the soil. The possession
of the cropper being merely that of a servant, and incident to his right
and duty of entering the close for the purpose of planting, cultivating,
and gathering the crop, it is not the legal possession of premises which
usually gives the possessor the title to the produce. He has no property
in his share of the crop until the division which is made by the owner
of the land.” 8 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 324, 325. It is there
said that: “The term ‘cropper’ is applied to a person hired by the
landowner to cultivate the land, receiving for his compensation a portion
of the crop raised.” Id. So it was said in an early case in Pennsylvania
that: “If one hires a man to work his farm, and gives him a share of
the produce, he is a cropper. He has no interest in the land, but re
ceives his share as the price of his labor. The possession is still in
the owner of the land, who alone can maintain trespass.” Fry v. Jones,
2 Rawle, 12. In a later case in the same state it was held that an
“agreement to farm land on shares is a contract of service, and not of
lease, and a person doing the farming is a mere cropper, and not a
tenant, and has no interest in the land.” To the same effect, Steele v.
Frick, 56 Pa. 172; Adams v. McKess0n’s EX’x, 53 Pa. 81, 91 Am.
Dec. 183. Thus it has been held in North Carolina that: “Where a
person agrees to work on the land of another for a share of the crop,
the cropper cannot convey a legal title to his share of the crop to a third
person before an actual division and appropriation.” McNcely v. Hart,
32 N. C. 63, 51 Am. Dec. 377. To the same effect, Brazier v. Ansley, 33
N. C. 12, 51 Am. Dec. 408; Harrison v. Ricks, 71 N. C. 11. In this last
case it is said that: “A cropper has no estate in the land. That remains
in the landlord. Consequently, although he has, in some sense, the pos
session of the crop, it is only the possession of a servant, and is in law
that of the landlord. The landlord must divide off to the cropper his
share. In short, he is a laborer receiving pay in a share of the crop.”
That is referred to approvingly in Strain v. Gardner, 61 Wis. 184, 21
N. W. 35. Perhaps it would have been more proper to have used the
word “landowner” instead of “landlord.” We must hold that the de
fendant was a mere cropper, and that the plaintiff remained all the
time the legal owner of the whole crop, and hence was entitled to re
cover in replevin.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is re
manded, with direction to enter judgment in favor of the plaintifi in
accordance with this opinion.
FARROW v. \VOOLEY, in Ala. Sup. Ct., Feb. 12, 1903.-138 Ala. 267, 36
S0. 384.
This is an action by Wooley & Jordan of two counts, one in tres
pass for taking, the other in trover for converting, two bales of cotton;
FARMING on snAans. 109
which was grown by Pratt on Tillman’s land under an agreement by
which Tillman furnished the stock and land and Pratt the labor, the
crop to be divided equally. Pratt gave Wooley & Jordan a mortgage on
the crop in February, and delivered these two bales to them in the fall
to apply on the mortgage. Tillman took the cotton from their premises
and delivered it to defendant, Farrow, who gave him credit on account
for it
,
knowing all the circumstances. The justice’s judgment for plaint
iffs was affirmed in the circuit court, and the defendant appeals.
DOWDELL, J. The undisputed evidence showed that no force or violence
was used in taking the cotton, and that the legal title to the cotton was
in Tillman, from whom the defendant purchased it. The defendant was
entitled to the afi_lrmative charge as requested and the court erred in its
refusal. Jordan v. Lindsay, 132 Ala. 567, 31 So. 484; Code 1896.
§ 2712. The cases of Collier V. Faulk, 69 Ala. 58; and Adams V. State,
87 Ala. 89, 6 So. 270, and the other cases following the Collier-Faulk
decision, in addition to those mentioned in Jordan v. Lindsay, supra,
must be overruled.
Reversed and remanded.
MEYER v. LIVESLEY, in Ore. Sup. Ct., Nov. 28, 1904.-45 Ore. 487, 78
Pac. 670, 106 A!_n. St. Rep. 667.
BEAN, J . This is a suit to restrain the defendants from trespassing
upon or interfering with the plaintiff’s possession of a hop-yard. On March
7
, 1900, I. M. Simpson, being the owner of a certain tract of land in
Polk county, upon which the hop-yard in question was situated, leased the
yard, with the improvements thereon, consisting of dry kiln, hop poles,
etc., to the defendants, for the years 1900 to 1904, inclusive. On October
25, 1902, the defendants sublet the yard, together with the hop kilns,
baler and farming implements mentioned in the lease from Simpson to
them to W. D. Huston, agreeing to furnish Huston one of the dwelling
houses on the Simpson place, or to remodel another building thereon,
and the use of Simpson’s horses in the cultivation of the hops at a certain
stipulated rate per day, in consideration of which Huston agreed to pay
them, as rental, one-fourth of the “average quality” of the hops produced
on the land during the years of 1903 and 1904. On January 11, 1904,
Huston assigned to the plaintiff all his right and interest in and to the
lease or contract between himself and the defendants. This assignment
was not recorded, and on January 23, 1904, the defendants, without
knowledge or notice thereof, entered into a new lease with Huston for the
current year, taking from him a mortgage on his interest in the crop
to be grown during that year to secure a balance due for advances made
the previous year. It was stipulated in the new lease that, in case of a
violation of any of its terms by Huston, the defendants should have the
right to re-enter and take possession of the hop-yard, to complete the
cultivation of the crop, and harvest and sell it
,
paying over the surplus,
if any, to Huston. In March, 1904, the defendants attempted to enter
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and take possession of the hop-yard, on account of a violation of the
provisions of the lease or agreement between them and Huston, when
this suit was brought by the plaintiff to enjoin them from doing so.
The only question we deem it necessary to consider is whether the
lease from the defendants to Huston, made in October, 1902, was assign
able by Huston without the consent of the defendants. The plaintiff
claims title under such an assignment, but, unless Huston had authority
to assign the lease to him, he has no standing in court, and the other
questions become immaterial.
As a general rule, the power of assignment is incident to the estate of
a lessee of real property, unless it is restrained by the terms of the lease:
Wood on Landlord and Tenant, p. 529 ; Taylor on Landlord and Tenant,
9th ed., sec. 402. But a lease of land upon shares, including the use
of buildings, farm implements, stock and other personal property is
regarded as a personal contract, and not assignable without the consent
of the lessor, because the amount to be received by the lessor, and the
care of the property depend upon the character, industry and skill of
the lessee: Taylor on Landlord and Tenant, 9th ed., secs. 24, 24a; Ran
dall v. Chubb, 46 Mich. 311, 41 Am. Rep. 165, 9 N. W. 429 ; Lewis v.
Sheldon, 103 Mich. 102, 61 N. W. 269. Randall V. Chubb is much
in point. Chubb leased certain premises to Stoddard upon shares for
the term of three years with the privilege of five. Stoddard was to do all
the work, find all the seed, and deliver to the lessor one-third of the
crop. The farm was to be cropped in a certain specified way, and, as in
the case at bar, the lessee was to have the use of certain property belong
ing to the lessor. The court held that the lease was not assignable, and
that an attempt to assign it worked a forfeiture of the estate of the lessee,
and the lessor could take immediate steps to recover possession. “The very
nature and character of the lease or agreement,” says Mr. Chief Justice
Marston, “shows that it was a personal one to the defendant, and could
not be assigned by him to a third party without the consent of his lessor.
The rent or share which the latter would receive must depend very much
upon the character of the lessee, and the latter could not place a party
in possession of the premises who might not be a good husbandman, and
who might not be able to carry on the farm operations in a good, careful
and proper manner. Under such a lease the landlord has a right to choose
his tenant, and he may be willing to lease upon shares to one man, and
yet be wholly unwilling to let another have possession upon any terms.
So, with reference to the use of his farm implements, one might be a
careful, prudent man, who would take good care of them, while another,
more reckless, would not by the owner be permitted to use them upon any
terms.” The same principle was reaffirmed in Lewis V. Sheldon, 103
Mich. 102, 61 N. W. 269.
The cases of Dworak V. Graves, 16 Neb. 706, 21 N. W. 440, and Yates
V. Kinney, 19 Neb. 275, 27 N. W. 132, are not in fact in conflict with this
doctrine. They involve the right of a lessee of property on shares to sell
or mortgage his interest in the crop after it has been grown without
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the consent of the lessor, and not the right to assign or transfer all his
estate or interest under the lease to another before the crop is raised.
The terms of the lease from the defendants to Huston bring it directly
within the doctrine of the Michigan cases. The lease included not only
the hop-yard, the successful cultivation of which necessarily depended
upon the industry and skill of the lessee, but also the use of certain build
ings, farm implements, and personal property the care of which likewise
depended upon the character of the lessee. In addition to this, the lease
is indefinite as to its terms. It does not contain any stipulation as to the
manner in which the hops shall be cultivated, cared for, harvested, or
prepared for the market——provisions usual in leases of real property.
Its nature and terms would seem to indicate that it was made by the
defendants in reliance upon the ability, character, and skill of Huston.
From the character of the agreement and the subject-matter thereof,
we are led to conclude that it was a personal contract, which Huston
could not assign or transfer so as to substitute another in his place as
lessee without the consent of the defendants.
These views result in the reversal of the decree and the dismissal of
the bill, and it is so ordered.
Right to Rent Arrear on Death of Lessor.
TEMPLE v. TEMPLE, in Common Bench, 42 & 43, Ellz.—A. D. 1601.—Cro.
Eliz. 791.
Debt. A rent was granted to baron and feme for their lives, the rent
was arrear; the baron dies; another rent was arrear; the feme dies in
testate; and her administrator brings debt for the arrearages due in the
life of the baron and after.
The Court resolved that it well lay, because the arrearages survived
to the feme as well as the rent itself. * * *
1
.
Landlol‘d’s Right to Enter and Inspect Dur1ng—Term.
HUNT v. DOWMAN, in King’s Bench, Trinity, Jac. 1.—A. D. 1618—C1'o.
Jae. 478.
Action on the case ; whereas the defendant, being lessee for years, the
reversion in fee to the plaintiff (and shows how), the plaintiff coming
to the house to see if any waste was committed therein, or any defect
in the reparations, that the defendant disturbed him, and would not
suffer him to enter and view the waste, by reason whereof he is without
remedy to punish the same; and after verdict for the plaintiff upon not
guilty pleaded, it was moved in arrest of judgment, that this action lay
not: 1. because it was not shown that waste was done * * * 2, that it
was never seen before this present that such an action had been brought,
and therefore it is not allowable. But ALL THE CoURT, held, that
the action was maintainable; for, as to the first objection, the law will
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not presume that he can come to a precise knowledge what waste is done
without a view. * * *
_
\Varranty of Safety and Fitness. _
LIBBEY v. TALFORD, in Me. Sup. Ct., 1861-48 Me. 316, 77 Am. Dec. 229.
Assumpsit to recover for damages to goods in plaintiff’s store by
want of repairs promised by defendant after leasing to plaintifi. Non
suit ordered. Plaintiff appealed.
By Court, APPLETQN, J . In the lease of a store or warehouse, there
is no implied warranty that the building is safe, well built, or fit for
any particular use: Dutton v. Gerrish, 9 Cash. 89 [55 Am. Dec 45].
So, in a lease of a house, there is none that is reasonably fit for habita
tion: Foster v. Peyser, Id. 243 [57 Am. Dec. 43] ; Gleves v. Willoughby.
7 Hill, 83. On a demise of the vesture of land for a specific term, and
at a certain rent, there is no implied obligation on the part of the
lessor that it shall be fit for the purpose for which it is taken: Sutton
v. Temple, 12 Mee. & W. 52. Nor of a house that it shall be reasonably
fit for habitation: Hart V. Windsor, Id. 68. Nor is it implied that it
shall continue fit for the purpose for which it is demised, as the tenant
can neither maintain an action, nor is he exonerated from the payment
of rent if the house is blown down or destroyed by fire, or the occupation
rendered impracticable by the act of God or the king’s enemies: Id.
When it is agreed that the landlord shall do the repairs, there is no
implied condition that the tenant may quit if the repairs are not done:
Surpliee v. Farnsworth, 7 Man. & Gr. 576 ; S. C., 49 Eng. Com. L. 574.
In Gott V. Gandy, 2 El. & Bl. 845, ‘S. C., 75 Eng. Com. L. 843, the
plaintiff brought an action against his landlord for neglecting to make
substantial repairs to the premises, after notice that they were in a
dangerous state, by reason of which the premises fell during the tenancy,
and injured his goods. The court held that no obligation on the part of
the landlord to make repairs arose from the relation of landlord and
tenant. “The absence of authority to show a duty, as between landlord
and tenant,” marks Erle, J ., “is very strong against the existence of
such a duty.” In the absence of any special agreement, the tenant
takes the risk of the future condition of the premises leased. “The
tenant,” remarks Savage, C. J., in Mumford v. Brown, 6 Cow. 475
[16 Am. Dec. 440], “takes the premises for better and for worse, and
cannot involve his landlord in expense for repairs without his consent.”
In the present case, it does not appear that there was any agreement,
when the contract of leasing was entered into, that the landlord should
keep the premises in repair. If there be no stipulation between the
parties to a lease on the subject of repairs, -the tenant is bound to keep
the premises in repair: Long v. Fitzsimmons, 1 Watts & S. 530.
The lease and its terms and conditions were made. The duties of
the parties were left as at common law. The landlord was under no
1
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obligation to repair, either by express contract or by implication of law.
By law, the duty to repair devolved upon the tenant. It is not in proof
that the premises were out of repair when the tenant entered upon their
occupation. The landlord, being under no legal obligation to make re
pairs, promised the tenant, who was under such obligation, to make them.
The promise was without consideration. It was no part of the original
agreement. It was made while the tenant was occupying the premises.
The action cannot be maintained.
Exceptions overruled.
INGALLS v. HOBBS, in Mass. Sup. (Jt., 189-156 Mass. 348; 31 N. E. 286,
16 L. R. _A. 51, 32 Am. St. Rep. 460, Tiedeman R. P. Cas. 126.
KNOWLTON, J . This is an action to recover $500 for the use and
occupation of a furnished dwelling house at Swampscott during the
summer of 1890. It was submitted to the superior court on what is
entitled an “agreed statement of evidence,” by which it appears that the '
defendant hired the premises of the plaintiflfs for the season, as a
furnished house, provided with beds, mattresses, matting, curtains,
chairs, tables, kitchen utensils, and other articles which were ap
parently in good condition, and that when the defendant took possession
it ‘was found to be more or less infested with bugs, so that the de-|
fendant contended that it was unfit for habitation, and for that reason
gave it up, and declined to occupy it. * * * Judgment was ordered
for the defendant, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. * * *
The facts agreed warrant a finding that the house was unfit for habita
tion when it was hired, and we are therefore brought directly to the
question whether there was an implied agreement on the part of the
plaintiff that it was in a proper condition for immediate use as a dwell
ing house. It is well settled, both in this commonwealth and in England,
that one who lets an unfurnished building to be occupied as a dwelling
house does not impliedly agree that it is fit for habitation. Dutton v.
Gerrish, 9 Cush. 89; Foster v. Peyser, Id. 242; Stevens v. Pierce, 151
Mass. 207; 23 N. E. 1006; Sutton v. Temple, 12 Mees. & W.‘52; Hart
v. Windsor, Id. 68. In the absence of fraud or a covenant, the pur
chaser of real estate, or the hirer of it for a term, however short, takes
it as it is
,
and determines for himself whether it will serve the purpose
for which he wants it. He may, and often does, contemplate making
extensive repairs upon it to adapt it to his wants. But there are good
reasons why a different rule should apply to one who hires a furnished
room, or a furnished house, for a few days, or a few weeks or months.
Its fitness for immediate use of a particular kind, as indicated by its
appointments, is a far more important element entering into the con
tract than where there is a mere lease of real estate. One who lets for
a short term a house provided with all furnishings and appointments
for immediate residence may be supposed to contract in reference to a
well-understood purpose of the hirer to use it as a habitation. An im
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portant part of what the hirer pays for is the opportunity to enjoy
it without delay, and without the expense of preparing it for use. It is
very difficult, and often impossible, for one to determine on inspection
whether the house and its appointments are fit for the use for which they
are immediately wanted, and the doctrine caveat emptor, which is or
dinarily applicable to a lessee of real estate, would often work injustice
if applied to cases of this kind. It would be unreasonable to hold, under
such circumstances, that the landlord does not impliedly agree that what
he is letting is a house suitable for occupation in its condition at the
time. This distinction between furnished and unfurnished houses in
reference to the construction of contracts for letting them, when there
are no express agreements about their condition, has long been recognized
in England, where it is held that there is an implied contract that a
furnished house let for a short time is in proper condition for immediate
occupation as a dwelling. Smith v. Marrable, 11 Mees. & W. 5; Wilson
v. Hatton, 2 Exch. Divi. 336; Warehouse C0. v. Carr, 5 C. P. Div. 507;
Sutton Y. Temple, ubi supra," Hart v. Windsor, ubi supra ,-' Bird v. Lord
Greville, 1 Cababe & E. 317; Charsley v. Jones, 53 S. P. Q
. B. Div. 280.
In Dulton v. Gerish, 9 Cush. 89, Chief Justice Shaw recognizes the
'doctrine as applicable to furnished houses; and in Edwards v. McLean_,
122 N. Y. 302; 25 N. E. Rep. 483; Smith v. Marrable, and Wilson v.
Hutton, cited above, are referred to with approval, although held inap
plicable to the question then before the court. See Gleves v. Willoughby,
7 Hill, 83; Franklin v. Brown, 118 N. Y. 110, 23 N. E. 126. We
are of opinion that in a lease of a completely furnished dwelling house for
a single season at a summer watering place there is an implied agree
ment that the house is fit for habitation without greater preparation
than one hiring it for a short time might reasonably be expected to make
in appropriating it to the use for which it was designed.
Judgment affirmed.
IWILES v. TRACEY, in Ky. Ct. of App., Jan. 3d., 1906—28 Ky. L. Rep. 621,
89 S. W. 1128.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to her peti
tion.
O’REAR, J . Appellees, landlords, owned a two-story building, the
lower story of which was let to tenants and the upper story to appel
lant. The building fell because structurally insecure, and damaged
appellant’s furniture. She sues the landlords to recover the damages.
In Franklin v. Tracy, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1409, 77 S. W. 1113, 63 L.
R. A. 649, it was held that there was no implied warranty by the land
lord that the tenement was fit or safe; that the tenant leases, as one
buys such property, with the duty to look and take notice for himself
of its condition. In this case, to avoid the effect of the opinion above
cited, it is admitted, and to conform presumably to the response to the
petition for a rehearing in that case (25 Ky. L. Rep. 1409, 78 S. W.
_ .
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1112, 63 L. R. A. 949), appellant here amended her petition in this case,
and alleged that she was tenantof the upper story alone, that the de
fendants had let the lower story to other tenants, and that appellees had
retained and reserved control and possession of the walls and foundation
of the building. The desire was to bring the allegations of this plead
ing up to the rule as stated by some text-writers and courts, that where
the landlord lets portions of a tenement to difierent tenants, reserving
a common entry, hallway, or stairway, which is not let to any of them,
but is reserved for the use of all, he is liable for injuries occurring
in such reserved portion by reason of its defective condition. This case
falls short of the doctrine relied on. Although it is stated that the
landlords retained possession and control of the walls and foundation,
the pleading shows the fact to be that the possession of the entire prem
ises had been parted with. While if the landlord had reserved, for
example, a stairway for the common use of all his tenants, it could not
be said that any of them had exclusive control of it
,
or that all together
had. It was then his duty to keep it in repair, not by reason of any
implied covenant to that effect, but, as those using it were his licensees,
he owed them the duty to keep the passageway in reasonably safe and fit
condition for their use. But here there could have been in fact no
reservation of possession or control. The _technical averment is an
ideality, and inconsistent with the essential conditions resulting from the
facts alleged in the petition. It then is reduced to a legal conclusion,
and does not help an otherwise defective pleading. There is no allega
tion that the defective condition of the building was known to the land
lords, or that the defect was concealed or warranted against by them.
Judgment afiirmed.
SIGGINS v. McGILL, in New Jersey Court of Err. and App., Nov. 20, 1905
-—72 N. J. L. 263, 62 At]. 411, 111 Am. St. Rep. 666.
PITNEY, J. Plaintifi was a tenant of the defendants, occupying an
apartment in a building owned by them in Jersey City. There were
several apartments in the building, and these were separately rented
out by defendants to difierent families. The halls and stairways
of the building were used in common by several tenants. While de
scending one of these stairways the plaintiff stumbled and fell, sus
taining personal injuries. This action was brought to recover com
pensation therefor from the landlords, upon the ground that the plaint
iff’s fall was due to the bad condition of the stair covering.
The verdict and consequent judgment were in favor of the plaintiff.
There were motions for nonsuit and for direction of a verdict in favor
of defendant, both of which were denied. They were based in part
upon the ground that plaintiff knew, or ought to have known, the con
dition of the stair covering, and either had assumed the risk or by his
own negligence had contributed to his injury. These grounds were
untenable, there being at least disputable questions of fact for the
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jury’s determination with respect to the plaintiff’s knowledge of the
condition of the stairs and with respect to his care while using them.
The motions were based, also, upon the ground that thereOwas no lia
bility on the part of the landlords for the condition of the staircase.
The learned trial justice, having refused the motions, submitted the
case to the jury with this instruction—that since the building was oc
cupied by several families, who had the use of the halls and stairways
in common, there rested upon the defendants the duty of using reason
able care to keep the halls and stairways in proper condition for the
common use of the tenants. To this instruction, as well as to the
denial of the motions, exception was duly sealed.
In this state it is established as a general rule that the landlord is
not liable for injuries sustained by a tenant or his family, or guests,
by reason of the ruinous condition of the premises demised, there being
upon the letting of a house or lands no implied contract or condition
that the premises are or shall be fit and suitable for the use of the
tenants. So it was held by the supreme court, in Naumberg v. Youny,
44 N. J. L. 331, 43 Am. Rep. 380; Mullen v. Rainear, 45 N. J. L.
520; Clyne v. Helms, 61 N. J. L. 358, 39 Atl. 767, and Land v. Fitz
gerald, 68 N. J . L. 28, 52 Atl. 229, and, by this court in Murray v. Al
bertson, 50 N. J. L. 167, 7 Am. St. Rep. 787, 13 Atl. 394.
But it is recognized that this rule does not apply to those portions of
his property (such as passageways, stairways and the like) that are not
demised to the tenant, but are retained in the possession or control of the
landlord for the common use of the tenants and those having lawful occa
sion to visit them, the ways being used as appurtenant to the premises de
mised. With respect to such ways it has been held by our supreme court
that the landlord is under the responsibility of a general owner of real es
tate who holds out an invitation to others to enter upon and use his prop
erty, and is bound to see that reasonable care is exercised to have the pas
sageways and stairways reasonably fit and safe for the uses which he has
invited others to make of them: Gillvon v. Reilly, 50 N. J . L. 26, 11 Atl.
481; Gleason v. Boehm, 58 N. J. L. 475, 34 Atl. sse, 32 L. R. A. 645.
This doctrine, we think, is indubitably sound. It is in nowise opposed to
the rule which exempts the landlord from liability for the condition
of the premises that are demised, but is plainly distinguishable there
from. In the case of a demise, the entry and occupancy are pursuant
to an estate vested in the tenant and are exclusive of the landlord,
while in the case of passageways and stairways that are retained in the
legal possession of the landlord and are simply used by the tenants
as appurtenances to the property demised to them, their ingress and
egress are by virtue either of invitation or of necessity. This is the
ground of the distinction as pointed out in Looney v. McLean, 129
Mass. 33, 37 Am. Rep. 295, cited with approval in Gillvon v. Reilly,
50 N. J. L. 26, 11 Atl. 481. In Phillips v. Library Co., 55 N. J. L.
307, 27 Atl. 478, which was a case of one of several tenants of a build
ing injured while using a path to the rear that was arranged for the
~¢
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common use of the tenants, this court affirmed the responsibility of
the landlord for the condition of the path.
The judgment under review should be aflirmed.
Right to Emblements.
OLAND v. BURDWICK, in B. R., Easter, 38 Eliz.—A. D. 1597, Cro. Eliz. 460.
Same case 5 Coke 416, Godsb. 189, 190, Moor 394.
A feme holding land during widowhood sowed corn, and before harvest
took baron; and in trespass by the baron against the lord of the manor
for taking the corn, the question was who should have it. It was ad
judged for the lord by POPHAM, C. J . and CLENGH, J.; FENNER, J ., con_
tra, and GAWDY, J ., absent. CLENCH, J ., said there is a difference when
the estate of him who sows the land is determined by his own act, by a
casualty, and when by the act of the law or by another man. And there
fore in this case, if the feme had let the land, and the lessee had sown
it
,
and afterwards the feme had taken baron, yet the lessee should have
the corn. But if the determination be by the act of him who sows the
land it is otherwise. * * *
Right to Estovers.
ANDERSON v. COWAN, in Iowa. Sup. Ct., Oct. 20, 1904-125 Iowa, 259,
101 N. W. 92, 106 Am. St. Rep. 303.
Action by lessor to enjoin lessee for term of five years from cutting
timber trees for fire wood.
LADD, J. The lease contains no reference to the use of timber for
firewood, but appellees insist that the right to estovers is an incident
to be implied from the mere leasing of the farm, and such was l111
doubtedly the rule at common law: 1 Wood on Landlord and Tenant,
sec. 247; 1 Taylor on Landlord and Tenant, sec. 350. See 18 Am. 82
:
Eng. Ency. of Law, 448; Van Deusen v. Young, 29 N. Y. 9; Wright
v. Roberts, 22 Wis. 161; Webster v. Webster, 33 N. H. 18, 66 Am. Dec.
705. This is conceded, but it is argued that the common of estovers
is so out of harmony with the spirit of our institutions that it ought
not to be adopted as a part of the law of the state. That the com
mon law obtains in this state is not questioned, and appellant has
not taken the trouble to point out any differences between our situation
and that of the people of England which should lead to the rejection
of this particular portion of it. Many decisions, in liberally inter
preting the rules relating to estovers, have given as a reason therefor
the existence of more extensive forests here than in England, and the
necessity of reducing the land to cultivation; but we have found none
suggesting the rejection of the doctrine entirely as inimical to our in
stitutions. In many of the states woodland is abundant, and cutting
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it down by a tenant for life or for years has been allowed under cir
cumstances which would be regarded as waste there: Tiedeman on
Real Property, 69; Proflitt v. Henderson, 29 Mo. 325; 4 Kent’s Com
mentaries, 76. Mr. Washburn, in- his work on Real Property, says
that: “In respect to what timber and what trees may be used for fire
wood, and whether the cutting of trees, though for neither of these
uses, would be waste, depends upon the usages of the country, the
customary mode of managing lands, and the manner in which the in
heritance would be affected by such cutting, rather than the rules
of the English common law; the rule here as to waste being that noth
ing which does not prejudice the inheritance of those who are entitled
to the remainder or reversion can be deemed waste”: 1 Washburn on
Real Property, 128 at seq.
In large portions of this state there were no native forests, and in
these innumerable artificial groves have been planted. In others, native
timber is found in abundance, and, while not enough in any part to per
mit of indiscriminate destruction, we cannot say that because of local
conditions the common of estover ought not to be regarded as a part of
the law of the land. Estovers are of three kinds: 1 Housebote, being
a sufficient supply of wood to repair and burn in the house; 2. Plow
bote for making and repairing instruments of husbandry; and 3.
Haybote, for repairing hedges and fences. The tenant is allowed to
cut only for present use on the premises, and not elsewhere, and only
on such as may be suitable for the purpose. Few, if any, houses in
this state have been constructed from native timber and rarely will
timber be made use of in the repairs of the house, or in the making
instruments of husbandry, or in the repair of fences, save in replacing
of posts. The dead and fallen timber is usually of no value save for
fuel, and ordinarily the only benefit the tenant obtains from the wood
lots is the fuel for his stove. Indeed, it is of little value for any other
purpose. This, undoubtedly, the tenant may burn as firewood. It is
said in Coke on Littleton, 53b, that, if there is suflicient dead wood
for fuel, the tenant has no right to cut down growing trees for that
purpose, and in Simmons v. Norton, 7 Bing. 640, it was held that in
felling trees for repairs only those suitable might be taken. According
to Blackstone the tenant was not permitted to cut timber trees: See
Coo1ey’s Blackstone, 122, 144. And this appears to have been the
view of Coke: Coke on Littleton, 53. In McCull0ugh v. Irvine’s E'xrs.,
13 Pa. St. 438, the court held that whether cutting timber will be
deemed waste depends on the custom of farmers, the situation of the
country, and the value of the timber. If timber trees have been planted,
they are presumed to have been placed to meet the special purposes of
the owner, as to serve as an ornament to his farm, or as a windbreak
for his stock; and in determining whether any may be appropriated
by the tenant the use of the owner designed for them is always to be
kept in view. Indeed, it may be safely laid down that the main object
had in planting an artificial grove is not ordinarily to raise fuel, and
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that growing trees so planted may not be cut down without the owner’s
assent. With respect to the native forests we are‘ inclined, because
of the conditions in this state, to adhere to the common law more strictly
than has been done in other jurisdictions in this country, and, unless
growing trees are such as are customarily cut down for firewood, the
tenant ought not to be permitted to make use of them for this pur
pose. In the instant case the defendants cut for fuel, besides the
dead and fallen timber, a number of live trees. They were of a kind
ordinarily used in that vicinity for fuel, were suitable for that purpose
only, and whether their removal worked any injury to the reversion
was in dispute. The witnesses were before the court, and, in view of
its superior opportunities of weighing the testimony, we are not in
clined to interfere with the decree.
Affirmed.
Apportionment of Rent on Destruction.
ANON, Mich., 30 Edw. I, Year Book, 30 & 31, Edw. I, p. 476.
A man demanded arrears of a rent, &c. for a mill leased for a term
of years. The defendant said that the mill was burned by the Scots
&c. ; and that consequently he ought not to pay the rent; and the same
plaintiff brought a writ of covenant respecting the same mill, stating
that the defendant ought to have left the mill at the end of the term
in as good a state &c.; and the defendant gave the same answer, whereby
he was bound without‘ exception.
RICHARDS LeTAVERNER’S CASE, Trinity, 35 Hen. 8.-—A. D. 1544—
Dyer 56a.
A man makes a lease for years of land, and of a flock of sheep, render
ing certain rent, and all the sheep died. It was asked upon indenture
of Richards le Taverner, whether this rent might be apportioned. And
some were of opinion that it should not, although it is the act of God,
and no default in the lessee or lessor; as if the sea comes upon part
of the land leased, or part is burned with wild-fire, which is the act of
God, the rent is not apportionable, but the entire rent shall issue out of
the remainder. Otherwise it is if part be recovered or evicted by an
elder title, then it is apportionable. And of this opinion were
BROMLEY, PORTMAN, HAms, sergeants, LUKE, justice, BROOKE, and sev
eral of the temple. But MARVYNE, BROWN, justices, Townsmm, GRIF
FITH, and FosTER, e contra. But all thought it was good equity and
reason to apportion the rent. And afterwards this case was argued in
the readings by MOORE, in the following lent. And it seemed to him and
to BROOKE, HADLEY, FoRTEsouE and BROWN, justices, that the rent
should be apportioned, because there is no default in the lessee.
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GRAVES v. BERDAN, in New York Ct. of App., 1863—26 N. Y. 498, Finch
733, Pattee 367.
Action for rent on rooms on second story which had been destroyed by
fire before the rent accrued.
ROSEKRANS, J .—The opinion delivered by Justice Emott in this case,
in the Supreme Court, is a correct exposition of the law a_ppllCal)l6 to
it, and for the reasons stated therein, the judgment should be aflirmed.
The case of Stockwell v. Hunter, 11 Metc. 448, may be added to the
authorities cited by Justice Emott to show that a lease of basement rooms
or chambers, in a building of several stories in height, without any stip
ulation, by the lessor or lessee, for rebuilding, in case of fire or other
casualities, gives the lessee no interest in the land upon which the build
ing stands, and that if the whole building is destroyed by fire, the lessee’s
interest in the demised rooms is terminated, and the lessor may, after
the destruction of the building, enter upon the soil and rebuild upon the
ruins of the former edifice.
It may be added that at common law, where the interest of the lessee
in a part of the demised premises was destroyed by the act of God,
so that it was incapable of any beneficial enjoyment, the rent might be
apportioned. In Rolle’s Abridgment, 236, it is said that if the sea
break in and overflow a part of the demised premises, the rent shall
be apportioned, for, though the soil remains to the tenant, yet as the
sea is open to every one, he has no exclusive right to fish there. A
distinction is taken between an overflow of the land by the sea, and fresh
water, because, though the land be covered with fresh water, the right
of taking the fish is vested exclusively in the lessee, and in that case the
rent will not be apportioned. In the latter case the tenant has a bene
ficial enjoyment, to some extent, of the demised premises, but in the
former he has none, and if the use be entirely destroyed and lost, it is rea
sonable that the rent should be abated, because the title to the rent is
founded on the presumption that the tenant can enjoy the demised
premises during the term. Com. Land. and Ten. 218; Gilb. on Rents,
182.
Where the lessee takes an interest in the soil upon which a build
ing stands, if the building is destroyed by fire, he may use the land
upon which it stood, beneficially, to some extent, without the build
ing, or he may rebuild the edifice; but where he takes no interest in
the soil, as in the case of a demise of a basement, or of upper rooms
in the building, he cannot. enjoy the premises in any manner after
the destruction of the building, nor can he rebuild the edifice. He
cannot have the exclusive enjoyment of the vacant space formerly
occupied by the demised rooms. The effect of the destruction of the
building, in such a case, is analogous to the effect of the destruction of
demised premises by the encroachments of the sea, mentioned in Rolle’s
Abridgment; and the established rule for the abatement or apportion
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ment of the rent should be applied in the former as well as in the latter
case. The same reason exists for its application in both cases.
But even if the lessee’s interest in the demised apartment, in a case
like this, was not terminated by the total destruction of the building,
it may be doubted whether the lessor could recover rent so long as he
failed to give the demised upper rooms the support necessary to them
for special enjoyment. The rule seems to be settled in England, that
where a house is divided into different floors or stories, each occupied
by different owners, the proprietor of the ground floor is bound, by the
nature and condition of his property, without any servitude, not only
to bear the weight of the upper story, but to repair his own property so
that it may be able to bear such weight. The proprietor of the ground
story is obliged to uphold it for the support of the upper story.
Humphrey v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739; s. c. 1 Eng. Law and Eq. 241;
Rowbothem V. Wilson, 36 Id. 236; Harris '0. Roberts, 6 El. & Br. 643;
s. c. 7 Id. 625. In the case last cited the duty of such support is
recognized as a general common law right. In a lease of upper rooms by
the owner of the entire building, a covenant should be implied on the
part of the lessor to give such support to the upper rooms as is necessary
for their beneficial enjoyment. It has been decided in this court that
the statute forbidding the implication of covenants in conveyances of
real estate, does not apply to leases for years. Mayor of New York V.
Maybee, 3 Kern. 151; Vernam V. Smith, 15 N. Y. 332, 333.
The judgment should be afiirmed. DENIO, C. J ., SELDEN, BALCOM,
and MERVIN, JJ ., concurred.
The dissenting opinion of WRIGHT, J ., concurred in by DAVIES, J ., is
omitted.
Liability for \Vaste.
ANON., in Common Bench, 6 Eliz.—A. D. 156-1.—Cases rep. by Dalison in
Kellwey, p. 206, pl. 10.
In waste. Waste was assigned in a parish, in that the lessee suffered
a sea wall adjoining the parish to become ruinous, whereby the land be
came flooded by the tide. Carus moved that this could not be assigned
for waste, because no limit can be put to the shore, and it is as if waste
should be assigned of .a house destroyed by tempest. DYER (C. J.) It
seems reasonable that if there should be a small breach in the bank
or wall, and the tenant suffers it to continue so that later the violence
of the sea destroys the whole wall and floods the land, this is waste;
for the lessee might easily have prevented it in the beginning. But if
it was suddenly done by the violence of the water, that might be pleaded
in bar. And he said that this was a rare case, and he demanded of the
clerks if they had any precedent for such an assignment, and they said
no. In another action of waste the same year it was held by DYER (C.
J.) and WELSH (J .), that if the lessee for years permits the banks
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of the sea to decay so that the adjoining land is flooded by the flowing
sea, this is waste. But where it is by a storm of the sea it is otherwise,
which note. * * *
And observe also, that the same year Walter Griffin brought waste,
and assigned that the lessee permitted the banks of the river Trent to
wash away and remain unrepaired, through which the water broke the
banks and flooded the land, by his default. And it was held by all the
judges that this was waste; for the Trent is not so violent but that the
lessee by vigilence and industry might easily enough maintain the
banks. But the violence of the sea is such that it could not by any
care be restrained; so that if the sea tempestuously breaks its bounds, and
floods the land, this is not waste.
COUNTESS OF S$¥,EWSBURY’S CASE, in King’s Bench, Mich. 42 & 43
Eliz.—A. D. 1600-5 Coke 13b.
The countess of Shrewsbury brought an action on the case against
Richard Crompton, a lawyer of the Temple, and declared, that she leased
to him a h‘ouse at will, and that he so carelessly and negligently kept his
fire that the house was burned; to which the defendant pleaded not
guilty, and was found guilty, &c. And it was adjudged that for this
permissive waste no action lay, against the opinion of Brooke in the
abridgment of the case of 48 Edw. III, 25, Waste 52. And the reason
of the judgment was because at the common law no remedy lay for waste
either voluntary or permissive against a tenant for life or years, because
the lessee had an interest in the land by the act of the lessor, and it was
his folly to make such lease, and not restrain him by covenant, condition,
or otherwise, that he should not do waste. So, and for the same reason
a tenant at will shall not be punished for permissive waste. But the
opinion of Littleton is good law, § 71: if lessee at will commits voluntary
waste viz. in abatement of the houses, or in cutting of the woods, there
a general action of trespass lies against him; for, as it is said in 2 & 3
Phil. & Mary, Dyer 122b, when a tenant at will takes upon him to do
such things which none can do but the owner of the land, these amount
to the determination of the will, and of his possession, and the lessor
shall have a general action of trespass without any entry. * * *
As to liability on covenant to repair and return in good condition, see
post, Covenants. —-.
Tenant’s Right to Open and Work Mines.
SAUNDERS’ CASE, in the Common Pleas, Trinity Term, 41 Eliz.—A. D.
1599-5 Coke 12.
Saunders brought an action of waste against Marwood, assignee of
the term in the tenements, for waste done in digging seacoals. The de
fendant pleaded in bar, that the first lessee, who opened the mine,
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granted to him all his interest in the land with all profits, excepting
and reserving always to himself and his heirs all benefits and profits
of the mine Anglice (the coal-mine), in the said parcel of land, and
all fallen trees; and averred that the said mine was at the time of the
assignment and yet is open. Whereupon the plaintiff demurred in
law. And on great deliberation it was adjudged for the plaintiff: and
in this case three points were resolved: -
1. If a man hath land in part of which is a coal-mine open, and he
leases the land to one for life or for years, the lessee may dig in it; for
as much as the mine is open at the time, &c., and he leases all the land,
it shall be intended that his intent is as general as his lease is, scil.
that he shall take the profit of all the land, and by consequence of the
mine in it. See 17 Edw. III, 7 a, b, John Hull’s Case, accord; and so
the doubt in Fitz. Nat. Brev. 149 G is well explained.
2. If the mine were not open but included within the bowels of the
earth at the time of the lease made, in such case by leasing the land
the lessee cannot make new mines, for that shall be waste. Fitz. Nat.
Brev. 59, & 22 Hen. VI, 18b, accord.
3. If a man hath mines hid within his land, and leases his land and all
mines therein, there the lessee may dig for them, for whenever anyone
grants anything he is understood to grant that without which the thing
itself may not be, and therewith agrees 9 Edw. IV, 8, where it is said,
that if a man leases his land to another, and in the same there is a
mine (which is to be intended of a hidden mine) he cannot dig for
it; but if he lease the land and all mines in it, then although the mines
be hidden, the lessee may dig for them; and by consequence the digging
of the mine in the principal case was waste in the first lessee.
4. It was resolved that although the mine be first opened by the first
lessee, yet if his grantee dig in it
, it is waste in him.
5
. It was resolved that the exception was void; for, first, by the ex
ception of the profits of the mine, or of the mine itself, the land is not
excepted; and then it follows, that he hath excepted that which he
could not have or take; as if a man assigns his term, and excepts the
timber trees on the land or the gravel or clay within the land, it is void,
for he cannot except to himself a thing which doth not belong to him by
the law. And although it was said, that forasmuch as the lessee first
opened the mine, and thereby committed the waste, and so had quodam
modo appropriated it to himself and by his wrong had subjected himself
to lose the place wasted and treble damages, it should be a reason that
he might keep it to himself and so continue punishable for the waste of
which he was the first author; but nothwithstanding that it was resolved
as above, for his wrong which he committeth cannot divest the interest
in the mine, being in the land demised to him out of the lessor; and
therefore he cannot except that to himself which belongs to another.
9
!
# *
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ASTRAY v. BALLARD, in King's Bench, 29 Car. 2.—A. D. 1677—2 Lev.
185. 2 Jones 71. Abridged from Levinz.
Trover, not guilty pleaded, special verdict. One seised in fee of lands
wherein were mines opened, by indenture leased the lands and mines
therein to defendant, who opened a new coal mine and there dug the
coals for which this action was brought. The question was whether
the lease gave right to open new mines. It was said for the plaintifi
that it did not, citing Coke Lit. 54 b, and Lif0rd’s Case, 11 Coke 46,
For defendant it was agreed that Coke Lit. 54b is as cited; but to war
rant his opinion he cites, Saunders’s Case, 5 Coke, which does not war
rant it
,
nor does any other book. But the COURT held, that by the words
land and mines, there being mines open at the time of the demise, no
mines pass but those open; and gave judgment for the plaintiff.
Termination of Relation.
LOW v. ELWELL, in Muss. Sup. Judicial Ct., Nov. Term, 1876—121 Mass.
309, 23 Am. Rep. 272.
Tort for assault in forcibly entering and ejecting plaintifi from her
dwelling house. Plaintiff’s husband had rented the house orally, oc
cupied it two years, and been given notice to quit. The case comes here
on agreed facts, by consent of parties without verdict. If the agreed
facts justify defendant, there should be a nonsuit; otherwise, the case
to stand for assessment of damages.
GRAY, C. J . A tenant holding over after the expiration of his tenancy
is a mere tenant at sufferance, having no right of possession against his
landlord. If the landlord forcibly enters and expels him, the landlord
may be indicted for the forcible entry. But he is not liable to an action
of tort for damages either for his entry upon the premises, or for an
assault in expelling the tenant, provided he uses no more force than is
necessary. The tenant cannot maintain an action in the nature of tres
pass quare clausum fregit, because the title and the lawful right to the
possession are in the landlord, and the tenant as against him, has no right
of occupation whatever. He cannot maintain an action, in the nature
of trespass to his person, for a subsequent expulsion with no more force
than necessary to accomplish the purpose; because the landlord having
obtained possession by an act which, though subject to be punished by
the public as a breach of the peace, is not one of which the tenant has any
right to complain, has, as against the tenant, the right of possession of
the premises; and the landlord, not being liable to the tenant in an
action of tort for the principal act of entry upon the land, cannot be
liable to an action for the incidental act of expulsion, which the landlord
merely because of the tenant’s own unlawful resistance, has been obliged
to resort to in order to make his entry effectual. To hold otherwise would
enable a person, occupying land utterly without right, to keep out the
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lawful owner until the end of a suit by the latter to recover the possession
to which he is legally entitled.
This view of the law, notwithstanding some inconsistent opinions, is
in accordance with the current of recent decisions in England and in this
Commonwealth.
In Turner v. Meymot, 7 Moore, 574, S. C. 1 Bing. 158, it was decided
that a tenant whose term had expired could not maintain trespass against
his landlord for forcibly breaking and entering the house in his absence.
In Hillary V. Gay, 6 C. & P. 284, indeed, Lord Lyndhurst at nisi prius,
while recognizing the authority of that decision, ruled that if the land
lord, after the expiration of the tenancy, by force put the tenant’s wife
and furniture into the street, he was liable to an action of trespass quare
clausum fregit. And in Newton V. Harland, 1 Man. & Gr. 644; S. C.
1 Scott N. R. 474; a majority of the court of common pleas, overruling
decisions of Baron Parke and Baron Alderson at nisi prius, held that
under such circumstances the landlord was liable to an action of trespass
for assault and battery.
But in Harvey V. Brydges, 14 M. & W. 437, Baron Parke stated his
opinion upon the point raised in Newton V. Harland, as follows: “Where
a breach of the peace is committed by a freeholder, who, in order to get
into possession of his land, assaults a person wrongfully holding posses
sion against his will, although the freeholder may be responsible to the
public in the shape of an indictment for a forcible entry, he is not liable
to the other party. I cannot see how it is possible to doubt that it is a
perfectly good justification to say that the plaintiff was in possession of
the land against the will of the defendant, who was owner, and that he
entered upon it accordingly; even though, in so doing, a breach of the
peace was committed.” Baron Alderson concurred, and said that he re
tained the opinion that he expressed in Newton V. Harland, notwithstand
the decision of the majority of the court of common pleas to the con
trary. The opinion thus deliberately adhered to and positively declared
by those two eminent judges, though not required by the adjudication in
Harvey V. Brydges, is of much weight. In Davis V. Barrell, 10 C. B. 821,
825, Mr. Justice Cresswell said, that the doctrine of Newton V. Harland
had been very much questioned. And it was finally overruled in Blades
V. Hiygs, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 713, where, in an action for an assault by
forcibly taking the defendant’s property from the plaintiff’s hands, using
no more force than was necessary, Chief Justice Erle, delivering the
uanimous judgment of the court, approved the statement of Baron Parke,
above quoted, and added: “In our opinion, all that is so said of the
right of property in land applies in principle to a right of property in
a chattel, and supports the present justification. If the owner was
compellable by law to seek redress by action for a violation of his right
of property, the remedy would be often worse than the mischief, and the
law would aggravate the injury, instead of redressing it. See also Lows
V. Telford, 1 App. Cas. 414, 426.
In Commonwealth V. Haley, 4 Allen, 318, the case was upon an indict
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ment for forcible entry, and no opinion was required or expressed as to
the landlord’s liability to a civil action.
_ The judgment in Sampson V. Henry, 11 Pick. 379, turned upon a.
question of pleading. The declaration, which was in trespass for an as
sault and battery (alleged that the defendant assaulted the plaintiff, and
with a deadly weapon struck him many heavy and dangerous blows. The
pleas of justification merely averred that the defendant was seised and had
the right of possession of_ a dwelling house, that the plaintiff was unlaw
fully in possession thereof and forcibly opposed the_defendant’s entry,
and that the defendant used no more force than was necessary to enable
him to enter and to overcome the plaintiffs resistance; but did not deny
the use of the dangerous weapon and the degree of violence alleged in
the declaration; and were therefore held bad, in accordance with Gregory
V. Hill, 8 T. R. 299, there cited. The remarks of Mr. Justice Wilde,
denying the right of a party dispossessed to recover possession by force
and by a breach of the peace, would, if construed by themselves, and
extended beyond the case before him, allow the tenant to maintain an ac
tion of trespass against the landlord for entering the dwelling-house, in
direct opposition to the judgment delivered by the same learned judge, in
another case, between the same parties, argued at the same term and
decided a year after. Sampson V. Henry, 13 Pick. 36.
In the latter case, which was an action for breaking and ‘entering the
plaintiff’s close, and for an assault and battery upon him, the court held
the plea of liberum tenementum was a good justification of the charge of
breaking and entering the house, but not of the personal assault and bat
tery. That decision, so far as it held that the landlord was not liable to
an action of trespass quare clausum fregit by a tenant at sufferance for a
forcible entry, has been repeatedly afiirmed. Meader V. Stone,,7 Met. 147 ;
Miner V. Stevens, 1 Cush. 482, 485; Mason V. Holt, 1 Allen 45; Curtis
V. Galvin, 1 Allen 215; Moore v. Mason, 1 Allen 406. And, so far as it
allowed the plaintiff to recover, in such an action, damages for the inci
dental injury to him or to his personal property, it has been overruled.
Eames V. Prentice, 8 Cush. 337; Curtis V. Galvin, ubi supra.
It has also been adjudged that a landlord, who, having peaceably en
tered after the termination of the tenancy, proceeds, against the tenant’s
opposition, to take out the windows of the house, or to forcibly eject the
tenant, is not liable to an action for an assault, if he uses no more force
than is neecssary for the purpose. Mugford V. Richardson, 6 Allen, 76;
Winter V.'Stevens, 9 Allen, 526. For the reasons already stated, we are
all of opinion that a person who has ceased to be a tenant, or to have
any lawful occupancy, has no greater right of action when the force ex
erted against his person is contemporaneous with the landlord’s forcible
entry upon the premises. _
Our conclusion is supported by the American cases of the greatest
weight. Jackson V. Farmer, 9 Wend. 201; Overdeer V. Lewis, 1 W. &
S. 90; Kellam V. Jonson, 17 Penn. St. 467; Stearns V. Sampson, 59
Maine, 568; Sterling V. Warden, 51 N. H. 217. The opposing decisions
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are so critically and satisfactorily examined in an elaborate article upon
this subject in 4 Am. Law Rev. 429, that it would be superflous to refer
to them particularly. _
‘
The tenancy of the plaintiff’s husband under an oral lease was but a
tenancy at will, which by the written lease from his landlord to the de
fendant, and reasonable notice thereof was determined, and he became
a mere tenant at sufferance. Pratt V. Farrar, 10 Allen, 519. It being
admitted that, if the defendants had the right to remove the plaintiffs by
force, no more force was used than was reasonably necessary, this action
cannot be maintained. Plaintifi nonsuit.
TENANTS AT WILL.
Tenant at Will Defined.
I1ITTI4ETON’S TENURES, Sec. 68 (Littlet0n died A. D. 1482.)
Tenant'at will is where lands or tenements are let by one man to
another, to have and to hold to him at the will of the lessor, by force of
which lease the lessee is in possession. In this case the lessee is called
tenant at will, because he has no certain nor sure estate, for the lessor
may put him out at what time it pleases him. Yet if the lessee sows the
land, and the lessor, after it is sown and before the corn is ripe, put him
out, yet the lessee shall have the corn, and shall have free entry, egress,
and regress to cut and carry away the corn, because he knew not at
what time the lessor would enter upon him. Otherwise it is if tenant
for years, who knows the end of his term, sows the land, and his term
ends before the corn is ripe. In this case the lessor, or he in reversion,
shall have the corn, because the lessee knew the certainty of his term
and when it would end. .
Same § 70. Also if a man make a deed of feoffment to another of cer
tain lands, and deliver to him the deed, but not livery of seisin ; in this
case he to whom the deed is made may enter into the land and hold and
occupy it at the will of him who made the deed, because it is proved by
the words of the deed that it is his will that the other should have the
land. But he who made the deed may put him out when it pleaseth
him.
COKE LIT. 55a.—A. D. 1620?
It is regularly true that every lease at will must in law be at the will
of both parties; and therefore when the lease is made to have and to
hold at the will of the lessor, the law implyeth it to be at the will of the
lessee also; for it cannot be only at the will of the lessor, but it must be
at the will of the lessee also. And so it is when the lease is made to have
and to hold at the will of the lessee, this must be also at the will of the
lessor. And so are all the books that seem prima facie to differ clearly
reconciled.
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ANON., in Common Bench, Trinity, 20 Hen. 7.-—A. D. 1505.—Keilwey 65a.
' In debt the plaintiff counted on his lease to the defendant to have at
the will of the lessor, rendering annually 20 s., and so from year to
year at the will of the lessor, and for so much arrear at such a day action
accrued to the plaintiff, for the sum demanded. On which came
Yaxley for the defendant, and said that after the lease and before the
day, to-wit, at such a day and place, the defendant came to the plaintiff
and declared that he did not wish longer to occupy the land, after
which notice the rent was arrear. The case was argued by all the bar
and by all the bench for this doubt, viz. whether the lessee in such case
should be tenant at the will of the lessor or at the wlll of the lessee,
or at the will of both.
Faowrxn, (C. J.) Sir, it seems to me that it is not at the will of
either, for then we would have a tenant at liberty to terminate his es
tate at his own will, and so tenant at his own will, which is not reason,
for he did not receive his estate in that manner, but he took his estate
to hold at the will of the plaintiff. And so it seems to me he should
be held a tenant at the will of the lessor. And on the other hand, to
adjudge his estate merely at the will of the lessor would be to create a
perpetuity if the lessor pleased, which is unreasonable. But this will
of the lessor must have a reasonable construction, and should be in this
form, to-wit, if he (lessee) entered and occupied till a rent day is passed
he remains all such year a tenant by the year, so his entry shall charge
him, for in an action of debt against a tenant at will it is proper for the
plaintiff to allege in his declaration that the defendant had entered and
occupied by virtue of the lease, and this entry is traversable. But in such
declaration against the tenant for years his entry is not traversable, for
he is chargeable without entry, and so a diversity.
But yet the lessee may discharge himself reasonably, and this is as the
year is ended; when he may determine his estate at his pleasure if he
give up the occupation, but if he enter the commencement of the second
year he has charged himself, and become tenant for all that year, and
so on indefinitely. But the lessor is still at liberty to oust him; for he
made his lease with these words, and also the tenant is not thus prej
udiced, for else if he hold till the last day of the year and then the
lessor oust him he has all his occupation to his own advantage. But on
the part of the lessor, if the lessee after he had discharged himself one
or two days before the end of the year, from this it follows that he takes
the advantage of all the year, and discharges himself of payment of his
rent by his own act, which is contrary to reason and against the custom
of the realm'; for by such means, if this was the law, no tenant at will
in England could be compelled to pay his rent but at his own pleasure.
* * * And it was adjourned.
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ANON., in Common Bench, Mich., 3 Hen. 8.—A. D. 1512.—-Keilwey 162b.
A lease was made to one R. H. to have to him at his own will, and
itwas held by all the justices of the common bench, that it should be held
at the will of either the lessor or lessee; for if it should be at the will of
the lessee he might will to have it for life; and then it would be a free
hold in him, which may in no way pass without livery, for it is a prin
ciple of law that no man shall have a freehold without livery or what
is equivalent thereto, as livery within the ville or where the king by
matter of record gives land by his letters patent. And, sir, if land
is leased at the will of the lessor, yet the lessee may notify his lessor that
he does not will longer to occupy the land; and so though he had the
land at the will of his lessor it is in law at the will of both. This matter
is discussed in 35 Hen. 6, & 18 Hen. 6. * * *
Estates at \Vill—How Determined.
HENSTEAD’S CASE, in Common Pleas, Mich., Term, 30 & 37 El1z.—A. D.
1595, 5 Coke 10.
A woman, tenant for life of a house and certain land in Shoram in
Kent, made a lease at will rendering rent and afterwards took husband
and she and her husband brought an action of debt for arrearages after
the marriage; and if the lease at will were determined by the inter
marriage or not was the question.
And itwas agreed by the whole court, that the will was not deter
mined by the intermarriage; for although the woman had by marry
ing submitted herself to the will of her husband as her head, yet for
asmuch as it might be prejudicial to the husband to have the lease de
termined for then he would lose the rent to be paid the next day after
the marriage, and it could not be in any manner prejudicial to the wife
if the lease continue but rather to her benefit. And generally it might
be great prejudice to all husbands who intermarry with women who have
tenants at will, for the losing of their rents. For these causes it was re
solved, that without express matter done by the husband after the mar
riage to determine the will, it is not determined.
'
The same is the law if a lease be made to a woman at will and she
marries; the will continues notwithstanding the marriage. So if a
lease be made to three, rendering rent, and one dies, it is no determina
tion of the will; and although nothing can survive, yet because every
joint-tenant is possessed per my & per tout, they shall be charged with
the whole rent; and so the quare in 10 Eliz. Dyer 269 b (pl. 20) well
resolved. But in the case at bar, after the marriage the woman herself
could not countermand or determine the lease at will, no more than
where she and her husband make a lease at will rendering rent during
the coverture, or if the lease be made to them at will; for she hath sub
mitted herself and all her will to her husband. And so a feme covert
may have a tenant at will and be tenant at will, and yet she herself
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cannot countermand it; because she by her intermarriage hath put her
countermanding power in this case (which doth not concern freeholds
or inheritance) into her husband’s mouth. Also if the husband and wife
lease land at will rendering rent and the husband dies, it is no counter
mand of the will, but the lease continues. So it was said if two joint
tenants make a lease at will rendering rent and one dies, all survives to
the other and if the lessee continues his possession the survivor shall have
an action for the whole rent for the privity, and it shall not be counter
manded for the one moiety for the mischief which might ensue to lessors,
and the rather because no mischief or prejudice can come to the lessees
in such case.
SHA\V v. BARBER, in Common Bench, Easter, 43 El1z.—A. D. 1601.——Cr0.
Eliz. 830.
Ejectione Firmae. Upon evidence it was agreed by the whole court,
and so delivered for law to the jury, that if a tenant at will make a lease
for years, and the lessee enters, he is only the'disseisor: and a release or
confirmation to the tenant at will afterwards is void, because the pri
vity is determined. WALMSLEY, J., said that so it had been resolved,
against the opinion in 12 Edw. 4, pl. 12.
LEIGHTON v. THIEED, in King’s Bench, Hilary 13 Wm. 3, 1701—2 Salk.
413, s. c. 1 L. Raym. 707.
If H holds lands at will, rendering rent quarterly, the lessor may de
termine his will when he pleases; but if he determines it within a
quarter, he shall lose the rent which should [*414] have been paid for
that quarter in which he determines it. So the lessee may determine
it when he pleases, but then he must pay the quarter’s rent. Per
Horr, C. J .
PARKER d. WALKER v. CONSTABLE, in Kjng"s Bench, Mich. 10 Geo. 3.
-—A. D. 1769.—3 \Vils. 25. 3 Gray Gas. 412.
Per WILMOT, C. J . and totam curiam: It has not been doubted of
late years (and it was now resolved in this case), that half a year’s
notice to quit possession must be given to a tenant at will; before the
end of which time an ejectment will not lie to turn him out of the
farm. In a case of the demise of Tasker v. Burr, the same point was re
solved by the court of B. R. ; and per Leigh, sergeant, in Easter term, 6
or 7 Geo. 3, the same law was held in the case of an executor of a tenant
at will. In the case at bar, the plaintifi, having been nonsuited for want
of giving such half year’s notice to defendant Constable (a tenant at will)
to quit the premises, moved to set aside the non-suit; and on showing
cause, the rule to set aside non-suit was discharged for the reason
above in ejectment, for lands in Surrey.
RIGHT d. FLOWER v. DARBY, in King's Bench, Easter Term, 26 Geo.
IlI.—-A. D. 1786.-—1 Term 159.
In ejectment it was found by special verdict that May 11, 1781, de
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fendant Darby leased the premises, a house in Salisbury, and occupied
them as a public house from that time under a parol lease at a rent of ten
pounds yearly, the rent to commence from midsummer following; that
he let part of the premises to defendant; and that March 26, 1785,
defendant Darby was served with notice to quit on Sept. 29 following.
On case reserved for the opinion of this court the question was whether
the plaintiff was entitled to recover.
LoRn MANSFIELD, C. J.: When a lease is determinable on a. certain
event, or at a particular period, no notice to quit is necessary, because
both parties are equally apprized of the determination of the term.
If there be a lease for a year, and by consent of both parties the tenant
continue in possession afterwards, the law implies a tacit renovation of
the contract. They are supposed to have renewed the old agreement,
which was to hold for a year. But then it is necessary for the sake of
convenience, that, if either party should be inclined to change his mind,
he should give the other half a year’s notice before the expiration of the
next or any following year: now this is a notice to quit in the middle
of the year, and therefore not binding, as it is contrary to the agreement.
As to the case of lodgings, that depends on a particular contract, and
is an exception to the general rule. The agreement between the parties
may be for a month or less time, and there to be sure, much shorter
notice would be sufficient, where the tenant has held over the time agreed
upon, than in the other case. The whole question depends upon the nature
of the first contract.
ASHHURST, J.—There is no distinction in reason between houses and
lands, as :to the time of giving notice to quit. It is necessary that both
should be governed by one rule. There may be cases, where the same
hardship would be felt in determining that the rule did not extend to
houses as well as lands; as in the case of a lodging house in London,
being let to a tenant at Lady-day to hold as in the present case: if the
landlord should give notice to quit at Michaelmas, he would by that
means deprive the lessee of the most beneficial part of the term, since
it is notorious that the winter is by far the most profitable season of
the year for those who let lodgings.
BULLER, J.— It is taken for granted by the counsel for the plaintiff,
that the rule of law which construes what was formerly a tenancy at will
of lands into a tenancy from year to year, does not apply to the case of
houses; but there is no ground for that distinction. The reason of it
is, that the agreement is a letting for a year at an annual rent; then if
the parties consent to go on after that time, it is a letting from year to
year. This reason extends equally to the present case; an annual rent
is here reserved; and‘upon such a holding it has been determined that
half a year’s notice to quit is necessary. This doctrine was laid down
as early as in the reign of Henry VIII (13 H. 8, 15 b). The moment the
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year began, the defendant had a right to hold to the end of that year;
therefore there should have been half a year’s notice to quit before the end
of the term. This gives rise to another objection in this case, upon the
distinction between six months and half a year. The case in the year
books requires half a year’s notice; but here there is less than half a year’s
notice, and therefore it is bad on that ground also.
Judgment for the defendant.
TENANCY FROM YEAR TO YEAR.
LAYTON v. FIELD, in King’s Bench, Hilary 13 Wm. 3.-—A. I).1701.-—3
Salk. 222.
Per Honr, C. J . Where a lease is made at will, the lessee, after a
quarter of a year is commenced, may determine his will, but then he
must pay that quarter’s rent; and if the lessor determine his will after
the commencement of a quarter, he shall lose his rent for that quarter.
But if a lease be made from year to year, quamdui ambabus partibus,
placuerit; in such case, after a year is commenced, neither the lessor nor
the lessee can determine their wills for that year, because they have willed
the estate certain for so long a time.
DOE d. RIGGE v. BELL, in K. B., Mich. 34 Geo. 3.—A. D. 1794.—5 Term
471, 2 Smith Lead. Cas. "72, 3 Gray Cas. 416.
Ejectment. At the trial it appeared that the agent for the lessor of
the plaintiff let the farm in question to defendants, for seven years, by
parol. Defendant entered accordingly and paid rent. Afterwards notice
to quit on Lady-day was served Sept. 22d, 1792. Plaintiff being non
suited, obtained a rule on defendant to show cause why the nonsuit should
not be set aside.
KENYON, C. J . Though the agreement be void by the Statute of Frauds
as to the duration of the lease, it must regulate the terms on which the
tenancy subsists in other respects, as to the rent,“the time of year when
the tenant is to quit, &c. So where a tenant holds over after the ex
piration of his term, without having entered into any new contract, he
holds upon the former terms. Now, in this case, it was agreed that the
defendant should quit at Candlemas ; and though the agreement is void
as to the number of years for which the defendant was to hold, if the
lessor chose to determine the tenancy before the expiration of the seven
years, he can only put an end to it at Candlemas. Rule discharged.
CLAYTON v. BLAKEY, in K. B., Mich. 39 Geo. 3.—A. D. 1799.-8 Term
3, 2 Smith's Lead. Cas. 74, 3 Gray Cas. 417.
This was an action against a tenant to recover double rent, for hold
ing over after the term ended, and after regular notice to quit. One
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count of the declaration stated a holding under a certain term; and
the others, a holding from year to year. At the trial it appeared that
defendant had held two years under a parol lease for twenty-one years.
It was claimed that there was a variance, because the Statute of Frauds
declared such leases should operate only to create a tenancy at will.
ROOKE, J ., instructed the jury that it amounted to a tenancy from year
to year. Wood now moved to set aside the verdict, on the ground of a
misdiraction.
KENYON, C. J . The direction was right, for such a holding now oper
ates as a tenancy from year to year. The meaning of the statute was,
that such an agreement should not operate as a term; but what was then
considered as a tenancy at will has since been very properly construed
to enure as a tenancy from year to year.
Rule refused.
ARBENZ v. EXLEY, in W. Va. Sup. Ct. App., April 25, 1905, 57 W. Va. 580,
50 S. E. 813, 4 A. & E. An. Cas. 625.
BRANNON, P. John Arbenz, Sr., made a written lease, but not under
seal, to Exley, Watkins & Co., leasing for a term of five years and
three months a brick building, including the Vacant parts of certain
lots, in the city of Wl1eeling—the term commencing January
1, 1896, and ending March 31, 1902—for the annual rent of
$700, commencing April 1, 1896, payable in monthly installments,
The lessees took possession on the first week of January, and occupied
the premises, paying rent monthly. On September 15, 1898, a fire
totally destroyed said building. The lessees paid rent for that Sep
tember, and also for October, but with the rent of October sent a letter,
October 31, 1898, to Arbenz, informing him that they “hereby” vacate
the premises, and surrender them to him. In November, 1898, Arbenz
sued out a distress warrant against said lessees for rent from November
1, 1898, to October 31, 1899, and, the same having been levied, a
forthcoming bond was given, and in the proceedings upon it in the
circuit court of Ohio county a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff
for $502.54, after deducting for failure to repair an engine, and judg
ment given thereon, and the defendants took a writ of error. The de
fendants filed a plea denying grounds of attachment, and denying all
liability for the rent claimed. The judgment below was affirmed
by this court. Those matters will appear in 52 W. Va. 476,
44 S. E. 149, 61 L. R. A. 957. _ On August 1, 1903, Arbenz
brought assumpsit against Exley, Watkins & Co. to recover rent
accruing later than that recovered in the proceeding above mentioned
(to recover rent for the period beginning November 1, 1899, and end
ing December 31, 1902, a period of 38 months, at $700 per year), and
the suit resulted in a Verdict for only $148.15 (that is
,
for the 2 months
of November and December, 1899; the court holding that no recovery
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could be had after the current year ending that date, on the theory
that the tenancy from year to year then closed).
The theory against the right to recover is that a few days after the
fire defendants wrote Arbenz the following letter:
“Oct. 31st, 1898. Mr. John Arbenz, City—Dear Sir: We beg to
advise that we have vacated the premises known as west building on
20th street, destroyed by fire Sept. 15th, last, and hereby surrender
possession of same. Yours truly, Exley, Watkins & Co.”
On the former writ of error we held that, for want of seal to the lease,
the term of years named in it was not created, but that it created an
estate from year to year, and that said letter did not operate as a notice
to quit—to end the tenancy—so as to preclude recovery of rent up to
November 1, 1899, the rent in litigation in the former proceeding.
We did not go further, as no later rent was involved in that case. The
question presented in the second suit is, did the tenancy end December
31, 1899? Did that letter close the tenancy and stop the rent at that
date—the close of the current year 1899? For the defendants the con
tention is that the letter, accompanied by actual vacation of the prem
ises and coupled with the fact that in the circuit court in April,
1899, Exley, Watkins & Co. made defense in the former pro
ceeding, denying liability for rent, operated as a notice to quit, and
closed the tenancy December 31, 1899. Take the letter. The question
rests mainly on it. It states the facts that the lessees had vacated,
and then surrendered possession. It does not notify that at the
end of a current year in future the tenant would quit, but states
present acts or past vacation and surrender. The common law, for
centuries, has required, in order that lessor or lessee, under a tenancy
from year to year, may close the tenancy of his own motion, that a
notice to quit should be given six months before the end of the current
year. That period or time of notice must be prior to the close of a year.
Code 1899, c. 93, § 5, provides that “a tenancy from year to year may
be terminated by either party giving notice in writing to the other,
prior to the end of any year, for three months, of his intention to
terminate the same.” That provision recognizes as still continuing the
common-law estate of tenancy from year to year, and the process of
terminating it by notice to quit, and changed it only in requiring written
notice and fixing a shorter time of notice. Hence it seems that we must
appeal to the common law and its mode of notice to test the efliciency of
the letter as notice to quit. It does not notify of a future act of quitting,
but relies on past vacation and present surrender of possession for the effect
of the letter. It does not name a day or time in the future when the
tenancy is to end. The profession has always regarded this as a
requisite in a notice to quit, I think. 2 Taylor, Landlord & Ten. § 476,
says: “Form of. The notice may be given to quit on a particular
day, or, in general terms, at the end of the current year of the tenancy,
which will expire next after the service of the notice, or in one month
after the next rent day. The latter form of expression is generally
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used where the landlord is ignorant of the period when the tenancy
commenced, and it is preferable even when the commencement of the
tenancy is known, as it provides against any misapprehension of the
exact day when the tenant entered.” 1 Washburn, Real Prop. § 810,
says: “Notice The Time. Whether a longer or shorter time of notice
is required, it must, in order to be binding, clearly indicate the time
when the tenancy is to expire, and, of course, must be given a suf
ficient number of days before the time so indicated.” The particular
question before us is whetherO that letter is bad as a notice to quit be
cause (1) it is a quitting at its date, not notice of a future quitting
at the end of a year; and (2) because it fails to state a time for quiting.
Under the above and many other authorities, we are driven to say that
it did not end the tenancy at any time. Currier v. Barker, 2 Gray,
224; Steward v. Harding, Id. 335; Hanchet v. Whitney, 1 Vt. 311;
Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 49 N. W. 327; Grace v. Michaud, 50
Minn. 139, 52 N. W. 390; People v. Gedney, 15 Hun, 475; Prescott v.
Elm, 7 Cush. 346; Phoeniatville v. Walters, 147 Pa. 501, 23 Atl. 776;
Berner v. Gebhardt, 87 Mo. App. 409 ; Huntington v. Parkhurst, 87 Mich.
38, 49 N. W. 597, 24 Am. St. Rep. 146; Finklestein v. Herson, 55 N. J .
Law, 217, 26 Atl. 688; Walters v. Williamson, 59 N. J. Law, 337,
36 Atl. 665; Godard’s Ex’rs v. S. Carolina Railroad, 2 Rich. Law (S.
C.) 346; Huyser v. Chase, 13 Mich. 98; Rollins v. Moody, 72 Me. 135.
The text-book writers seem to so regard the law. I have quoted from
some above. Tiedeman on Real Estate, § 218, says that: “The notice
must not only be given for a certain length of time before the estate is
to end, but the estate can only be determined at the expiration of the
time during which the tenant may lawfully hold: i. e., at the end of
the rental period. It can only be determined at the end of the year,
quarter, or month, according as the tenancy is respectively a yearly,
quarterly, or monthly tenancy. The notice must be suiflciently clear
in its terms as to the time when the tenancy is to expire.” 3 Minor’s
Inst. pt. 1, p. 241. “The notice * * * must end with the period at
which the tenancy commences.” 2 Kerr, R. Prop. 1310. 1 Lomax,
Dig. 164; 1 Greenleaf’s Cruise, R. Prop. p. 248, § 26. Chitty on Con
tracts (11th Ed.) 485, speaking of English common law, says, “The
notice must be framed with reasonable certainty as to the time of
quitting.” In Currier v. Barker, 2 Gray, 227, it was held that a present
demand or notice to quit was insufficient, and the rule is stated as
follows: “The notice to quit is technical, and is well understood. It
fixes a time at which a tenant is bound to quit, and the landlord has a
right to enter at a time which the rent terminates. The rights of both
parties are fixed by it and are dependent on it. Should the landlord
decline to enter, and the tenant quit according to notice, the tenant
could no longer be holden for rent, although he had given no notice to
the landlord. The lease is determined by such notice properly given by
either party. It is manifest, therefore, that, when such consequences
depend upon the notice to be given, the notice should fix with reason
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able exactness the time at which these consequences may begin to take
effect. See, also, Walker v. Sharpe, 14 Allen, 45.” Of course, much
force is to be given to the harmonious construction of the many cases
by the text-writers. Still I have had a question whether the cases mean
only that the period of time before the termination must expire on the
day of the close of the year, or that the notice must designate the time
when the tenant intends to quit. Such seems to be the law. The only
question is, does it fit this case?
It does seem of great force to say that the only object of notice is
to manifest an intent of one party to end the tenancy, and to inform
the other party of that intent, and that the letter in this case did that.
Arbenz surely knew that his tenants designed to end the tenancy, be
cause he knew that they had quit the premises and surrendered pos
session. What more could formal notice do? True, it could not go
to end the tenancy December 31, 1898, because from the letter to that
date was not three months. But could it not end the tenancy at close
of 1899? Now, if the tenants had on the date of the letter given notice
that they would quit December 31, 1899, who would say that it would
not be sufiicient? Did not that letter disclose intent to quit? By
law it could not operate to close the tenancy December 31, 1898, be
cause the time would be too short. Would it not operate then as soon
as the law would let it, just as a formal notice at the date of the letter
would have done; that is
,
December 31, 1899? Arbenz had notice
of his tenants’ intention to quit. Why could not that notice operate
at the earliest date the law would allow it to operate? In addition, if
anything more could in reason be demanded to disclose the intention
of the tenants to stop the tenancy, and to inform Arbenz of such in
tention we add that the tenants in April, 1899, in court, defended the
claim of Arbenz to rent prior to November, 1899. Their defense was
that the building was destroyed, and they had sent that letter and
abandoned possession. But here comes in the answer that the statute,
reiterating common law prevalent for centuries, tells how the tenant
must end his tenancy; that is
,
by written notice. It is dangerous for us
to insert an exception by saying that, if the landlord had knowledge
of the tenant’s intention, it stands for notice. It may not be improper
to say that I have given labored investigation of this case, as other
members of the court have, and I have been impressed with the weight
of the line of defense just stated, and have struggled to find a justifica
tion for adopting it, as the payment of the whole rent by the defendants,
without any return, works a hardship, which all the members of the
court appreciate; but I am compelled to say that to decide against
the plaintifi would be to fly in the face of practically a unanimity of
authorities through several hundred years in all quarters where the
common law rules. As applied generally, the rule is right. As applied
in this case, it works hardship. But we cannot bend a fixed rule to
suit a hard case. ,
Counsel says that the statute only requires three months’ notice
Q
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before end of year, and that the written notice need not specify time
of quitting, and that to say so is to read such a requirement into the
statute. We answer that the statute only recognizes as the law already
the requirement of notice to terminate a tenancy from year to year, and
it has not changed the common-law requisites of the notice. We have
cited to us the Georgia case of Robertson v. Simons, 34 S. E. 604, in
which the opinion says that while mere abandonment of premises at the
end of the year “might perhaps” be suflicient to bring home notice
to the landlord of the tenant’s intention to terminate the tenancy, “so
as to prevent the landlord recovering rent beyond the year immediately
succeeding such abandonment.” This is mere opinion. It was not at
all in judgment—a thought in the mind, not maturely considered for
actual judgment. Betz v. Maxwell, 48 Kan. 143, 29 Pac. 147, seems
to support the defense in saying that as the landlord, from abandon
ment of possession, knew of the intention to quit, formal notice was
useless. This seems to be answered by the quotation above from Currier
v. Barker. And it runs counter to the principle which all authorities
assert—that mere abandonment will not dispense with notice, but the
tenancy and liability for rent go on. “The tenant’s liability for rent
continues till he puts an end to the estate by notice, whether he con
tinues to occupy the premises or not.” 1 Washb. R. Prop. § 807. So far
is this so that the landlord may, at his choice, relet and recover the
difference, or let the premises stand vacant. Merrill v. Willis, 51 Neb.
162, 70 N. W. 914; 6 Ballard, R. Prop. § 462; Schuisler v. Ames, 16
Ala. 73, 50 Am. Dec. 168. Adams v. Cohoes, 127 N. Y. 175, 28 N.
E. 25, is strongly relied on. The judge writing the opinion does say
that knowledge of intention to quit, brought home to the landlord, will
dispense with formal notice. In the vast mass of New York decisions
it is readily noticed there are multitudinous conflicts. This case is in
conflict with other decisions in New York itself. It seems that the New
York statutes entered into the case.
We do not go on the theory that the former decision is res judicata
to fix right to recover the rent involved in the present case. That case
was for rent for a certain period of time; this, for another. That case
is res judicata to establish that it was a tenancy from year to year, but
did not say how long. A case may settle principle, but not be res judi
cata as to matters not immediately involved.
We are compelled to reverse the judgment and render for the plaintiff
for his demand.
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CHAPTER V.
CONDITIONS.
Term on Condition to Enlarge to a Fee.
BRITTON, 1 Liber c. 5, Sec. 15, p. *96.—A. D. 1275—1300.
A fee may be made to arise out of a term; as is the case where one
going a pilgrimage leases his land for a term of years with this condition,
that if he does not return, the land shall remain in fee to the termor ;
such a condition shall always be a bar to the action of the heir of the
pilgrim. And thus it appears that feofiments and purchases may be
conditional as well as simple and without condition.
_ _ LI'1"I‘LETON’S TENURES. Littleton Died in 1482.
_'
_ J ~: § 350. Also if land be granted to a man for a term of five years, upon
_'__“u~_condition that if he pay to the grantor within the two first years 40
~ ._ marks that then he shall have fee, or otherwise but for term of five years,
:~‘
'
and livery of seisin is made by force of the grant, now he hath a fee
~'
“ “
"simple conditional, &c. And if in this case the grantee doth not pay
'~ ~ ' 'to the grantor the 40 marks within the first two years, then immediately
" ” ' '
after the said two years past, the fee and the freehold is and shall be ad
judged in the grantor, because that the grantor cannot after the said
two years presently enter upon the grantee, for that the grantee hath
yet title by three years to have and occupy the land by force of the same
grant, and so because the condition is broken by the grantee and the
grantor cannot enter, the law will put the fee and the freehold in the
grantor. For if the grantee in this case makes waste, then after the
breach of the condition, &c., and after the two years, the grantor shall
have his writ of waste.
COKE LIT. 216b.—A. D. 1620-30.
Many are of opinion against Littleton in this case, and their reason
is, because the fee-simple i
s to commence upon a condition precedent,
and therefore cannot pass until the condition be performed; and that
here Littleton of a condition precedent doth, before the performance
thereof, make it subsequent; And for proof of their opinion they avouch
many successions of authorities that no fee-simple should pass before
the condition performed. * * * 217 a * * * Notwithstanding all
(138)
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this there are those that defend the opinion of Littleton, both by reason
and authority. By reason, for that by the rule of law a livery of seisin
must pass a present freehold to some person, they cannot give a freehold
in futuro, as it must do in this case, if after livery of seisin made the
freehold and inheritance should not pass presently, but expect until
the condition be performed; and therefore if a lease for years be made
to begin at Michaelmas the remainder over to another in fee, if the
lessor make livery of seisin before Michaelmas, the livery is void, be
cause if it should work at all it must take effect presently and cannot
expect. Secondly, they say that when the lessor makes livery to the
lessee, that it cannot stand with any reason against his own livery of
seisin a freehold should remain in the lessor, seeing there is a person
able to take it. But if a man by deed make a lease for years, the re
mainder to the right heirs of I. S., and the lessor make livery to the
lessee sucundum formam chartze, this livery is void because during the
life of I. S. his right heir cannot take (for nemo est haeris viventis),
and in that case the freehold shall not remain in the lessor, and expect
the death of I. S. during the term; for although I. S. die during the
term, yet the remainder is void, because the livery of seisin cannot expect.
And they say further that seeing all the books aforesaid 217b prove that
such a condition is good, and that the livery made to the lessee is ef
iectual, by consequence the freehold and inheritance must pass presently
or not at all. And it is not rare say they in our books that words shall be
transposed and marshalled so as the feofiment or grant may take effect.
Condition or Declaration of Use.
ANON., 31 Hen. 8.-A. D. 1539.—Brooke’s New Cases pl. 152, Bro. Abr., t.
Conditions 191.
By many, if a man makes a feoffment in fee to intent to perform his
will, this is not a condition but a declaration of the purpose and will of
the feoffor, and the heir may not enter for non performance.
RAWSON v. INHABITANTS OF SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 5 of UXBRIDGE,
in Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Oct. 1863-89 Mass. (7 Allen) 125, 83 Am. Dec. 67Q.
Writ of entry. Demandant claimed by deed made by the heir of
Daniel Taft after entry for breach of condition in the deed by Daniel
in 1837 to the town of Uxbridge “to their only proper use, benefit and be
hoof, for a burying place forever.” The town had sold the premises
in 1860 to tenants who used them for school purposes. Judgment for
demandant and the tenants appeal.
BIGELOW, C. J . The construction of the deed from the demandant’s
ancestor to the town of Uxbridge is not free from difliculty; but upon
careful consideration we are of opinion that, adhering in its interpreta
tion, as we are bound to do, to the strict rules of the common law respect
|
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ing grants of real property, we cannot construe it as a deed upon condi
tion.
It is said in Shep. Touchstone, 126, that “to every good condition is
required an external form ;” that is
,
it must be expressed in apt and suffi
cient words, which according to the rules of law make a condition; other
wise it must fail of effect. This is especially the rule applicable to the
construction of grants. A deed will not be construed to create an estate
on condition, unless language is used which, according to the rules of
law, ex proprio vigore, imports a condition, or the intent of the grantor
to make a conditional estate is otherwise clearly and unequivocally indi
cated. Conditions subsequent are not favored in law. If it be doubtful
whether a clause in a deed be a covenant or a condition, courts of law will
always incline against the latter construction. Conditions are not to be
raised readily by inference or argument. Co. Litt. 205 b, 219 b; 4 Kent
Com. (6th ed.) 129, 132; Shep. Touchstone, 133; Merrifield v. Cob
leigh, 4 Cush. 178, 184.
In the deed on which the present controversy arises there are, strictly
speaking, no words of condition, such as of themselves import the creation
of a conditional estate. The usual and proper technical words by.which
such an estate is granted by deed are, “provided,” “so as” or “on condi
tion.” Lord Coke says, “Words of condition are sub conditione, ita qu0d,
proviso.” Mary P0rtington’s case, 10 Co. 42 a; Co. Litt. 203 a, 203 b.
So a condition in a deed may be created by the use of the words “si” or
“quod s
i
contingat,” and the like, if a clause of forfeiture or reentry be
added. Co. Litt. 204 a, 204 b. Duke of N0rf0lk’s case, Dyer, 138 b
.
1 Wood on Conveyancing, 290. In grants from the crown and in devises,
a conditional estate may be created by the use of words which declare that
it is given or devised for a certain purpose, or with a particular intention,
or on payment of a certain sum. But this rule is applicable only to those
grants or gifts which are purely voluntary, and where there is no other
consideration moving the grantor or donor besides the purpose for which
the estate is declared to be created. But such words do not make a condi
tion when used in deeds of private persons. If one makes a feoffment
in fee ea intentions, ad efiectum, ad propositum, and the like, the estate
is not conditional, but absolute, notwithstanding. Co. Litt. 204 a; Dyer
ubi supra; 1 Wood on Conveyancing, 290 ; Shep. Touchstone, 123.
These words must be conjoined in a deed with others giving a right to
reenter or declaring a forfeiture in a specified contingency, or the grant
will not be deemed to be conditional. It is sometimes said that the words
“causa” and “pro,” when used in deeds, create a condition; that is, where
a deed is made in express terms for a specific purpose, or in consideration
of an act to be done or service rendered, it will be interpreted as creating
a conditional estate. But this is an exception to the general rule,
and is confined to cases where the subject-matter of the grant is in
its nature executory; as of an annuity to be paid for service to be ren
dered or a right or privilege to be enjoyed; in such case if the service be
not performed or the enjoyment of the right or privilege be withheld
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which formed the consideration of a grant, the grantor will be relieved
from the further execution of the grant, to wit, the payment of the annu
ity. Shep. Touchstone, 124; Cowper v. Andrews, Hob. 41; Co. Litt.
204 a. But ordinarily the failure of the consideration of a grant of land,
or the non-fulfillment of the purpose for which a conveyance by deed is
made, will not of itself defeat an estate. The reason for this distinction
between the two classes of cases is
,
as stated by Coke, “that the state of
the land is executed and the annuity executory.” Co. Litt. 204 a. There
is one other class of grants which are sometimes said to be conditional; as
when a feoffment is made ad solvendum, “for the matter shows that the
intent of the feoffor was to have the land or the money ;” or a grant ad
erudiendum filium, “because the words purport that the instruction is to
be given, or the feoffment will be void.” It may be doubtful whether such
words do operate in strictness as a condition. The latter case is stated in
the Touchstone doubtfully, in this wise: “Some have said this estate is
conditional.” But if grants so expressed can be construed to create a
condition by which to defeat an estate on breach and entry, it is clear
that such an interpretation of them is confined to cases where the whole
consideration of the grant is the accomplishment of a specific purpose, and
the enjoyment of the estate granted is clearly made dependent on the
performance of an act or the payment of money for the use or benefit
of the grantor or his assigns. We believe there is no authoritative sanc
tion for the doctrine that a deed is to be construed as a- grant on a condi
tion subsequent solely for the reason that it contains a clause declaring
the purpose for which it is intended the granted premises shall be used,
where such purpose will not enure specially to the benefit of the grantor
and his assigns, but is in its nature general and public, and where there
are no other words indicating an intent that the grant is to be void if the
declared purpose is not fulfilled.
If it be asked whether the law will give any force to the words in a
deed which declare that the grant is made for a specific purpose or to
accomplish a particular object, the answer is
,
that they may, if properly
expressed, create a confidence or trust, or amount to a covenant or agree
ment on the part of the grantee. Thus it is said in The Duke of Nor
f0lk’s case, Dyer, 138 b
, that the words “ea intentione” do not make a
condition but a confidence and trust. See also Parish V. Whitney, 3 Gray,
516, and Newell v. Hill, 2 Met. 180, and cases cited. But whether this
be so or not, the absence of any right or remedy in favor of the grantor
under such a grant to enforce the appropriation of land to the specific
purpose for which it was conveyed, will not of itself make that a condi
tion which is not so framed as to warrant in law that interpretation.
An estate cannot be made defeasible on a condition subsequent by con
struction founded on an argument ab inconvenienti only, or on considera
tions of supposed hardship or want of equity.
In the light of these principles and authorities we cannot interpret the
words in the deed of the demandant’s ancestor, which declare that the
premises were conveyed “for a burying-place forever,” to be words of
142 CONDITIONS.
strict condition. Nor can we gather from them that they were so in
tended by the grantor. The grant was not purely voluntary. It was
only partially so. It was not made solely in consideration of the love and
affection, which the grantor bore towards the grantees, but also “for
diverse other valuable considerations me moving hereunto.” Previously
to the time of the grant, the premises had been used for a burial-place.
It is so described in the deed. Under what circumstances this had been
done does not appear. It may have been for a compensation. We can
not now know, therefore, that the sole cause or consideration which in
duced the grantor to convey the estate to the town was, that it should be
used for the specific purpose designated in the deed. There can be no
doubt of the intent of the grantor that the estate should always be used
and appropriated for such purpose. This intent is clearly manifested;
but we search in vain for any words which indicate an intention that if
the grantees omitted so to use them, and actually devoted them to another
purpose, the whole estate should thereupon be forfeited, and revert to the
heirs of the grantor. The words in the deed are quite as consistent with
an intent by the grantor to repose a trust and confidence in the inhab
itants of the town, for whom he declared his affection and love, that they
wolud always fulfill the purpose for which the grant was made, so long
as it was reasonable and practicable so to do, as they are with an intent
to impose on them a condition which should compel them, on pain of
forfeiture, to maintain the premises as a burial place for all time, how
ever inconvenient or impracticable it might become to make such an
appropriation of them. Language so equivocal cannot be construed as a
condition subsequent without disregarding that cardinal principle of real
property already referred to, that conditions subsequent which defeat an
estate are not to be favored or raised by inference or implication.
Judgment for the tenants.
Rule to Distinguish Condition from Covenant.
SIMPSON v. TITTERELL, in t-he Common Pleas, Trlnlty, 33 El1z.—A. D.
1592.—Cro. Eliz. 242.
Ejectione Firmae. B let land to defendant for years: provided always
and it is further covenanted, that the lessee shall not assign. The lessee
assigned; the lessor entered, and let it to the plaintiff. Were the words
a condition or a covenant only?
All the Justices held it was a good condition to defeat the estate. PER
IAM, J ., said proviso always implies a condition if there be not words sub
sequent which change it into a covenant as'where there is another penalty
annexed to it for non-performance, as Doclrzrey’s Case, 27 Hen. 8, pl. 14.
But it is a rule in provisoes where the proviso is that the lessee shall
perform or not perform a thing, and no penalty to it
,
this is a condition,
otherwise it is void. But if a penalty is annexed it is otherwise. To
1
RULE TO DISTINGUISH CONDITION FROM COVENANT. 143
which the rest of the justices agreed. And it was adjudged for the
plaintiff that the entry was lawful.
See the discussion as to the distinction between a condition and a limita
tion in Willion v. Berkley, ante p.
HORNER v. CHICAGO, M. 8: ST. P. RY. CO., Wis. Sup. Ct., Aug. Term,
1S75.—38 Wis. 165.
Appeal by defendants from judgment for plaintiff in an action to re
cover land conveyed to defendant’s grantor by plaintiff’s grantor by
deed “in consideration of one dollar,” reciting that: “The aforesaid piece
or parcel of land hereby conveyed to the party of the second part only for
depot and other railroad purposes.” The defendant had remained in
possession of the land for ten years after receiving the deed, and no
depot had ever been built thereon.
LYON, J. It is claimed on behalf of the plaintiff, that the clauses in
the deed from Mary E. Watson (plaintifI’s grantor) to the Milwaukee
& Horicon R. Co. expressing the purposes for which the lands con
veyed thereby were to be used, are conditions subsequent, a breach of
which might work a forfeiture of such lands. The action is brought upon
that theory, and the most important, if not the controlling question to
be determined, is whether those clauses are conditions. The principles
or rules of law which are believed to be conclusive upon that question
will be briefly stated:
1. Although there are technical words, which, if used in a conveyance,
unmistakeably create a condition, yet the use thereof is not absolutely
essential to that end, and a valid condition may be expressed without
employing those words.
2. It is not essential to a valid condition that, in case of a breach
thereof, a right of re-entry be expressly reserved in the deed, or that it
be expressed therein that the estate of the grantee shall terminate with
the breach of the condition.
3. Neither does the character of the clause alleged to be a condition
depend upon its insertion in any particular part of the instrument.
“Conditions regularly follow the habendum in a deed, but are good in
law in any other place.” Jacob Law Dict. “ Condition.”
4. The construction of the clause or stipulation must depend upon the
intention of the parties to be gathered from the instrument and the
existing facts. Says Chancelor Kent in 4 Com. 132: “Whether the
words amount to a condition or a limitation or a covenant may be matter
of construction depending on the contract. The intention of the party to
the instrument, when clearly ascertained, is of controlling efiicacy;
though conditions and limitations are not readily to be raised by mere
inference and argument. The distinctions on this subject are extremely
subtle and artificial; and the construction of a deed as to its operation
and effect, will after all depend less upon artificial rules than upon the
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application of good sense and sound equity to the object and spirit of the
contract in a given case.” -
5. When the deed does not expressly provide for a forfeiture of the
estate or give a right of re-entry in case of default, words of limitation
or restriction are sometimes, perhaps usually, necessary to create a con
dition. For want of these in the lease in Brugman v. Noyes, 6 Wis. 3,
the instrument was held not to contain a condition or covenant.
6. In a voluntary conveyance words may be held to be a condition
which if used in a conveyance for a valuable consideration would be
held a covenant only.
7. Conditions subsequent are not favored in the law and are to be
strictly construed.
8. To the foregoing may be added the following rule prescribed by
statute: “When any conditions annexed to a grant or conveyance of
lands are merely nominal, and evince no intention of actual and sub
stantial benefit to the party to whom or in whose favor they are to be
performed, they may be wholly disregarded, and a failure to perform
the same shall in no case operate as a forfeiture of the lands conveyed
subject thereto.” R. S. oh. 83, sec. 46.
9. Although a deed contain a clause declaring the purpose for which
it is intended the granted premises shall be used if such purpose will not
inure specially to the benefit of the grantor, but is in its nature gen
eral and public, and if there are no other words in the grant indicat
ing an intent that the grant is to be void if the declared purpose is
not fulfilled, such a clause is not a condition subsequent. The appli
cation of this rule controlled the cases of Strong v. Doty, 32 Wis. 381;
and Rawson v. Inhabitants, 7 Allen 125, cited and relied on by the de
fendants.
The foregoing rules are, it is believed, fully sustained in the elemen
tary treatises and by numerous adjudged cases. Many of these will be
found cited in the briefs of the learned counsel on both sides. Further
citation of authorities on these subjects is not deemed necessary. It
remains to be determined in the light of the above rules of law, whether
the deed from Mary E. Watson to the Milwaukee & Horicon R. Co.,
conveyed an absolute fee in the lands in controversy, or only a condi
tional fee. The deed conveyed two parcels of land. After the descrip
tion of the first parcel, and referring to it
,
are the following words:
“The aforesaid piece or parcel of land hereby conveyed to the party of
the second part only for depot and other railroad purposes.” And
after the description of the other parcel, which in terms is granted for
a railway, the deed contains this clause: “Both of said pieces or parcels
being granted solely for said road purposes.” The words only, quoted, and
solely, quoted, are words of restriction and exclusion. As used in this deed
their effect clearly is to prohibit the grantee from using the lands for any
other than the specified purposes. The grantor owned a tract of land
suitable for building purposes, adjacent to the land conveyed for a
depot site. She believed, as she well might, that the construction of
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the railroad and the location and erection of the depot at that point,
would enhance the value and facilitate the sale of her property. Hence
she was willing to donate, and did donate, the land in controversy to
the railroad for the purpose specified in the deed, and no other.
But it is argued that parol evidence was improperly admitted to
prove that no consideration was actually paid for the land. It is claimed
that because the deed recites a consideration of one dollar, it is a verity
in the case that the grantor received one dollar for the land. We do
not stop to inquire whether this position is correct or otherwise; for
we think that it was competent for the plaintiff to prove by parol evi
dence, not for the purpose of showing the deed void in its inception, but
as a circumstance bearing on the intention of the parties, and as aiding
in a correct interpretation of the instrument, that the construction of
the railroad, and the location of the depot on the granted premises, were
the principal inducements to the execution of the deed. See Hanna v.
Oxley, 23 Wis. 519 and cases cited. It may be further remarked on
this subject that if substance be regarded rather than form, the dis
tinction in principle between paying for the land a mere nominal con
sideration and paying nothing at all for it is not very apparent. It is
a very significant fact in the case that the grantor (acting through her
agent, Mr. Horner) refused to execute an unconditional conveyance of the
land, and required the clauses under consideration to be inserted in
the conveyance which she did execute. But their insertion was a use
less act unless the clauses are held to be conditions. That the grantor
intended to reserve to herself some remedy in case the grantee should
make default, is too plain for argument. * * *
It must be held, therefore, that the parcel of land first described in
the deed was conveyed upon condition that the grantee should use it
for depot purposes, and the parcel last described upon condition that it
should be used “for a railway,” that is, as we undersand it
,
the railway
track should be laid upon it. And here it may be observed that we do
not think that the first condition in the deed applies to the second parcel
of land therein described. That is to say, we do not think the failure
to use the land first described for depot purposes can alone work a for
feiture of the strip conveyed “for a railway.” Having regard to the
rule above stated and that these conditions are to be strictly construed,
we must construe them the same as though two deeds had been made,
one conveying the depot lot on condition that it be used for depot pur
pose, and the other conveying the strip two and a half rods wide on
condition that it be used for a railway track. The track having been
laid upon such strip of land in 1857 or 1858, and having been maintained
there until the present time, it necessarily follows from the views just
expressed, that there has been no breach of the condition upon which
the same was conveyed, and hence that the circuit court erred in ren
dering judgment therefor for the‘ plaintiff. But the failure to use the
other parcel for depot purposes, evidenced by the erection and main
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tenance, by the grantee and its successors, of the depot for Ripon eighty
rods south of such parcel and separated from it by a mill pond, was in
jurious to the grantor and a substantial breach of the condition upon
which such parcel was conveyed.
We are next to determine whether the grantor, before she conveyed
to the plaintiff, made entry for condition broken, upon the land con
veyed for depot purposes. Without recapitulating the testimony on that
subject, we think the fact is established by a clear preponderance of the
evidence that in 1862 or 1863 the grantor, by her agent, made sufficient
entry thereon to revest in her the title to such parcel. * * *
By the Court: The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the
cause remanded with directions to that court to give judgment for the
plaintiff, modified as indicated in this opinion.
Conditions and Limitations Distinguished.
NEWIS et ux. v. LARK and HUNT, in C. B., Mich. 13 & 14 Eliz.—-A. D.
1572.—Often Cited as SCOLASTICA’S CASE, and Reported in 2 Prowd.
Com. 403, and Partially in N. Bendlows 196. Abridged from Plowd. Com.
Assize of novel-disseizin by Robert Newis and Scolastica his wife
against William Lark and John Hunt for land in Middlesex. The as
size was taken by default; and plaintiff gave evidence to prove, that
Henry Clerk, seised in fee of the land in question, made his devise in
writing, whereby he gave it to his son John in tail, remainder to his
son Francis in tail, remainder to the plaintiff Scolastica his daughter
in tail, with remainders over; and in this writing he declared his will
that if any of those to whom the land was so given should sell, waste,
mortgage, or discontinue the lands, or their interest dr possibility or any
part of it
,
or unlawfully vex or disquiet any to whom such lands were so
given, the persons and their heirs so doing shall from thenceforth be
clearly discharged and excluded from the entails to him or them, and
from all benefit and advantage as if they had never been mentioned in
the will: that after the death of the testator Francis and John joined
in a covenant to levy a fine and suffer a recovery to the defendants herein,
which fine was levied and recovery suffered accordingly; and that after
wards the plaintiff’s entered claiming by force of thewill, on whom the
defendants re-entered whereupon this suit was brought. Defendants de
murred in law to the evidence, and the plaintiffs joined in the demurrer.
Afterwards the matter was argued at the bar and by all the judges.
OPINION or THE Couirr. It was held by all the justices that the bar
gain, fine, and recovery are such acts as give title and occasion to defeat
the estates tail limited to John and Francis. But the great doubt was
whether the penalty which the testator had added be a condition, or a
limitation and no condition, and how it stands with law, and who shall
take advantage of it
,
and by what means.
l
l
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All the Justices argued that it is no condition; for if it should be a
condition and should be broken by any in possession or in remainder,
then the heir, to whom the privity of conditions in inheritances descends,
should enter, and thereby defeat all the estates. For if a man makes a
lease for life, remainder in tail, remainder in tail, remainder in fee, upon
condition that some of them in the remainder shall do such an act, there,
if it is not done the feoffor and his heirs may enter, and thereby defeat
as well the estate in possession as all the remainders; for he that re
enters for a condition broken is in of such estate as he had before the
condition made, from whence it follows that he has defeated all the
estates. But here it was not the devisor’s intent that all the estates
tail should be utterly defeated, for in his declaration and discourse, made
after the limitation of the estates-tail he expresses that his mind was,
that the said hereditaments should continue in the name of the Clerks,
to the memorial of his own name; and besides this he declares, that if
any of them attempt any act contrary to his limitation, the tenements
shall come to the party next in tail, as if such disorderous person had
never been mentioned in his will. From which clauses it manifestly ap
pears to all to be his intent that the estate tail of one should not be de
feated by the act of another, and the words of every man expressed in
his will shall be taken and expounded according to his intent and mean
ing, from whence it follows that the penalty expressed shall not be a
condition to defeat all the other estates. And hereupon the case in 29
Assize pl. 17, was cited by HARBER and DYER, [JJ.,] where a man
seized in fee of lands devisable devised them to one for term of his life, and
that he should be chaplain, and should sing for his soul all his life, so that
after his death the said tenements should remain to the commonality of
the same town, to find a chaplain perpetual for the same tenements, and he
died; and the devisee, being of sufiicient age to be a chaplain, entered
into the tenements, and held them for six years, but was no chaplain, and
the heir of the devisor ousted him, and the devisee brought an assize,
and the heir pleaded to the assize, and all this matter was found by the
assize, and the justices encouraged the assize as much as they could to
find for the plaintiff, and at last they said that the plaintiff was seised
and disseised; for there it seemed to the court that the limitation that
he should be chaplain and should sing for him was no condition, for
the breach whereof the heir might enter, for it he might enter, thereby
the remainder would be defeated, and it appears that it was not the in
tent of the devisor to defeat the remainder, because it was given to find a
chaplain perpetual, and the chaplain could not be found perpetually if the
remainder was annulled. From whence it appears that the words in a
will whichseemingly tend to a condition, shall not in the law be taken
for a condition, when it appears to be the intent of the party that the
whole estate shall not be defeated. So here the words of the penalty shall
not make a condition to defeat all the estates.
_ Another reason was also given in proof thereof, and that was, because
the tail was first appointed to John Clerk, who was his eldest son and
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heir, and it was the intent of the devisor that he should be restrained
from discontinuing or barring his tail, as well as any of the others, and
if it should be taken to be a condition, and that there was no other
penalty for the breach of it but entry only, then if the eldest son himself,
who is donee and heir, makes a feoffment, thereby the condition is ex
tinct, for the title of the condition passes in the land, so that he cannot
enter for the condition broken by himself contrary to his own feofiment,
and as he is at liberty to make a feoffment, so is he to suffer a recovery,
and thereby to bar all the remainders, which would be contrary to the
intent of the devisor, who had a mind that he should be restrained as
well as the others; and therefore, if his intent may hold place, it shall
not be a condition, but there shall be some other penalty to the eldest son
which is greater to him than a condition carries along with it if he
breaks the intent of the devisor. And so all the justices unanimously
agreed that it was not a condition which implies a re-entry.
Further it was moved that if the penalty shall not amount to a con
dition containing a re-entry, whether or not it shall be a limitation in
estate, and if it be a limitation, whether entry is necessary before it be
ended, and whether the next in remainder be privy enough to make
entry. For Loan DYER, J ., said, if a man makes a gift in tail, upon
condition that if the donee does such an act his estate shall cease,
Frowick [C. J .] holds in 21 Hen. 7, 12 a, that if he does the act, his
estate shall not cease before entry, because it is an estate of inheritance
which shall not cease by parol without an entry in fact.
And as to this, all the justices argued that the clause in the will
which said: “That the person mortgaging or entangling shall be clearly
discharged excluded and dismissed touching the entail, and that the
conveyance of the entail shall be of no force benefit or advantage towards
him or them,” shall be taken and expounded in law as a limitation, that
is to say, it shall be taken in sense to be a devise to him in tail until he
mortgage, alien, pledge, entangle, incumber, or do the other acts there ex
pressed, and when he shall do any of these acts then the estate shall end
as fully as if he died without issue male; so that after the acts done
the right of the tail shall cease, and the tail is merely dissolved; for when
the intent is shown by words and the words are not aptly put, then such
sense ought to be put on the words as is suitable to the intent; and for
as much as in sense such words amount to a limitation, and especially
when the case is upon a devise, where the intent only is regarded, and the
words, although they are not apt in law for the matter, shall be drawn
to the intent. For as HARPER, J ., said, the devisor shall be accounted
inops consilii, because men most commonly make their wills when they
are at the point of death, and have not time to seek counsel; for which
reason the law shall be their counsel and shall interpret the words, and
direct the operation of them according to the intent of the party.
And each of the justices cited the last case which Fitzherbert puts in
the writ of erc gravi querela in his Natura Brevium, 201 o, which is thus:
A man devises land in London to his wife for life, upon condition that
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if she marries the land shall remain to his son in tail, and for the default
of such issue the remainder to the right heirs of the donor in fee; the
wife takes husband, and she and the husband occupy the land, he in re
mainder dies without heirs of his body ; the right heir of the donor shall
have a special writ of ea; gravi querela directed to the mayor and sherifis
of London, rehearsing this special devise and the said matter, command
ing them to call the parties and hear them, &c., and to do right: So he
says, it appears that he in remainder shall have advantage of the condi
tion if it be broken, but that shall be by the way of suing this action
and not of entry by force of the condition not performed;and the said writ
appears in the register, and all this appears in the said Natura Brevium.
And the justices said that the words of the condition there mentioned are
not properly a condition, but words of limitation. But DYER, J ., said
that where it seemed to Fitzherbert in that case that the heir of the
donor might not enter, in his opinion he might well enter.
And HARPER, J ., also cited the case in 34 Edw. 3, Fitz., formedon pl.
ult. 4, where a man had issue a son and a daughter and devised land
devisable to one for life, upon condition that if the son disturbed the
tenant for life, or the executors of their administration, then the land
should remain to the daughter; and he died and the daughter, after the
death of the tenant for life, brought a formedon in remainder against
the son, and alleged that he had disturbed the tenant for life and the
executors, and the son‘ traversed it and thereupon issue was joined. So
that there the condition took away the fee out of the son, and put it in
the daughter by allowance of the law, in order to perform the intent of
the devise, although the remainder did not vest when the first estate
took effect.
And all the justices agreed upon the matter in law, viz., that the said
clause of restraint shall be a limitation which shall determine the estate,
and not a condition requiring re-entry, and that by the said acts, viz.,
the bargain, fine, and recovery, the estates tail ended, and that the plaint
iffs might enter, and should not be driven to any formedon or other
suit, as they should be upon discontinuance of any other estate tail
general by feoffment or fine, and by dying without issue after; for here
the estate ended by collateral limitation, so that the act which ends the
estate by the limitation cannot make a discontinuance; for the doing of
the act and the end of the estate come together, at one and the same in
stant; for the fine levied by John determined his interest, and was no
discontinuance to Francis, because the estate tail of John was not in
esse longer than the fine took effect, and it being determined could not
be discontinued as to him, or the other, or him in remainder, and the
recovery determined the estate of Francis which preceded, and so there
is no discontinuance to retard the entry of the plaintiffs.
This is believed to be one of the first cases in which the rules to dis
tinguish conditions from limitations are fully discussed; and in this respect
it has been followed and much cited since. But in so far as it holds valid
provisions creating forfeitures on alienations or attempts to alienate, it was
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soon overruled. See Corbit’s Case, post 172; and Mary Portington’s Case,
ante 45.
In Mary Portington’s Case, 10 Coke 41. Lord Coke says: “The authority
of the book of 29 Assize 17, is against that which was cited in Scho1astica's
Case; and thereby you may see, good reader, how dangerous it is to ground
an opinion upon any abridgement; for Fitzherbert, in abridging the case
abridges it without any words of express condition, as cited in Scholastica’s
Case. But Brooke, tit., ‘Condition,’ abridges it to be upon express condition.
And as to the said case in F. N. B. it is cited in Scholastica’s Case in this
manner [stating as above]; which case so put by Fitzherbert out of the
original writ in the register is utterly mistaken in two points: 1, because
the devise to the wife in the case put in F. N. B. was upon express words
of condition; but inspecto registro fo. 246, the devise was upon apt words of
limitation "‘ * * ; 2, where Fitzherbert saith that the right heir cannot
enter, it is clear that the right heir may Well enter, because he has the
reversion by descent, and not by way of remainder.”
Scholastica’s Case was followed on similar facts in Sharington v. Minors,
in B. R., Pasch. 41 Eliz., Moore 543, on the opinions of Fenner, Gawdy, and
Clench, J.T., against the opinion of Popham, C. .T.,who relied on Germin v.
Arscot, post.
The question was involved and argued at bar and bench in B. R. Mich. 39
& 40 Eliz., in Tan'ant's Case, Moore 470; but because of the difference of
opinion among the judges no decision was reached in that case at that time.
\VELLOCK v. HAMMOND, in Queen’s Bench, Trinity, 32 E1iz.—A. D. 1591,
Cro. Eliz. 204.
Trespass. The case upon special verdict was; Thomas Wellock, copy
holder in fee of land of nature of borough English, descendible to the
younger son and younger brother, had issue four sons and a daughter,
and surrendered the land to the use of his will, and devised it to his
wife for life, remainder to his eldest son, paying forty shillings to each
of his brothers and sister within two years after the death of the wife,
and died. The wife entered and died. The eldest son entered and did
not pay the legacies within two years, but within five years he did pay
them. The youngest son died without issue. The oldest then surrendered
the land to the use of his will, devised it to his wife, and died. She
entered and married defendant. A younger son of Thomas entered, de
fendant ousted him, he brought trespass, and it was found that the land
was worth 4£ per annum. The question was whether the entry was
lawful.
Godfrey and Cooke, for the plaintiff, argued that the oldest was
given only a life estate, since 8£ was too small a consideration to make
a fee-simple on a devise without limitation; that the word paying was
a limitation, because void as a condition, being descendable to the heir.
Shirley and Johnson, for the defendant, argued; that the devise was in
fee because of the consideration, and the value was not material, citing
29 H. 8; Brooke’s Abr., “Testaments” 18: do. “Estates” 78 ; 6 E. 6; 38
E. 3, 14; that the words were sufficient and apt to make a condition;
that it cannot be a limitation because the lands are limited to another if
he did not pay; and whether condition or limitation, it is not found
that there was any demand for the money and so no breach.
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PER CURIAM :—It is a fee, for the value is not material, and no book
speaks of the value. It is a limitation, and not a condition; for if it be
a condition it extinguisheth in the heir, and no- remedy for the money.
But being a limitation, the law shall construe it that upon the non
payment of the money his estate shall cease, and then the law shall carry
it to the heir by custom, without any limitation over. And in a devise
it may well be that an estate in fee shall cease in one, and shall be trans
ferred to another. The money was to be paid without request. And it
was adjudged for the plaintiff. See 3 Coke 20 b.
HARDY v. SEYER, in Queen’s Bench, Easter, 37 El1z.—A. D. 1596.—Cro.
Eliz. 414. Abridged.
Ejectione Firmae. Upon special verdict. A lease was made to a
widow for forty years, upon condition that during the time she remain
sole and live in the house. She continued unmarried in the house all
her life, but died within the forty years. The question between the ex
ecutor of the widow and him in reversion was whether the term was de
termined. If these words were a condition the term remains, for she
performed it till it became impossible by act of God, which shall not
turn to her prejudice; but if it is a limitation it is otherwise.
POPHAM [(3. J .] and GAWDY and CLENCH [JJ .] held that the words,
upon condition that if
,
&c. were void words ; for they are insensible, and
are neither condition nor limitation; for all conditions shall be taken
strictly, and no words shall be supplied by intendment to make a con
dition to divest or destroy an estate. And so here it is no more than that
a man makes a lease for years rendering rent—on condition that if the
rent be not paid—and says no more, which is without sense; for it may
be intended that he shall forfeit a pain, or that the lessor shall re-enter,
which is uncertain. Every that if ought to be answered by the words
what then, whereby to make the intention of the parties full, what shall
be done, otherwise we cannot judge of their intention: and for this un
certainty it is void, and the lease is absolute. But if the words were that
the lease was for forty years, “if she so long live unmarried and inhabit
therein,” POPHAM [C. J .], held it to be a limitation, and to determine the
lease by her marriage or death, so that she cannot inhabit therein: and
so Bromley [of counsel for the reversioner] aflirmed was the intent of
the parties, and the truth of the case, and that it was mistaken in draw
ing the verdict. But FENNER, J ., held that the words are full enough
to make a condition of re-entry without any other, and are a condition
and not a limitation, and that this condition is well performed, and the
lease remains absolute. Wherefore it was adjudged for the plaintiff.
HAYNSWORTH v. PRETTY, in Queen’s Bench, Hilary 41 Eliz.—A. D. 1599.
-Cro. Eliz. 833, Moor 644.
Trespass. Special verdict. One seised of lands in socage had issue
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two sons and a daughter, and devised to his second son and daughter
201. to be paid by his eldest son, and devised his land to his eldest son
in fee, on condition that if he paid not these legacies, that his land should
be to his second son and daughter and their heirs. The eldest son fails
of payment. Whether the younger son and daughter shall have the land
was the question. After argument it was resolved by the Court clearly,
that they should have it; for the first devise to his son and heirs in fee,
being no more than what the law gives, is void; and it is but a future
devise to the second son and daughter upon the eldest son’s default of
payment. The case is no other but as if one had devised that if his
eldest son did not pay all legacies, that his lands should be to the legatees,
and there is no doubt but that indefault of payment the land should
vest in them. GAWDY and FENNER [JJ .] held that if it were a good de
vise to the eldest son, yet this condition is a limitation of his estate, and
shall give it to the second son and daughter upon default of payment.
wherefore it was adjudged accordingly for the plaintiff.
For neglect to enter judgment, the case was reargued and again adjudged
for the defendant, for the same reasons. Cro. Eliz. 919.
VVRENFORD v. GYLES, in Common Bench, Mich. 40 & 41 Eliz.—-A. D. 1600.
—Cro. Eliz. 643, Noy 70.
A lease was made for 21 years if the lessee lived so long and continued
in the lessor’s -service. The lessor died, and whether the term was de
termined was the question.
ANDERSON, [C. J .], OWEN and GLANVILLE, [J J .], held that the lease
continued, for there is not any laches in the lessee that he did not serve_;
but it is the act of God that he cannot serve any longer; and it is like
to Sir Thomas Wr0th’s Case. [Dyer 167, Plowd. Com. 454.] But
WAMsLEY [J .] strongly against it: because it is a limitation to the estate,
that it shall not continue longer than he serves. Quaere.
HENDERSON v. HUNTER, In Pa. Sup. Ct., 1868, 59 Pa. St. 335, Pattee’s
Gas. R. P. 258, Tiedman’s Cases on R. P. 229._ Gate’s Cases R. P. 149.
AGNEW, J . This was an action of trespass by church trustees under
a deed of trust made by Thomas Pillow in 1836, for taking down and
removing the materials of a church building in 1867. The case turns
on the limitation in the deed. The legal estate of the trustees clearly
has no duration beyond the use it was intended to protect. The word
“successors” is used to perpetuate the estate, but as the trustees are an
unincorporated body having no legal succession, there is nothing in the
terms of the grant to carry the trust beyond its appropriate use. This
brings us to the limitation of the use itself.
It is for the erection of “a house or place of worship for the use
of the members of the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States
CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS DISTINGUISHED. 153
of America (so long as they use it for that purpose, and no longer, and
then to return back to the original owner), according to the rules and
discipline which from time to time may be agreed upon and adopted by
the ministers and preachers of the said church at their General Confer
ence in the United States of America.” This is the main purpose of the
trust, the other portions of the deed relating to the use being ancillary
only to this principal object. The interjected words, “so long as they
use it for that purpose and no longer, and then to return back to the
original owner,” are terms of undoubted limitation, and not of con
dition. They accompany the creation of the estate, qualify it
,
and
prescribe the bounds beyond which it shall not endure.
The equitable estate is in the members of the church so long as they
use the house as a place of worship in the manner prescribed and no
longer. This is the boundary set to their interest, and when this limit
is transcended the estate expires by its own limitation, and returns to
its author. The words thus used have not the slightest cast of a mere
condition. No estate for any fixed or determinate period had been
granted before these expressions were reached, and they were followed
by no proviso or other indication of a condition to be annexed. -
“A special limitation,” says Mr. Smith, in his work on Executory
Interests, p. 12, “is a qualification serving to mark out the bounds of an
estate, so as to determine it ipso facto in a given event without action,
entry, or claim, before it would, or might, otherwise expire by force of,
or according to, the general limitation.” A special limitation may be
created by the words “until,” “so long,” “if,” “whilst,” and “during,”
as when land is granted to one so long as he is parson of Dale, or while
he continues unmarried, or until out of the rents he shall have made
£500. 2 Black. Com. 155; Smith on Exec. Int. 12 ; Thomas Coke, 2 vol.,
120-21; Fearne on Rem. 12, 13 and note p. 10. “In such case,” says
Blackstone, “the estate determines as soon as the contingency happens
(when he ceases to be parson, marries a wife, or has received the £500),
and the subsequent estate which depends on such determination becomes
immediately vested, without any act to be done by him who is next in
expectancy.”
The effect of the limitation in this case was that the estate of the
trustees terminated the moment the house ceased to be used as a place
of worship according to the rules and discipline of the church, by the
members to whose use in that manner it had been granted; and the
reversion ipso facto returned to Thomas Pillow, the grantor. The abandon
ment of the house as a place of worship, therefore, became a chief
question in the cause, because the title of the trustees to the property,
and consequently their right to maintain this action, hinged upon this
event. Then, as the use of the members of this church was to be accord
ing to the rules and discipline from time to time adopted by the general
conierence, it became a question whether the alleged abandonment of
the house as a place of worship was by church authority, and according
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to the rules and discipline then existing; for a mere temporary sus
pension of services there, or a discontinuance of the use without authority,
would not, ipso facto, determine the use. Hence an inquiry both into
the fact of abandonment and the authority of the church became es
sential. * * *
The fact of such an abandomnent was submitted by the judge and
found by the jury. In his charge the learned judge submitted the
question on the testimony of the presiding elder and the book of dis
cipline as to the authority for so doing; and on his testimony and that
of others as to the actual discontinuance of services there and the
causes thereof. This was all he could do, as the question of fact be
longed to the jury. * * *
Judgment afiirmed.
Impossibility of Performance. -
THOMAS v. HOWELL, in King’s Bench, Trinity 4 Wm. & Mary.-A. D.
1693.—1 Salk. 170, 25 Eng. Rul. Cas. 626.
One'devised to his eldest daughter upon condition she would marry
his nephew on or before she attained the age of 21. The nephew died
young, and the daughter never refused, and indeed never was re
quired to marry him. After the death of the nephew, the daughter,
being about 17, married J . S. And it was adjudged in C. B. that the
condition was not broken, being become impossible by the act of God;
and the judgment was afterwards aflirmed in error in B. R.
Right of Entry when not Expressly Reserved.
LIT'1‘LE'1‘ON’S TENURES. Littleton died in 1482.
§ 331
* * * It is commonly used in all such cases as aforesaid to
put the clauses in the deeds, seilicet, if the rent be behind, &c., that it
should be lawful to the feoffor and his heirs to enter, &c., and this
is well done, for this intent, to declare and express to the common
people, who are not learned in the law, of the manner and condition of
the feofiment &c., As if a man seised of land letteth the same land
to another by deed indented for a term of years, rendering to him a
certain rent, it is used to put into the deed, that if the rent be behind
at the day of payment, or by the space of a week or month, &c. that
then it shall be lawful to the lessor to distrain, &c., yet the lessor may
distrain of common right for the rent behind, &c., though such words
were not put into the deed, &c.
\Vho May Enter for Condition Broken.
LIT’1‘LETON’S TENURES (Littleton died in 1482).
§ 346. And here no two things: one is that no rent (which is properly
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so called) may be reserved upon any feofiment, gift, or lease, but only
to the feofior, donor, or lessor, or to their heirs, and in no manner may it
be reserved to any strange person. But if two joint-tenants make a lease
by deed indented, reserving to one of them a certain yearly rent this is
good enough to him to whom the rent is reserved, for he is privy to the
lease and not a stranger.
§ 347. The second thing is that no entry nor re-entry (which is all one)
may be reserved or given to any person but only to the feoffor, donor,
or lessor, or to their heirs; and such re-entry cannot be given to any other
person. For if a. man letteth land to another for term of life by in
denture, rendering to the lessor and to his heirs a certain rent, and for
default of payment a re-entry, &c., if afterwards the lessor by a deed
granteth the reversion of the land to another in fee, and the tenant
for term of life attorn &c., if the rent be after behind, the grantee of
the reversion may distrain for the rent, because the rent is incident
to the reversion; but he may not enter into the land and oust the
tenant, as the lessor might have done, or his heirs, if the reversion had
been continued in them, &c. And in this case the entry is taken away
forever; for the grantee of the reversion cannot enter for the reason
aforesaid; and neither the lessor nor his heirs can enter, for if the
lessor might enter, then he ought to be in his former estate, &c., and
this may not be, because he hath aliened from him the reversion.
‘ COKE LIT. 2141)-215b.—A. D. 1620-30.
If a man have a lease for years and demise or grant the same upon
condition, &c., and die, his executors or administrators shall enter for
the condition broken, for they are privy in right, and shall represent
the person of the dead. [215a] If cestui que use had made a lease
for years, &c., upon condition, the feoffees should not enter for the
condition broken, for they are privy in estate, but not privy in blood.
Another diversity is in case of a lease for years, where the condition
is that the lease shall cease, or be void as is aforesaid, and where the
condition is, that the lessor shall re-enter; for there the grantee, as
Littleton saith, shall never take benefit of the condition. And it is
to be observed, that where the estate or lease is ipso facto void by the
condition or limitation no acceptance of the rent after can make it to
have a continuance; otherwise it is of an estate or lease voidable by
entr .
Aizlother diversity is between conditions in deed, whereof suflicient
has been said before, and conditions in law. As if a man make a lease
for life, there is a condition in law annexed unto it
,
that if the lessee
doth make a greater estate, &c., that then the lessor may enter. Of this and
the like conditions in law, which do give an entry to the lessor, the
lessor himself and his heirs shall not only take benefit of it
,
but also his
assignee and the lord by escheat, everyone for the condition in law broken
in their own time.
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Another diversity there is between the judgment of the common law,
whereof Littleton wrote, and the law at this day by force of the statute
of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34. For by the common law no grantee or assignee
of the reversion could (as hath been said) take advantage of a re-entry
by force of any condition. For at the common law, if a man had made
a lease for life reserving a rent, &c., and if the rent be behind a re
entry, and if the lessor grant the reversion over, the grantee should
take no benefit of the condition, for the cause before rehearsed. But
now by the said statute of 32 Hen. VIII, the grantee may take advantage
thereof, and upon demand of the rent and non-payment, he may re
enter. By which act it is provided, that as well every person which
shall have any grant of the king of any reversion, &c., of any lands,
&c., which pertained to monasteries, &c., as also all other persons be
ing grantees or assignees, &c., to or by any other person or persons,
and their heirs, executors, successors, and assignees, shall have like ad
vantage against the lessees, &c., by entry for the non-payment of the
rent, or for doing of waste, or other forfeiture, &c., as the said lessors
or grantors themselves ought or might have had. Upon this act divers
resolutions and judgments have been given, which are necessary to be
known: 1. That the said statute is general, viz. that the grantee of
the reversion of every common person, as well as the king, shall take
advantage of conditions. 2. That the statute doth extend to grants
made by the successors of the king, albeit the king be only named in
the act. 3. That where the statute speaketh of lessees that the same
doth not extend to gifts in tail. 4. That where the statute speaks of
grantees and assignees of the reversion, that an assignee of part of the
state of the reversion may take advantage of the condition. As if
lessee for life be, &c., and the reversion is granted for life, &c. So
if lessee for years be, and the reversion is granted for years, the gran
tee for years shall take benefit of the condition in respect to this word
(executors) in the act. 5. That a grantee of part of the reversion
shall not take advantage of the condition; as if the lease be of three
acres, reserving a rent upon condition, and the reversion is granted
of two acres, the rent shall be apportioned by the act of the parties, but the
condition is destroyed, for that it is entire and against common right. 6.
That in the king’s case the condition in that case is not destroyed, but re
mains still in the king. 7. By act in law a condition may be apportioned in
the case of a common person; as if alease for years be made of two acres.
one of the nature of borough English, the other at the common law; and
the lessor having issue two sons, dieth, each of them shall enter for the
condition broken; and likewise a condition shall be apportioned by the act
and wrong of the lessee, as hath been said in the chapter of Rents. 8. If a
lease for life be made, reserving a rent upon condition, &c., the lessor levies
a fine of the reversion, he is grantee or assignee of the reversion; but with
out attornment he shall not take advantage of the condition, for the mak
ers of the statute intended to have all necessary incidents observed, other
wise it might be mischievous to the lessee. 9. There is a diversity between
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a condition that is compulsory and a power of revocation that is vol
untary for a man that hath a power of revocation may by his own act
extinguish his power of revocation in part, as by levying a fine of part;
and yet the power shall remain for the residue, because it is in the nature
of a limitation, and not a condition; and so it was resolved in the Earl
of Shrews-bm'y’s Case in the court of wards, Easter, 39 Eliz. & Mich. 40
& 41 Eliz. 10. If the lessor bargain and sell the reversion by deed in
dented and enrolled, the bargainee is not in the per of the bargainor,
and yet he is an assignee within the statute. [215b] So if the lessor
grant the reversion in fee to the use of A and his heirs, A is a sufiicient
assignee within the statute; because he comes in by the act and limit
ation of the party, although he is in the post, and the words of the statute
be, to or by, and they be assignees to him although they be not by
him; but such as come in merely by act in law, as the lord of the vil
lein, the lord by escheat, the lord that entereth or claimeth for mort
main, or the like, shall not take benefit of this statute. 11. If the
lessor in the case before, bargain and sell the reversion by
deed indented and enrolled, or if the lessor make a feoffment in fee,
and the lessee re-enter, the grantee or feoffee shall not take any ad
vantage of any condition without making notice to the lessee. 12. Al
beit the whole words of the statute be for nonpayment of the rent, or
for doing of waste, or other forfeiture, yet the grantees or assignees
shall not take benefit of every forfeiture by force of a condition, but
only of such conditions as either are incident to the reversion, as rent,
or for the benefit of the estate, as for not doing of waste, for keeping
the house in reparations, for making of fences, scouring of ditches, for
preserving of woods, or such like; and not for the payment of any sum
in gross, delivery of corn, wood, or the like, so as other forfeiture shall
be taken for other forfeitures like to those examples which were there
put (videlicet) of payment of rent and not doing of waste, which are
for the benefit of the reversion.
ANON., 22 Edw. IV.-—A. D. 1483.—B1'00ke Abr. t. Conditions 167, 22 Edw.
- ' IV, 17.
Debt. The master and associates of St. Bartholomews in London
had granted to J . S. for life a certain corody, &c., for doing such serv
ices as N and others had done, and the grantee leased to the master
and his associates for seven years rendering 10£ rent. The grantee
brought debt, and the grantor said that the plaintiff had not done the
services; and the plaintiff said that he was excused by reason of the
lease to the grantor which is a suspense, by which it was argued that
the plaintifi should be paid his rent and the corody, and see on this
case 20 Edw. IV, 18, 19, BRIAN, G. J. If a man enfeoffs me on
condition to pay to him 10£ on such a day or to re-enter, and I lease the
land to him rendering rent, and at the day I do not pay the 10£, here
he may retain the land, and the rent reserved by me is extinguished.
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But if a man makes a feofiment in fee rendering rent with a clause
of re-entry for non-payment, if the feoffee re-enfeoff the feoffor the
feoffer may not re-enter for non-payment of the rent, for he has the
same land from which the rent is issuing. Contrary it is of a sum
in gross as above. And the same would seem to be the law of a lease
made afterwards by the lessee to the lessor for years or life, for by this
the rent is suspended.
NOTA, Easter Tel‘m.—A. D. 1496.—Year Books, 11 Hen. VII, 17, pl. 14. ,
If I should lease for a term of years on condition that he should go
to Rome such a day, and if not that his estate should cease, here
if the lessor grant the reversion to another, and he attorn, andllater
the condition is broken, he who has the reversion may enter, for by
breach of the condition the estate is void and determined; so of a term
for life. But if the condition was that he might re-enter for the con
dition broken, and he had granted the reversion over, the grantee may
not enter.
CHAWORTH v. PHILLIPS, M001‘ 876. About 7 Jae. 1, A. D. 1610.
It was resolved that if a lease was made on condition to be void if
10£ be not paid by a day named, the grantee of the reversion cannot
enter by such condition, because it is collateral. Resolved, also, that if
a lessee for 20 years make a lease for 10 years on such condition, and
afterwards the lessee for 20 years surrender to him in reversion, he
in reversion may not have benefit of the condition, because he is in of
another estate paramount.
WARREN v. LEE, In the K1ng’s Bench, Hilary, 2 & 3 Phil. & Mary.—A. D.
1556.—-Dyer 126b.
In trespass for breaking a close, by Jasper Warren against Lee and
others. The defendants pleaded not guilty, and at nisi prius there
was a demurrer in law upon the evidence. And the case was: that
the father of the plaintiff was seised in fee of land holden in
socage, and by his last will in writing gave the land in the premises
thereof to his wife for the term of [*127a] her life, on condition that
she should provide for the said Jasper, being the eldest son at school,
and bring him up in virtue and good morals at her own expense until
he should be of the full age of 21 years; and_ afterwards in the end of
the will, he'gave the land after the death of his wife to his second son
in tail, reserving the fee-simple; and died. The wife entered and
broke the condition; and the said Jasper, after he came of age, entered,
and brought this action of trespass during the life of the wife. The
question was, whether his entry was lawful or not. First, it is to be
considered whether a condition can be knit to a devise or not? And
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it seems it may; and this by the statutes of wills 32 [Hen. 8 c. 1] and
35 Hen. 8 c. 5 which give power to the devisor to make devises at his
free will and pleasure for the advancement of his wife, &c., or other
wise, &c.‘ Also, to prove this by a case in Littleton [§ 125], that the
executors of the devisor of land devisable by custom shall sell the land,
they do it not, the heir enters, &c. Also, such devises of land in use
have been common. And see a condition, that the devisee shall pay rent
to the wife of the devisor and a clause of distress to the wife for the same;
whether this destroys the condition, quaere bene, H. 18 Eliz. [Dyer
348a] Also, note for whose benefit and advantage this condition was made,
and by whom it ought to be performed. Also, whether the condition knit
to the particular estate only be destroyed and made void by the limitation
over in tail, the fee-simple remaining in the devisor, or not ? And it seems
not, although the remainder had been over in fee; for there is a difference
between the reservation of a rent and of a condition; for the one, viz. the
latter, may be without deed by livery accordingly, and the former not with
out deed indented, &c.; and although the remainder be not entailed upon
the condition also, yet it takes effect upon this conditional livery; and
see Perkins accordant thereto, the last chapter of his book [§ 831],
who makes no question of the condition, but whether he in remainder
shall take advantage of the breach of it; and it seems not, &c. See also,
Fitz. Nat. Brev. in ex gravi querela [201 C] such a devise upon condi
tion, &c., remainder over in tail without condition, and good. And if
a man make a lease for life reserving a rent and re-entry for default of
payment, remainder over in tail; this remainder does not destroy the
condition, because it is made all at one and the same time. But when
the condition is once annexed to the particular estate, and then by an
other deed the reversion is granted by the maker of the condition,
there the condition is gone, causa patet. Also, whether the entry of
the heir of the devisor for breach of the condition be lawful, or not?
And what estate he shall be adjudged to have? And whether the re
mainder be defeated, or not? And it seems the entry is lawful, al
though no re-entry or entry are expressly reserved to him,” because
it is tacitly implied in law when the condition is to be performed by
the devisee. [*127 b] And this sort of condition carries with it a
penalty, viz., the defeasance of the estate to which it is annexed. And
in common reason he who was prejudiced- by the devise, viz., the heir
who is disinherited by it
,
shall take advantage of the breach of the
condition. For by Glanvil lib. 7, c. 1, fol. 44 the father cannot make
a devise of land without the assent of the heir, but with his assent
he may.” And it seems that the remainder is not destroyed by the
‘Note how differently this free will and pleasure phrase is construed in
Soulle v. Gerrard, post 226.
’ If it is a condition, clearly the right of entry for breach exists as a nat
ural consequence, without express reservation.
“While Glanvil does make this statement, we hear little of it after him;
and certainly it could not hold after the statute of wills expressly permitted
the devisor to dispose at his tree will and pleasure.
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entry, but the heir shall have only an estate for the life of the wife; for
there is a difference between this remainder made by will and a re
mainder created by deed and livery; for in the last case the entry de
feats the livery, but it is not so in a. will; for a remainder by will, is
good although the particular estate were never good ;‘ as if to a
monk, &c. And the law in this case shall be taken in the same manner
as if the devisor had expressly reserved an entry and retainer during
the life of the wife; and such tempering and qualifying of the penalty
shall not altogether defeat the estate, &c., as Littleton [§ 327] says
of re-entry and retainer until, &c. * * * Also the case in 29 assize
[159 pl. 17] of a devise to Clerk to be priest, remainder to a com
monalty in fee, &c., and he in remainder shall not take advantage of
the breach, because no words of the will give it to him, and also he is
a stranger to it; but if the words had been provided that if the con
dition be broken, his estate shall cease, and he in remainder may im
mediately enter; there he should take advantage, although he be a
stranger, because the estate determines there without re-entry. And
therefore, if I make such a conditional lease for life, with condition,
viz. that the estate shall cease, and then alien the reversion, the alienee
shall take advantage of this condition, because the estate determines
without entry, &c. * * *
VAN RENSSELAER v. BALL, New York Ct. of Appeals, March, 1859.-19
N. Y. 100.
Ejectment for 1201/2 acres of land. Plaintiff gave in evidence an
indenture dated Oct. 20, 1792, by which Stephen Van Rensselaer con
veyed the land in question to William Ball in fee, reserving an
annual rent payable in wheat, fowls, and a day’s service each year. The
deed contained a covenant by the grantee for himself, his heirs, rep
resentatives, and assigns to pay the rent and contained clauses for dis
tress for re-entry on condition if the rent should not be paid. It was
proved that W. Ball died 12 years before the trial, that defendant his
son was in possession, and had paid the rent for his father but not
since his death. It was also proved that S. Van Rensselaer died Jan.
26, 1839, leaving a will by which he devised to the plaintiff “all his
estate, lands, tenements, rents, and hereditaments, in the manor of
Rensselaerwick, on the west side of the Hudson river” including the
lands here in question. The defendant objected that the indenture did
not create the relation of landlord and tenant between the parties to it
or their representatives; that ejectment did not lie except between land
‘Observe that the future estate here is called a remainder; the name
executory devise is a later invention. Observe that the doctrine, that future
estates by will are liable to the rules as to remainders by deed if by possi
bility they could take effect as strict remainders, was as yet unknown.
This rule is believed to have arisen from a desire to limit the scope of the
rule in Pells v. Brown (1620), post 242.
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lord and tenant; that the reservation called rent was not such in law,
but a personal contract between the original parties, affecting only
themselves and their representatives, and did not attach to or concern
the land; that if this were not so, the plaintiff as devisee of the rent
could not enter or maintain ejectment; and that even if he could do
that, he must make strict demand of the rent before suing, and must show
that there was no suflicient distress on the premises. The judge over
ruled the_ several objections, gave judgment for the plaintiff; and de
fendant’s coimsel excepted, appealed to the general term, and now ap
peals from the judgment of the general term aflirming the judgment
below.
[*102.] DENIO, J.: A condition annexed to a conveyance in fee,
that the grantee his heirs and assigns shall pay to the grantor and his
heirs an annual rent and that in default of payment the grantor or
his heirs may re-enter, is a lawful condition. Littleton puts it as an
example of a condition in deed, at the commencement of that part of
his treatise which relates to estates upon condition. Such an estate,
he says, “is as if a man by deed-indented enfeofis another in fee simple,
reserving to him and his heirs yearly a certain rent payable at one
feast or divers feasts, per annum on condition that if the rent be be
hind, &c., that it shall be lawful for the feoffor and his heirs to enter.
&c., and if it happen the rent to be behind by a week after any day of
payment of it
,
or by a month after any day of payment of it
,
or by a half
a year, &c., that then it shall be lawful for the feofior or his heirs to
enter, &c. In these cases, if the rent be not paid at such' time, or before
such time limited and specified within the condition comprised in the
indenture, then may the feofior or his heirs enter into such lands or
tenements, and then of his former estate to have and hold, and the
feoflfee quite to oust thereof. And it is called an estate upon condition,
because that the estate of the feofiee is defeasible, if the condition be not
performed, &c. (§ 325.) The systematic writers upon the law of real
property from that time to the present have assumed the legality of
such conditions; and the substance of the condition in the conveyance
under consideration is usually put as an example. 2 Bl. Com. 154;
2 Oruise’s Dig. c. 1 § 1 pl. 3
, 9
;
4 Kent Com. 123. Among the numerous
authorities referred to by the defendant’s counsel, I have been unable
to find a single dictum or the slightest hint that such conditions were
contrary to law, or that they could only be attached to estates for life
or years, or that a common law tenure between the parties, or a re
version in the grantors, were necessary to uphold them. There is
moreover, nothing in the case of De Peyster v. Michael, 2 Seld [467]
lately decided in this court, which, properly understood, creates a
doubt as to the validity of such a condition, or the lawfulness of annex
ing one to an estate in fee. [*103].
The books which treat of such estates do, indeed, state that a con
dition repugnant to the nature of the estate granted is void; and the in
stances given are of feofiments, or conveyances in fee, by bargain and
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sale, with a condition that the feoifee or grantee shall not alien; and they
say that even this could be done before the statute of quia emptores
because the feoffor had a possibility of reverter, by the expiration of
the feudal investiture upon the failure of heirs of the tenant. Coke
Lit. *223a. The argument in the opinion of the chief judge in
De Peyster v. Michael consisted in showing that a condition for the
payment of one quarter part of the value of the land and improvements
upon each sale by the grantee, or those who should succeed to his
estate, was a restraint upon alienation repugnant to the nature of a fee
simple, within the sense of the authorities; and that, although this
could be done where there was a reversion, as upon the grant of an
estate for life or years, or a possibility of reverter, as upon a feofiment
before the statute of quia emptores, it was unlawful in this state, in
respect to a conveyance in fee, after the re-enactment of that statute
by the legislature. It seems to me, that there is nothing in the reason
ing of that opinion to encourage one to question the validity of the
clauses of re-entry for non-payment of rent in a conveyance in fee, even
though the chief judge had not taken care to state, as he has done, that
the principles which he laid down would leave to the grantee in these
conveyances, and his representatives, the full benefit of the remedy of
re-entry for the enforcement of their right to the rent.
But assuming that the estate conveyed to William Ball was de
feasible by the non-performance of the condition to pay the annual
rent; no one but the grantor or his heirs could, at common law, enter
for the breach- of a condition subsequent. Littleton 347; Coke Lit.
*214b; 4 Kent Com. 127; Nicoll v. N. Y. & E. R. R., 12 N. Y. 121.
This was the consequence of a maxim of the common law that nothing
in action, entry or re-entry, could be granted over; for, as Coke says:
“Under color thereof pretended titles might be granted to great men,
whereby right might be trodden [*104] down and the weak oppressed,
which the common law forbiddeth, as men to grant before they be in
possession.” Coke Lit. Supra. The reason upon which this maxim
was founded has, no doubt, become in great measure obsolete; still,
the principle that the right of entry cannot in general be granted
over is, I am inclined to believe, still a part of the law, notwithstanding
the tendency of modern decisions and the provisions of the code. This
then is the first difficulty in the plaintiff’s case. He brings this action
as the assignee, by devise, of the grantor, and not as his heir; and he
is disabled from maintaining the action unless the act of 1805 and its
different re-enactments apply to the case. Laws 1805, c. 98; 1 R. L.
1813, 364 § 3; 1 R. S.. 748 § 25. I have elsewhere stated the origin and
history of the series of enactments in favor of the assignees of rever
sions, of which this forms a supplement, and have shown that it enabled
the grantees of a perpetual rent charge to maintain an action on
the covenants for the payment of rent. But the original statute of 32
Henry VIII, c. 34, gives to the assignee mentioned in it not only a
remedy by action, but the “like advantages” “by entry for non-payment
_
l
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of the rent” which the grantors might have had, and this feature is pre
served in the re-enactments in this state (2 Jones & Var. 184; 1 R. L.
1813, 363, § 1; in the Revised Statutes of 1830 the expression is that the
assignees “shall have the same remedy by entry action or otherwise,”
as their grantor or lessor had or might have had. 1 R. S. 74’? § 23.
Then follows the provision first introduced by the act of 1805, and con
tinued in the revisions, that this provision shall extend to grants or
leases in fee reserving rents, as well as to leases for life or years. But
in all the acts the expression is retained, which is found in the statute
of Henry VIII, “as if the reversion had remained in the lessor or
grantor.” In grants in fee, there being no reversion these words are
inapplicable, or at least incongruous: and to make the provision coherent
they should be read as though the language were, “as if said right of
entry had remained in the lessor or grantor ;” or this particular expression
in the statutes [*105] should be limited to the case embraced in the
provision where the grantor had a reversion, and be dropped in the
cases it is made to relate to grants in fee, upon the rule of construc
tion redendo singula singulis. No one can for a moment doubt the
intention of the legislature to confer upon the assignees of a grantor
in fee reserving rent, the remedy by entry for the non-payment of such
rent, precisely as the grantor himself had it before he parted with the
right. In other words, the design is plain to make the right of entry
transferable, and thus to change to this extent, in favor of this class
of conditions, the rule of the_common law. This is so manifest to my
mind from the reading of the statutes that anything I could further
say would be likely to obscure rather than to elucidate it.
There is the question, in the next place, whether where one has a
perpetual rent and a right of entry on the land of another to enforce
its payment, transmissible to his heirs, but not legally transferable by
sale or assignment, the legislature can lawfully interpose, by an en
actment declaring that thenceforward the rent and the right of entry
shall be subject to transfer like a rent incident to a reversion; in
other words, whether the act of 1805 can be applied to conveyances and
reservations of rent existing when it was passed, without violating the
provision of the constitution of the United States, which protects
contracts from being impaired by the state legislatures. I think the
statute is not subject to question on that ground. A conveyance, I
agree, is as fully within the constitutional provision as an executory
contract; and the only point is whether the obligations of the contract
contained in this conveyance have been impaired within the sense of
the provision. Clearly the rights of Van Rensselaer, the grantor, have
not been affected unfavorably. They have been manifestly advanced;
for the rent and the remedy to enforce it, have been improved by hav
ing imparted to it a vendible quality. Nor have the obligations of the
grantee, or his representatives or assigns, been increased, or their rem
edies changed to their prejudice. The estate of the grantee was subject
to be destroyed by a re-entry for non-payment (*106) of rent before
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the statute, and no new or further liability is attached to it now. A
re-entry can be sustained in precisely the same cases in which it could
before, and in no others. The contract in question is afiected in pre
cisely the same manner as all existing non-negotiable choses in action
were by the code of procedure, when it rendered them capable of as
signment so as to vest the legal title and the right to sue upon them in
the assignee. § 111. Yet the courts have uniformly applied this pro
vision of the code to all existing contracts, equally with those made
after the code was enacted. As to the remedies of the grantee and his
representatives and privies in estate, if they have been changed at all,
it is to give them a right of action where none existed before. The
act of Henry VIII, which has been regularly followed in this particular
in our re-enactment, and in the revision, gave a reciprocal remedy to
the grantee or lessee, and his representatives, against the assignee of
the reversion; and, by the act of 1805, bringing grants in fee within
the purview of these provisions, the grantees acquired a remedy against
the assignees of the grantor, which they did not possess before. They
can now sue such assignees for any breach of the grantor’s covenants,
which they probably could not have done at common law, and certainly
not by any of the statutes prior to the act of 1805; and they are not
deprived of any remedy which they might have had against the grantor
himself, and his personal representatives, upon his express covenants.
It is, moreover, argued on behalf of the defendant, that if all other
difficulties were removed, an action in the nature of ejectment could not
be maintained without strict demand of the rent on the land and at
the precise time at which it became payable—a formality which it is
admitted has not taken place. The common law requires such a demand
preparatory to bringing ejectment. (Coke Lit. *201b, 202a.); and it
was for the purpose of avoiding “the many niceties which attend re
entries at common law,” as it is expressed in the preamble, that the
statute 4 Geo. II, c. 28, was passed. It is limited to cases between
landlord and tenant where there is a right by [*107] law in the former to
re-enter; and it makes the service of a declaration in ejectment to stand
in the place and stead of a demand and re-entry. The provision was
early re-enacted in this country, and has been continued in each sub
sequent revision of the laws. 2 Jones & Var. 238, § 23 ; 1 K. & R. 134,
§ 23; 1 R. L., 1813, 440 § 23; 2 R. S. 505 § 30. The statutes require,
to warrant the action, evidence that no suflicient distress can be found
on the premises to satisfy the rent due. The defendant’s position is that
these acts do not apply to the case, because, as it is argued, a reservation
of an annual payment upon a conveyance in fee is not properly rent, as no
distress can of common right be made for it, and it is only distrainable
by virtue of an express provision contained in the indenture; and the
statute requires it to be a case between landlord and tenant, which
implies, it is said, that the relation should exist at common law. But
such reservations as the one before us were considered as creating a
rent within the legal meaning of that term, from the time of Littleton
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to the present. We have seen that it was called rent in § 325 of the
treatise already quoted; and by looking into § 217 and § 21.8. we see
that it was one of the recognized species of rent, and was called rent
charge. It was rent, too, as has been shown, for the non-payment of
which a re-entry was given at common law, where the rightto re-enter
was provided for in the deed. The act of 1805 assumes that rent mav
be reserved upon a conveyance in fee, and the preamble of that act
states that such reservations had been, long in use in this state. Now
the inconvenience which the statutes making a declaration in eject
ment stand in the place of a strict demand were intended to remedv,
was the great particularity and nicety attending this demand at common
law: and this was precisely as applicable to rents arising upon grants
in fee as upon leases for life or years. I do not, therefore, see any
reason, in the nature of the case, or in the language of the statutes, for
confining this remedy by ejectment to cases of rent service; and I am
of opinion that it is applicable to all cases of non-payment of rent
where there was a right to re-enter at common law. * * *
These reasons have led me to the conclusion that none of the points
so ‘ingeniously taken and ably urged on the part of the defendant can
be sustained; and I am in favor of afiirming the judgment of the
supreme court.
ALLEN and SHELnoN, JJ., took no part in the decision, all the
other judges concurring. Judgment aflirmed.
Division and Waiver of Conditions.
ANONYMOUS, Easter, 20 El.iz.—-A. D. 1578.-—Moor 113.
A man seised of copyhold held of a manor, part borough English
and part at common law, leased the land by deed indented for 21 years
by license of the lord, provided always that if the lessor, his wife, heirs,
assigns, or any of them, give a _vear’s warning to the lessee that the
husband, wife, or heirs will dwell there, that then the lease shall be
void, except that the lessor or his heirs shall pay to the lessee 20£. The
lessor and his wife died, and the reversion of the one part descended to
the oldest son, and the reversion of the other part descended to the
youngest, and he purchased the reversion of his older brother; and
later, claiming to be a person within the proviso, gave notice
to the lessee. On this two questions were moved: 1, if he
was such a person as might give the warning or if the condi
tion is destroyed, the reversion having been severed; 2, if by
the words, except the lessor or his heirs shall pay, &c., the intent was
that this should be a consideration to the lessee for his departure, if
these words were suflicient to give the lessee the 20£. MoUNsoN and
MANWOOD [JJ.] held that he might give the Warning, and that
the law which had severed the reversion had severed also the condition,
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although at the commencement they were entire. And so of one part
as heir and of the other as assignee of the older brother he might
have advantage of the condition. But MANWOOD, J., said that if
he had made feoffment of the borough English lands, and had issue
two sons and died, now the elder only might have advantage of the
condition, for that is a condition in gross, but in this case it was a
reversion reserved to the lessor. But if two joint tenants with war
ranty make partition, or if one grant his part to another, now the
warranty is gone; for this is their own act, and they were not compellable
to make partition. And so there was a diversity taken. And as to the
other question ‘they held that the words were sufiicient to give him the
20£. * * *
HARVY v. OSWOLD, in B. R.-Trinity, 38 E1iz.—A. D. 1596.—Moor 456.
In ejectione firmae the case was that one made a lease rendering rent,
with condition that the lessee should not lease without assent of the
lessor. He leased part, and the lessor without notice of it accepted
the entire rent of the first lessee; and now the question was if he might
enter by the condition. And it was adjudged that he might notwith
standing the acceptance, because he had no notice of the breach, which
want of notice the defendant had pleaded in his rejoinder; but if he had
notice the acceptance seems a bar, though the condition was collateral.
Per GAWDY and POPHAM.
DUMPOR’S CASE, in King’s Bench, Hilary Term 45 Eliz.—A. D. 1603.-4
Coke, 119b, 1 Smith Lead. Cas. *85.
In trespass between Dumpor and Symms, upon the general issue,
the jurors gave a special verdict to this effect: the president and
scholars of the college of the Corpus Christi in Oxford, made a lease
for years in anno 10 Eliz, of the land now in question to one Boldo,
proviso that the lessee or his assigns, should not alien the premises to
any person or persons without the special license of the lessors. And
afterwards the lessors by their deed, anno 13 Eliz. licensed the lessee
to alien, or demise the land, or any part of it
,
to any person or per
sons quibuscumque. And afterwards anno 15 Eliz. the lessee assigned
the term to one Tubbe, who by his last will devised it to his son, and by
tlie same will made his son executor, and died. The son entered
generally, and the testator was not indebted to any person, and after
wards the son died intestate, and the _ ordinary committed adminis
tration to one who assigned the term to the defendant. The president
and scholars by warrant of attorney entered for the condition broken,
and made a lease to the plaintiff for 21 years, who entered on the
defendant, who r‘e-entered, upon which re-entry this action of trespass
was brought; and that upon the lease made to Bolde the yearly rent
of 33s. 4d. was reserved, and upon the lease to the plaintiff; the yearly
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rent of 22s. was only reserved. And the jurors prayed upon all this matter
the advice and discretion of the court, and upon this verdict judg
ment was given against the plaintifi. And in this case divers points
were debated and resolved: 1. That the alienation by license to Tubbe,
had determined the condition, so that the alienation which he might
afterwards make could break the proviso or give cause of entry to the
lessors, for the lessors could not dispense with an alienation for one
time and the same estate should remain subject to the proviso after.
And though the proviso be, that the lessee or his assigns should not
alien, yet when the lessors license the lessee to alien, they shall never
defeat, by force of the said proviso, the term which is absolutely aliened by
their license, in as much as the assignee has the same term which was
assigned with their assent: so if the lessors dispense with one aliena
tion they thereby dispense with all alienations thereafter; for in- as
much as by force of the lessor’s license and of the lessee’s assignment,
the estate and interest of Tubbe was absolute it was not possible that
his assignee who has his estate and interest shall be subject to the
first condition: and as the dispensation of one alienation is the dis
pensation of all others, so it is as to the persons, for if the lessors
dispense with one, all the others are at liberty. And therefore it was
adjudged, Trinity 28 Eliz., Rot. 256, in the common pleas between
Leeds and Orompton (Cro. Eliz. 816, Godb. 93, Noy 32, 4 Leon. 58, 2
Bulstr. 291) that where the Lord Stratford made a lease to three, upon
condition that they or any of them should not alien without the assent of
the lessor, and afterwards one aliened by his assent, and afterwards the
other two aliened without license, and it was adjudged that in this
case the condition being determined as to one person, by the license
of the lessor was determined in all. And POPHAM, C. J ., denied the
case in 16 Eliz., Dyer 334, that if a man lease land upon condition
that he shall not alien the land or any part of it without the assent of
the lessor, and afterwards he aliens part with the assent of the lessor,
that he cannot alien the residue without the assent of the lessor: and
conceived that this is not law, for he said the condition should not be
divided or apportioned by the act of the parties; and in the same
case as to parcel which was aliened by the assent of the lessor the
condition is determined; for although the lessee alien any part of
the residue, the lessor shall not enter into the part aliened by _the
license, and therefore the condition being determined in part is de
termined in all. And therefore the chief justice said he thought the
said case was falsely printed, for he held clearly that it was not law.
NOTE reader, Paschae 14 Eliz. Rot. 1015, in the common pleas, that
where the lease was made by deed indented for 21 years of three
manors, A, B, O. rendering rent, for A 61. for B 51, for C 101., to
be paid in a place out of the land, with a condition of re-entry into
all three manors for default of payment of the said rents, or any of
them, and afterwards the lessor by deed indented and enrolled bar
gained and sold the reversion of one house and 40 acres of land parcel
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of the manor of A to one and his heirs, and afterwards by another
deed indented and enrolled bargained and sold all the residue to an
other and his heirs; and if the second bargainee should enter for condition
broken or not was the question. And it was adjudged that he should
not enter for the condition broken; because the condition being entire,
could not be apportioned by the act of the parties, but by the severance
of a part of the reversion is destroyed in all. But it was agreed that
a condition may be apportioned in two cases: 1, By act in law; 2,
By act and wrong of the lessee. By act in law, as if a man seised of
two acres, the one in fee, and the other in borough English, has issue
two sons and leases both acres for life or years rendering rent, with
condition, the lessor dies; in this case by this descent, which is an
act in law, the reversion, rent, and condition are divided. By act
and wrong of the lessee, as if the lessee makes a feofiment of part or
commits waste in part, and the lessor enters for the forfeiture or re
covers the place wasted, there the rent and condition shall be appor
tioned; for none shall take advantage of his own wrong, and the
lessor shall not be prejudiced by the wrong of the lessee. And the
Lord Dyer, then chief ‘justice of the common pleas, in the same case
said, that he who enters for a condition broken ought to be in of the
same estate which he had at the time of the condition created, and
that he cannot have when he has departed with the reversion of part;
and with that reason agrees Littleton 80b. And vide 4 & 5 Phil. & Mary,
Dyer 152 pl. 7, where a proviso in an indenture of lease was that the
lessee his executors or assigns should not alien to any person without
license of the lessor but only to one of the sons of the lessee; the lessee
died, his executor assigned it over to one of his sons; it was held by
Stamford and Catlin [JJ.] that the son might alien to whom he pleased
without license, for the condition as to the son was determined, which
agrees with the resolution of the principal point in the case at bar. 2.
it was resolved that the statutes of 13 Eliz. c. 10; and 18 Eliz c. 11,
concerning leases made by deans and chapters, colleges and other ec
clesiastical persons, are general laws whereof the court ought to take
knowledge though they are not found by the jurors, and so it was re
solved between Claypole and Carter (Yelv. 106, 1 Leon. 306, Moor
593) in a writ of error in the king’s bench.
Conditions in Restraint of Alienation.
LITTLETON. Secs. 720, 721, 722, 723. Littleton died in A. D. 1482.
§720. I have heard say that in the time of king Richard II there
was a judge of the common pleas dwelling in Kent called Richel, who
had issue divers sons, and his intent was that his eldest son'should
have certain lands and tenements to him and to the heirs of ll1s body
begotten, and for default of issue the remainder to the second son, &c.,
and so to the third son, &c.; and because he would that none of his sons
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should alien or make warranty to bar or hurt the others that should
be in remainder, &c., he caused an indenture to be made to this effect,
viz. that the lands and tenements were given to his eldest son upon
such condition that if the eldest son alien in fee or in fee tail, &c.,
or if any of his sons alien &c., that then their estate should cease and
be void, and that then the same lands and tenements immediately
should remain to the second son and to the heirs of his body begotten,
and so to the last, the remainder to his other sons, and livery of seisin
was made accordingly.
721. But it seems by reason, that all such remainders in the form
aforesaid are void and of no value, and this for three causes: One
cause is that every remainder that begins by deed ought to be in him
to whom the remainder is entailed by force of the same deed
before the livery of seisin is made to him who shall have the free
hold; for in such case the growing and being of the remainder is by
the livery of seisin to him that shall have the freehold, and such remainder
was not to the second son at the time of the livery of seisin in the
case aforesaid, &c.
722. The second cause is, if the first son alien the tenements in fee,
then is the freehold and the fee simple in the alienee and in none
other; and if the donor had any reversion, by such alienation the re
version is discontinued; then how in reason can it be that such remainder
shall commence its being and its growing immediately after such
alienation made to a stranger who has by the same alienation a free
hold and fee simple, &c.? And also, if such remainder should be good
then might he enter upon the alienee where he had no manner of
right before the alienation, which should be inconvenient.
723. The third cause is, when the condition is such, that if the elder
son alien, &c. that his estate shall cease and be void, &c., then after such
alienation, &c., may the donor enter by force of such condition, as
it seems; and so the donor or his heirs in such case ought sooner to
have the land than the second son that had not any right before such
alienation; and so it seems that such remainders in the case aforesaid
are void.
ANON.,‘in Hilary Term 21 Hen. VI, 33, pl. 21.—A. D. 1443.
Note that a question was moved between the justices (NEWTON
absent), as to this: A lease was made for a term of years on condition
that the lessee should not grant over his estate, and whether this con
dition was void or not was the question. PASTON: The ‘condition
seems clearly void; for in that the lease is made is included that the
lessee may grant over his estate. For, suppose that a feofiment is made
in fee simple on condition that the lessee shall not make waste: the con
dition is void, for what is in him includes that he may commit waste;
so, &c. YELvER'roN: In your case, where a feoffment is made in
fee on condition that he may not commit waste, or that he may not
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alien, I well grant that the condition is void, because at the time of
the feoffment the fee and right passes out of the person of the feoffor,
and so that he had no right reserved in him; and so the condition re
served to him is void. But in the case that is here moved, the free
hold and the fee did not pass out of the person of the lessor; so that
he may well reserve this condition. PASTQN: Suppose that the lease was
made for term of life on condition that he may not commit waste, I
contend that this condition is void; and yet a reversion in fee simple
remains in the person of the lessor: and I claim that in such a case
the condition is void, not for the damages that may result, but for
the inconvenience. FULTHoaP (J .) : Suppose that one gives land
in tail on condition that the donee in tail shall not discontinue the
estate tail, is this condition void? I hold that it is not; for Thirning,
who was chief justice here, gave his land to his eldest son on condition
that if he alien, &c. it should remain to his younger son, and so he
made the remainder to two or three others. AsoUE (J.) : I under
stand that such a gift in tail with the condition is good and effectual,
for Thirning made this gift on the advice of the justices of his time.
PASTON: Not exactly; I know it was done with the assent of the
justices, and he said he would have the gift openly stated in the court,
and Hank said it would be valid.
And he arose and said that the whole condition was void, and so
it seems to me.
And note that in [Lib.] Assize 24 plea 8 a gift in tail on condition was
recited by Fulthorp and Ascue; and the condition was held good by
the whole court: but of a fee simple it was said the law was otherwise.
And note that it was after averment; and note also that this gift in
tail was made on great deliberation on the conclusion of agreement
between Lord Fitz Hugh and Lord Lescrop See 13 Hen. 4, which
agrees with what Paston had said, in a writ of ejectione firmae.
ANON., in Mich. Term.—A. D. 1495.—-Yearbooks, Mich. Term, 10 Hen. VII
11, pl. 8.
Land was given in tail, remainder in fee, on condition that if the
donee in tail or his heirs alien, to the damage of the issue, the donor
and his heirs might enter: and the opinion of the court was that
the condition was good, and one may make a condition on any act
prohibited by law. For I may lease my land to one for term of life
proviso that he shall not alien in fee, or proviso that he shall not
commit waste; and I may make feoffment proviso that the feoffee shall
not commit felony, or that he shall not alien in mortmain or within
age. And also, I may enfcoff one and his wife on condition that they
shall not enfeofi any man by deed; but I may not cnfeoff them on
condition that they shall not levy a fine, for this [condition] is merely
contrary to law. Yet I may restrain a lessee by condition that he
shall not do an unlawful act.
¢
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KEBLE held that if I infeoff a man in fee, omitting the word
assigns, provided that he shall not alien, the condition is good, for the
condition is consistent with the estate; for it is given to him and his
heirs, the nature of which gift is not to have perpetual continuance,
&c. Which the majority denied.
ANON., in Common Bench.—A. D. 1496.—Yearbooks, Mich. Term, 11 Hen.
VII, 6, pl. 25.
Note that it was held by all the justices of the common bench, trinity
term 8 Hen. VII, that if land is given in tail, remainder over to the
right heirs of the tenant in tail, on condition that if he or his heirs
should alien in fee the donor or his heirs might enter, this is a good
condition notwithstanding the fee simple in reversion; and the di
versity was taken between a fee simple in possession and a fee simple
depending on another estate. And it was well argued.
ANON., in Common Bench, Mich. 31 Hen. 8.—A. D. 1540.—Dyer 45a.
A lease was made to one for term of years upon condition that the
lessee should not alien his term to J . S.; and he aliens to R. B., who
aliens to the said J . S. It was moved in C. B., whether the condition
be broken? And it should seem not, because every condition is taken
strictly; for if a man make a feofiment upon condition that he shall
not enfeofl‘ J . S., and he die, and his heir enfeoff J . S. this is not a
breach of the condition. * * * , a
PARRY v. HARBERT, in Court of Augmentation, Mich. 31 Hen. 8.—A. D.
1540.—Dyer 45b.
A lease was made for a term of years, upon condition, that if the
lessee during his life should assign his term to any other without the
assent of the lessor, it should be lawful for the lessor to re-enter. The
lessee devised his term by his will to another without the assent, &c.
Whether this was cause of forfeiture? Because during his life the as
signment did not take effect. And yet R. Baooxn, and HALES, the
master of the rolls, thought this was a forfeiture; for the devisee, when
he is in, shall be said to be in by assignment, which the lessor [lessee]
made during his life. * * *
ANON., Mich. 3 Edw. 6—A. D. 1550.—Dye1' 651).
A question was asked upon these words in a lease, viz. and it shall not
be lawful for the lessee to give, sell or grant his estate and term to any
person without the leave of the lessor, upon pain of forfeiture of his
said term. The lessor and lessee die,Oand the executors sell the term
without the leave of the heir. It was holden, that this is out of the
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case of forfeiture, because the restraint was only [*66a] during the
lives of the lessor and lessee. And yet it was agreed in the bench,
that the words above make a condition.
GOS'1‘WICK’S CASE, in Common Plea.s.—A. D. 1591.--Cro. Eliz. 163.
A lease was made for two years, upon condition, that they nor either
of them shall alien any part of the land without the assent of the lessor.
They make partition, and one aliens his part. This is a forfeiture of
the whole.
GERMIIN v. ASCOT, in Common Bench, Mich. 37 & 38 El1z.—A. D. 1596.—
Abridged from Moor 364, 1 And. 186, 2 and 7.
Waste. Carew, being seised in fee of the land, made a lease for years.
and afterwards devised it to his sons in tail male successively, with
proviso that if any of the devisees or their issue go about to alien, dis
continue, or incumber the premises, then from the time they so go
about their estate shall cease as if they were naturally dead, and from
thenceforth it shall be lawful for him next in remainder to enter and
hold the land for the life of him that shall so alien, and that on his
death the land shall go to his issue as if no such offense had been
committed. The devisor died. The eldest son and all other except
the second levied a fine of the land, for which the second came and
claimed by force of the devise. Afterwards the lessee committed waste,
the conusee brought waste, the defendant pleaded all this matter and the
plaintiff demurred.
ALL THE JUSTICES agreed that the proviso of cessor on attempt
to alien or for alienation was wholly repugnant, and that the remainder
to the second son limited to commence on such attempt was void; for
which they adjudged against the second son, who brought this action.
The justices argued the case openly, and conferred with all the justices
of England, who agreed as one that the proviso was repugnant.
CORBET’S CASE, in Common Pleas, Easter, 42 Eliz.—A. D. 1600, 1 Coke
83b, 2 And. 134.-—Abrldg'ed from Coke.
Christopher Corbet being seised of manor of S, covenanted. by in
denture with several for himself and his heirs, to stand seised of it
for his own use for life, then to the use of his son Roland in tail male,
and for want of such issue to use of Christopher’s son Arthur in tail
male, then to the use of others of his blood in tail, and finally to the
use of the right heirs of said Christopher. By the same deed it was
covenanted that if anything should be done by Roland or any of hi‘
heirs of his body to alienate the manor or bar the entail, that then
immediately before such act attempted the use and estate in him limited
should cease and the manor should immediately pass to the person next
l
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entitled in the same manner as if the person so attempting were natur
ally dead. Christopher died, and Roland suffered a common recovery
to his own use, whereupon Arthur entered, Roland re-entered, and Arthur
sued him in trespass. Whether Arthur’s entry was lawful was the
question.
By ANDERSON, [C. J .] and WALMSLEY, GLANVIL, and KINGMILL,
[JJ .], it was resolved that this proviso to cease an estate limited to one
and his heirs male of his body as if the tenant in tail was dead, was
repugnant, impossible, and against law; for the death of the tenant in
tail is not a cesser of the estate tail, but the death of the tenant in
tail without issue of his body is the determination thereof. And if
the estate tail should cease as if he was dead his issue inheritable to
the estate in tail would have it by descent in the life of his father, or
he in remainder or reversion would have it in the life of the tenant
in tail which is not possible; for to every descent, remainder, or re
version, upon the determination of an estate tail, death, either civil
as entry into religion, or natural, as dissolution of the soul from the
body, is requisite. It was said that there was no such repugnancy or
impossibility at the time of the breach in the case at bar, because the
tenant in tail had no issue at the time. To that it was answered
that the having of issue was not material, that this was repugnant to
the beginning: for by the express limitation he has an estate of in
heritance, which by possibility may continue forever, and his estate of
inheritance does not begin by the having of issue, but presently before
any issue he has an estate of inheritance; and therefore before issue
his feoffment is a discontinuance and no forfeiture, neither shall he
in reversion be received upon his default in a praecipe.
ANDERSON, C. J., put the case in 8 Assize pl. 33, where a man gave
land to Mary and Joan her sister and to the heirs of their bodies be
gotten, by which they had a joint estate for life and several inheritances ;
and the donor intending that neither of them should break the jointure,
but that the survivor should have all by survivorship, added this clause,
that by this provision she who survived would have the land entire; but
for as much as his intent is contrary to law, therefore if the jointure
be severed by a fine levied, the survivor shall not have the part so
severed, by the clause which he hath inserted out of his own conceit
and imagination repugnant to law and reason. So here the intent
of Christopher was that the estate tail should cease as if the tenant in
tail was dead, which intent is repugnant to the rules of law and against
sense and reason. Plesington’s Case, 6 Rich. 2, [Fitzherbert’s Abr.]
tit. Quid Juris Clamat, pl. 20, was also cited, in which a man made
a lease on condition that if the lessor grant the reversion the lessee
should have the fee. If the lessor grant the reversion by fine, he shall
not have the fee, for the condition is repugnant and void. He also dis
cussed at length two cases adjudged in point on the case at bar, one
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in the case of a will G-ermin v. Arscot, [Moor 364, 4 Leonard'83, 1
Anderson 186,] and the other in the case of a use, Chomley v. Humble,
[1 Anderson 346, Cro. Eliz. 379, post 189.]
WALMSLEY, J ., said that when an estate is given to one it may be de
feated wholly _~by a condition or limitation; but the same estate or
any part of it cannot be determined as to one, and given in part or in
all to another, for that is repugnant to the rules of law. As if a man
makes a lease for life on condition that if he do not pay 20£ that
another shall have the land, this future limitation is void. And in
the case at the bar the donor might have annexed a condition or limi
tation to determine his estate;-but in this case the donor intended
to continue the estate tail, and to cease it as to one, and in his life
transfer it to another. It would be strange and against reason that
this estate in the case at bar should end in regard to one and continue
in regard to another, and that Roland should be dead when one saw
him, and be alive when another saw him. An act of parliament or
the common law may make an estate void as to one and good as to
another but a man by his words and the breath of his mouth cannot
do it.
GLANVIL, [J .], said that betwixt the making of the statute De Donis
Conditionalibus, 13 Edw. 1, c. 1, and the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. 8.
c. 10, such proviso annexed to an estate tail that it should cease as if
the tenant in tail was dead was never seen nor heard of; and therefore
he concluded that it cannot be done by the law._ Uses were not within
the letter of the statute De Donis, which speaks only of lands and
tenements, but are within the equity, and therefore ought to follow the
nature of the land. Richill, who was a judge in the time of Richard
2
, and Thirning, who was chief justice of the common pleas in the
time of Henry 4 intended to have made perpetuities, and upon for
feiture of the estate tail of one of their sons to have given the remainder
an entry to another, but such remainders were utterly void and against
the law.
And for these reasons it was resolved by the whole court without
dissent that judgment should be given against the plaintifi.
This is usually cited as the leading case on the questions decided; but why
it should be considered so important is not easy to see, when it follows other
decisions in the same court so nearly like it on the facts, viz: Germin v.
Ascot ante 172, and Chomley v. Humble, post 189.
HARDY v. GALLOWAY, in N. Car. Sup. ot., Oct, 19, 1s92.-111 N. Car.
519, 15 s. E. soo, 32 Am. st. Rep. s2s.
Suit to foreclose a mortgage including an acre conveyed to the
mortgagor by a deed stating that the grantors (Galloway) “retaining
for themselves, and their heirs and assigns, the right to repurchase
said land when sold, the said Jefierson Evans [grantee] conveying a
l
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title for said lands, either by deed or mortgage, without first givingJ . B. Galloway and wife, and their heirs and assigns, the privilege of
repurchasing the same, renders this deed null and void, otherwise it
remains in full force.” When Galloway learned of the mortgage to
plaintiffs he took possession of the lot, and was in possession when this
suit was brought. Judgment for plaintiffs and defendant appeals.
SHEPHERD, J . Considered either as a conditional sale or a contract to
reconvey, his honor was entirely correct in holding as void for uncer
tainty the provision in the deed respecting the right of the grantor to
repurchase the land when sold. No time is fixed for performance, nor is
there any stipulation whatever as to the price to be paid. The pro
vision, not being a limitation, can therefore only take effect, if at all,
as a condition subsequent; and, viewed in this light, we cannot hesitate
in deciding that the restriction upon alienation, attempted to be imposed
after the grant of the fee, is repugnant to the nature of the estate
granted, contrary to the policy of the law, and therefore inoperative.
Ever since the statute of quia emptores, the right of alienation has been
considered as an inseparable incident to an estate in fee, (Co. Litt.
436; Williams, Real Prop. 61, 62; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 79 ;) and except
in some cases, where the restriction is only partial, the law does not
recognize or enforce any condition which would directly or indirectly
limit or_ destroy such a privilege,—iniquum est ingenuis hominibus non
esse liberam rerum suarum alienationem. Accordingly it has been held
by this court that a condition that a devisee in fee shall not sell or in
cumber his land before attaining the age of 35 is void, “because it is
inconsistent with the full and free enjoyment which the ownership of
such an estate implies.” Twitty v. Camp. Phil. Eq. 61. To the same
effect has it been ruled as to a condition that a devisee in fee shall make
oath “that he will not make any change during his life” in the testator’s
will respecting his property, (Taylor v. Mason, 9 Wheat. 350,) or that
he shall not offer to mortgage or suffer a fine or recovery, (Ware v. Cann,
1_0 Barn. & C. 433,) or that he shall contract in writing not to alienate
before the proceeds of certain realty are paid to him, (Mandlebaum v.
McDonnell, 29 Mich. 78,) or that land devised to a number of persons
shall not be divided, (Smith v. Clark, 10 Md. 186.) Such conditions
are not sustained where they “infringe upon the essential enjoyment
and independent rights of property, and tend manifestly to public incon
venience.” 4 Kent, Comm. 131; Bac. Abr. tit. “Conditions ;” Shep.
Touch. *131. “A condition annexed to an estate given is a divided clause
from the grant, and therefore cannot frustrate the grant precedent,
neither in anything expressed nor in anything implied, which is of its
nature incident and inseparable from the thing granted.” Stukeley v.
Butler, Hob. 170. While unable to find any decision exactly in point,
we feel assured that our case falls within the principle stated and
illustrated by the foregoing authorities. The restriction is certainly
inconsistent with the ownership of the fee, as well, it would seem, as
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against public policy. The right to repurchase is of indefinite extent
as to time, (it being reserved to the grantors, their heirs or assigns,)
and may be exercised whenever the property is sold, although no amount
is fixed upon as purchase money. In other words, we have an estate
in fee without the power to dispose of or incumber it
,
unless first odor
ing it for no definite price to the grantors, their heirs or assigns. The
condition is repugnant to the grant, and therefore void. Even if the
right to repurchase could be sustained, the defendant'has no cause of
complaint, inasmuch as the court in decreeing foreclosure has ordered
that 30 day’s notice of the sale shall be personally served on him. The
exception to the insufficiency of :the description in the mortgage from
Evans to the plaintiffs is plainly untenable. Henley v. Wilson, 81 N. C.
405; Euliss v. MeAdams, 108 N. C. 507, 13 S. E. Rep. 162, and the cases
cited. * * *
Judgment aflirmed.
CHAPTER VI.
FUTURE ESTATES.
REMAINDERS.
To begin in Future without Particular Estate.
HOGG v. CROSS, in Queen's Bench, Mich. 33 & 34 E111.-—A.D. 1593, Cro.
Eliz. 25-1.
Ejectione firmw of a house and garden in London. J . Warren seised of
it by burgage in fee, devised it to his wife for life, and after his death she
married Rice, who leased to plaintiff. Before making the will, testator
made a deed of feoffment to G, his son, habendum after the death of
the feoffor to said G in tail, and made livery of seisin secundum formam
chartae. Whether anything passed by this was the question.
G. Wray, for the plaintiff, argued that the feoffment was void, and
nothing passed, and then the will made afterwards was good: for when
no estate is expressed in the beginning of a deed, but only an implied
estate for life, as here, and by the habendum an express estate is limited,
this controls the implied limitation; and if this be void and repugnant
in law, as it is here, being after the death of the feoffor, all is void.
But if there be an express limitation in the beginning, if the habendum
be repugnant, it is void, and the first is good. And though livery be
made, yet it is limited to the terms of the charter of feoffment, which
is void, and so all is void; for it is but the execution of a void deed,
citing Mayn’s Case.
Dalton, for the defendant, argued that an estate for life passed by the
premises and the habendum was void.
ALL THE JUDGES resolved the contrary: for it appears to be the in
tent of the feoffor that no estate shall pass but in futuro, viz. after his
death, which is against law; and it being all the purport of the deed,
nothing shall pass in any other manner; for nothing shall pass by the
premises but according to his intent, which is nothing; for he intended
not to pass the freehold immediately. But if one grant a term by
deed, habendum after his death, this passes by the premises; for the
premises are sufficient to carry it
,
and the habendum shall not utterly
destroy it. But it is otherwise here, where it is so take effect by limit
ation of the party, which is void; and the livery is also void to ex
ecute a void deed. And without further argument it was adjudged for
the plaintiff.
BUCKLER v. HARVY, in Common Bench, Mich. 37, & 38 Eliz.—-A. D. 1597.
—Cro. Eliz. 450.—Abri(lgcd from Croke.
Ejectione firmae. Upon special verdict, the case was, tenant for life,
-
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remainder to Buckler in tail. The tenant for life made a lease for
four years, and afterwards granted the reversion, to have said tenement
after midsummer next ensuing for the life of the grantor. After mid
summer the lessee for years attorned, the term expired, the grantee
entered, the grantor levied a fine to him saur conusance de droit come
ceo, u’Zc.; the tenant in tail in remainder entered for the forfeiture,
and let it to the plaintiff; upon whom the defendant, being the grantee
in reversion, re-entered, the first tenant for life being yet alive. The
first question was whether by this grant of the reversion, habendum
after midsummer, and the attornment made, the grant was good or
void. Secondly, admitting it to be void, the grantee entering in dis
seisin, and the tenant for life levying the fine to him, whether this
be a forfeiture.
WALMSLEY, J . A grant of a reversion, habendum after the death of
the tenant for life is good; for so is the course of fines, for this limita
tion is as to the having the possession, and not as to having the re
version, for that is in the grantee presently. But when a reversion is
granted habendum after a future day, he is thereby excluded to have
the reversion until that time, and therefore it is utterly void. The
habendum shall not be void but where it is not requisite, as in release
of a right, or grant of a term; but here the habendum is necessary to
show the estate.
BEAUMOND, J . The grant is void: for if the estate had passed by the
livery, it had been clearly void; and the same is law here; for the
habendum is not void otherwise but in regard that no estate is limited
in the premises. And because the habendum limits the estate. and all
the estate depends on that which is void; and the grant being void,
the grantee by his entry is a disseisor.
Upon these reasons it was adjudged to be a forfeiture, and the entry
of him in reversion to be lawful.
Afterwards this case was argued in the Queen's Bench on another special
verdict, and the judges of that court were of the same opinion. Buckler v.
Hardy (1597), Cro. Eliz. 585, 5 Gray P. Cas. 44.
BARWICK’S CASE, in Exch., Trinity. 39 Ellz.—A. D. 1600.-—Abridged from
5 Coke 98b.
Information of intrusion into a house and lands in York County,
against P. Barwick and others. Queen Elizabeth having the reversion
of lands in lease for years to H. Barwick, demised them to him by
letters patent to have from the day of the making of such letters for
the lives of three others and the survivors of them; and under this
demise the defendant claimed. Whether the lease was valid was the
question. And after many arguments at bar and bench, judgment was
given by PERIAM, C. J ., and the whole court of exchequer, for the
queen; and in this case these points were resolved.
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OPrN1oN or COURT. 1. When the queen demised the manor from
the day of making the letters patent, that day is without question ex
eluded.
2. An estate of freehold could not by the common law begin in
futuro but ought to take effect presently in possession, reversion or
remainder. The difference is between a lease for life and a lease for
years: for a lease for years may begin in futuro, but not a lease for
life. As if a man makes a lease for years to begin at Michaelmas next
ensuing, it is good; but if a man makes a lease for life to begin at
Michaelmas, it is void; and the reasons and causes of this difierence
are: 1. because a lease for years may be made without livery of seisin,
but so cannot an estate of freehold without livery, either in fact or
in law. And therefore when a man makes a lease for life to begin at a
future day he cannot make present livery to a future estate, and
therefore in such a case nothing passes. And it was said that letters
patent under the great seal amount to a livery in law; and therefore,
by letters patent a lease cannot be made for life to begin at a day to
come.
If any freehold should pass presently by the letters patent from
a’ day to come, then the queen in the mean time would have a particular
interest and term without any donor or lessor, which would be against
the rules of the law. But no such consequence will follow in the case
of a lease for years; and therefore it was resolved in the case at bar
that the lease for three lives was void, because it was to begin the next
day after the teste of the letters patent. And if the lease should be
good the queen would have an interest for the day, and although the
lease was to begin the next day after the teste of it, it is all one in
law as if it had been to begin twenty or forty days or years to come,
for the difference of the time doth not make an alteration of the law
in such case. And in this case it was agreed, that if a man makes a lease
for years to A & B, the remainder to C for life, in that case the lessor ought
to make livery to A & B before their entry, and by the livery to A &
B, C shall take a perfect estate for life by way of remainder, by force
of the livery made to the lessees for years.
SWYFT v. EYRES, in King’s Bench, Trinity, 15 Car. 1.—A. D. 1640.—
Abridged from Cro. Car. 546.
Debt by Swyft, subchantor, and one of the vicars choral of Litchfield,
against Eyres and others, lessees of Sir_Edward Peto, to recover under
the statute of 2 Edw. 6 for not setting out tithes. On non debit pleaded,
it was found by special verdict, that the subchantor and vicars choral,
being seized in fee of the rectory on which the tithes are claimed, leased
them to John Peto for 42 years, and later, by indenture reciting that
Richard and John Woodward had bought that lease, granted the tithes
to them “habendum from and after the said term and determination
thereof and the years in the said indenture comprised,” &c, then to
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Richard Woodward for one month, and after that month fully expired
then to John Woodward and his heirs and assigns forever, rendering
rent, &c. ; and later by another indenture misreciting the facts, granted
the same to Humphrey Peto and his heirs. Defendants’ lessor claimed
under both indentures. The only questions were as to the validity of these
indentures.
As to the first, ALL the Jusrrons argued for the plaintiffs, that
they have a good title, notwithstanding this indenture; for this in
denture is merely void, because it is to convey an inheritance in futuro;
for the month is not to begin until the forty and two years be ex
pired ; and it is a grant of interesse termini, and no grant of a reversion;
for the inheritance is granted therein, which was not in the lease before;
and as it is an interesse termini for the tithe hay, so ought it to be for the
residue, for there cannot be fraction of the estate ; and then, being
only an interesse termini in Richard Woodward, there cannot be a
grant of the remainder or reversion to commence in futuro. And to
prove this see 5 Coke 25, Bucklefs Case [reported herein ante p. On
the second indenture they held defendant had title notwithstanding the
misrecital, although such mistake would void letters patent by the
king.]
Acceleration of Remainders.
RICKMAN v. GARDENER, in Common Pleas, Mich. 2 & 3 Phil. & Mary.—
A. D. 1556.—Dyer 122a.
A man seised of.land in fee had issue two sons and a daughter, and
made his last will and testament in writing after the statute, &c., and
thereby devised his lands to his wife for the term of ten years after
his death, remainder to his youngest son and his heirs forever; and
that if either of his two sons should die without issue of his body law
fully begotten, that then the land should remain to his daughter and
her heirs in fee. And afterwards, viz., in the life-time of the testator,
the said youngest son died without issue, and then the father died
without making any alteration of his will. Whether the eldest son shall
have the land as tenant in tail, or in fee-simple by the intention of the
devisor, or the daughter? was the question. And it was demurred in law
in waste by Rickman and his wife against Gardener. And by the opinion
of all the judges of C. B. this was a good remainder to the daughter,
notwithstanding the death of the devisee without issue in the life-time
of the testator, and they would not argue the case. See Perkins, accord
ingl_v, in Devise, fol. 120 [f
. 246, § 568] where the case is a man de-
vised his lands to one for life, remainder over in fee ; the devisee for life
died in the life-time of the devisor, and then the divisor died: he in
the remainder may well enter and execute his remainder. But see
contra in this matter E. 7 Eliz. fol. 237.
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FULLER v. FULLER, in B. R., Hilary, 36 Eliz.—A. D. 1595.—Moor 353,
Cro. Eliz. 422.—Abi-idged from Cro. Eliz.
Trespass for lands. Upon not guilty pleaded, a special verdict found,
that “Henry Fuller, seized of socage lands in fee, had issue, John,
Henry, Richard, and Edward; and devised the land to Richard and the
heirs of his body; and after his death without issue, to Edward in tail,
and then to John in tail, remainder to the right heirs of the devisor.
Richard died leaving issue, T, and W. Afterwards Henry, the devisor,
said, ‘My will is that the sons of Richard, my deceased son shall have
the land devised to their father, as they should have had if their father
had lived, and had died after me.’ ” The devisor died and T. the son
of Richard entered, on whom John, the eldest son of the devisor en
tered. T. re-entered and John brings trespass.
GAWDY, J ., held that he in remainder shall have it presently; for
the devise being void as to the first, it is as if it never had been made;
so it is if the first devisee refuse, he in the remainder shall have it
presently; as 3'7 Hen. 6; Plowd. Com. 414. And in this point all the
other justices agreed with. him. Wherefore the plaintiff has no cause
of action.
When All to Particular Tenant and So No Remainder.
ANONYMOUS, Mich. 29 Eliz., 1587.—Moor 247.
Puckering, sergeant, moved that a lease was made to three, habendum
to them for 99 years, viz: to the first if he so long live, and if he die
to the second for the residue of the term of years, and if he die within
the term then to the third for the residue of years. And he moved that
if the first die, what estate the second had. PERRIAM and WIND
HAM, JJ., held that he had a good estate for so many of the years as
yet remained; for PERRIAM said that this inured as a grant of so
many years in remainder, and the law may be applied to the intent
of the parties; but he said if it were for the residue of the term and
no more, that would be void to the second, because the term is ended
by the death of the first. ANDERSON, C. J ., contra: for he said that
it might not inure by way of remainder, because there was no estate in
being during the particular term; and he would not allow the diversity
made by PERRIAM, because the residue of the term is intended as a
residue of years, for the term is not that continuance for years. PERRIAM
changed opinion on the diversity, but he held the law yet good for the
estate of the second, as before, for this inured as a new grant. Roons
was of the same opinion. Sed quaere, for they were all parties to the
deed, wherefore it would be better that by way of remainder to one who
is not party, as the case in Dyer 150.
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GREEN v. EDWARDS, in the Common Pleas, Hilary, 33 Eliz.—A. D. 1592.
-—Cro. Eliz. 216, Moor 297.
Demurrer. Land was let to J . S. for ninety years if he so long
live, and if he die within the term, then his wife shall have it during
the whole residue of the term aforesaid, J . S. died within the term,
and the question was whether his wife should have it during the residue.
By all the Justices, resolved, that she shall not, for the term was
wholly determined, and the limitation to her was void; for as a re
mainder it cannot inure, for a remainder must be created with a par
ticular estate, and is to be limited for a certain estate, viz. for years,
life, in fee, &c. And here no certain estate is limited to her; for al
though it is limited to her during the residue of the term, and so
shall be intended a lease for years, yet for as much as every lease for
years is to have a certain commencement and ending, here it is un
certain whether she shall ever have it
,
for J . S. may outlive the ninety
years. And so a termor cannot grant the term after his death, and so
the remainder here is void. Annnnson, C. J., said that if the wife had
been a party to the deed this peradventure might have been good to
her, not by way of remainder, but by immediate grant and demise for
so many years which shall be to come; and durante termino shall not
be taken for the interest but for the time: which WALMsLEY and WIND
HAM [JJ.,] did expressly deny, for they held it is at first void for the
uncertainty when it shall commence, or whether it shall commence.
It was adjudged that the wife took nothing.
Cecil's Case (8 Eliz., 1566), 3 Dyer 253b, was so decided on a lease for
41 years to XV if he so long live, and if he die within the term to E for the
residue, and if she die within the term to W’s son for the residue. But the
reasons are not so fully stated.
Remainders After Fee Tail.
BRACTON, Book 1, c. 6, sec. 1, 1'0. 18b.—A. D. 1260?
A donation may be made to several persons under a mode, together and
severally; as if a person has several sons, and has thus made a donation
to the first-born, and says, I give to A, my first-born son, so much
and such land, &c., to have and to hold to himself and his heirs pro
created of his body, and if he have no such heirs, or has had them and
they fail, then I give that land to B, my after-born son, and I will
that land to revert to B, to have and to hold to him and his heirs
procreated of his body, and if he have no such heirs, or if he has had
them and they fail, then I will and grant, on behalf of myself and my
heirs, that the aforesaid land shall revert to C
,
my third son, to have
and to hold to him and his heirs procreated of his body (and so. of
several). And if the aforesaid A, B, C die without such heirs pro
created of their bodies, then I will that land to revert to me and to
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my other heirs (which would be done without being expressed), under
a tacit condition, unless the donor has otherwise thereupon ordained.
See the discussion of the common law as to remainders after a fee in
Willion v. Berkley, ante p. 35.
When in Abridgmcnt of Prior Estate or on Condition.
COLTHZIBST v. BEJUSHIN, in Common Bench, Easter, 4 Edw. 6.-—A. D.
1551.—Abridged from Plowden Com. 21 to 35.
Trespass quaere clausum. Defendant pleaded not guilty and further
that the prior of bath, being seised in fee of the close wherein the
trespass is alleged to have been committed, leased it by deed indented
to Henry Bejushin and Eleanor his wife, for term of their lives, re
mainder to William, a son of said Henry and Eleanor, for life, if he
should always reside on the place; and if he should die before said
Henry and Eleanor, then the said prior appointed it to Peter Bejushin,
another son, who is the defendant herein, if he should likewise reside
on the place; that by force of this lease said Henry and Eleanor entered
and were seised, and being so seised William died, and then Henry
and Eleanor died; after which Peter, the defendant, entered and was
and still is seised and at all times since his entry has resided on the
place; which is the trespass complained of. He gave color to the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff demurred.
Pollard, serjeant, argued for the plaintiff, that the remainder is void.
1. Because the limitation of the remainder is here appointed during
the particular estate, and every remainder ought to be limited to take
effect after the particular estate, and if limited to take effect during
the particular estate it is repugnant to the first estate, and so utterly
void. So here this remainder is void, because it is limited to take effect
immediately after the first estate for life is determined; and when the
first estate for life is determined, then the first remainder for life
commences; and if it so connnences, it follows that the second re
mainder cannot then begin, for it would avoid the first.
2. This remainder is void, because it is limited to commence upon
condition, which no remainder may do, for conditions always inure
in privity, so that none but privies shall take advantage of them; for
none shall enter for a condition broken except the lessor, donor, and
feoffor, or their heirs. And as none but privies shall avoid an estate
before made for breach of condition, so none but privies shall take a
new estate by performance of a condition. If I make a lease for life,
upon condition that if the lessee do not pay me 20£. at such a day
then it shall remain over to a stranger in fee, and he fails of payment,
this is a void remainder, for the cause stated. (M. 18 Henry 8, 3 _b
,
arguendo.) But if I make a lease for life, upon condition that if
the lessee do a certain act he shall have the fee, and he does it accord
ingly, there he shall have the fee; because he is privy to the condition,
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and therefore he shall take the benefit of it. And so the diversity
appears where the estate upon condition is appointed to a privity, and
where it is to a stranger. In our case the remainder is limited to the
defendant if his brother first dies in the life of his parents, and if he
does not, then the defendant shall not have the remainder. So that
the remainder is to commence upon a contingent, and for this cause
it is good. If an estate is made for life upon condition that if the
tenant for life die, then it shall remain over, this remainder is good
because it commences upon the termination of the particular estate,
which is certain, and so no condition; M. 27 Henry 8, 24 a, by Fitz.-
herbert, J.,) but in our case it is uncertain, and may be performed
or broken.
3. This remainder is void, because in every state it is necessary
that conveyances be certain, for certainty is the mother of repose, and
uncertainty is the mother of contention, which our law has ever guarded
against. For which reason it has ordained certain ceremonies to be
used in the transmutation of things from one to another (and especially
of freeholds, which are of greater price and estimation in our law than
other things) in order to know the certain times when things pass;
and therefore in every feoffment the law has appointed that livery and
seisin shall be had, and in every grant of reversions or rents that at
tornment shall be made; which are certain points, containing the time
when, and to whom such estates do pass. And for the same reason
the law has ordained and appointed that every remainder shall have
three things, besides those before mentioned, as rules whereby to know
when remainders are good, viz.: a, an estate precedent, made at the
same time that the remainder commences; b, that the particular estate
shall continue when the remainder vests; 0, and that the remainder be
out of the donor at the time of the livery. If any of these three fail,
the remainder is void. And therefore as to the first point, if the lessor
confirms the estate of his tenant for years, the remainder in fee, this
remainder is void. because the estate for years was made before and
not at the time of the remainder, and he shall not take it as a grant
of the reversion, because he is not a party to the deed. So if the lessor
disseizes his tenant for life, and afterwards makes a new lease to him
for life, remainder in fee, this remainder is void, for the same reason.
As to the second point, the precedent ought to continue when the rep
mainder vests; and therefore if‘a man makes a lease for life, and that
the day after the death of the tenant for life it shall remain over, this
remainder is void, because the first estate is determined before the re
mainder is appointed. As to the third point, that the remainder ought
to pass out of the lessor at the time the livery is made, or else it shall
be void, this is proved by the common case where a lease is made for
life, remainder to the right heirs of a person living; this remainder
passes out of the lessor presently, though it does not vest presently.
But in our case the estate precedent was made long before the re
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mainder, and therefore the remainder shall be void; and also the re
mainder is not out of the lessor at the time of livery, but is appointed
to pass upon the performance of a condition, for the words are, if the
son in the remainder die, then it shall remain to the defendant.
Cook, serjeant to the contrary. The remainder here is good, for
first there is an estate on which the remainder may be built, and the re
mainder here is appointed upon it. - The cause why the remainder
shall not be good is alleged in two grand points: a because the fee
does not pass presently out of the lessor; and b, because the re
mainder may not pass upon a condition. It seems to me that the re
mainder passes out of the lessor presently, as in Littleton’s case (Litt.
§ 350), viz. if one makes a lease for 5 years, upon condition that if
he pay to him 20£. within the first two years, that then he shall have
fee, the fee passes out of the lessor presently. So shall it be here. And
sir, a remainder may well commence upon condition, as if a lease is
made for life, upon condition that if J . S. marry my daughter during
the estate for life it shall remain to him, this is a good remainder,
and yet it commences on condition. That which I may give without
condition I may give on condition. If one makes a disseisin to the
use of a stranger, and the stranger afterwards agrees to it
,
he shall have
the land thereby. And if land may be transferred by such assent, all
the more may it pass upon a condition, especially with a freehold estate
precedent.
HALES, J ., said: It seems to me that the remainder is good. When
the lessor appoints the remainder to the defendant as above his intent
may be perceived herein, and it is reasonable that the same should be
fulfilled, viz. that the defendant should have it in such manner and
form as it is appointed. And this limitation is not against law, nor
against any principle thereof, as I shall prove hereafter; neither is it
repugnant in itself, therefore it is good. And to prove that it is not
against law, I shall put some cases founded _upon like reason, and
which will also answer the reason of that which has been alleged, viz.
that the remainder ought to pass out of the lessor presently, which I
utterly deny. And therefore if I made a lease for years, the remainder
for life, upon condition that if he in the remainder do not such an
act, the remainder shall be void, now before the condition is
broken the remainder is good, and in him to whom it is ap
pointed; but if the condition is broken, then the remainder is out of
him, and in the person of the lessor again, which proves that a freehold
by agreement had upon the livery may be transferred from one to
another b
y matter ezv post facto. So if one grants a rent or reversion,
and afterwards attornment is had, now the reversion shall pass thereby,
and yet it did not pass presently by the grant, which case proves that
upon the assent first had, and act done afterwards, a freehold may be
divested out of one and vested in another. So if a man makes
a lease for life by deed, remainder to the king, and makes live1'y of
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seisin, the remainder does not pass presently, but if the deed is after
wards enrolled, then the remainder shall be in the king from the time
of the first livery (T. 1 Hen. 7, 30b, 31a). So that by the limitation
declared upon the livery, the remainder which did not pass out of
the lessor at the time of the livery shall pass by the act done after
wards. So in Plesingt0n’s Case (H. 6 R. 2; Fitz. Abr. Quid Juris Clam.
20), one condition was that if the lessor died within the term, then
the lessee for years should have the land for life, and it was there held,
that if the lessor died, his estate should be enlarged caasa qua supra.
So if one makes disseisin to the use of J . S., now the freehold is not inJ . S. ; but if J . S. afterwards agrees to it, then the freehold is in him.
(P. 12 Ed. 4
, 12 pl. 23; Fitz., Disseizin 3; Brooke Abr. 66, Agree
ment 4.) Which cases prove that when livery is made, or when a man
first meddles with the possession of land, and thereupon words are spoken,
there by force of such words and of some act afterwards done, a free
hold may be transferred from one to another. So in the principal
case, livery is made, and thereupon the lessor hath declared and ap
pointed that if William die living the husband and wife, then it shall
remain to the defendant; in which case I will readily agree that the re
mainder does not pass out of the lessor until William is dead, and when
he is dead, it shall well pass by force of the first words annexed to the
livery.
To make a difference where the fee is appointed upon condition to
a privy, and where to a stranger, is but an idle and insignificant eon
ceit. As to what has been said touching the words if William
die living the husband and wife, then it shall remain to the defendant,
which word then shall be intended presently during the lives of the
husband and wife, so as to defeat their estate; sir, the sentence is not
to be so understood, but it shall have a beneficial construction, viz.
that then it shall remain as a remainder ought to do, and that is, to
vest, and be executed after the death of the husband and wife. As if
a gift in tail is made to one upon condition that if he do such an act,
then the land shall remain to his right heirs, this word then‘ is not so
to be understood as to avoid the estate tail, and to be executed presently
upon the performance of the act, but it must be taken in this manner,
viz. that upon the performance of the act the remainder shall vest, and
after the estate ended it shall be executed. So shall it be understood
here, and then there is no such repugnancy as has been alleged, nor
is there any prejudice to a stranger. But if any prejudice shall arise
to a stranger thereby, then the remainder shall not be good. As if it
was that if William die, then the defendant shall have the land during
the lives of the husband and Wife, this should be void in respect to the
prejudice to the particular estate, for things which are done in prej
udice of others shall be void.
‘ On this point see Boraston’s Case post p. 212.
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HINDE, [J .] The remainder is good. That the remainder com
mences upon condition, sir, I deny that: for the remainder is limited
to the defendant if William die living the husband and wife, which
is not a condition, but a limitation when the remainder shall commence;
for no words make a condition unless such as restrain the thing given,
as upon condition that he shall not do such an act, or the like; but
here these words limit the time when the remainder shall commence,
and do not restrain the thing given, and therefore they may not be
called a condition, but rather a limitation, If I make a lease for life
upon condition that if the lessee die I may enter, this is only a limita
tion of the time of my entry; which is void, because it is no more than
the law says; and it is no condition because it does not restrain the
estate. So if I make a lease for life upon condition that if the lessee
does waste, and I recover the place wasted, I shall enter into it,
this is no condition because it does not restrain the estate. So if I make
a lease for life upon condition that if I recover in waste any parcel, that I
shall enter into the whole land, &c., this is a condition for that part in
which no waste was done, for the condition is restrictive, and goes in de
feasance of that part. The common case of fines are, where an estate
tail is that if it happen the donee die without issue, that then it shall
remain to a stranger, which is not a condition, but a limitation of the
time when the remainder shall commence. So in the principal case,
it is but a limitation and an explanation of the time when the remainder
shall commence. And I do not see any cause or reason why I may not
make a remainder to commence and vest in the midst of a particular
estate, as well as I may at the beginning or end of a particular estate:
for there is no repugnancy, but that it may commence to vest at any
time during the particular estate; for when the fee simple is in me
I may condition with it as I please, if it be not contrary to law, which
it is not in ours, or such like cases. But if I make a lease for life upon
condition that if J . S. pay me 20£. then I shall enter upon the tenant
for life, and then it shall remain, &c., this remainder is void; because
by the entry the first livery is annulled and defeated, and then there
is no particular estate continuing upon which the remainder may de
pend: but here there is no such matter, for which reason the remainder
seems to me to be good. And if it be a condition, yet the remainder
may commence upon it well enough, seeing it is the will of the lessor
that it should be so. Wherefore it seems to me that the plaintiff shall
be barred. -
BROWN, J ., spoke to the same purpose, on another day; and argued
that the remainder should be good upon condition. And if it should not
be good upon condition, he said it should be good to the defendant as
a grant of the reversion; and therefore the plaintiff should be barred.
MONTAGUE, C._J. If it was a condition, yet the plaintiff has not
enabled himself to take benefit of it; for, as been said, none
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but privies shall take benefit of conditions by entry, by the common
law. And now by the statute of 32 Hen. 8, c. 34, the grantees and
patentees of the king shall also take advantage of conditions. And
here the plaintiff has not conveyed to himself a capacity to take benefit
of the condition, as privy, nor as patentee or grantee of the king, nor
in any other manner. And further the remainder seems to be good;
for in the first place, it appears to me that there is not any condition
here whereupon the remainder depends, but that it is a limitation and
appointment of the time when the remainder shall vest, and in this
point I agree with my brother Hinde. But even admitting it to be
a condition, or call it a limitation, or give it what other term you
please, yet it seems to me that the remainder is good; for every man
who is lawful owner of any land, may give it to what person, in what
manner, and at what time he pleases, so that his gift be not contrary
to law, nor repugnant. Here it seems to me that his gift is not con
trary to law. In 10 Ed. 3, 30 pl. 33, Fitz, Assize 161, a man made
a lease for years to J. S. and in surety of his term he made him a
charter of feoffment, upon condition that if the lessee was disturbed
within the term, that then he should hold the tenement to him and his
heirs, and J . S. was disturbed and afterwards ousted, and he brought
an assize, and it was awarded that he should recover; which proves
that a freehold may pass by a condition well enough, where the con
dition is expressed at the time of the livery. And by the reason of
this case a man may make as many remainders as he will to commence
upon the -like condition; and although he is in the one case immediately
privy, and not in the other case, this is no matter to stay the remainder,
for his livery shall be taken most strongly against himself. When I
was at the bar I was counsel with one Mr. Melton (M 27 Hen. 8, 24
pl. 2), and the case was thus: a fine was levied sur grant rfi render,
whereby the counsee granted and rendered to the conusor the tenements
in tail upon condition that the conusor and his heirs of, &c., should
bear the standard of the conusee when he went to battle, and if the
conusor or his heirs failed to do it
,
then the land should remain to a
stranger; and I moved the case then to the court, and it was greatly
wondered that the fine upon condition was received. But Fitzherbert,
J., then held the remainder good, and they did not wonder at it
,
nor
held it any great question but that it might commence upon condition.
Adjudged for defendant.
COGAN v. COGAN, in C. B., Easter, 38 E1iz.—A. D. 1597.—Ab1-idged from
Cro. Eliz. 360.
Trespass. Upon demurrer, the case was, that John, seised in fee,
let to Robert for life, remainder to Catherine, the defendant, for life,
“provided, that if John, the lessor, had issue a son during life, who
should live to the age of five years, that the estate limited to the de
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fendant, Catherine, should cease, and it should remain to the said son
in tail.” The lessor had issue, the plaintiff, who attained his age of
five years. Whether the remainder limited to the defendant shall
cease and the remainder limited to the plaintiff were good, was the
question. THE COURT resolved for the defendant after the sergeants
had argued. ANDERSON, [C. J .], said there are certain rules in law
touching remainders, viz; that a remainder ought to pass at the first
b
y the livery, and shall not take effect with a condition precedent, nor
shall begin upon such a condition; for a remainder depending upon a
condition precedent is merely void. And further in this case, an entry
is requisite to avoid the remainder for life; for a freehold cannot de
termine without the ceremony of entry, but otherwise it is of a lease
for years. WALMSLEY, [J .], said, by Littleton, the remainder ought
to pass at the time of the livery, and the nature of a livery is a giving,
and there cannot be a giving, but there ought to be one to take, in
praesenti or in expectancy, so that the law shall preserve it in the in
terim; and there need be no deed of a remainder, which proves that
it passes by the livery. A remainder cannot pass by contingency, for
then there would an absurdity follow, viz., there should, by the first
livery, be an immediate reversion, expectant on the remainder for life;
and afterwards this remainder shall be turned out, and the reversion
also; and a new remainder and reversion should come in place of them;
so as there should be turnings out and turnings in at several times,
by one livery which was made at one time. But as touching the ceas
ing of the remainder, he conceived it might very well be without any
entry, by the operation of law, the particular estate remaining in being.
BEAUMOND, [J .], to the same intent. But he held that a remainder
of an estate of freehold or inheritance cannot cease without entry or
claim, no more than an estate of freehold in possession. OWEN, [J .]
,
agreed with Bmumonn, [J.], entirely. Adjudged for the defendant.
CHOMLEY v. HUMBLE, in Common Bench, Hilary, 35 Eliz.—A. D. 1594.—
Cro. Eliz. 379, 1 And. 346. Abridged from Croke.
Trespass. On demurrer, the case was, a feoffment was made to the
use of one for life, remainder to Ohomley in tail, remainder to another
in tail, remainder to the lord chamberlain, with this proviso. “that
if any of them in remainder go about to levy a fine, or do any act whereby
the uses limited shall not take effect according to the limitation, then
the estate of him who so goeth about shall cease as if he were naturally
dead and no otherwise.” Whether this were a good proviso, was the
question.
The Court, after argument on either side, delivered their opinion,
that it was not good. ANDERSON, [(3. J .], said, at the common law the
cestui que use had nothing: and an estate of inheritance at the common
law cannot cease; and the Statute of Uses does not help it; for the
statute cannot help any use where there is not any person who is seised
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to the use. WAMSLEY, [J.], said, the proviso, that it shall cease as
if he were naturally dead, is void, and without sense; for if he were
dead, it should descend to his son, and he should be in, in the per,
by the father, but that cannot be when the father is living; and so it
is an estate tail absolute and without condition. BEAUMOND. [J .]
,
agreed, and said, an estate tail cannot cease at the common law; no
more can it in use at this day, for it is as an estate executed at the
common law; and the issue cannot have a formedon, living the father;
and that feoffees at this day should be seised to his use is absurd.
In the next term adjudged that the proviso was not good, and that
the issue could not have it for the forfeiture. 1 Coke, 86 [Corbct’s
Case, ante 172].
Alternative Remainders in Fee.
LODDINGTON v. KIME, in Common Bench, Mich., 6 \V. & M.—A. D. 1695.
—1 Salk. *224, 3 Lev. 431, 1 Ld. Raym. 203, 5 Gray P. Cas. 54. From
Salk.
In replevin a special verdict was found, viz: That Sir Michael Armin,
being seised in fee, devised a rent charge, and then devised the land to
A for life, without impeachment for waste, and in case he have any
issue male, then to such issue male and his heirs forever; and if he die
without issue male, then to B and his heirs forever. A entered and
sufiered a common recovery, and died without issue.
1
.
Question was whether A was tenant in tail by his devise?
POWELL, J ., held the express estate for life not destroyed by the impli
cation that arose on the latter words following, so that A was only
tenant for life, and the rather, because these words viz. impeachment
o
f waste, and for life, must in that case be rejected, qu0d Treby, O’. J.,
concessit.
2
. The court held that issue was to be taken here as nomen singulare,
because the inheritance was annexed and limited to the word issue; so
that the inheritance was in the issue, and not in A, the father.
3
. That this limitation to the issue was not an executory devise, be
ing after a freehold, but a contingent remainder, so that a posthumous
son could never take.
4. That the remainder limited to the issue of A was a contingent
remainder in fee, and that the remainder to B was a fee also; but those
fees are not like one fee mounted on another nor contrary to one another,
but two concurrent contingencies, of which either is to start according
as it happens; so that these are remainders contemporary and not ex
pectant one after another.
5
. The court held that the remainder in fee to B was not vested,
because the precedent limitation to the issue of A was a contingent
fee; and they took this difference, viz: where the mesne estates limited
are for life or in tail, the last remainder may, if it be to a person in
esse, vest; but no remainder limited after a limitation in fee can be
vested.
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6. That the recovery suffered by A had barred the estate limited to
his issue, that being contingent, and likewise the remainder limited to
B and his heirs, because that was contingent, not vested, and now
never could vest; and that A had gained a tortuous fee, which would
be good against B and his heirs, and likewise against all persons but
the right heirs of the devisor.
This case is cited in Hennessey v. Patterson, 85 N. Y. 91, Finch R. P. Cas.
868, recognizing that alternative limitations in fee are remainders.
DOE D. HERBERT v. SELBY, in B. R., Easter, 1824.—2 Barn. & Ores. (9
E. G. L.) 926, 5 Gray’s P. Gas. 1.
Ejectment for houses and lands in Middlesex county. Plea, general
issue. A verdict was found for plaintifl’, subject to the opinion of the
court, as follows: Thomas Herbert, being seised of the lands in fee,
made his will duly executed, devising the lands to his son George “dur
ing the term of his natural life; and from and after his decease, I give
and devise the same estates unto all and every the child and children of
my said son George and their heirs for ever, to hold as tenants in
common. But if my son George should die without issue, or leaving
issue and such child or children should die before attaining the age of
twenty-one years, or without lawful issue; then I give and devise the
same estates unto my son Thomas, my daughter Ann, my son-in-law
William Duke, and their heirs for ever, to hold as tenants in common.”
After the death of the testator, George suffered a common recovery to
his own use, conveyed the land to the defendant in fee, and died with
out having had issue. The plaintiff is the lessee of the said Thomas,
Ann, and William, claiming under the gift over.
Chitty for the plaintiff. It will be contended on the other side that
the ultimate remainder was contingent, and therefore defeated by the
destruction of the particular estate. But that is not so, for either the
estate given to G.’s children was an estate tail, in which case the ultimate
remainder' would be vested, or it was a contingent fee determinable,
and the limitation over must take effect as an executory devise, accord
ing to Gulliver V. Wickett, 1 Wils. 105. In either case the destruction
of the particular estate would not destroy the remainder. 1. Even if G.
had died leaving a child, who had died under age without issue, the
devise over would take effect; it could not therefore be a contingent
remainder, but must be an executory devise: Pells v. Brown, Cro.
590 [post p. 242]. Doe v. Webber, 1 B. & A. 713. 2 George’s
children would take an estate tail, for the gift over is on their death
without issue, which reduces their interest to an estate tail. Besides
the ultimate remainder is to persons who would be heirs general to
the children, so they would never die without heirs as long as those
persons lived. This case is therefore different from Loddington V. Kime,
3 Lev. 431 [ante p.]; and Goodright V. Dunham, 1 Doug. 264.
(Bailey, J . But here you must read the devise, “if the children should
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die before twenty-one and without issue,” otherwise the remainder over
will be too remote.)
BAILEY, J . * * * It is not contended that George took an estate tail;
and, indeed, Goodright v. Dunham, 1 Doug. 264, clearly shows that he
took for life only, and that the children would take as purchasers by way
of remainder, and they would take in fee. It has been contended that the
ultimate devisees took either by way of executory devise or vested re
mainder. But it is clear that where a devise may operate as a contingent
remainder, it cannot be considered as an executory devise. If a fee be
given by way of vested limitation, but determinable, a remainder after
‘that must be an executory devise ; but if a fee is limited in contingency,
and upon failure of that the estate is given over, that is a contingency
in a double aspect; and if the estate vests in the one, it cannot in the
other :L0ddingt0n v. Kime, 3 Lev. 421 [ante p.]. But it may happen,
that an estate may be devised over in either of two events; and that in
one event the devise may operate as a contingent remainder, in the
other as an executory devise. Thus if George had left a child, a de
terminable fee would have vested in that child, and then the devise
over could only have operated as an executory devise. But George hav—
ing died without having had a child, the first fee never vested, and
the remainder over continued a contingent remainder. Gulliver v.
Wickett, 1 Wil. 105, was clearly a case of executory devise. The es
tate was given to testator’s wife for life, and after her death to such
child as she was then supposed to be enceint with, and to the heirs of
such child forever, provided, that if such child shall die before
twenty-one, leaving no issue of its body, then the reversion over. The
description of the child there was a clear desvlgnato persona, and as
a child in ventre sa mere, is for many purposes considered as in esse,
the first remainder, a fee determinable was vested in that child, and
the remainder over could only operate by way of executory devise.
The other cases which I have mentioned are not in substance dis
tinguishable from this. Doe v. Burnsell, 6 Term 30, was a devise
to Mary Owstwhick, and the issue of her body, as tenants in common;
but in default of such issue, or being such, if they should all die under
twenty-one, and without leaving any lawful issue of their bodies, then
over. Mary Owstwhick suffered a recovery, and died without having
any issue, and it was held that all the limitations subsequent to that to
her were contingent, and destroyed by the recovery. No question was
raised as to ultimate remainder operating by way of executory devise,
but that could not be raised, as Mary Owstwhick never had any issue
in whom the first remainder might vest. But Orump d. Wooley V. Nor
wood, 7 Taunton 362, is on all fours with the present case. There the
devise was to the testator’s wife for life, if she should so long remain
unmarried, and immediately after her decease or marriage, to testator’s
three nephews, share and share alike, for life, as tenants in common,
remainder to the heirs of their bodies respectively in fee; if more than
REMAI NDERS. 193
0
one, then to all equally, as tenants in common; “and if any of his said
nephews should die leaving no such issue, or leaving any such, they
should all die without attaining the age of twenty-one years, then over ;”
and it was held that the remainders subsequent to the devise to the
nephews were contingent, and defeated by the destruction of the par
ticular estate. And one of the nephews having died without having
had issue, Gibbs, C. J ., considered that in that event the question of
executory devise did not arise; although if there had been issue, the
ultimate devise over might have operated in that mode. These au
thorities satisfy me, that in the event which has happened, the devise to
the lessors of the plaintifi in this ease did not operate by way of ex
ecutory devise. It has been argued, that it might operate as a vested
remainder, for that the devise to George’s children was only of an estate
tail, because they could never die without heirs as long as the lessors
of the plaintiff lived, and therefore, “heirs” must mean “heirs of the
body.” But although it may be so where, after a devise to a man and
his heirs the estate is devised over simpliciter to a collateral heir, yet
it is not so where the limitation over depends upon the party dying
within a limited time. Upon the whole, I am of opinion that George
Herbert took an estate for life only, and that his children, if there
had been any, would have taken a fee ; but in the event of there not being
any, which is the event that has happened, the remainder over was given
by way of contingent remainder, and was defeated by the destruction
of the particular estate. Our judgment must therefore be for the de
fendant.
HoLRoYD, J . Under the will in question, George took an estate for life,
and his children in fee. In the event of his having no children, the de
vise over would operate as a contingent remainder; but if he had chil
dren, then it could only take effect as an executory devise. That it was
not an executor-‘y devise, in the event that has happened, is clearly proved
by the cases which my brother Bailey has cited; and the language of
Gibbs, C. J ., in Crump v.Norwood, is peculiarly applicable. Here the
estate is given over on either of two contingencies, one of them George’s
dying without children; that has happened, and upon that the re
mainder over would, if at all, take efiect as a contingent remainder.
But the particular estate having been previously destroyed, the con
tingent remainder was thereby defeated.
LITTLEDALE, J . The principles applicable to this case were fully con
sidered in Crump V. Norwood, which cannot be distinguished from it.
Doe v. Burnsell is also in point. It is true, that in that case the words
were, “if all such issue should die under twenty-one a/nd without issue ;”
but here the word or must be read and; and although the point of the
executory devise was not there agitated yet Gibbs, C. J ., thought it
an express authority for his judgment in Crump V. N orwoocl, where
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it was raised. Upon these authorities it seems to me clear that the lessors
of the plaintiff cannot recover. Judgment for defendant.
\VADDELL v. RATTE\V, in Pa. Sup. Ct., April 16, 1835.-—5 Rawle 231, 2
Shars. & B. 316, Finch R. P. Cas. 932.
Action by Maris Waddell, claiming as a grand-child and heir of Mary
(daughter of testator), against John and Eleanor (son and daughter
of testator’s son John) to recover land in Middleton Tp., Montgomery
county. From judgment for defendants plaintiff bring error.
John Rattew, being seised in fee, devised the land in question to his
son Aaron “during the term of his natural life, and if he shall hereafter
have issue of his body lawfully begotten, then to hold to him and his
heirs and assigns forever; but in case he shall die without leaving such
issue, then I give and devise the same to all the rest of my children, their
heirs and assigns forever, as tenants in common.” After testator’s death
Aaron suffered a common recovery and died without issue.
KENNEDY, J . * * * The plaintiff’s counsel contend that Aaron took
under the will a contingent fee, determinable upon his dying without
issue living at his death, and that the limitation over in that event to the
testator’s other children, must therefore be considered an executory de
vise, and consequently not affected by the common recovery suffered by
Aaron; or in other words, they allege that Aaron, according to the terms
of the will, in case he had had issue, would thereupon have become im
mediately vested with a fee-simple estate in the land devised to him, de
feasible however upon his dying without issue living at the time of his
death—that the birth of issue would have instantly determined his life
estate, by enlarging it into a fee ; and again in the event of his surviving
such issue, and dying without any living at the time of his death, the
ulterior devise to the other children of the testator, could only have
operated as an executory devise; because as a contingent remainder it
could not take efiect after a determinable fee had become vested in
Aaron. I must confess that this view of the devise in question, when
first presented by counsel for the plaintiff, struck me forcibly as having
something in it; and it was certainly maintained on their part with great
ingenuity. And if Aaron had not sufferedthe commonrecovery and had had
issue who had died during his life, and he had then died himself without
any living at the time of his death, it may possibly be that the ulterior
devise of the land to the other children of the testator, would have op
erated and taken effect as an executory devise; for it has been said, that
an estate may be devised over in either of two events, so that in one
event the devise may operate as a contingent remainder, and in the
other as an executory devise. Doe d. Herbert V. Selby, 2 Barn & Cress.
(9 E. C. L.) 926. Be that however as it may, the event which
has occurred in this case, does not render it necessary to decide it under
such aspect; but if it did, I see no objection that could be made to it,
»
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unless it might possibly be thought by some, that to adopt such a prin
ciple, would be intrenching upon a rule that has been said to prevail
without even an exception to it; which is
;
that when a devise is capable
according to the state o
f the objects at the death of the testator, of tak
effect as a remainder, it shall not be construed to be an executory devise.
Reeve V. Long, Caruth. 310; Burefoy V. Rogers, 2 Saund. 380, and cases
cited in note nine. Besides this, there is said to be another rule by which
an executory devise is distinguishable from a contingent remainder,
which seems to be opposed to the construction contended for by the
plaintiff’s counsel; it is this: that to constitute an ulterior limitation
an executory devise, where there is a prior estate of freehold devised, the
latter must not be merely liable to be determined before the former shall
take effect, which only renders the remainder dependent on it contingent,
but it must be determined before the taking effect of the ulterior de
vise; as in the case of a devise to A for life, and after his decease to the
unborn children of B, this would be a contingent remainder in such
children; but under a devise to A for life and after his decease to the
unborn children of B, this would be a contingent remainder in such
children; but under a devise to A for life, and after his decease and
one day, to the children of B, the children of B in this case would take
an executory devise. 2 Pow. on Dev. by Jarman 238. And for the day
undisposed of between the death of A and the time fixed for the ulterior
devise to the children of B to take effect, the estate would belong to the
heir or residuary devisee. Id. ; Stephens v. Stephens, Cas. temp. Talbot
238. Now it is obvious in the case under consideration, that the prior
estate devised to Aaron for life, could not be said to be necessarily de
terminable before the time at which the ulterior limitation over to the
other children of the testator was to take effect; it was at most, even
upon the construction contended for by the counsel of the plaintiff
only liable to be determined before that event might happen; and hence
according to the rule just mentioned cannot, or at least in the event that
has occurred, cannot be considered an executory devise, but must be
deemed a contingent remainder. This construction seems to be req
uisite, also, for the purpose of carrying into effect an intention pretty
plainly manifested by the testator, that Aaron should not have it in his
power to dispose of the land beyond the period of his own life; so that
by construing the prior devise to Aaron, for the term of his natural life,
an absolute vested estate on him for life, making it neither more nor
less, with a contingent remainder to him in fee upon his dying, leaving
issue living at the time of his death; we give full effect to the latter of
the will as well as the intent of the testator.
If the fee given to Aaron, which is admitted to be determinable,
had vested in him during his life, the limitation over to the other chil
dren of the testator could only have taken efiect as an executory devise,
but being ever in contingency, and the event having failed upon which it
is claimed by the counsel for the plaintiff, that it would have become
vested, the ulterior devise of the land to the other children had all the
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properties of a contingent remainder, and as such might and would have
taken effect, if the recovery had not been suffered, and therefore could
not have operated as an executory devise. The devise to the other chil
dren of the testator, is not then the case of a limitation over to them,
after a prior vested determinable fee given to Aaron, which would make it
an executory devise, but it is one of two several fees, limited merely as
substitutes or alternatives, one for the other, that is the first to Aaron,
if he should die leaving issue living at the time of his death, but if not,
then to the other children of the testator in lieu thereof; thus substituting
the latter in the room of the former, if it should fail of effect. This is
the principle which was decided in Luddington V. Kime, 3 Lev. 431,
1 Ld. Raym. 208, where it was held that the first remainder was a con
tingent remainder in fee to the issue of A and the remainder to B was
also a contingent fee, not contrary to, or in any degree derogatory from
the effect of the former, but by way of substitution for it. And this
sort of alternative limitation was termed a contingency with a double
aspect. Fearne on Cont. Rem. 373. So if the estate vested in the one,
it never could in the other. Doe d. Herbert V. Selby, 2 Barn & Cress.
(9 E. C. L.) 926, [ante p. 191]. The ulterior devise then to the other
children of the testator, being considered in the event that has taken
place, a contingent remainder, and Aaron, by suffering a common re
covery, having determined his life estate, the only prop of the remainder,
before it became vested, it fell, and never could take efiect afterwards.
The plaintiffs therefore have no right to recover the land, and the judg
ment is aflirmed.
Suflicient Particular Estate to Support.
NOTE BY DYER AND MANTVOOD, JJ., in Common Pleas, Mich. 19 Eliz.
—-A. D. 1587.—4 Leonard 21, Cas. 67.
A leaseth to B for years, the remainder to the right heirs of the said B,
and makes livery. The remainder is void,Obecause there is not any
person in esse who can take presently. But where a lease is made to B
for life, the remainder to his right heirs, there he hath a fee executed;
and it shall not be in abeyance, for there he takes the freehold by the
liverv.
"
Limited on Remote Possibility.
ANON., 40 Edw. 3.—A. D. 1367.—Brooke Abr. t. Done & Rem. 6, Yearbooks
40 Edw. 3, 9.
There were father and two sons. The father levied a fine to N sur
grant & render to the father for life, remainder to the eldest son and
his wife in tail, remainder to the right heirs of the father; the father
died, and afterward the tenant in tail and his wife died without issue,
the younger son entered, and the lord avowed on him for relief as heir
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of the elder brother to the remainder in fee, and had return by judgment
notwithstanding that the younger son would have to be adjudged in as
a purchaser by the name of right heir of the father, because by his accept
ance the fee and the estate tail might not be at the same time in the elder
son; which would seem contradictory, for he may have in him the pos
session and the other be in abeyance, and this may be given and for
feited; and it is said that where a gift is made to N for life the re
mainder to the right heir of J who is living, the remainder is in sus
pense or abeyance during the life of J, and from this it was said that
if J die during the life of N the remainder is‘ good, but if J survive N
the remainder is void, because there is nothing to sustain it so.
CHOLMLEY’S CASE, in the Exchequer, 39 Eliz.—-A. D. 1597.—-2 Coke 50,
Moor 342, 2 Roll Rep. 60. Abridged from 2 Coke 50.
Trespass quare cla/usum by Hugh Cholmley against Randall Hanmer
and others. Plea not guilty. It was found by special verdict, that:
Thomas Holford, being seized of the land in question, and having two
sons (Christopher and George), said Thomas, Jane his wife, and
Christopher the_elder son, levied a fine of the land to John Warren
and T. Stanley, to the use of Thomas for life, then to the use of
Christopher and the heirs male of his body, then to the use of George
and the heirs male of his body, then to the use of the right heirs of
Thomas. Later Thomas died, and still later George, by indenture duly
enrolled, bargained and sold all his right, title, and interest in the
tenements to John Warren, to have to said John’s use during the life
of Christopher, remainder to the queen her heirs and successors forever,
upon condition that the estate should be void upon tender of 20£. to
Warren, or to the queen. Later Christopher enfeofied the land to several
and their heirs, and later a common recovery was had against them,
who vouched Christopher to warranty, who vouched the common vouchee,
and execution was had accordingly; which was to the use of Christopher
and his heirs. Afterwards George paid 20£. to Warren, who received
it. Afterwards the queen, reciting the grant by George to Warren re
mainder to her and that the remainder to her was by fraud, of her
own motion granted it to Christopher in fee. Later George bargained
and sold the tenements to John Bruin, by indenture duly inrolled, to
have and hold for the life of Christopher, remainder to the queen on
condition to cease on tender of 30s., to which grant Bruin agreed. Later
another recovery was suffered with double voucher, in which Christopher
was again vouched; which recovery was to the use of Christopher and
his heirs. Later Christopher died without issue male. His daughter
Mary-had married the plaintiff, who claims in her right. George paid
the 30s. to Bruin according to the condition, which was found by in
quisition by virtue of a commission under the great seal of England;
and upon showing his right, it was awarded that the queen’s claim be
released. Thereupon defendants entered by command of George, and
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plaintiff brought trespass. Whether the entry was lawful was the
question.
Opinion of the Court. And after many arguments at the bar, case
was argued at the bench by Ewnn and CLARK, BB., and PERIAM, C. B.,
and it was unanimously agreed by them, that the entry of George Hol
ford was not lawful; wherefore judgment was given for the plaintiff.
And in this case divers points were unanimously resolved by the court:
1. That the remainder limited to the queen after the death of
Christopher was void for three reasons: (A) Because Warren, who was
party to the first indenture, took nothing; and by consequence the queen,
who is not party to the indenture, but named by way of remainder after
the habendum, the particular estate being void, shall take nothing; for
the estate which is limited to Warren is for the life of Christopher. This
grant is void, because it can never take effect in possession, nor can
the grantee ever have any benefit thereof. And therefore a difference was
taken between such' grant of a reversion and the said grant of a re
mainder, for the grant of a reversion during the life of a tenant in
tail is good because he shall have the service which the tenant in tail
ought to do during the life of the tenant in tail; but such grant of a
remainder can never to any purpose take effect, and therefore it is void.
Moreover, a manifest difference appears between this case at bar and a
lease to Christopher for his life, the remainder to another for the life
of Christopher, for by possibility the remainder may take effect; e. g.,
if the tenant for life makes a feoffment in fee, or commits any for
feiture, he in the remainder may enter for the forfeiture; and that is
proved by the book in 41 Edw. 3, Fitz. tit. Waste 83, and (remanere
dicitur quasi term remanens) that cannot be when a remainder cannot
by any possibility fall into possession; for a remainder ought to vest in
estate during the particular estate, and ought to take effect in possession
when the particular estate ends, for vain is the possibility that may not
in any way come into action.
It was objected that Christopher might enter into religion, and then
might Warren enter during his natural life, for as much as Christopher
had no issue male. But as to what it was answered and resolved, that
such possibility shall not make the remainder good, because it is such
a remote possibility as shall not be intended by a common intendment
to happen. A possibility which shall make a remainder good, ought to
be a common possibility, and possibility proximate, as death, or death
without issue, or coverture, or the like. The logician says that pos
sibility is of two kinds, remote and proximate. 9 Hen. 6, 24b. The re
mainder to a corporation which is not at the time of the limitation of
the remainder, is void, although such be erected during ..the particular
estate, for it is a possibility remote. And this difference plainly ap
pears in a common case in our books: if a lease be made for life,
the remainder to the right heirs of J . S., this is good; for by common
possibility J . S. may die during the life of the tenant for life; but if
at the time of the limitation of the remainder there is no such J . S. but
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during the life of the tenant for life J . S. is born and dies, his heirs
shall never take it is agreed in Y. B. 2 Hen. 7, Hilary 13 b. pl. 16.
And in 10 Edw. 3, 45 a & b, and 46a, the case was, that upon a fine
levied to R he granted and rendered the tenements to one I and Florence
his wife for their lives, the remainder to G (son of I) in tail, the re
mainder to_ the right heirs of I; and in truth at the time of the fine
levied, I had not any son named G, but afterwards he had a son named
G and died; and in a praecipe against Florence it was adjudged that G
should not take the remainder in tail; because he was not born at the
time of the fine levied, but long after, wherefore another who was right
heir to I, by judgment of the court, was received; for when I had not any
son named G at the time of the fine levied the law will not suppose that
he will afterwards have a son named G, for that is a possibility remote.
Note reader a difference between a remainder limited by a particular
name, and by a general name; for a remainder limited by general name
may be good, although the person be not in being at the time of the
remainder limited; as if a lease for life be made, the remainder to the
right heirs of J . S., who is alive, this remainder may be good, and yet
he has no heir at the time of the remainder limited. The same law of
a remainder to the first born son. But a remainder limited in par
ticular by name of baptism and sir name is not good if the person be not
in being. It is held in 7 Edw. 3 that if the advowson of the church
of D. be granted to the person of D. and his successors, it is void to the
successors, because the successor who ought to take it can never be
benefited by way of presentation.
(B.) The remainder to be the queen is void, because the law will
never adjudge a grant good by reason of a possibility or expectation of
a thing which is against law, for that is a possibility remote and vane,
which by intendment of law never can happen.
(C.) The remainder to the queen is void, because George, having a
remainder in tail, has granted all his estate to Warren, habendum all
his estate during the life of Christopher, the remainder to the queen, in
which case, when he granted all his estate to Warren, he cannot limit any
remainder thereof to the queen; for a remainder is but a remnant of the
estate of the grantor, and the queen cannot have any remnant of the
estate of George, when he having an estate in tail has granted all his
estate to Warren. Littleton, § 649, says that in such case the estate
tail is in abeyance. It was adjudged in Blitheman’s Case, (1 And. 291,
Moor 345, 683, Lit. Rep. 122, Yelv. 51, Cro. Eliz. 279, 280, Nov. 46, 2
Roll Rep. 70, Godb. 442, Dyer 55 pl. 3 in margin), that if tenant in
tail in consideration of parental love, covenants by deed to stand seised
to the use of himself for his own life and after his death to the use of
his eldest son in tail, and after this covenant the covenantor marries and
dies, the wife shall be endowed; for when tenant in tail has limited
the use to himself for the term of his own life, he cannot limit any
remainder over; for an estate for his own life is as long as he can limit
by the law, and therefore the limitation of the remainder is void. Where
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fore it was concluded, that upon consideration of the first point Warren
had nothing. And upon consideration of this latter point, if he should
take entirely he would take too much, andby consequence the remainder
to the queen is void which ever way decided. And it was agreed that
the limitation to Warren by the habendum for the life of Christopher
was void and repugnant.
2. Admitting the remainder to: the queen was good, yet it was resolved
that the common recovery did bar the estate of Warren, and by conse
quence the condition also during his life. It was resolved that the re
covery does bar not only the estate tail, but also the estate for life of
Warrem, although the remainder of the fee was in the queen; for it is
out of the statute 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 20, because the estate tail was not
of the queen’s gift, nor any of her ancestors, kings of England, as it has
been adjudged. Jackson v. Drury, Moor 115, 3 Leon. 37; Wiseman’s
Case, 2 Coke 15, Moor 195, 1 And 140.
This payment to Warren cannot devest the remainder out of the queen
for three reasons: 1, because the condition during the life of Warren was
discharged; 2 because he who takes benefit of a condition ought to have
the whole estate given revested in him as in his first estate, and that
cannot be here, for the estate of Warren was barred by the recovery; also,
3, the tender to Warren was to the intent to revest his estate, and that
cannot be when his estate was barred: for which cause this payment
cannot devest the remainder out of the queen.
Destruction of Contingent Remainders by Discontinuance or Failure oi‘ Par
ticular Estates.
EARL OF BEDFORD’S CASE, in Court 01‘ Tvards, Hartford Term, 34 & 35
Eliz.——A. D. 1593.-—Abl‘idged from ,l\rI00r 7L8. S. C. 2 And. 197.
Francis, Earl of Bedford, having four sons, Edw., John, Francis and
\Villiam, and being seised of lordships in fee, enfeoffed them to several for
the use of himself for. 40 years, then to the use of John and the heirs male
of his body, and for want of such to the use of the right heirs of the said
earl forever. Later Edw. died without issue and later John died without
issue male, leaving issue Elizabeth and Anne; after which the earl by deed
indented, to provide jointure for his wife and to advance his heirs of his
body, covenated with several that from thenceforth he and his heirs
should stand seised of the lands, &c., to the use of himself for life, then
to the use of his son Francis and the heirs male of his body, with re
mainders over. Afterwards Francis the son died leaving his son Edward
surviving, and shortly afterwards Francis the earl died. The question
was whether said Edward now Earl of Bedford as heir of his father ought
to have the lands by virtue of the indenture last mentioned, or whether
the daughters of John ought to have them by force of the feoffnient
first made, as heirs of Francis, by purchase, or otherwise.
The case was argued openly before Wray and Anderson, chief justices,
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and the master and counsel of the court, by Popham for the daughters,
and by Egerton for the heir male. The case by order of the court was
divided into points; and the counsel on one side made objections on these
points, and the other made response in writing, that the court might see
the difference. The objections and responses were as follows:
1. We object that the earl over-living John Lord Russell his son, who
died without issue male, in the life of the earl, the remainder limited to
the right heir of the earl is void, for that the earl could not have an
heir in his lifetime, and every remainder must depend upon a particular
estate, and vest during the particular estate; as if a man make an estate
in tail, remainder to the right heirs of J . S., and the tenant in tail die
living J . S. the remainder is void, for that J . S. cannot have an heir
during his life, and the remainder cannot vest during the estate in
tail. The answer was: We agree the law to be so in feofiments and
gifts executed in possession, and the reason for that there is no person
able to take the freehold in the mean time, and the freehold in that case
cannot be in abeyance or in no person, for then no stranger that hath
any right in the land can have any praecipe, or recover the land if the
freehold should be in no person. But in the case of feoffees to uses the
use may be in abeyance in no person for a time, for the feoffees in the
mean time are persons able to hold the land, and are liable to every
man’s praecipe, and mischief at all. And this agrees with the common
practice and experience, for who doth not upon establishment of his
lands limit uses to his first, second, third, sons, &c., albeit he hath none
at that time, for the feoffees are persons able to hold the land to a future
use.
2. We object, that if the earl had limited an estate for life to himself,
the remainder in tail, the remainder ,to his right heirs, the remainder had
been executed in him. The response was: We agree this, for it is a
principle of law, that wheresoever the ancestor takes an estate for life,
or any estate of freehold in any conveyance, and after in the same con
veyance an estate is limited to his right heirs, the law will conjoin the
estates in the ancestor, for the ancestor and his heirs be correlative;
but otherwise it is where the ancestor takes but an estate for years; and
therefore if a lease be made to A for years, remainder to B in tail, re
mainder to the right heirs of A, the right heir of A shall be a purchaser
without question, and the remainder doth not vest in A.
Lastly, we object that if a man maketh a lease for years, the remainder
in tail, the remainder to the right heirs of the lessor, the remainder is
void; for a man cannot limit a remainder to his right heirs; no more
in the case at bar. The response was: True it is that in acts executed
in possession a man cannot limit a remainder to his right heirs, for the
law prefers the descent before the remainder. No more can a man by
any conveyance in possession limit a remainder to himself; and therefore,
if A maketh a lease for life, the remainder in tail, the remainder to A
himself in tail or in fee, or the remainder to the right heirs of A, the
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remainder is void; for no more than he can limit a remainder to himself,
no more can he limit it to his heirs, for the son is part of the parent. But
otherwise it is in case of uses, for without question a man may make a
feofiment to the use of A for life, and after to the use of B in tail, and
after to the use of the feoffor himself in fee, or in tail, or for life, &c., and
by consequence to his heirs.
On which matters and more, arguments were made at the Hartford
term with all the justices of England; and the case was argued again
before them by serjeant Glanville and by Coke. And afterwards it was
resolved by the greater part of them, and so ruled and decreed, that the
use limited to the right heirs by the earl was the old use and not a new
use; also, that the death of John Russell without heir male had so de
termined the particular freehold on which the remainder to his right heirs
depended, that the remainder by this reverted to the donor. And by this
the now earl held the land.
CHUDLEIGITS CASE, argued in the Exchequer Chamber before all the
judges of England, Hilary, 36 El1z.—A. D. 1594. Abridged from 1 Coke
120-14011. S. C. 1 And. 309, Popham 70.
Trespass quare clausum by William Dillon against John Freine in
king’s bench. Plea not guilty. It was found by special verdict, that
Richard Chudleigh, seised in fee of the place where the trespass is al
leged to have been committed, had issue four sons: Christopher his oldest,
Thomas second, Oliver _third, and Nicholas. Being so seised, the father
enfeoffed the manor by indenture to several persons and their heirs,
to the use of the said Richard and the heirs of his body on certain persons
named and in default of such issue to the use and performance of his will
for ten years after his death and -then to the use of the feoffees during
the life of Christopher, and then to the first son of Christopher in tail,
and so on to the tenth, then to the use of Thomas in tail, then to the use
of Oliver in tail, then to the use of Nicholas in tail, and finally to the use
of the feoffor’s heirs. The feofior died, and then, before any issue born
to Christopher, the feoffees enfeoffed him, having notice of the former
uses. Afterwards Christopher had issue John, under whom defendant
claims. The question was whether the uses which before were in con
tingency, should vest in the son of Christopher, and be executed by the
statute of uses, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10.
WALMSLEY, J. Before the statute 1 Rich. 3, c. 1, the feoffees had not
only the whole estate in the land, but also the whole power to give and
dispose of it; for the cestuy que use was a trespasser if he entered on
the land against their will. And after that statute the cestuy que use
had a power to make a disposition of the land itself and yet the whole
estate of the land did remain in the feofiee till the cestuy que use had
made such disposition; for which reason, said act, intending to provide
for the cestuy que use, had not made a sufiicient provision for him. For
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the estate of the land remaining in the feoffees, they many times,
contrary to the trust reposed in them, by secret feoffments and other
covinous acts, had defrauded the cestuy que use, and had prevented such
disposition of the land as the statute gave him. And sometimes there
was fraud in both; for the cestuy qua use by force of the statute, and
the feoffee by the common law, had both severally power to dispose
of the same land. Sometimes the cestuy que use by his secret estate pre
vented the feoffees, and sometimes they prevented him, so that they
played at double hand, and thereby frustrated the true intent of the
act.
The statute of 27 Hen. 8, c. 10, was not made to extinguish or eradicate
any uses, but has advanced uses, and established safety and assurance
for the cestuy que use against his feoffees; for before the statute the
feoffees were owners of the land, and now the statute has made the
cestuy que use owner of the land; before the statute the possession
governed and ruled the use, but now since the statute the use governs
and rules the possession; for by the act 27 Hen. 8, c. 10, the possession is
the subject and follower of the use. No word of the preamble condemns
uses; but for the extirpating and extinguishing of all such subtle
practiced feoffments, fines, abuses, &c. ; so that the uses are not guilty
of the inconveniences mentioned in the preamble, but the feofiments,
fines, and recoveries subtly and craftily practiced. So that the intent
of the act was to extirpate and extinguish, which are both significant
words, all such feoffments, fines, recoveries; but how? By destroying
the uses? No, truly; but by divesting the whole estate out of the feoffees,
conusees, and recoverers, and vesting it in the cestuy que use; so that
it would be against the meaning and letter of the law also to say that
any estate or right or scintilla juris should remain in the feotfees after
the statute 27 Hen. 8, c. 10.
The statute of 27 Hen. 8, c. 10, extends to all lawful and good uses,
as well future as in esse, and no such use is destroyed but advanced and
extolled. As a fountain gives to every one that comes in his tum to it
his just measure of water, so the first seisin and estate in fee, given by
the first feoffment to the feoffees, is sufficient to yield to all persons
to whom any use present or future is limited, a competent measure of
estate in their time, proportionable to their estates which they shall have
in the use. But the whole estate shall be first vested in those who are
in rerum natum, and the possession shall be vested in him who has the
future use when it comes in esse by force of the first livery, and shall
divide the estates which were joined before. The future uses in our
case cannot be suspended, for a thing which never was in esse cannot
be suspended, but when the future uses come in esse, then they shall
come in between the other estates which were joined before.
If feoffment be made of land to the use of A, and there is also a
rent issuing out of the same land to the use of B, although the possession
of the land be disturbed by disseisin, yet the use of the rent is not dis
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turbed thereby, because the disturbance is done to another seisin, that
is to say, to the land, and not to the seisin of the rent out of which the
use is limited. So in the case at bar, the disturbance is not to the first
seisin, given by the feoffment, out of which all the uses, as out of a
fountain, flow; but the disturbance is done to the other seisins, to wit
to the seisins executed by the statute of 27 Hen. 8, c. 10, and not to the
first seisin, which by no means can be tolled or divested; for it has not
any essence until the future use has essence, which by force of the statute
shall draw a suflicient estate to it; but when the future use is come
in esse, now by reference and relation to the first seisin, there is seisin and
use within the statute of 27 Hen. 8. c. 10.
PERRIAM, C. B., conceived that these future uses before their births are
not preserved in the bowels and belly of the land, but that they were in
nubibus, and in the preservation of the law; for he well agreed with
WALMSLEY, J ., that by force of the act the whole estate shall be out
of the feoffees, and then of necessity it ought to be in some person, or in
abeyance and consideration of law; and it would be absurd to say that
the feoffees had a less estate than they took by the first livery. And
therefore, because nothing remains in the feoifees, and this future use
cannot be executed until the person who should take it comes in esse,
it must of necessity be in the meantime in the preservation of the law.
If the estate in our case had been limited in possession by livery and
seisin, the remainder to the eldest son, &c., till his birth it would be by
the rule of the common law in the consideration of the law; and by force
of the same reason the use shall be in our case, and as the use shall be so
shall be the possession by force of the statute; for be the use in esse
or in consideration of law, the possession shall be transferred to it by
force of the statute. The statute does not say, to the use of any person
or persons in esse, but to the use of another person, and that shall be
intended when his time shall come; and it would be a hard construction
to destroy these future uses in our case, which were limited upon good
cause and consideration, and especially when the sons who were not then
in esse, were not parties to any wrong. These uses have extended them
selves into many branches, and are to be resembled to Nebuchadnezzar’s
tree, for in this tree the fowls of the air build their nests, and the nobles
of this realm have established their houses; and if this tree should be
felled or subverted it would make a great impression in the land; and
therefore it is convenient to repose the mischief after by parliament, and
not to have any respect to the cases before.
He and WALMsLEY, J ., also agreed in their argument that the uses in
this case should follow the rules of the common law; and therefore,
if in this case tenant for life dies before the birth of a son, the remainder
in use shall be void, for such remainder would be void by the rule of the
common law, if the remainder do not vest during the particular estate,
or at least when the particular estate determines, and no difference be
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tween uses and estates made in possession to this purpose. And so they
concluded that judgment ought to be for plaintiff.
ANDERSON, C. J ., of the common bench, POPHAM, C. J ., of the queen’s
bench, OWEN, BEAUMONT, FENNER, GAWDY, and CLnNcH, JJ ., and
EWENS and CLARK, BB., argued to the contrary. And it was agreed by
them all that the feoffment made by the said feofiees who had an estate for
life by limitation of the use devested all the estate, and the future uses
also, and although Richard Chudleigh their feoffee had notice of the first
use, yet it was immaterial, because all the ancient estates were devested
by the said feoffment, and this new estate cannot be subject to the an
cient uses which rise out of the ancient estate which was devested by the
feoffment.
GAWDY, J ., conceived that the uses limited to the eldest son, &c., were
in abeyance, and that the estates of the land sufficient to serve these
future uses were in abeyance also; but he agreed that this was not by the
letter of the statute 27 Hen, 8, c. 10, for the letter of the statute is to
the use of any person, and here wanteth the person. If a feofiment in fee
be made to the use of one for life, and after to the use of the right heirs
of J . S., the fee simple of the land shall be in abeyance; and before the
statute if a man had made a feoffment to the use of one for years, and
after to the use of the right heirs of J . S., this limitation had been good,
for the feofiees remain tenants of the freehold; but such limitation after
the statute is void, for then the freehold would be in supense, for nothing
can remain in the feoffees. But he said that these remainders in future
were devested and destroyed by the feofiment of the tenants for life;
and although the remainders be in custody of the law, yet they ought to
be subject to the rules of the law, for the law will never preserve any
thing against the rule of law; and because the rule of the law is that
the remainder must take the land when the particular estate determines,
or else the remainder shall be void, for this reason these remainders in
futuro, by this matter em post fact0, were utterly destroyed. A remainder
without a particular estate can no more exist in the case of a use than
in the case of an estate made in possession. Of the same opinion were
POPHAM, C; J ., CLARK, B., and OWEN, J ., as to the point of forfeiture.
It was held by EWENS, B. Ownxs, BEAUMOND, FENNER, CLARK, and
CLENCH, JJ., and by the two chief justices, that, at the common law,
by disseisin or by such feoffment as in the case at bar, as well all future
uses or uses in contingency are devested and discontinued, as uses in
esse, till the first estate out of which the uses rise be recontinued; and
that the statute of 27 Hen. 8 c. 10, does not transfer any possession to
any use but only to uses in esse, and not to any use in future or in con
tingency till it comes in esse, and this appears by the letter of the act.
They held that those who had argued on the other side had taken but the
first part of the sentence, that is to say, that the estate shall be out of
the feoffees; but they had forgot the latter part of the sentence, to wit,
that the estate shall be in such person who hath the use, and that cannot
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be till the person and the use also be in esse. And by this clause it
also appears that no estate shall be transferred in abeyance out of the
feoffees and vested in no body, or transferred to a possibility of a use
which has no being, which would be against reason, and against the letter
and meaning of the act.
So all the justices and barons of the exchequer, except PERRIAM, C. B_,.
and WALMSLEY and GAWDY, JJ ., did conclude, that, for as much as the
statute of 27 Hen. 8, c. 10, extends only to uses in esse, and to persons
in esse, and not to any uses which depend only in possibility; for that
reason, the contingent uses in the case at bar remain so long as they de
pend in possibility only at the common law; and by consequence they
might be destroyed or discontinued before they came in esse, by all such
means as-uses might have been discontinued or destroyed at common
law. And all the justices and barons did agree with WALMSLEY, J ., in
the point that these remainders limited in use in the case at bar should
follow the rule and reason of estates executed in possession by the
common law; and therefore they all unanimously agreed, that if the
estate for life in the case at bar had been destroyed by the death of the
feoflfees before the birth of the eldest son, that the said remainders in
futuro were void, and should never take effect although the sons were
born afterward; for a remainder in use ought to vest during the par
ticular estate, or at least eo insta‘nte when the particular estate ends,
as well as an estate in possession. And it was held by all
the justices that if the contingent use in the case at bar had come in
esse without any alteration of the estate of the land, that it should be
executed by the statute 27 Hen. 8, c. 10; but the alteration of the estate
before it came in esse had destroyed it.
POPHAM, C. J., said in argument, that by force of the statute 2'7
Hen. 8, c. 10, some uses are executed immediately, some uses are ex
ecuted by matter ex post facto, and some uses are extirpated and ex
tinguished by the act. Uses in esse draw the possession immediately, and
uses in future limited agreeable to the rule of the common law are also,
if they come in esse in due time, within the purview of the statute.
But uses not limited agreeable to the ancient common law of the land are
utterly extirpated and extinguished by this act. He said if such a
construction upon the statute, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10, by equity or otherwise
should be made for maintenance and preservation of future uses as has
been made by those who have argued on the other side, greater incon
veniences would be introduced than were before the statute.
PO\VLE v. VEERE, in Chancery, 41 Eliz.-—A. D. 1599.—-Moor 554.
The case referred to WALMSLEY & KINGSMILL [JJ .], was that John,
Count of Oxford, made a lease by indenture to Robert Veere, his brother,
of a manor in Berks, for his life, which was executed by livery with
these words, that if Robert should marry and his wife should out-live
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him it should remain to her for her life if he should by sealed writing
or his last will declare he wished her to have it. Before taking any wife
Robert made a feoffment to Tho. Nooke, the father, to whom the Count
of Oxford levied a fine after the feoffment, and bargained and sold the
land and suffered a common recovery as vouchee. Afterwards Robert
took the defendant to wife and made declaration that she should have
the remainder; and afterward he and his wife levied a fine come ceo, &c.
with warranty of Robert and Nooke and their heirs. Later Robert made
another declaration that his wife should have the remainder, and died,
and she entered. And the question was if her entry on Powle the pur
chaser from Nooke was lawful. And the justices certified that it was
not; but that the remainder, if it was ever good, was destroyed by the
feoffment, because the freehold was supplanted before the vesting of the
remainder; and also that the possibility in the wife was included in the
fine, and the warranty was also barred. Wherefore the decree was ac
cordingly for Powle.
WELLS v. FENTON, in C. B., Hilary, 43 El1z.—A. D. 1600.—Cro. Eliz. 826.
Ejectione Firmae. R. seized in fee, levied a fine to the use of him
self for life, and after to the use of his wife who should be at the time
of his death, for life, remainder to E in tail. R takes to wife A; he
and A his wife, by fine, reciting that he is tenant for life, remainder to
said A for life, give it to a stranger in fee, who renders it to the hus
band for life, remainder to F for 60 years, remainder to the right heirs
of the husband. The husband dies, the said A being his feme, survives,
and disclaims to have anything in the land. E enters, lets to the de
fendant, she takes another husband, and they make a lease to the plaint
iff. Upon all these matters disclosed these points were moved: 1.
Whether this contingent remainder to the wife who should be, was good.
For although such a contingent remainder may be by way of limitation of
an estate of land in esse, yet it cannot be of any use; for the statute of 27
Hen, 8, c. 10, doth not execute uses, but thoseaonly which are in esse.
and preserves not any contingent uses, for no seisin continues to pre
serve them. And of that opinion was ANDERSON, G. J . But WALMs
LEY and WARBURTON, JJ., e contra; for it was good at the time of
limitation, and stood with the rules of common law, and for the benefit
of the commonwealth, that such limitations or jointures should be good;
and therefore the law preserves and regards them, unless there be some
mean act afterwards done to destroy them. But an use limited to J . S.
until a praecipe be brought, and then to the use of J . D., this con
tingent use of J . D. is against law and justice to defraud a przecipe, and
therefore is void.
2. Whether by the joinder in this fine the feme hath given her pos
sibility, so as she cannot afterwards claim it. WALMsLEY, J ., held that
she had not for she hath not any estate, nor was there any certain per
son who might have it: for it is unto her who shall be his wife at the
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time of death, and it is not known who that shall be. But where the
person is certain, although the estate be but in possibility, there per
adventure she might have excluded herself thereof. Adjudged for the
plaintiff.
ANONYMOUS, in Common Bench, Mich. 5 Jac. 1.—A. D. 1608.—4 Leon. 236.
If land be given to A & B for the life of C, remainder to the right
heirs of A or B who shall survive; it was held that if A release to B,
that the remainder was destroyed. And if land be given to one in tail,
and if J comes to Westminster such a day, the remainder to J in fee,
if the estate tail descends to two coparceners, who make partition; now
if J come to Westminster the fee shall not accrue, because the particular
estate is not in the same plight as it was before.
REEVE v. LONG, in King’s Bench, Easter, 6 WV. & M.—A. D. 1695.—1 Salk.
227, Carth. 309, 3 Lev. 408, 4 Mod. 282, Skin. 430, Comb. 252, Holt 228,
286, 5 Gray P. Cas. 53. From Salk.
Error of a judgment in common bench in ejectment, wherein a
special verdict was found, and the case was: John Long being seised
in fee devised the lands to his nephew Henry Long for life, remainder
to the first son in tail male, and so on to the second, third, &c. And
for default of such issue, remainder to his nephew Richard Long, lessor
of the plaintifi, for life, remainder to the first son in tail, and so on to
the second, third, &c., with divers remainders over. The devisor died,
Henry married, and died without issue, leaving his wife enseint with
a son. Richard entered as in his remainder, and afterwards the post
humous son (the defendant) was born, and his guardian entered upon
the lessor ; whereupon he brought this ejectment and judgment was
given for the plaintiff in the common bench by the whole court, And
now that judgment was affirmed by this court; and resolved: 1. That
the remainder to the first son of Henry is a contingent remainder, and
must take effect during the particular estate of Henry or the instant
that it determines; that by consequence this remainder to the son be
came void by the death of the tenant for life before he had a first son.
2. That this. was such a default of issue, or dying without issue,
that instantly the remainder limited over to Richard vested in him, and
he became seised in possession; and this cannot be defeated, nor the
estate fetched back again, though Henry has a son born afterwards.
But note: this judgment was afterwards reversed in the house of
lords, against the opinion of all the judges, who were very much dissat
isfied, and blamed the judge who tried thecause, for sufiering a special
verdict to be found.
\
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ADAMS v. SAVAGE’S tenants, in King’s Bench, Easter, 2 Ann.—A. D. 1703.
—2 Lord Baym. 854, 2 Salk. 679, 5 G1-ay’s P. C. 119. Given according
to L. Raym.
A scire facias was sued by the plaintiff as administrator, to J . S.,
upon administration granted to him by the arch-deacon of Dorset, upon
a judgment recovered by the intestate against Savage in this court.
The issue after pleading, was, whether Savage was seised of the lands,
&c., in fee? Upon which the jury found a special verdict, that Savage,
being seised in fee, conveyed the lands by lease and release to trustees
and their heirs, to the use of himself for 99 years, if he should so long
live, remainder to the trustees for 25 years, remainder to the heirs male
of his body, remainder to his own right heirs. The question was, if
Savage, during his life, not having heirs male of his body, should have
a use result to him for his life, and so become tenant in tail in pos
session; or if no use could result, and then, there being no freehold to
support the contingent remainder to the heirs male of the body of Savage,
the said remainder would be void, and Savage seised in fee as before.
THE Couar HELD, that no use could result to Savage during his
life, and therefore the remainder to the heirs male was void, and Savage
seised in fee. And their reasons were, because the limitations to himself
for 99 years and to the trustees for 25 years, and the heirs male were
new uses, and new estates. As if a man, by lease and release, or by
covenant to stand seised, limit the use to himself for life, or in tail,
these are new estates and not parcel of the old estate, according to
Englefield’s Case, 7 Coke 13b. And where in such case upon a con
veyance such uses are limited, as (supposing the limitations to be good),
would pass the whole estate, there no use will result contrary to the
express limitations of the party. But if the limitations are void, the
conveyanceof necessity will fail. If a man seised in fee convey his
estate by lease and release to the use of himself for life, remainder
to trustees for lives, remainder to the heirs of his body, he hath an estate
tail in him; but he is but tenant for life in possession; otherwise if
there had been no intermediate estate in the trustees for their lives.
And in the former case, if a man makes a feoffment, it is no discon
tinuance, but only divests the estate. And for the same reason in this
case, where the first limitation is only for years, the remainder to the
heirs of the body of the tenant for years is a contingent remainder, and
void. These are the reasons of Chief Justice Honr.
POWELL, justice, said, that there was a difference, where the limita
tion was upon a covenant to stand seised, and where upon a lease and
release. For where the limitations are to take effect out of the estate
of the covenantor, there if the limitations were such as could not take
effect immediately, or not till after the death of the covenator, as in
the case of Pybus V. Midford, 2 Lev. 75, there the law may mould the
estate remaining in the covenantor into an estate for life; but that
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cannot be where the limitations are to take effect out of the estate of
the trustees, for want of a limitation, much less against an express
limitation. And therefore (by him) if there had been an express limit
ation in the case of Pybus v. Midford, limited to the convenantor, the
judgment would have been otherwise. And for these reasons, the whole
court ordered last hilary term, that judgment should be entered for
the plaintiff, unless cause should be shown to the contrary by the first
day of this term. * * *
In accord with this decision is Rawley v. Holland (1712), 22 Vin. Abr.
187, pl. 11. These cases have been doubted by Mr. Sergeant Hill and Mr.
Sanders (1 Sanders Uses 142, 143; 148, 5th ed.), and denied by Mr. Butler
to be law (note y to Fearne Cont. Rem. p. 41), and Mr. Preston lays down
a doctrine opposed to these cases (1 Prest. Abst. 114, 130, 131). Sir Edward
Sugden defends these decisions -(Sugden’s Gilbert on Uses and Trusts 35,
note); and, in the opinion of Mr. Williams, has sufficiently answered Mr.
Butler's objections (Williams on Real Prop. 17th ed. p. 457, note 1). Prof.
Gray considers these cases substantially overruled by Gore v. Gore, post 263,
and believes that if brought directly in question they would be expressly
overruled. See Gray on Perpetuities §§ 59, 60.
FABER v. POLICE in S. Car. S. Ct., 1877—10 S. Car. 376, Tied. R. C. 367.
Action by John L. Faber against J . G. Police to recover damages for
breach of a contract to buy land of plaintifi. From judgment for plaint
iff defendant appeals.
The defense was that the plaintiff’s title was defective. Plaintiff’s
father devised the land to trustees “in trust to and for the use, benefit,
and behoof of my son,” the plaintiff, for life, and then “in trust to and
for the lawful issue of my said son living at the time of his death:
* * * and should my said son die without leaving lawfully begotten
issue, living at the time of his death, * * * -then unto my residu
ary devisees and legatees, their heirs and assigns forever.” After the
death of the testator the plaintiff conveyed the land by deed of feoffment
with livery of seisin to another who deeded it back the next day, after
which plaintiff deeded it to his mother, through whom he claims title
as her sole heir.
MCIVER, A. J . * * * The appellant contends that the estate lim
ited to the issue of John Lewis Faber is vested and not a contingent re
mainder, and therefore the remainder was not barred by the deed of
feoffment and livery of seisin * * * It is very clear, from the lan
guage used, that the testator did not intend that the issue should take
the estate in remainder absolutely and at all events, but only on a con
tingency—that of their surviving their father; and it is equally clear
that he did not intend that the residuary legatees and devisees should
take the estate in remainder absolutely and at all events, but only on a
contingency—that of the son dying without issue living at the time
of his death. * * * A vested remainder is one which is limited
to an ascertained person in being, whose right to the estate is fixed
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and certain, and does not depend upon the happening of any future
event, but whose enjoyment in possession is postponed to some future
time. A contingent remainder on the other hand is one which is limited
to a person not in being or not ascertained; or if limited to an ascer
tained person, it is so limited that his right to the estate depends upon
some contingency in the future; so that the most marked difference be
tween\the two kinds of remainders is that in the one case the right to the
estate is fixed, though the right to the possession is deferred to some
future period; while in the other the right to the estate as well as the
right to the possession of such estate is not only deferred to a future
period, but is dependent upon the happening of some future contingency.
* * * These estates, as well the particular estate for the life of John
Lewis Faber as the estate in remainder to his issue, and in default of
such issue to the residuary legatees and devisees, passed out of the
testator at the time of his death—the time when his will, the instru
ment by which the estates were created, speaks. Then it was that these
estates were created, and to that point of time must we look to determine
their character. It is very clear that at that time it was wholly uncertain
who would be the persons to take at the termination of the particular
estate. The life tenant then had no issue, and it was of course uncertain
whether he would ever have any; and as to the issue which he has subse
quently had it is yet uncertain whether any of them will be living at his
death; and the same uncertainty exists as to whether the residuary lega
tees and devisees will ever have a right to take. * * *
Hence the remainders are contingent. If so, then it necessarily fol
lows, upon the authority of Redferu v. Middleton, Rice (S. Car.) 459,
in which the court of errors adopted the reasoning of Chancellor Harper
in his decree in Dehon v. Redfern, Dud. 115, that the contingent remain
ders to the issue of John Lewis Faber, and in default of such issue to
the residuary legatees and devisees, were barred by the deed of feoff
ment and livery of seisin to Folker. * * *
But, second, it is argued by the appellant that, even if the remainders
be construed to be contingent and not vested, yet the deed of feoffment
and livery of seisin could not bar such remainders, because the legal
estate was vested in the trustees. This proposition might be admitted
if it were true that the legal estate was in the trustees. It becomes
necessary, therefore, to consider that question. The rule undoubtedly,
is that where there is a conveyance to one for the use of another, and
the trustee is charged with no duty which renders it necessary that the
legal estate should remain in him to enable him properly to perform
such duty, the statute of uses executes the use and carries the legal title
to the cestui que use. By the terms of the will under consideration it
does not appear that the trustees are charged with any duty whatever.
* * * The other justices concurred.
Aflirmed.
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“'hat are Contingent?
BORASTON’S CASE, in Queen’s Bench, Hilary, 29 Eliz.—A. D. 1587.—3
Coke 19a, 25 Eng. Rul. Cas. 579. Abridged from Coke.
Ejectione firmw by Richard Hynde against William Ambrye. Plea,
not guilty. The jury gave a special verdict finding that Thos. Boraston,
seised of the lands in fee, and having issue two sons, Humphrey the
elder, and Henry the younger, made his will in writing, Aug. 12, 1559,
by which he devised the lands in these words: “Item, I give to Thomas
Amery and Amphillis his wife, all that my upper part of my close called
Reading, for eight years next after my decease; * * * And after the
said term of eight years, the said upper part to remain to my executors
until such time as H. Boraston shall accomplish his full age of 21 years,
and the mean profits to be employed by my executors towards the per
formance of this my last will and testament; and when the said Hugh
shall some to his age of 21 years, then I will he shall enjoy the said
upper part, to him and his heirs for ever.” The testator died Aug. 14,
1559. Hugh died when nine years old. After the expiration of the
terms of Thomas Amery and wife and to the executors, Philip Boraston
entered on the lands as brother and heir of Hugh, and leased them to
William Ambrye, defendant herein; on whom Thomas Brand and Con
stance his wife, and William Davies and Margaret his wife, claiming
in right of their wives as daughters and heirs of Humphrey, testator’s
oldest son, entered and leased the lands to the plaintiff herein, by force
whereof he was possessed, till the defendant by command of Philip re
entered. The question referred to the court was whether the entry of
the defendant was lawful.
Counsel for Plaintifi’ argued that no remainder vested in Hugh till
he attained 21 years of age, and that in the mean time the lands de
scended to the daughters of the eldest son, as general heirs of the devisor ;
and because Hugh never attained his age of 21, the land never vested in
him, but remained in the general heirs; for by the words of the will he
should not have it till his said age. So it appears that the devise to
Hugh depends on the contingency of his attaining his age, and whether
he would ever attain it no man could know.
It was also said, that when a particular estate which doth support a re
mainder may determine before the remainder can begin, there the
remainder shall not presently vest, but shall depend in contingency; as if
one makes a lease to J . S. for his life, and after the death of J . D. to re
main to another in fee, this remainder doth depend in contingency; for
if J . S. dies before J . D. the particular estate is determined before the
remainder can begin. So and on the same reason it was adjudged in
Colthurst v. Bejnshin [reported ante p. 183]. A lease is made to one
for life, remainder to the right heirs of J . S., this remainder is good
upon a contingent, that is to say if the lessee survives J . S., otherwise
not. So, and for the like reason, if a man having a son of the age of nine
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years, makes a lease until his son shall attain his full age, and after
he shall attain his full age, that it shall remain over to another in fee,
nothing presently vests in him in remainder, which was granted by the
whole court. And it was said by the plaintiff’s counsel, that such re
mainder is utterly void, and yet it may take effect; for, in as much as
the remainder ought to pass out of the lessor presently, either to him
in remainder, or to be in abeyance and custody of the law, and a free
hold cannot in such case be in abeyance, for this cause the remainder is
utterly void ; as if a man makes a lease to A for 21 years if B shall live
so long, and after the death of B that it shall remain over in fee, this
remainder over is void. So if a lease for years be made, the remainder
to the right heirs of J . S., this remainder is void; which was granted
by the whole court. Also it was said, that_when a remainder is limited
to take effect on the doing of an act, which act will be the determination
of the particular estate, yet if the act depends on a casualty and mere
uncertainty whether it will ever happen or not, there also the remainder
doth depend in contingency, and shall not presently vest: as if A
makes a feoffment to the use of B till C come from Rome to England,
and after such return to remain over in fee, this remainder doth depend
in contingency, for it is uncertain whether C will ever return; which
was granted by the whole court. And so it was concluded by plaintif'f’s
counsel, that for all these causes judgment ought to be given for the
plaintiff.
Defendant’s Counsel conceived the remainder vested in Hugh presently
by the death of the devisor ; and by his death without issue, the land de
scended to Philip his brother, who leased to the defendant. It was said
that although Hugh died before his full age, yet the interest and term
of the executors did not cease; and their reason was, because in wills the
intent of the devisor is to be considered, and when he deviseth his lands
to his executors till Hugh his son shall come to his full age, for pay
ments of his debts, and to perform his will, it is to be intended that he
hath computed that the profits to be taken of his lands during the
minority of his son, would suflice to pay his debts and perform his will,
and that he did not intend it should determine by the death of his son ;
for then the means which he had prescribed to satisfy his debts and
perform his will would be defeated, and by consequence his debts would
remain unsatisfied and his will unperformed; and therefore this case of
a devise doth differ from a lease or a grant made in like manner. For
the devisor is intended to be without counsel, and therefore the law will
be his counsel. Although the devisor being hindered by sickness or want
of good advice, makes his will in a disordered manner, and in barbarous
and unfit words, the law in such case will reduce his words which want
order into good order, and sentence his unfit words to words sutficient
in law, according to his intent which appears by his own words, as
was adjudged in Wellock v. Hammond, [reported ante p. , which
Coke here states at considerable length.] Upon which it was concluded
by defendant’s counsel, that the executors had a good term for 12 years,
¢
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which was not determined by the death of Hugh; which was granted by
the whole court. And the general rule put by counsel of the other
side was well agreed, that the remainder ought to commence in pos
session when the particular estate ends, as well in wills as in grants;
but that doth not concern the case at bar; for here, in as much as the
term did not end by the death of Hugh, the remainder did begin in pos
session at the end of the term. As to the uncertainty, it was said, that
the case at bar is no other in effect, but that a man devises his lands
to his executors for the payment of his debts, until his son shall or
should have come to his age of 21 years, the remainder to his son in
fee: for although these are adverbs of time, when, &c., and then, &c.,
yet they do not amount to make anything precede the settling of the
remainder. A man leases land for life or years, and -after the decease
of the lessee, or the term ended, the remainder to another, yet it shall
remain presently; for when these adverbs refer to a thing, which must
of necessity happen, there they make no contingency: and it is certain
that every man must die, and every term end. So that these adverbs
then and when in our case, are demonstrations of the time when the re
mainder to Hugh‘ shall take effect, in possession, as in the said cases of a
lease for life and a lease for years, and not when the remainder shall
vest; which was granted by the whole court. And judgment was given
that the plaintiff should take nothing by his bill.
NAPPER v. SANDERS, in Common Bench, 7 Car. 1'.—-A. D. 1632.—I..Iutt0n
118, 5 Gray’s P. C. 48.—Abr1dged.
Ejectione firmae by Robert Napper against Henry Sanders, on a lease
by indenture of Francis Sanders, John Napper, and Elizabeth, John’s
wife. Plea, not guilty. On special verdict the case was, that, one seised
in fee of the land in question, made feoffment of it to the use of herself
for life, then to the use of the feoffees for 80 years if Nicholas Sanders
and Elizabeth his wife should so long live, and if Elizabeth survive
Nicholas, then to her use for life, and after her death to the use of
Posthumous Sanders her son in tail, and for default of such issue to the
use of plaintiffs lessors in tail, remainder to the heirs of the feoffor.
The feoffor died, the feoffees entered, Elizabeth Sanders died (Nicholas
yet living), Posthumus died without issue, plaintiff’s lessors entered
and were possessed, and defendant entered as son and heir of the feotfor,
and ejected them and the plaintiff; whence this action. The sole ques
tion was whether the remainders to Posthumus and plaintiff’s lessors
were vested or contingent.
It was resolved by all the COURT, that the remainders were not con
tingent in the estate for life which was to come to Elizabeth Sanders,
the wife of said Nicholas, but were vested presently. And it was agreed,
that the estate for life, if she survive her husband was contingent; and
when that had happened, being by way of limitation of an use, it shall
be interposed when the contingent happen; as in C’hu(llelgh’s Case
oourrnonnr REMAINDERS. _ 215
[ante p. 202], a feoffment to the use of the feoffor, for life, and after
his death to his first son which shall be afterwards born, for life, and
so to divers, and afterwards to the use of J . D. in tail, it is resolved that
all the uses limited to persons not in esse are contingent, but the uses to
persons in esse vest presently, and yet these contingent uses when they
happen vest by interposition, if the first estate for life which ought to
support them be not disturbed. And in this case it was a good estate
for life to Margaret [the feoffor], and then gives the remain in the
feoffees for eighty years, if Nicholas and Elizabeth Sanders so long
should live, and if Elizabeth survive Nicholas, then to Elizabeth for her
life, and after her decease to Posthumus in tail, and after his decease
to the said three daughters in tail, so that there the estate for years de
termines upon the death of Elizabeth, and so also the estate for the
life of Elizabeth, which was contingent, determines by her death. [After
citing and admitting Lord Derby’s Case Litt. Rep. 370 ; B0rast0n’s Case,
ante p. 212, and others, and distinguishing Colthurst v. Bejushin, ante
p. 183, the report proceeds] And after argument at bar, this term (it
being before that the Loan RronAansou was there, who was of the same
opinion) we all concurred, and judgment was entered for the plaintiff.
EDVVARDS v. HAMMOND, in Common Pleas, as Car. 2.—A. 1). 1683.-3
Lev. 132, 1 B. & P. N. R. 32411., 2 Danv. 16, pl. 12, 5 Gray P. 0. 52.
Ejectment, upon not guilty and special verdict, the case was; a copy
holder of lands, borough English, surrendered to the use of his eldest
son and his heirs, if he live to the age of 21 years, provided and upon
condition, that if he die before 21, that then it shall remain to the
surrenderer and his heirs. The surrenderer died, the youngest son en
tered, and the eldest son being 17 brought ejectment. And the sole
question was whether the devise to the eldest son be upon condition
precedent, or if the condition be subsequent, viz., that the estate in fee
shall vest immediately upon the death of the father, to be divested if
he die before 21. For the defendant it was argued, that the con
dition was precedent, ‘and that the estate should descend to the youngest
son in the mean time; and so the eldest son has no title now, being
no more than 17. On the'other side it was argued, and so agreed by the
COURT, that though by the first words this may seem to be a condition
precedent, yet, taking all the words together, this was not'a condition
precedent, but a present devise to the eldest son, subject to and defeasible
by this condition subsequent, viz. his not attaining the age of 21; and
they resembled this to Spriuge v. Caesar, W. Jones 389.
* * * Adjudged.
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\Vithout Prior Particular Estate.
ASSABY v. LADY ANNE IVIANNERS, in Exchequer Chamber, 6 & 7 Eliz.-—
1565.—2 Dyer, 2341).
Before 27 H. 8, c. 10, one seized of land in fee, in consideration of
a marriage to be had between his daughter and heir apparent with B,
the son and heir apparent of C, covenanted by indenture with C, that he
himself would have, hold, and retain, the land to himself and the profits
of it during his life, and after his decease the said son and daughter
should have the land, to them and the heirs of their two bodies, and that
all persons then or afterwards seised of the land should stand and be
seised immediately after the marriage solemnized to the use of said A for
term of his life, and after his death to use of said son and daughter
in tail as above, and covenanted further to make an assurance accord
ingly before a day named. Then the marriage took effect; and after
wards A bargained and sold the land for 200 marks, of which not a
penny is paid, to a stranger, who has notice of the first covenants and
use, and enfeoffed divers persons to this last use, against whom a common
recovery was had to this last use; and also A levied a fine to the re
coverers before any execution had; and notwithstanding all these things
A continued in possesion in taking the profits during life, and afterwards
died. And afterwards the son and daughter entered and made feofi
ments to their use. And all this was found by special verdict in assize in
8 H. 8. And judgment was given upon great deliberation in the ex
chequer chamber, that the entry and feoffment were good, and the use
changed by the first indenture and agreement. * * *
1\fUTTON’S CASE, Hilary, 14 Eliz.—A. D. 1572.—-M001‘ 96, 1 And. C. P. 42,
pl. 106, Dyer 274.
Jane Mutton brought a writ of entry against Anne Mutton, who
pleaded in bar that John Mutton, the father of the said Jane, was
seised of the lands in question, and 1 & 2 Phil. & Mary, levied a fine of
them to the use of himself and the woman he should afterwards marry,
and after their death to the use of said Jane and the heirs of her body;
and that afterwards he took to wife said Anne, now tenant, and died;
that Jane by color of descent, without any right in possession, entered
on said Anne, who re-entered, for which re-entry Jane conceived this
action. Jane demurred to the plea. The case was argued by Jeoffreys
for the plaintiff and Mead for the defendant; and the only question in
the case was whether by the limitation of the use to the woman he
should afterwards marry, Anne obtained a jointure with John, or was the
limitation of the use and estate on this void, for want of a woman in being
at the time of the limitation. It was argued on both parts that such an
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estate limited in possession would be wholly void. But by the limitation
of the use in the present case, MANWOOD, MOUNSON, and HARPER, JJ.
in their arguments held clearly that the law is otherwise, and that the
demandant was barred. DYER, J . contra. And they all argued anno
17 Eliz. in the common bench openly.
With this agree the opinions of three justices in 6 Edw. 6, Brooke,
feofiments to uses 30; and 38 Hen. 8, Brooke Assurances; and the case
between Newes and Lark in Plowden’s Com. [ante p. 146] and the case
of petition by Basset v. the Queen, 4 Mary, Dyer; and 15 Eliz, in ejec
tione firmce by Huddy v. Gilbert.
Before this time it had been held otherwise in several cases. A feoffrnent
was made to the use of a man and woman and the heirs of their two bodies,
afterwards they inter-married, then the statute of uses was passed, vesting
the estate in them as they had the use; and held that they were not joint
tenants, and the wife surviving was entitled to a moiety only; though the
statute vested the possession in them at the same time, when they were hus
band and wife. Bedyll v. Holstoke (T. 3 & 4 Ph. & Mary, A. D. 1556); Ful
jambe v. Lyndacre (4 & 5 Ph. & Mary); and Morgan V. Wharton (E. 8 Eliz.,
A. D. 1566, in Com. Bench); all reported in 2 Dyer 149b, and one in 1 And.
303.
ANONYMOUS, in ‘C. B., Mich. 24 Eliz.-—A. D. 1582.—Moor 17 7.
MEAD and PERRIAM, JJ ., afiirmed that it was adjudged in the time
of Lord Dyer, that if lands are devised to two men and to the child
with which the wife of the devisor is enseint that this devise is good;
and the child shall take by the devise ; but if he should take in common
or in jointure the Loan DYER doubted.
TVOODLIFF v. DRURY, in B. R., 87 & 38 Eliz.—A. D. 1597.-Cro. Eliz. 439.
Trespass. After verdict, Coke, Att. Gen., moved in arrest of judg
ment, the case on the pleadings was, that one made a feoffment, and it
was declared in the indenture that it was to the use of himself and
A, his feme that should be, after their marriage, and to the heirs of
their bodies; and he took A to feme. \/Vhether she should take by the
limitation of this use was the question. And he moved that she
should not: for presently by this feofiment the fee is in the baron by
the possession, executed to the use which he had before the marriage;
which cannot after the marriage be divided and 'inade an estate tail in
him; for he had the fee in him until the marriage; for it might have
been that the marriage had never taken efiect, and that would have con
founded the other use; and uses in futuro shall not rise on such
future acts; for then an use should rise out of an use. [Tyrrel’s Case]
Dyer 155.
But All the Justices held, that although he be seised in fee in the
meantime, as in truth he is; yet by the marriage the new use shall
arise and vest, if there be no act in the meantime to destroy that future
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use (as it was in Chudley’s Case,) according to the limitation of the
use. And judgment was given accordingly for the plaintiff.
PAY’S CASE, in B. R. Easter, 44 El1z.—A. D. 1602.—Cro. Eliz. 878.
Upon a special verdict the case was, that one devised his land to J .
S. from Michaelmas following for five years, remainder after to the
plaintiff and his heirs. He [testator] died before Michaelmas: The
question was whether this were a good remainder, because it could not
enure instantly upon his death? For it may not begin until the par
ticular estate, which is not to begin till after Michaelmas, and a free
hold cannot be in expectancy. But ALL THE CoURT held, that it very
well might expect; for in case of a devise, the freehold in the mean
time shall descend to the heir, and vest in him. Wherefore, without
argument, it was adjudged accordingly, and that the remainder was
good.
HOPKIN S v. HOPKINS, in Court of Chancery, 1734.—Cas. Tem. Talb. 44,
5 Gray’s P. C. 168, Gate’s Cas. R. P. 221.
The testator, Mr. Hopkins, by his will, devises his real estate to trus
tees and their heirs, to the use of them and their heirs, in trust for
Samuel Hopkins (the plaintiff’s only son, which plaintiff is heir at law
to the testator) for life ; and from and after his decease, in trust for the
first and every other son of the body of the said Samuel, lawfully to be
begotten, and the heirs male of the body of every such son; and for want
of such issue, in case the said John Hopkins, the plaintiff, should have
any other son or sons of his body lawfully begotten, then in trust for
all and every such son and sons respectively and successively, for their
respective lives, with remainders over, then in trust for the first and every
other son of his cousin Anne Dare (wife of Francis Dare) lawfully to
be begotten, with like remainders to the heirs male of the body of
every such son of the said Anne Dare; and for default of such issue,
then in trust for his own right heirs forever.
Samuel Hopkins died in the testator’s lifetime, without issue; and
some time after, the testator died without any alteration made of his
will; nor had John Hopkins any other son; nor were any of the other
remaindermen in essg at the testator’s death, except Dare, son of
Anne Dare.
The cause was first heard at the rolls, and there decreed to be an
executory devise.
TALBOT, Lord Ch. Two questions have been made upon this will:
The first is, whether this limitation to the first and every other son of
John Hopkins can now take effect as an executory devise? or whether it
shall be taken as a contingent remainder, and consequently void for
want of a particular estate to support i
t, by reason of Samuel’s death in
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the testator’s lifetime, and that John Hopkins had no son in esse at
the testator’s death, in whom the remainder might vest? The next
question is, in case the limitation be taken as an executory devise, what
is to become of the rents and profits of this estate until -John Hopkins
has a son? As to the first, I think it impossible to cite any authorities
in point. None have been cited. It seems to be allowed, that if things
had stood at the testator’s death as they did at the time of the making
of the will, the limitation in question would have been a remainder,
by reason of Samuel’s_ estate, which would have supported it. So is
the case of Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Saund. 380, 388, and limitations of this
kind are never construed to be executory devises but where they cannot
take efiect as remainders. So on the other hand, it is likewise clear, that
had there been no such limitation to Samuel and_his sons, the limitation
must have been a good executory devise, there being no antecedent estate
to support it; and consequently not able to inure as a remainder; so
that it must be the intervening accident of Samuel’s death in the testa
tor’s lifetime, upon which this point must depend. And as to that, I
am of opinion that the time of making the will is principally to be re
garded in respect to the testator’s intent. If an infant or feme covert make
a will, and do not act either at full age or after the covert'ure determined,
to revoke this will, yet the will is void, because the time of making is
principally to be.considered; and the law judges them incapable of dispos
ing by will at those times. The same reason holds in the case of a devise
of all the lands which a man has or shall have at the time of his death, no
after-purchased lands shall pass without a republication, which was the
case of Bunter v. C0070, 1 Salk. 237, because the time of the will made
is chiefly to be regarded. Indeed it_ is possible that subsequent things
may happen to alter the testator’s intent; but unless that alteration be
declared, no court can take notice of his private intent, not manifested
by any revocation of the former; though these subsequent accidents may
and must, in many cases, have an operation upon the will ; as in the case
of Fuller v. Fuller, Cro. Eliz. 422, [ante p. 181], and Hutton v. Simp
son, 2 Vern. 722. And in the Lord Landsd0wn’s Case, 10 Mod. 96, the
first limitation did not expire by effiuxion of time, but by the inter
vening alteration of things between the time of the will made and the
testator’s death; and the words there, for want of such issue, were not
construed to create another estate tail to postpone the limitation, but
only to convert the second estate to the precendent limitation. So we
see, that in these cases the method of the courts is not to set aside the
intent because it cannot take effect so fully as the testator desired; but
to let it work as far as it can. And if
,
in this case, we consider it as an
executory devise, the intent will be served in case John Hopkins has
a second son; but if it is taken as a remainder, the intent plainly ap
pearing that a second son of John Hopkins should take, is quite de
stroyed; there being no precedent estate to support it as a remainder.
The very being of executory devises shows a strong inclination, both in
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the courts of law and equity, to support the testator’s intent (Doe v.
Fonnereau, 2 Doug. 487), as far as possible; and though they do not
of ancient date, yet they are of the same nature with springing uses,
which are as old as uses themselves. I can see no difference between
this case and the others of like nature, that have been adjudged. And
if such a construction may be made consistently with the rules of law,
and agreeable to the testator’s intent, it would be very hard not to sufier
it to prevail. In Pay’s Case, Cro. Eliz. 878 [ante p.], had the testator
lived to Michaelmas, the limitation had been a remainder; and if a re
mainder in its first creation does, by any subsequent accident, become
an executory devise, why should it not be good here, upon the authority
of that case, where by the testator’s death before Michaelmas, what
would otherwise have been a remainder, was held to be good by way of
executory devise? I think, that in this case the limitation would
operate as an executory devise, if it was of a legal estate; and therefore
shall do so as a trust, the rules being the same.
The next question is
,
what is to become of the rents and profits, in
case this be taken to be an executory devise, until the birth of a son
to John Hopkins? * * * Until somebody is in esse to take under this
executory devise, the rents and profits must be looked upon as a residue
undisposed of, and consequently must descend upon the heir-at-law;
the case being the same where the whole legal estate is given to the
trustees, and but part of the trust disposed of, as in this case; and where
but part of the legal estate is given away, and so the residue undisposed
of, the legal estate descends upon the heir-at-law. So it was held by
the Lord King in the case of Lord and Lady Hertford v. Lord Weymouth
—which shows that equity follows the law.
One objection indeed has been made, which is, that the testator hav
ing in this case devised another estate to John Hopkins, his heir-at-law,
can never be supposed to have intended him this surplus. And to war
rant that objection, the case of North v. Oromptonfl Ch. Cas. 196,
has been cited. I answ_er, that in these cases the heir does not take
by reason of the testator’s intent being one way or the other; but the
law throws it upon him: and wherever the testator has not disposed
(be his intent that the heir should take or not take), yet still he shall
take, for somebody must take ; and none being appointed by the testator,
the law, throws it upon the heir. * * * Decree aflirmed.
GORHAM v. DANIELS, in Vermont Sup. Ct. June, 1851.—23 Vt. 600.
Trespass quare clausum fregit. Amaziah Richmond, being well seised
in fee of the land in dispute, made a deed “meaning to convey one half
of the above described land, * * * and the other half not to come
into possession of it not till after my decease, Amaziah Richmond’s and
Sarah Richmond’s decease; it is meant to convey the whole of the above
land after the decease of Amaziah Richmond and Sarah Riclnnond.”
The consideration expressed was $750. The grantee was the son of
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Amaziah and Sarah, went into possession on execution of the deed, and
later borrowedmoney and gave a mortgage on the land, which was fore
closed on default, and plaintiff claims under the foreclosure decree.
Plaintiff being in possession, defendants entered, claiming under Sarah,
widow of the grantor. It was agreed that if Sarah then had title or
right of entry, defendant should recover costs; otherwise judgment
should be for plaintiff for $8.00 damages and costs. The county court
gave judgment for plaintiff and defendant excepts.
REDFIELD, J . This case has been twice argued, and mainly upon
the question how far_ the statute of Henry 8 of England, called the
Statute of Uses, is to be considered in force in this state. It seems to
me very much to be regretted, that so important a question should have
come to a final determination in a case so utterly insignificient in
pecuniary consequence. But I have given my best attention to the
subject, during the two arguments, and notwithstanding, it seems to be
conceded, that the Statute of Uses is considered in force in most of
the other American states, and would answer a good purpose, in many
cases, in effecting, at law, the real intention of the parties, without the
necessity of a resort to a court of equity, and the farther consideration,
that it is known, that the late Mr. Justice Thompson of the United
States supreme court, while presiding in the circuit court, in this state,
upon argument, and after a deliberate consideration, in a written opinion
of considerable labor, decided that it was in force here, still I cannot
bring my mind to that conclusion. See 1 Green1ief’s Cruise, 349, and
the learned editor’s elaborate note upon the subject, where the matter
is fully discussed.
But so far as the conveyance of lands, in this state, is concerned, it
seems to me, that our statutes are fully adequate to all the ordinary in
cidents of the subject, and that in those extraordinary cases, where the
statute of uses might answer a good end, it will be safer and better
every way, to have resort to a court of equity, than to introduce a portion
of the ancient common law system of conveying real estate, most of the
incidents of which have been materially modified, even in England,
since the seperation of this country from that, it would become necessary
immediately to resort to very extensive legislation, in order to render
this addition to our present laws even tolerable. (*610)
This view is certainly confirmed by the history of our jurisprudence
on this subject. Nothing ever existed in the history of this state, calling,
in the slighest degree, for the use of such a statute, except in those cases,
where, by some mistake, the parties have failed fully to effect their inten
tion in the prescribed mode. The Statute of Uses would no doubt aid
somewhat this class of cases. But its original purpose and design had not
the remotest bearing, or purpose in that direction even. And to adopt a
portion of a system of laws, which will in its train, very likely, draw in the
whole, for the mere purpose of effecting some collateral purpose in a par
ticular cause, seems almost absurd.
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We entertain no doubt, that our system of conveyancing, so different
from the English, so simple and intelligable to all, and so intended to be,
by means of a thorough system of registry, from the very first, was
designed to be entire in itself. And although most of its terms, and
many of its forms of deeds even, like that of bargain and sale, derived
their meaning and operation to some extent, from the common law and
the English statutes, and that of uses among others, yet it was no doubt
the purpose of the framers of our laws upon conveyancing to havethem
“understanded” of the people, without the necessity of resorting to the
study of the subject in other quarters. Such has been the practical con
struction of the subject by all, professional or unprofessional, ever since.
With rare exceptions the profession in this state have never supposed
any of the common law modes of conveyancing to be regarded as in
force here. The attempt to bar an entail in this state by a common
recovery or the rights of a married woman by a fine would, I think, strike
the profession with some surprise. * * * [*611]
* * *. -
The granting of an estate in fee, to take effect after a particular
estate reserved, as an estate for life, or lives, is not inconsistent with
the law of England. And if it were, it could have no application here;
for under our statute of conveyancing, there being no livery of seisin
in fact necessary to invest the grantee with the title, but only the seisin
resulting from the due execution and recording of the deed, there is no
objection whatever to the creating of a freehold estate, in terms, to take
effect in future. This has been expressly decided in some of the American
states and we see no valid objection to holding the same under our statute.
WARDWELL v. BASSETT, m Rhode Island Supreme cs, March, 1866.-is
R. I. 302.
Trespass and ejectment for possession of land and buildings in Provi
dence. Defendants claim under the deed of Chloe Bassett, habendum
to Amey Bassett and her heirs to her and their sole use and benefit
“from and after the day of my decease.” Plaintiff claims under the
grantor’s will. _
BRADLEY, C. J . The question in this case arises upon the con
struction of a quitclaim deed made in the common form under our
practice, with the habendum providing that it shall not take effect till
after the decease of the grantor. This is not an unusual mode of con
veyance in this and other New England states, and is
,
upon the face of
it
,
open to the objection of attempting to create an estate in fee in futuro.
It is a duty of the court, of course, to sustain the intention of the parties
if upon any legal grounds it can be sustained. [*305]
The language of the instrument may be construed as a covenant to
stand seised, as the intention is clear, and as, upon inquiry, we find
that the relations of the parties to this deed are such as to furnish a
suflicient consideration; for it is admitted in the case, though not upon
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the face of the deed, that the grantor was the mother of the husband of
the grantee, by whom he had children. The case of Wallis v. Wallis,
4 Mass. 135; Gale v. Coburn, 18 Pick. 397; Bell v. Scammon, 15 N. H.
381, 41 Am. Dec. 706, are strictly analogous to this case, upon the
point here decided. See also Byron v. Bradley, 16 Conn. 473. It is
unnecessary to consider whether the deed could be sustained upon other
grounds. Judgment for the defendant.
FERGUSON v. MASON’, in Wisconsin Sup. Ct., April 15, 1884,—60 Wis. 377,
19 N. W. 420. _
Ejectment to recover undivided third interest in land. John Fer
guson, Sr., conveyed the land to defendant by deed “in consideration
of one dollar and love and affection.” The deed contains the clause:
“The party of the first part reserves the sole, free, and absolute use and
control of all the above described lands so long as he and his wife, or
either of them, may live.” The grantor and his wife are dead, and the
parties and one Margaret are the only heirs. On the death of her
father, defendant went into possession and entirely excluded the plaintiff.
From judgment for defendant plaintiff appeals.
LYoN, J . Laying aside the question of homestead for the present,
it is necessary first to determine whether a conveyance of land by the
owner thereof in fee is valid in which it is stipulated that the grantor
shall have the possession and absolute use and control of the land during
his life.
In very many of the older cases the courts, out of tender regard to the
subtle and technical distinctions and niceties of the common law rules
respecting the tenure and alienation of real estate, seem to have held
that if such a conveyance be regarded as a feoffment, or bargain and
sale, it could not be upheld. The reason given was that the effect of the
exception or reservation therein contained was to retain the whole
estate in the grantor during his life, and to uphold the conveyance
would be to violate the rule that a freehold cannot thus be created
to commence in futuro. So those sourts upheld such conveyances on
the ground that a covenant might be implied from their terms, on the
part of each grantor, to stand seised‘ of the lands to his own use during
his life, and, after his decease, to the use of the grantee and his heirs.
Hence upon the execution of the deed, the grantor was tenant for life,
and a remainder in fee was vested in the grantee. Thus, those courts
were strictly loyal to the common law rules which grew out of tenures
that never obtained in this country to any great extent, and at the same
time gave judgments which are clearly reasonable and just. Many of
the cases above referred to are cited in the briefs of the respective Coi]l1s8l.
Such conveyances cannot, however, be upheld in this state on any implied
convenant,O or on the doctrine that the grantor stands seised to the use
of the grantee, for our statutes long since abolished both implied
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covenants and such uses. Rev. St. 1858, c. 84, § 1; Id. c. 86, § 5; Rev.
St. §§ 2071, 2204. But we think they may be upheld on other grounds.
The statutes recognize and define future estates in expectancy as fol
lows: “A future estate is an estate limited to commence in possession
at a future day, either without the intervention of a precedent estate,
or on the determination, by lapse of time or otherwise of a precedent es
tate created at the same time.” Rev. St. 1858, c. 83, § 10 ; Rev. St. 1878,
p. 614, § 2034. At common law the intervention of a precedent estate,
created at the same time, was essential to the validity of a conveyance
of an estate of freehold, to commence at a future time, which is an
estate in remainder. It was said that without such precedent estate there
could be no valid remainder. The reason was (and it was conclusive to
the minds of our English ancestors) that unless a precedent estate was
created there could be no livery of seisin to support the remainder; and
without livery of seisin, no estate of freehold could be created. After lay
ing down the rule and giving the reasons therefore above suggested,
Blackstone informs us how the future expectant estate, that is
,
the
remainder, may be created. He says: “So, when it is intended to grant
an estate of freehold, whereof the enjoyment shall be deferred till a
future time, it is necessary to create a previous particular estate, which
may subsist till that period of time is completed; and for the grantor
to deliver immediate possession of the land to the tenant of the particular
estate, which is construed to be giving possession to him in remainder,
since his estate and that of the particular tenant are one and the same
estate in law. * * * The whole estate passes at once from the grantor
to the grantees, and the remainder man is seised of his remainder at the
same time that the termor is possessed of his term. The enjoyment of
it must, indeed, be deferred till hereafter; but it is, to all intents and
purposes, an estate commencing -in presenti, though to be occupied and
enjoyed in futuro.” 2 Bl. Com. 165. But this refined doctrine of the
necessity to create a particular estate to support a freehold estate to
commence at a future time, has been overturned by the statute above
quoted. Similar statutes prevail in a large number of the states of
the Union. These are referred to in 2 Washb. Real Prop. 265 (4th ed.
592).
Conveyances of land containing exceptions or reservations, similar
to that in the conveyance under consideration in the present case, are
very common, and always have been in general use in this country, as
reports of judicial decisions abundantly show. Because of this fact,
some courts, in the absence of statutory provisions on the subject, have
held such conveyances valid, without much regard to any other ground
upon which their judgments might have been placed. This is notably
true of the supreme court of Connecticut. Barrett v. French, 1 Conn.
362; Fish v. Sawyer, 11 Conn. 545; Bissell v. Grant, 35 Conn. 288.
Our constitution thus ordains: “All lands within this state are de
clared to be allodial, and feudal tenures are prohibited.” Art. 1, § 14.
That is to say, the owner of land in this state holds the same of no
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superior. He has absolute dominion over it
,
owing no rent, service. or
fealty to any, on account thereof. His obligation of fealty to the govern
ment is an obligation arising out of his citizenship, and is no greater or
different because he is a proprietor also. Even the government may not
condemn his land to the public use without paying him a just com
pensation therefor. Why has not the owner of land, held by a tenure
so absolute, the right to convey it on such terms and under such re
strictions as he chooses to impose, so long as he contravenes no public
policy or positive rule of law? And what policy or rule of law is con
travened, if
,
instead of making his conveyance take effect immediately,
he stipulates that it shall take effect at the end of a month, or a year,
or on the happening of some future event? We should be strongly in
clined to uphold that right as a necessary incident to allodial tenure,
were there no statute expressly conferring it. The conclusion is in
evitably, that, if otherwise suflicient, a conveyance of land in fee, to
take effect at a future time, is valid, and will vest the fee in the grantee
according to the terms of the conveyance. "
‘ * * '
In conclusion it is but just to say that the case was argued by learned
counsel for both parties with great ability, and their learning and re
search have been of much value to us in determining it. The judgment
of the circuit court must be affirmed.
A Fee After A Fee.
ANON., in Common Bench, Easter, 28 and 29 Hen. 8.—-A. D. 1538.—1 Dyer
33a.
The custom of London is that a man may devise his purchased lands
in mortmain. And a purchaser devised by his will, that the prior and
convent of St. Bartholomew in West Smithfield and their successors
should have the lands, so as they paid annually to the dean and chapter
of St. Paul sixteen marks; and if they should fail of payment, that
their estate should cease, and that the said dean and chapter and their
successors should have it. And for a breach of the condition, they of
St. Paul entered. And to FITzHERBERT [J .] and BALDWIN [C. J.] it
seemed clear, that the condition is void; for it cannot continue after
the fee-simple given, for the feoffor has determined his right and in
terest, and then the stranger cannot enter for the condition broken, but
the heir may.
In speaking of this case in Gardner v. Sheldon, Vaughn 271, Judge
Vaughn said Baldwin and Fitzherbert were the greatest lawyers of their
age. Fitzherhert was the author of the Abridgment.
In Trinity, 19 Hen. 8, A. D. 1529, Fitzherbert, J. said: “If a man devise
land to H in fee, and if he die Without heir that M shall have the land, this
devise is void as to M; for a fee-simple cannot depend upon another fee
simple by the law.”
This point was made a question in 2 & 3 Ph. & Mary, A. D. 1553, on a de
vise in fee by a debtor to his sons on condition to pay his debts, devise over
to an uncle on like condition; and the first devisees failed to pay, and the
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second died without payment, and whether his heir could enter for the con
dition broken and make payment? But no decision reported. Wilford v.
Wilford, Dyer 128a.
HARWELL v. LUCAS, Hilary, 14 Eliz.—A. D. 1572.—l\I0or 99.
Replevin by Thomas Harwell against William Lucas. Thomas
Bracebridge, seised of the manor of K in Warwick county, made a lease
for 21 years of six acres of the manor to Thos. Moore without rent, and
afterwards he made a lease of the said six acres to John Curtes for 26
years to commence after the first lease expired, rendering certain rent;
and afterwards he made a feoffment of the manor and all other his lands,
to the use of the feoffees and their heirs, on condition that if they do not
pay 10,000£. within fifteen days to Thomas Bracebridge or his assigns,
then they shall be seised to the use of said Thomas and Joyce his wife,
remainder to Thomas their second son in tail, with divers remainders
over, remainder to the right heirs of said Thomas the father. Livery
was made of the land in possession only, and nothing in the six acres;
the money was not paid; and afterwards the first lessee for years at
torned, Thomas Sr. and wife died, the first lease expired, the second
lessee died, his wife being executor married Lucas, and Harwell the
plaintiff distrained the cattle of Lucas for rent arrear, as bailiff of
Thomas Bracebridge the son. The case was argued at bar and bench,
and at last adjudged for the defendant.
For although they held that the reversion of the six acres did not
pass by the livery of the manor without attornment, yet they held that
the attornment of the first lessee was sufficient; and also that although
the use limited to the feoffees and their heirs was determined before the
attornment, yet the attornment was good so as to pass the reversion
to the subsequent contingent use; and so the title of Thomas Brace
bridge the son to the rent was good, and the conusance of the defendant
his bailifi was sufficient.
This is given by Cruise as the second case of a shifting use decided after
the passage of the Statute of Uses, the first being reported in Brooke Abr.
feoff. ai Use pi. 30, and he adds: “It is observable that these cases were
prior to that of Chudieigh [ante p. 202] so that the doctrine of a possi
bility of entry or scintilla juris was not then established. But since
Chudleigh’s Case it is settled that all contingent uses must arise out of
the seisin of the covenantors, feoffees, or releasees to ‘uses, and not out
of the seisin of any prior cestui que use.” 2 Cruise’s Digest *356.
SOULLE v. GERRARD, in C. B., Mich. 38 & 39 Eliz.-—A. D. 1597, Cro. Eliz.
525. Abridged from Crokc.
Ejectione firmae. Upon not guilty pleaded, a special verdict found,
that Richard Baker seised in fee of land held in socage, devised it to his
son Richard and his heirs for ever, and if he died within age of 21 or
without issue, then the land should be divided equally amongst his three
other sons. The devisor died; Richard the son had issue Mary, and died
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within age; the other sons entered, and let it to the plaintiff; and the
defendant, by Mary’s command, ousted him.' Glanville, for the plaintiff,
argued that or cannot be taken for and; and that while a remainder
limited after a fee is held void at common law, as in 19 Hen. 8, pl. 8, and
29 Hen. 8, 1 Dyer 33, [ante p. 225.] it might well be under the statute
of wills 32 Hen. 8. _c. 1; for the statute gives liberty to every owner to
dispose of his land by devise at his will and pleasure; and as a re
mainder may be limited to depend on a fee by act of parliament, so it
may by will, which is to be so construed. And this is the opinion of
M0nson in [Newis v. Lark & Hunt 2] Plowden 413 [ante p. 146].
ANDERSON, [C. J.] The words of the act of parliament, that “he may
dispose at his will and pleasure,” are not to be construed so largely as has
been said; but he may dispose at his will and pleasure, so as it be accord
ing to the rules of law, otherwise it is a vain will. * * * I conceive
that this part of the limitation, “If he die within age,” is utterly void;
for a remainder cannot depend upon a fee; and then it is all one as if
the limitation had been single, “if he die without issue,” so Richard
had an estate tail, which descended to his daughter, and so the de
fendant’s entry was lawful. WAL1»1sLEY, BEAUMOND, and OWEN, [J J .],
agreed with ANDERsoN, [C. J .], and it was adjudged for the defendant.
.A fee on a fee by devise was held valid in Wellock v. Hammond (1591),
Cro. Eliz. 204, ante, , under conditions.
PLUNKET v. HOLMIES, in King’s Bench, 13 Car. 2,—-A. D. 1661.—1 Lev. 11,
2, L. Raym. 28, 1 Sid. 47, 1 Keb. 29, 119, 5 Gray P. C. 50. Given according
to Levin.
In ejectment, not guilty was pleaded and a special verdict found, on
which the case was, a man seised in fee devised the land to his eldest
son Thomas for life, and if he dies without issue living at the time of
his death, to Leonard, another son, and his heirs; but if Thomas had
issue living at his death, that then the fee should remain to the right heirs
of Thomas forever. Thomas enters after the devisor’s death, and suffers
a common recovery, under which the defendant claims, and dies without
issue. Two questions were made; 1, if by the will Thomas had only
a life estate, with a contingent remainder to Leonard, or whether the
fee was vested in Thomas, with an executory devise to Leonard; 2, if
it be an executory devise to Leonard, if the common recovery has barred
it. For the plaintiff it was argued, that Thomas had the fee, for though
only an estate for life be devised to him, yet by descent the whole fee
was in him, which merged his estate for life, and this is executed in him;
and then the estate to Leonard cannot be any other than an executory
devise; for when the whole fee is given or vested in one person, with
a limitation of a fee to another upon a contingency, this cannot be a
remainder, for one fee cannot remain (*12) upon another, but of ne
cessity must take effect as an executory devise. But when part of an
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estate is disposed of, as for life or in tail, and the residue given to an
other on a contingency, as to the right heirs of J . S. who is in life, or
to such a person as shall be living in the house at such a time, this is
a contingent remainder. But here the whole estate is in Thomas, either
by the devise or by descent, and then the devise to Leonard must of
necessity be an executory devise, which being to happen within the com
pass of a life, has been allowed, as in Pell and B1'0wu’s Case, 2 Cro.
[post p. 242]. And as to the second question they also relied on Pell and
Brown/s Case, where it was adjudged that a recovery shall not bar in
such a case. But on the other side it was argued, and so resolved by the
WHQLE Couar in Michaelmas term, 13 Car. 2, that Thomas took
but an estate for life by the will, and the remainder to his heirs not
executed; and though he bethe heir, to whom the reversion descends,
that shall not drown the estate for life contrary to the express devise
and intent of the will, but shall leave an opening, as they termed it
,
for
the interposing of the remainders when they happen to interpose between
the estate for life and the fee; and they compared it to Archer’s Case,
1 Coke [ante p. 55] ; where though Robert the devisee for life was heir,
yet the remainder to his next heir male was contingent, and so not an
estate for life merged by the descent of the reversion. And so the
estate of Thomas here being only for life, by this devise the remainder
to Leonard was a contingent remainder, and barred by the recovery.
And then the second point will not come in question, whether an ex
ecutory devise shall be barred by a common recovery. But on the first
point, they all gave judgment for the defendant.
SMITH v. BRISSON, in N. Car. Sup. ca, Feb., 1ss4.-90 N. Car. 284.
Ejectment. Both parties claim under a deed containing these words:
“For and in consideration of the natural love and affection I have for my
son, Rowland Mercer, and the further sum of one dollar to him in hand
paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, has given, granted,
bargained, sold, and conveyed, and do hereby give, bargain, sell and con
vey, to the said Roland Mercer and the heirs of his body, and if the said
Roland Mercer should have no heirs, the said land shall go to the heirs
of my son James A. Mercer,_ all that tract of land,” &c.
AsHE, J . Both parties to this action claim title to the land de
scribed in the complaint under the deed executed by Roland Mercer, Sr.,
to Roland Mercer, Jr., onthe 30th day of August, 1859. The plaintiffs
contend that the deed conveyed an absolute estate in fee simple in the
land to Rowland Mercer, Jr., and by his will the fee simple title to the
same was devised to the feme plaintiff. The defendants, on the other
hand, insist that the deed conveyed only a determinable fee to Rowland
Mercer, Jr., which terminated by his death without children, and vested
an absolute fee simple, by the limitation in said deed, in the children
of James A. Mercer. * * , *
At common law a fee simple could not be limited after a fee simple.
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There was no way known to that law by which a vested fee simple
could be put an end to and another estate put in its place; and the reason
is
,
because no freehold could pass without livery of seisin, which must
operate immediately or not at all. But after the Statute of Uses, 27
Hen. 8, when the possession of the legal estate was transferred to the
use, vesting the legal estate in the cestui que use in the same quality,
manner, form, and condition that he held the use, and the courts of
law assumed jurisdiction of uses, it was held that an estate created by
deed operating under the statute might be made to commencein futur0,
without any immediate transmutation of possession; as by bargain and
sale, or a covenant to stand seised to uses. Cessante ratione cessat et lens.
And consequently it was held that, by such conveyances, inheritances
might be made to shift from one to another upon a supervening contin
gency ; which to avoid perpetuities, was required to be such as must hap
pen within a life or lives in being, and the period of gestation and twenty
one years thereafter. * * *
Thence arose the doctrine of springing and shifting uses, or condi
tional limitations. * * * It was under this doctrine of a shifting use
that it has been (*289) held since very early after the Statute of Uses,
that a fee simple may be limited after a fee simple, either by deed or will;
if by deed, it is a conditional limitation; if by will, it is an executory
devise. “And in both these cases a fee may be limited after a fee.” 2
Bl. Com. 334. * * *
The Statute of Uses is in force in this state. Code § 1330. And
the deed, under which both parties to the action claim title to the
land in controversy, has its operation under the statute, and as the con
sideration mentioned in it is both pecuniary and natural afiection, it
may operate either as a bargain and sale or as a covenant to stand seised,
as to both parties, for they are all the blood relations of the grantor.
Our conclusion is that the limitation over to the children of James
A. Mercer was good, and that there was error in the court below in not
rendering judgment in their behalf upon the case agreed. * * * Re
versed.
ALLEN v. FOGLER, in S. Car. Ct. Of App., Dec. 1852.—6 Rich. Law 54.
Trespass to try title, by W. H. Allen and others, claiming as the
heirs of Josiah Gillett Allen, against John J . Folgar, claiming under
a deed made by Harriet Allen, who has died without issue. All parties
claim through a deed in these words: “Know all men by these presents,
that, I, Elijah Gillett, of state and district aforesaid, do, for the love
and affection I bear towards Harriet Allen and Joseph Gillett Allen,
give and bequesth to Harriet Allen, and to the heirs of her body, and
in case of her death before she has an heir, I desire whatever I may
give to her, may be the right and property of Josiah Gillett Allen, and
in case of his death before he has an heir,” &c.
_
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O’NEALL, J . * * * That the limitation over would be good by
way of executory devise, I do not entertain a doubt; for it would be
within a life or lives in being and twenty-one years after. But the
misfortune to the plaintiffs is that the question arises under a deed,
and not under a will. It is a case of remainder. Mr. Fearne, in his
book on Remainders. c. 6 § 8, p. 371, says, “A fee at common law cannot
be mounted on a fee; as if lands are limited to one and his heirs, and if he
dies without heirs, then to another, this last is void.” In this case the
first estate is a fee conditional at common law,‘ and upon that is
mounted a fee eventually to Elijah Gillett Allen and his heirs. The
latter is void under the rule cited from Mr. Fearne. The motion to re
verse the decision below is dismissed. All concurred.
PALELER v. COOK, in Ill. Sup. Ct.., 1896, 159 Ill. 300, 42 N. E. 79b, 50 Am.
St. Rep. 165. _
Bill for dower and partition by the surviving husband of Emily Cook.
Her title was by the following deed: “The grantor, Thomas Stewart,
of, [&c.], for and in consideration of one dollar in hand paid, doth
hereby grant, bargain, sell, convey, and warrant to Mary A. Stewart
and Emily C. Stewart, of Macoupin county, the following real estate
[describing it]. And I, Thomas Stewart, as for myself, retain pos
session and reserve the use, profits, and full control, during my life;
and further, in case either of the grantees dies without a heir, her in
terest to revert to the survivor. Dated this 10th day of March, 1883.
Thomas Stewart.” The trial court held the fee vested in the grantees,
and decreed dower and partition. Mary, the other grantee, appeals,
and contents that the grantees took simply a life estate, with a con
tingent remainder to the survivor in fee.
PHILLIPS, J . * * * By the thirteenth section of chapter 30 of the
Revised Statutes it is provided: “Every estate in lands which shall be
granted, conveyed, or devised although other words heretofore necessary
to transfer an estate of inheritance be not added, shall be deemed a
fee simple estate of inheritance, if a less estate be not limited by ex
press words, or do not appear to have been granted, conveyed, or de
vised by construction or operation of law.” By §9 of the same chapter
the words “convey and warrant” to the grantee are declared to be a
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, and his heirs and assigns,
with certain covenants, &c.
This deed is clearly within the letter and spirit of §9, and, by
the two sections above named, a fee simple estate was vested in the
grantees. It is an established principle of construction of contingent
remainders, that an estate cannot, by deed, be limited to another
after a fee already granted. The term “re1nainder” necessarily implies
what is left, and, if the entire estate is granted, there can be no re
1 Because the Statute De Donis was not in force in South Carolina.
_t__.._..... ._._ _.___i,_._ _ _,,:_ _.____ .__ .. _
EXECUTORY DEVISES AND SPRINGING AND SHIFTING USES. 231
mainder. This deed affected an absolute fee simple conveyance by the
first clause of the deed and vested the estate. By the last clause an
attempt is made to mount a fee upon a fee, which can only be done
by executory devise; Smith v. Kirnbell, 153 Ill. 368, 38 N. E. 1029;
Fowler V. Black, 136 Ill. 363, 26 N. E. 596; Griswold, V. Hicks, 132
Ill. 494, 24 N. E. 63, 22 Am. St. Rep. 549. * * * Under these prin
ciples this deed reserved to the grantor a life estate, and vested the fee
in the grantees; and the clause, “and further, in case either of the
grantees dies without a heir, her interest to revert to the survivor,”
must be held to be inoperative as a limitation of a fee.
O Decree ajfirmed.
The case above was cited and distinguished in Cover v. James (1905), 217
Ill. 309, 75 N. E. 490, ; in which it was held that, “convey and warrant
to A. Fred Cover and Bessie Cover * * ". In case of the death of either
' ‘ * the other to have the whole of said property without litigation,"
gave them an estate as tenants in common for their joint lives, with re
mainder to the survivor. -
By the Statute of Uses a fee might be limited after a fee, and that statute
is expressly re-enacted in Illinois. Does that fact affect this case?
After Life Estatelout of Term for Years.
ANON., 33 Hen. 8.—A. D. 1541.—Brooke’s New Cases pl. 209, Marslfs Trans
lation, Chattels. Bro. Abr. Chattels 23.
If a lessee for years devise his term, or other his chattel or goods, by
testament, to one for term of his life, the remainder over to another,
and dies, and the devisee enters and aliens not the term, nor gives nor
sells the chattel, and dies, there he in remainder shall have it. But if
the first devisee had aliened, given, or sold it
,
there he in remainder had
been without remedy for it. And so, it seems, if they be forfeit in
his life, he in remainder hath no remedy.
ANON., in Ki1_1g’s Bench, Mich. 6 Edw. 6.—-A. D. 1553.-—Dyer 74a.
A termor of a parsonage devised his entire lease, term, and interest,
to another, provided, if it should happen that the devisee die in the
life-time of I. S., that then the said lease, term, and [*74b] interest,
should remain entire to the said I. S. during the residue of the term
of the lease. The devisee sold the term entire, and died in the life-time
o
f I. S. Whether I. S. hathany remedy for the term or not? And LORD
MoNTAoUE [C. J .] and Justice HALns thought not. And it was said
by MONTAGUE, that the case was ruled by the opinion of all the justices
in the time of IJORD RICH, when he was chancellor.
See the comment on this and the other cases of this kind by Lord Chan
cellor Nottingham in the Duke of Norfolk’s Case, post p. 248 at p. 257.
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STANLEY v. BAKER, in Queen’s Bench, Mich., 27 & 28 Eliz.-—A. D. 1586.—
Moor 220.
Hitchcock, possessed of a lease for years, devised it to his oldest son
and the heirs of his body, and if he die without issue to his younger son
and the heirs of his body, and on default of such issue that the term
remain to his daughters. He died leaving two daughters and another was
afterwards born. The eldest son sold the term and died without issue;
the younger also died without issue; and the three daughters entered.
And the term was adjudged to the three, although the younger was not
born till after the death of the devisor. Otherwise, if the two daughters
had been named in the devise by their proper names.
RAYMAN v. GOLD, in Common Bench, Hilary, 34 Eliz.-—A. D. 1592.—Moor
635.
Ejectione firmae. It was found by verdict that Soper, possessing a
term for 80 years, devised that after the death of his wife, whom he
made sole executor, his sons John and Edw. shall have the whole profit
of the farm, and the longest liver of them shall appoint who shall have
the residue of the years which shall be remaining at the time. The
points moved were three: 1. If the widow had any estate by implication
for her life, as she would have in land of inheritance; and they agreed
that she would not, because the devisor could not in his life make an
estate for life out of a term. 2. If the devise of the profits was a de-'
vise of the term itself, and it was so agreed. 3. If the term may be de
vised to one for life, with remainder of the years to another which
should be to come at the time of the death of the first devisee, or the
same land after the death of the tenant for life. As to this the court
held that he could not, yet that a termor may demise the land for certain
years if the lessee so long live, and may demise the same land
to another to commence after the death of the first devisee, and it will be
good. _But note that in the principal case the widow all her life held
the term as executor, and not by implication of the devise; and the
estate of the sons is not appointed to commence till after the death of
the widow; by which it seemed to the court that it may well be as a
devise to the sons after the death of the widow, she having taken nothing
by the devise; and this inured as if the termor devise that after the
death of a stranger J . S. should have the land for such years as then
should be to come; and this is good by devise, because he might so have
done by demise in his life.
FOSTER v. BROWN, in Trinity 2 Jae. 1.—A. D. 1605.-—Moor 758.
A lessee for years devised the profits of his term to his wife for life,
remainder to Agnes _Hast for her life if Gabriel Mermion, his son-in-law,
within two years after devisor’s death should not bind himself in 100£. I
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to pay 5£ a year to said Agnes during her life, and if he bind himself
then all the term was devised to said Gabriel and the issue male of his
body, and if he die without issue, remainder over. Agnes died within two
months; and Gabriel, not having entered into the obligation, died leav
ing issue male, who'died within the term; and the plaintiff claimed by re
_lease and assignment of the executor against him in remainder. The
question was if the remainder was good or destroyed. The attorney
general allowed that the devise of the profits is a devise of the term;
and he held the remainder good, and not to be interrupted by what had
happened; and on this he cited Palmer’s Case, in the exchequer 33
Eliz. - ; Almer v. Lodington, in C. B. 35 Eliz. Pierponfs Case,
27 Eliz., adjudged in C. B. and affirmed on error in B. R. ; which
cases prove a remainder good after a life estate of a term. But re
mainder in tail, where after an estate in tail of a term is void, as ad
judged in trinity 27 Eliz. in B. R. in Miller’s Case. Brooke, on the other
side, cited Chedington’s Case, 1 Coke 153; 37 Hen. 6 ; 28 Hen.
8, 7 ; Dyer 33 H. 8. Brooke H0e’s Case 334; Brooke
Abr. t. demise 13; 2 Ed. 6; Brooke 168; 10 Eliz., Dyer 177; 13
Eliz., Dyer 358; Trin. 29 Eliz. rot. 187-1, Hamington’s Case,
that the devise of the profits to the woman during her widowhood with
remainder over was good. The second point was if the remainder limited
to Gabriel on a condition precedent of entering into bond within the
year after the death of the devisor was good, as he did not enter into
bond. They agreed that it was good notwithstanding, because the time
he was to have was a year, and the woman died within two months,
so that the condition was discharged by the act of God. Note that the
case was adjudged with Brooke, but with a special entry by the court
in the roll that they did not give judgment on the remainder but on
the release afterward procured of the executors.
PRICE v. ALMORY in Klng’s Bench, Trinity, 10 Jae. 1.—A. D. 1613.—M0or
831.
In ejeeti-one firmae, it was found specially that Tho. Moore, possessing
a term for 40 years, devised it to his wife for life if so long a widow, re
mainder to his son and the heirs of his body. The wife being executor
entered and claimed the term as a legacy. John the son died in the
life of the wife, the wife died, John’s executor entered, and the court
was of opinion that the entry of the executors was not lawful, because
John had only a possibility and no interest. See Chedingtoafs Case 1
Coke 153, where such possibility did not pass to the administrator; and
Manning’s Case, 8 Coke 96, where such devise was good as an executory
devise; but the case did not say that if the devisee of such possibility
die before the event happened, if the possibility would pass to the ex
ecutor. The court agreed that the heir of John the son could not take
the possibility by limitation.
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ANON., Hilary, 22 Hen. 7.—A. D. 1507.—Kellwey 881).
The opinion was that if one make a feoffment of land in fee to the
use of himself and his heirs, if the feofior make a lease for a term of
years to a man rendering rent, and die, that the lease is good by the
statute (1 Rich. 3, c. 1). If the heir in this ease should bring an action
of debt generally and show the lease made by his father, and though the
reversion descended to him, and by rent becoming in arrear after the
death of his father an action accrued to him, by all the court such a count
would not be good, but he ought to show the feofiment made by his
father to the use of himself and his heirs, and so to make a special
count. And it was also said, that although the rent was reserved only
to the lessor and not to his heirs, yet his heir should have it during
the term, for the rent is parcel -of the reversion; and as the reversion
descended to the heir, so the rent though not thus limited expressly in
the lease.
ANON., 3 Mary.—A. D,. 1556. Brooke’s New Cases pl. 470, Marsh’s trans
lation t. Feoffments to Uses, Bro. Abr. t. Feotfments to Uses 59.
If a covenant by indenture be that the son of A shall marry the
daughter of C, for which‘ C. gives A 100£., and for this A covenants
with C. that if the marriage takes not effect, that A and his heirs shall
be seised of 150 acres of land in D to the use of C and his heirs until
A his heirs or executors repay the 100£., and afterwards C has issue
within age and dies, and afterwards the marriage takes not effect, by
which the estate is executed in the heir of C by the statute of uses made
27 Hen. 8, notwithstanding that C died before the refusal of the mar
riage, for now the use and possession vests in the heirs of C, for that
the indentures and covenants shall have relation to the making of the in
dentures, for these indentures bind the land with the use, which in
dentures were made in the life of C. But by Brooke query whether the
heir of C shall be in ward to the lord, for he is heir, and yet a pur
chaser, as it seems.
'
BULLEN v. GRANT, in Queen’s Bench, Mich. 31 & 32 Eliz., A. D. 1591.
-—Cr0. Eliz. 148.
Trespass. The case upon evidence was, Hugh Bullen, father of the
plaintiff, being a copyholder in fee, surrenders the land to the use of his
last will, and devises it to his wife for life, remainder to G, his son in
tail, remainder to T, his son, in tail. The lord admits M and afterwards
admits G. The wife dies. G dies without issue. T is admitted and sur
renders to the use of the defendant and dies without issue. The plaint
iff, before admittance, being the heir of Hugh B, enters, and upon an
O
_
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ouster brings trespass. It was held PER CURIAM that the heir may enter
without admittance; for WRAY said when the surrender is to the use of
his last will, this is at first of all the whole fee; but when he deviseth
the land for life or in tail, and doth not meddle with the reversion, by
this the reversion never passed out of him, to the lord, but descends to
his heir, and he shall have it without any admittance. * * *
MILFORD v. FENWIKE, in the King’s Bench, M1ch., 32 & 33 Eliz.—-A. D.
1591.—1 And. 288. Same case sub nom. Fenwike v. Mitforth, Moor 284,
'1 Leon. 182.
Ejectione firmae was brought in the king’s bench by Margery and
Mary Milford against Fenwike, in which the case was that Anthony
Milford, being seised of land in fee, levied a fine of it to divers per
sons'to the use of his wife for life, and after to the use of Jasper his
son in tail, and after to the use of his right heirs; after which the
said Anthony leased the land for 1000 years to said Fenwike and died,
later the wife died, and the son also without issue; on which matter
the doubt was if the lease was good or not. And those who argued
against the lease claimed that this was a remainder to the right heirs
of Anthony, and that they took the land as purchasers, and so now the
lease is determined by the death of the lessor, and on this an action would
not lie. On the other side it was said that it should be a reversion;
the cause of which, as it was said, was, for this, that what the said
Anthony had limited in remainder in fee to his right heirs he should
haye in himself, and if he limit such a thing in use or possession to his
heirs the limitation is void; for it may not take effect in the heir of
him who limits it if not by descent. And other arguments were made
on uses express and implied, * * *. And at last it was adjudged by
the court, Mich. 32, 33 Eliz., that the lease was good, for this that the
fee simple remained in the lessor, and was as a reversion, and they gave
their reason on the cause above. _
ANON., in K1ng’s Bench, uncertain time.—1 And. 256, pl. 264.
:
If one make a feoflfment in fee to the use of himself for life, re
mainder over to a stranger for life in use, and after this to the use of
the right heirs of the feofior; the question was if this fee simple was to
this day in the feofior or not; and this in the nature of a reversion
in him or not, or if it should be in the nature of a remainder to the heirs
of the feoffor; and it was agreed by the COURT of king’s bench (as
the chief justice said to me), that the fee is in the feoflfor, and the use
limited to the heirs of the feofior is a use of the fee in himself in the
nature of a reversion; for this that it came from himself and by his
own act, and not from any other; which being the law, it follows that
the feoffor may sell the land, &c., and if he should die without heir
of age it shall be in ward; and so here it is accounted in all cases as a
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reversion; see before [1 And.] case 3, but it is better, reported by Dyer
in his book.
That limitation to heirs of feoffer is reversion. Jordan v. McClure (1877),
85 Pa. St. 495. O
BEDINGFIELD v. ONSLOW, in Common Pleas, Easter, 1 Jae. 2.-—A. D.
1685.—3 Lev. 209. Abridged.
Case, and declares that plaintiff was seised in fee of a close, and de
fendant possessed of the adjoining one, between which closes ran a
rivulet, and that defendant stopped it
,
and so that plaintiff’s trees were
drowned, and perished. Defendant pleads that the tenant holding under
lease by plaintiff’s father had accepted satisfaction for said trespass,
to which plaintifi demurs. And after arguments at the bar, and con
sideration of the books of_ 19 Hen. 6, 12; 12 Hen. 6, 4; 2 Roll Abr. 551;
Love v. Piggot, Cro. Eliz. 55; it was resolved by CHARLTON, LEVINZ,
and STREET, who only were in court, that this was no plea; for the
plaintiff, in respect of the prejudice done to the reversion, may maintain
an action; * * * and satisfaction given to one is no bar to the other.
But trespass during the plaintiff’s term could not be had, it being
founded merely on the possession.
METHODIST PROTESTANT CHURCH v. YOUNG, in N. Car. Sup. Ct., Feb.
18, 1902.,—130 N. Car. 8, 40 S. E. 691.
Action by the Methodist Protestant Church of Henderson and
others against J. R. Young and others, to quiet title. From a judgment
in favor of plaintiffs. Defendants appeal.
FURCHES, C. J . On the 21st of September, 1880, in consideration
of $1. W. A. Harris conveyed the land in controversy to “D. E. Young,
Geo. A. Harris, and John F. Harris,” trustees of the plaintiff church,
“and to their successors in oflice, upon which to build a church for
the worship of Almighty God,” with full warranty against the right
and claim of all other persons whatsoever. But he provided that if
said church “discontinue the occupancy of said lot in manner as
aforesaid, then this deed shall be null and void, and the said lot or
parcel of ground shall revert to the said W. A. Harris and his heirs
and assigns forever.” The plaintiffs erected a church building on
said lot soon thereafter, and continued to occupy and use the same as
a place of worship until December, 1900, at which time, their church
having increased until the building could not afford suitable accomoda
tion for the congregation, the plaintiffs decided to build a new church;
and for the reason that the location had become undesirable for a
church, and for the reason that the plaintiffs thought the lot would
be more valuable to sell it with the building on it than it would be to
tear down the building, which they would have to do to build on the
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same lot, they purchased another lot near by, and built a church on
that lot. In December, 1882, the said W. A. Harris died, leaving a
last will and testament, and one son, W. C. Harris, and one daughter,
Pattie Young, his only children, and heirs at law. By his said will he
devised and bequeathed his property to his two children, in which
he used the following language: __To Pattie Young, “one-half of all
my real and personal estate, of every kind and description, not here
inbefore disposed of.” Walter C. Harris is still living, but Pattie
died in October, 1892, without issue, leaving a last will and testament,
in which, after making numerous other dispositions of her property,
she willed in item 19 as follows: “It is my will and desire that all the
rest and residue of my property, real, personal, and mixed, of which I
may die seised and possessed, shall be sold and collected by my exec
utor hereinafter named, upon such terms as to time as he may deem
best.” She then named the defendant Young as her executor, and he
claims one-half of the property in controversy, under this‘nineteenth
item of Pattie Young’s will; and the plaintiffs for the purpose of
removing this cloud upon the title, brought this action.
~ It will ‘be observed that the deed from WQA. Harris to the plaintiff
is an absolute fee, which may have continued forever. But it con
tains a condition by which this absolute estate may be defeated. which
makes it an estate in fee upon condition, or, as it is called in the old
books, a base or qualified fee and is sometimes called a conditional
limitation,—a_ condition by which the estate may be defeated or is limited.
It is admitted that the condition had been broken by the plaintiff, and
that W. A. Harris, if living, might enter and revest himself of the
estate, and, as he is dead, that his heirs might do so. But it is con
tended that no one else can do so, and that at the time of the breach
both W. A. Harris (the grantor) and Pattie Young being dead. Walter
C. Harris being the only heir of said W. A. Harris and of Pattie Young,
is the only one who could enter,——Gray, Perp., p. 6, § 12 (2),-—and that
since the breach of the condition, and before the commencement of
this action, the plaintiff has received a quitclaim deed of conveyance
from said Walter C. Harris, and is now the absolute owner of said
property in fee simple; while the defendant contends that, although
the breach did not take place until after the death of both W. A. Harris
and Pattie Young, the said W. A. had a right or interest in said property
which he could will and did will to Pattie, and that the will of W. A.
gave her an interest which she could and did will to the defendant, and
that the deed from Walter C. to the plaintiff only conveys a one un
divided half interest therein, and that this defendant is entitled to the
other half thereof. Until the breach of the condition, neither said W.
A. Harris nor said Pattie Young had any interest or estate in this
property. The absolute estate was in the plaintiff, and therefore could
not be in any one else. Neither W. A. nor Pattie ever had an estate, an
interest nor even an expectancy in this property, as an heir may have
in the estate of his ancestor, as by reason of natural causes the ancestor
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must die, and the law declares his heirs, to whom his estate will descend.
But in this case there was nothing to limit the estate of the plaintifi, and
until the breach the grantee had the same rights as if it was a fee simple.
2 Chit. Bl. *109, *110, note 15; Id. *155-*157; Gray, Perp., supra. And
the grantor having nothing, he could convey nothing by his will, and
Pattie had nothing to convey by her will. Suppose that A. is the next
of kin and heir at law of B., and A. should die. His children would be
the next of kin and ‘heirs at law of B. A. dies in the lifetime of B.
leaving a last will and testament, in which he willed to C. (item 19)
as follows: “It is my will and desire that all the rest and residue of
my property, real, personal, and mixed, of which I may die seised and
possessed, shall be sold and collected by my executor hereinafter named,”
—and named Y. as his executor. After the death of A., B. dies in
testate. Would it be contended that the estate coming to A.’s children
from B.’s estate passed to C. by A.’s will? It most certainly would not,
for the reason that A. had no interest in B.’s estate at the time of his
death. And for the same reason the will of W. A. Harris passed no
title, estate, or interest to Pattie in the property in controversy, because
he had no interest in it to convey, and Pattie’s will passed nothing to
the defendant.
It seems that it is hardly denied by the defendant but what at the
common law the estate in the land in controversy would have reverted
to the heir at law, Walter C. Harris, upon condition broken. But he
contends that this is changed by the act of 1844 (Code, § 2141), which
makes the will speak from the death of the testator, and by the pro
visions of section 2140 of the Code. Other clauses are relied upon ~by the
defendant to sustain his contention, but the following paragraph seems
to be most nearly in point, and controls the others, if any of them bear
upon the question, and that is as follows: “And also to all rights of
entry for conditions broken, and other rights of entry; and also to such
of the same estate, interest and rights respectively, and other real and
personal estate as the testator may be entitled to at the time of his death.”
This evidently means rights of entry for conditions broken in the life
time of the testator, and where he had the right of entry while living.
This seems to us manifestly the proper construction of this statute_.—
such rights as he has “at the time of his death.” And besides this be
ing manifestly the proper construction of the statute, it puts the statute
in harmony with the plainest principles of law governing the rights of
property, as it cannot be supposed’ that the legislature intended to au
thorize a testator to will what he did not have.
Our opinion, then, is that at the death of W. A. Harris he had no
interest in the property in controversy, and no interest therein passed
to Pattie Young by his will. And of course, if W. A. Harris had no
interest, none passed to her under the will of W. A. Harris, nor could
she inherit what her father did not have; and she had nothing to will
to the defendant Young, and he has no interest in the same. Our
opinion, further, is that upon the breach of the condition in 1900 the
)fl _l
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right of entry and the estate in the land in controversy reverted to Walter
C. Harris, the only heir at law of the grantee, W. A. Harris, at the time
of the breach, and that, as plaintiff has acquired the title of W. C. Har
ris in and to said land, it is the absolute owner thereof in fee simple
The judgment below is aifirmed.
MONTGOMERY, J ., did not sit on the hearing of this appeal.
DOUGLAS, J . (concurring only in the result). I cannot agree with the
opinion of the court that until the breach of condition “the absolute
estate was in the plaintiff, and therefore could not be in any one else.”
The deed of W. A. Harris to the plaintiff conveyed a determinable fee,
having the incidents of a fee simple, except that of alienation, but liable
to be entirely defeated. By its very terms it could never be enlarged
into a fee simple absolute, except, of course, by the release of the grantor
or his heirs. It contained no inherit power of enlargement. It is true,
such an estate is sometimes called a fee simple limited or conditional,
which always seemed to me a misnomer; but it can never be an ab
solute fee. If it were, nothing would remain in the grantor, and hence
no one could take advantage of the possible defeasance. There must re
main in the grantor at least a possibility of reverter, which, while not
an estate, is in itself a right, coupled with the contingent right of entry.
This right may be in abeyance, but if it exists at all, actually or po
tentially, it must exist in the grantor. It seems to me that the pos
sibility of reverter is also an interest in the land, and thereby, by a double
title, comes within the provisions of section 21¢L0 of the Code. The
word has been thus defined: “Interest means concern; also, advantage;
good; share; portion; part; participation; any right in the nature of
property, but less than title. Its chief use seems to designate some right
attaching to property which either cannot or need not be defined with
precision.” 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 1102. Coke says:
“Interest, ex vi termini, in legal understanding, extended to estates,
rights, and titles that a man hath of, in, to, or out of lands; for he is truly
said to have an interest in them.” Co. Litt. 345a. Interests may be
vested, executory, or contingent. In Young v. Young, 89 Va. 675,
17 S. E. 4'/0, 23 L R. A. 642, it was held that a contingent remainder
was an interest or claim to real estate, and might be disposed of by deed
or will under a statute using those terms. In fact, the word seems to
be one of extreme elasticity, which may be used to include nearly every
thing legally connecting the claimant with the subject-matter. Section
2140 of the Code provides that: “Any testator * * * may dispose
of all real and personal estate, which he shall be entitled to at the time
of his death; * * * and the power hereby given shall extend to all
contingent, executory or other future interest in any real or personal
estate, whether the testator may or may not be the person or one of the
persons, in whom the same may become vested, or whether he may be
entitled thereto under the instrument by which the same was created,
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or under any disposition thereof by deed or will; and also to all rights
of entry for condition broken, and other rights of entry,” etc. It would
be difficult for one to make the language of the statute any broader ; and
I cannot doubt that it includes, and was intended to include, all contin
gent, executory, or other future interests, as well as all rights of entry,
whether vested or contingent. The possibility of reverter is a contin
gent interest, which becomes vested upon condition broken. Upon entry
the grantor or his heir is remitted to his former estate, and the reversion,
of course, becomes merged into the fee. I see no reason of public policy
why the statute should exclude a possibility of reverter, with its contin
gent right of entry, from the power of testamentary disposition, but a
very strong reason why it should be included. In England, the home of
the common law, the rule of primogeniture made the entry of the heir a
very simple matter, as there was practically but one heir; but here it is
different. Determinable fees may last for a very long time, and the grantor
may have a large number of descendants scattered over the country.
Must they all enter upon condition broken, or can one enter for all and
hold as tenant in common? These are questions diflicult of solution and
inconvenient of application, which may be avoided by testamentary dis
position. I am therefore forced to the conclusion that the possibility of
reverter could have been devised by either the grantor or his daughter,
Pattie, but whether it can be brought within the terms of the will of the
latter is a different question. I am not prepared to say that a person
“may die seised and possessed” of a possibility of reverter. If it did not
pass by Pattie’s will, it went to Walter, as Pattie’s heir, and was by his
deed conveyed to the plaintiff. I am thus brought to the conclusion of
the court. :
Accord: 4 Kent Com. *511; Deas v. Horry (1835), 2 Hill (S. Car.) 244, 249.
In Austin v. Cambridgeport Parish (18 38), 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 215, the in
terest of the grantor under a deed conveying land in fee subject to a con
dition subsequent was held to be a devisable interest before breach, and the
devisee’s action to recover was sustained.
D conveyed a strip of land to a railway company for its tracks, on express
condition that the road should be built by a time named. Before the time
expired D conveyed all the land to Nicoll including by general terms the strip
previously conveyed, but subject to the right of the railway company. The
road not having been built by the time specified, Nicoll brought ejectment
to recover the strip. The_court held that D parted with all his interest,
having only a possibility of reverter, not transferable; and that therefore he
could not by deed made before condition broken pass any right to the
plaintiff. Various statutes claimed to enable such transfers were held not
to have that effect. Nicoll v. New York & E. Ry. Co. (1854), 12 N. Y. 121,
Pattee Cas. 4'71, Finch Cas. 527.
Mrs. Davey conveyed land to Bishop Hughes on condition that he con
secrate the property or cause it to be consecrated, and cause a church to be
built upon it within a reasonable time. Mrs. D died later leaving her will,
by which she gave to a residuary devisee all property and estate real and
personal not previously effectively disposed of. Her heir brought ejectment
against Hughes’ successor, Corrigan, for breach of the condition, 29 years
having passed and no church built. The defense was that the possibility of
reverter passed by Mrs. D’s will, but the court held that she had no devise.
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ble interest, and judgment for plaintiff was aflirmed. Upington v. Corri
gan (1896), 151 N. Y. 143, 45 N. E. 358, 37 L. R. A. 704, Finch. 533.
H. Venable conveyed land to trustees to be conveyed by them to a cor
poration in fee for an academy as soon as the corporation should be formed.
The corporation was formed and deed to it made by the trustees. Later
H. V. died devising all his estate to his wife. Later the corporation lost
its charter on quo warranto; and the plaintiff, claiming under quit claim
deed from the widow devisee, sued in ejectment, claiming that the possibil
ity of reverter passed by the will. The court cited Nicoll v. New York & E.
Ry. Qo., above, and held that at the death of the testator he had no interest
but a mere possibility of reverter, a thing not devisable. Judgment for
plaintiff, reversed. Trustees of Presbyterian Church v. Venable (1896),
159 Ill. 215, 42 N. E. 836.
1
CHAPTER VII.
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES.
EDWARD PELLS v. WHILIAM BROWN, in B. R.,‘Hila.ry. 17 Ja'c. 1.—A. D.
1620.-—Cr0. Jae. 590, 2 Boll 196, 216, Palmer? 5 Gray’s P. C. 163. Given
according to Croke. ‘ -
Replevin for the taking of three cows at Rowdham. The defendant
justifies for damage fesant as in his freehold. The plaintiff traverseth
the freehold; and, thereupon, being at issue, a special verdict was found,
in which the case appeared to be, that one William Brown, father of the
defendant, being seised of this land in fee, having issue the defendant.
his son and heir, and Thomas Brown his second son, and Richard Brown
a third son, by his will in writing devised this land to “Thomas his
son and his heirs forever, paying to his brother Richard twenty pounds
at the age of twenty-one years; and if Thomas died without issue, liv
ing William his brother, that then William his brother should have
those lands to him and his heirs and assigns forever, paying the said
sum as Thomas should have paid.” Thomas enters and sufiers a common
recovery, with a single voucher, to the use of himself and his heirs;
and afterwards devises it to the use of Edward Pells, the plaintiff, and
his heirs; and dies without issue, living the said William Brown, who
entered upon Edward Pells, and took the distress.
This case was twice argued at the bar and afterward at the bench;
and the matter was divided into three points; 1, whether Thomas had
an estate in fee, or in fee-tail only; 2, admitting he had a_fee, whether
this limitation of the fee to William be good to limit a fee upon a fee;
3, if Thomas hath a fee, and William only a possibility to have a fee,
whether this recovery shall bar William, or that it be such an estate
as cannot be extirpated by recovery or otherwise.
As to the first, all the justices resolved, that it is not an estate tail
in Thomas, but an estate in fee; for it is devised to him and his heirs
forever, and also paying to Richard twenty pounds; both which clauses
show that he intended a fee to him. And the clause “if he died without
issue,” is not absolute and indefinite whensoever he died without
issue, but it is with a contingency,.“if he died without issue, living
William ;” for he might survive William, or have issue alive at the time
of his death, living William; in which cases William should never have
it
,
but is only to have it if Thomas died without issue living William,
See 19 Hen. 6, pl. 74; 12 Edw. 3, pl. 8; Be'risf0¢-d’s Case, 7 Coke 41;
Lampefs Case, 10 Coke 50. And therefore it is not like to the cases
cited on the other part: 5 Hen. 5, pl. 6. 3'7 Assize, pl. 15 & 16; and
(242)
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Dyer 330, Clactey’s Case: for it is an exposition of- his intent what issue
should have it
,
viz. of his body; and whensoever he died without issue,
the land should remain, &c. Hut here it is a conditional limitation
to another, if such a thing happen; and therefore they all relied upon
the book, Dyer, 124, and Dyer 354; which are all one with this case.
Secondly, they all agreed that this is a good limitation of the fee
to William by way of that contingency, not by way of immediate re
mainder (For they. all agreed it cannot be a remainder: as if one de
viseth land to one and his heirs, and if he die without heir, that it
shall remain to another, it is void and repugnant to the estate; for
one fee cannot be in remainder after another; for the law doth not ex
pect the determination of a fee by his dying without heirs, and there
fore cannot appoint a remainder to begin upon determination thereof, as
19 Hen. 9, pl. 8; 29 Hen. 8, Dyer 33 a [ante p. 225], but by way of con
tingency, and by way of executory devise to another, to determine the
one estate, and limit it to another, upon an act to be performed, or in
failure of performance thereof, &c.; for the one may be and hath always
been allowed: as devise of his land to his executors to sell, if his heir
fail of payment of such a sum at such a day, this is an executory de
vise. So the case cited in Borast-0n’s Case, 3 Coke 20 [reported ante‘ p.
212], of Wellock v. Hammond [reported ante p. 150], where the devise
was to the eldest son and heirs, paying such a sum to the younger sons,
otherwise that the land should be to him and his heirs, is a good ex
ecutory devise._ And a precedent was shown, Trinity term, 38 Eliz. Roll
867, Fullmerson v. Stewart; where upon special verdict it was adjudged,
that whereas Sir Richard Fulmerson devised to Sir Edward Cleere and
Frances his wife, daughter and heir of the said Sir Richard Fullrnerson,
certain lands in Elden in the county of Norfolk, to them and the heirs
of Sir Edward Cleere, upon the condition that they should assure lands
in such places to his executors and their heirs, to perform his will ; and
if he fail, then he devised the said lands in Elden to his executors and
their heirs. It was adjudged to be a good limitation and no condition;
for if it should be a condition it should be destroyed by the descent to
the heir; but it is a limitation, and as an executory devise to his ex
ecutors, who for the non-performance of the said acts entered and sold,
and adjudged good. So here, &c. For it is a good executory devise
upon this limitation, and DODERIDGE said the opinion 29 Hen. 8
,
Dyer
33 a [ante p
. 225], was, that such a limitation in fee upon an estate in
fee cannot be, and it had been oftentimes adjudged contrary thereto.
To the third point DODERIDGE held that this recovery should bar Wil
liam ;, for he had but a possibility to have a fee, as if a contingent estate
which is destroyed by this recovery before it came in esse; for other
wise it would be a mischievous kind of perpetuity, which could not by
any means be destroyed. And although it was objected that a recovery
shall not bar, but where a recovery in value extends thereto, as appears
by Capel’s Case, 1 Coke 62 a, where a rent charge granted by him in
remainder was l)oiJlJ1d; yet he held that this recovery destroying the
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immediate estate, all contingencies and dependencies thereupon are
bound, and a recovery shall bind everyone who cannot falsify it; and
here he who hath this possibility cannot falsify, therefore he shall be
bound thereby. But all the other justices were herein against him,
that this recovery shall not bind; for he who suffered the recovery had a
fee, and William Brown had but a possibility if he survived Thomas; and
Thomas dying without issue, in his life, no recovery in value shall extend
thereto, unless he had been party by way of vouchee, and then it should;
for by entering into the warranty he gave all his possibility; therefore
they agreed to the case which Darnport at the bar cited to be adjudged,
34 Eliz., where a mortgagee suffers a recovery it shall not bind the
mortgagor; but if he had been party by way of voucher it had been
otherwise. And here is not any estate depending upon the estate of
Thomas Bray, but a collateral and mere possibility, which shall not be
touched by a recovery; and if such recovery should be allowed, then if
a man should devise that his heir should make such a payment to his
younger sons, or to his executors, otherwise the land should be to them;
if the heir by recovery might avoid it
,
it would be very mischievous, and
might frustrate all devises; and there is no such mischief that it should
‘maintain perpetuities, for it is but a particular case, and upon a mere
contingency, which peradventure never may happen, and may be avoided
by joining him in the recovery who hath such a contingency; and on the
other part it would be far more and a greater mischief that all executory
devises should by such means be destroyed.
HOUGHTON, J., in his argument, put this case: if a man give or de
vise lands to oneand his heirs as long as J . S. hath issue of his body,
he shall not by recovery bind him who made this gift without making
him a party by way of vouchee; for a recovery against tenant in fee
simple never shall bind a collateral interest, title or possibility, or a con
dition or covenant, or the like. Wherefore they all (except DODERIDGE)
held that this recovery was no bar.
Then DODERIDGE took exception to the verdict that the lands were
not found to be holden in socage; for otherwise it might be intended to
be holden in knight-service, and so it shall be intended, and then the
devise is void for a third part. And so it was resolved 24 Eliz., Dyer,
that it ought to be shown that the land was holden in socage, otherwise
the devise was not good for the entire; but all the judges held it not
to be material, as this case is
,
for the issue is whether it was the free
hold of William Brown, who is found to be the heir of the devisor; then
although it were admitted that the land was held by knight-service,
yet he hath the entire: viz. two parts by the devise and a third part
by descent. Wherefore the tenure is not material as this case is. And it
was adjudged for the defendant.
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CHILD v. BAYLIE, in Exchequer Chamber, Hilary, 20 Jae. 1.—A. D. 1623,
on error from judgment of King’s Bench, Hilary, 15 Jac. 1.—Cro. Jae. 459,
Palmer 333, 5 Gray P. C. 495. -
EJECTMENT of a lease of Thomas Heath of lands.in Alchurch.
Upon not guilty pleaded, a special verdict was found upon the case;
which was, that William Heath, possessed of a lease for seventy-six years
of the land in question, let it to one Blunt from the day of his death
until the first of May, 1629 (which was three months before the end
of the lease), if Dorothy his wife lived so long. Afterwards he devised,
that William Heath his son and his assigns should have the said tene
ments, and the reversion of them, and all his title and interest in the
said tenements, for all the others of the said seventy-six years which
should be unexpired at the time of his wife’s death, “provided, that if
the said William die without issue living at the time of his death, that
Thomas his son (the now lessor) should have it for all the residue of
the seventy-six years unexpired from the death of his said wife, and of
William without issue; and if he died without issue, then to his
'daughters;” and made his wife his executrix, and died. The wife as
sented to the legacies; William assigned all this lease and his interest
thereto to the said Dorothy, who assigned it to Mr. Comb, under whom
the defendant claims; afterwards Dorothy died, and then William died
without issue. Thomas the devisee enters, and makes this lease to the
plaintiff.
After divers arguments at the bar, it was adjudged for the defendant.
First, it was resolved, where a lessee for years let it after his death
until the first of May, 1629, that it was a good lease, which began im
mediately by his death, he dying within that time.
Secondly, that the lease being made to begin after his death unto the
first of May, 1629, the lease being made (12 August, 1553), if Dorothy
his wife should so long live, he did not thereby convey the interest and
remainder of the term, viz. from the first of May, 1-629, to 12 August,
1629, and the possibility of a long term if Dorothy died before the first
of May, 1629, which interest and possibility together he might devise to
William Heath his son.
The third and main question was, whether this devise being to Will
iam Heath and his assigns, with a proviso, that if he died without issue
living, that Thomas Heath should have it
,
and he aliens it
,
and after
wards dies without issue, whether this alienation shall bind Thomas
Heath, or that he may avoid it?
It was resolved, that this alienation shall bind; for when he limited
to him and his assigns, all the estate was vested in him, and he had an
absolute power to dispose thereof; for the law doth not expect his dying
without issue. The difference therefore is, where a lease is devised to
one if he live so_l0ng, and afterwards to another, the first hath but a
qualified estate, and the other hath the absolute interest, and therefore
this alienation shall not prejudice him who hath the absolute estate;
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but when it is limited to him and his assigns, then the proviso thereto
added, is void to restrain the alienation: and the limitation to the heirs
of the body, and the proviso, are all one; for all long leases would be
more dangerous than perpetuities: and therefore this case differs from
the cases in 8 Co. 96,, and 10 Co. 46, Lampefs Case, that a devisee for life
could not bar him in remainder: and Lew7cn0r’s Case [easter term, 14
Jac. 1, 1 Roll. Rep. 356], the exchequer chamber, was cited. Where
fore it was adjudged for the defendant.
Note.—Upon this judgment a writ of error was brought in the Ex
chequer Chamber; 'and the error assigned in point of law, that the re
mainder of this term limited to Thomas Heath after the death of Will
iam without issue then living, was good, and the alienation of William
shall not bind him in remainder.
It was argued by Bridgman, and afterward by Humphrey Davenport,
for the plaintiff in error, that it was a good limitation of the remainder
of the term to William and his assigns, with the proviso, that if he died
without issue then living, the then remainder should be to Thomas, &c.,
and that it is no more in effect than after his death; and therefore it
differs from Lewkn0r’s Case, adjudged in the Exchequer, where a de'-O
vise of a term to one, and the heirs of his body, and if he die without
issue, that it shall remain to another, was held to be a void remainder;
for he cannot limit a remainder upon a term after the death of another
without issue, but here it is but a remainder after the death of one
without issue, viz. William dying without issue then living; so upon
the matter it depended upon is death, and therefore not like to the said
case; but'it is‘ agreeable to the reasons put in the cases of _8 Co. 94,
Matth. Manning’s Case, and 10 C0. 46.
But it was now argued on the other part by Thomas Crew and George
Cr-olce, that the judgment was well given in the King’s Bench; for here
the limitation being to William after the death of the devisor’s wife, of
all his estate and interest to him and his assigns, it is but_a remainder;
for the wife may outlive all the term, and then this devise of the re
mainder of the term is given to him in particular, and William hath
but a possibility; and then to limit it to Thomas after the death of
William then living, is to limit a possibility upon-a possibility, which is
against therules of law, as it is held in the Rector of Chedington’s Case-
1 Co. 156, and Lord Stafi’0rd’s Case, 8 Co. 73. ,
Secondly, that this limitation to Thomas after the death of William
without issue then living, is all one as if it had been limited upon his
death without issue: and the addition “then liming,” doth not alter the
case; for at the first limitation, non caastat
that he should die without
issue; and the law shall not expect his death without issue; and it is not
like to the case when it is limited after the death of one; for it is
certain that one must die, and it may be that he may die during the term,
and the law may well expect it; but that one should die without issue,
the law will never expect such a possibility, nor regard it: and it would
be very dangerous- to have a perpetuity of a term in that manner; for
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it would be more mischievous than the common cases of perpetuities
which the law hath ‘sought to suppress: and therefore it was said, that
this case was like to some of the cases which had been adjudged, that
the remainder of a term after the death of one person is good, and should
not be destroyed by the alienation of the first devisee. Vide 8 Co. 94,
Manning’s Case. 10 Co., Lampet’s Case. Plowd. 520 and 540; Dyer
74, 277.
After divers arguments, all the judges of the Common Pleas, viz.
HOBART, Wnvorr, HUTTON, and JONES, and all the Barons (except TAN
FIELD, Chief Baron) agreed with the first judgment: for they said: that
the first grant or devise of a term made to one for life, remainder to
another, hath been much controverted, whether such a remainder might
be good, and whether all may not be destroyed, by the alienation of the
first party; and if it were not first disputed, it would be hard to maintain;
but being so often adjudged, they would not now dispute it.—But for
the case in question, where there was a devise to one and his assigns, and
if he died without issue then living, that it would remain to another,
it is a void devise ; and it is all one as the devise of a term to one and his
heirs of his body, and if he die without issue, that then it shall remain
to another, it is merely void ; for such an entail of a term is not allowable
in law, for the mischief which otherwise would ensue, if there be such
a perpetuity of a term. And although TANFIELD, Chief Baron, doubted
thereof, especially by reason of a judgment given before in the King’s
Bench in Rethorick V. Chappel, Hil. 9 Jac. 1; 2 Bulst. 28; Godol. 149,
where “William Cary possessed of a term for years devised it to his wife
for her life, and afterwards that John his son should have the occupa
tion thereof as long as he had issue; and if he died without issue un
married, that then Jasper his younger son should have the occupation
thereof as long as he had issue of his body; and if he died without issue
unmarried, he devised the moiety to Dorothy his daughter, the other
moiety to Robert and William his sons, and made his wife executrix,
who assented to the legacies and died. John and Jasper died without
issue, unmarried; and afterward Robert and William entered upon the
defendant, claiming the moiety, and let to the plaintiff. Upon a special
verdict, all this matter being discovered, it was adjudged for the plaint
iff, that he should recover the moiety, which is all one case with the
case in question. But the defendant’s counsel in the writ of error
showed, that there was a difference betwixt the said cases: for, First, in
that there is a devise but of the occupation only; but here, of the term
itself. Secondly, it is a devise here of his estate and term to him and his
assigns, wherein is authority given that he may assign. Thirdly, the
limitation is there, if he die without issue unmarried, which is upon tho
matter, that if he die within the term; for if he be not married he can
not have issue”—but in the case here, he might have issue; and yet if
that issue should die without issue in his life-time, it should remain ;
which the law will neither expect nor will suffer: yet the JUSTIOES AND
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BARONS, by the assent of TANFIELD, all agreed, that judgment should
be aflirmed: and in Hilary Term, 20 Jac. I., it was affirmed.
DUKE OF NORFOLK’S CASE, in Chancery, High Court of Chancery, and
House of Lords,—repo1-ted in 3 Chancery Cases 1-54, and partially re
ported in 5 Gray's P. C. 498. Abridged from 3 Ch. Cas.
This case was argued by counsel in the court of chancery, Dec. 26,
1677, and at other times afterwards; the opinions of the judges and
the first opinion of the Lord Chancellor were delivered March 24th,
1682; the opinion of the Lord Chancellor on re-hearing was delivered
and final decree entered June 17th, 1682; which decree was reversed
in the High Court of Chancery by the Lord Keeper of the great seal
of England, on bill for review, May 15th, 1683; and. this last decree
was reversed and the decree of the Lord Chancellor aflirmed by the
House of Lords, after argument, on petition and appeal, June 19th,
1685.
This is a bill in chancery by Charles Howard against his brother Henry
Howard, Duke of Norfolk, and others, toestablish and have execution
of trusts created by two deeds executed by their father (Henry Fred
erick, Earl of Arundel and Surry), March 20th and 21st, 1647. Being
seised of the baronies of Grostock and Burgh in fee, and having sons as
follows—Thomas Lord Maltravers (non compos mantis), Henry (now
Duke of Norfolk and defendant herein); Charles (plaintifi herein),
Edward, Francis, and Bernard, and having a daughter, Lady Katharine
—the father made the deeds above mentioned, to provide settlement for
his estates and family. By the first of these deeds he bargained and
sold these baronies to the Duke of Richmond, Marquess of Dorcester, and
others, and their heirs, to the use of the father for life, then to the
use of his wife for her life, remainder to these trustees for 200 years,
for the trusts created by the other deed, remainder to the use of Henry
and the heirs male of his body, with like remainders in tail to Charles,
Edward, and the other brothers, successively. The other deed was made
to declare the trusts of the term for 200 years; and that declares that
it was intended this term should attend the inheritance, and that the
profits thereunder should be received by Henry and the heirs of his
body so long as Thomas or any issue male of his body should live, and if
he should die without issue, in the life of Henry and not leave his
wife pregnant with a son, or if after his death the dignity of Earl of
Arundel should descend on Henry; then Henry or his issue should have
no farther benefit or profit of the term of 200, but then the term shall
be in trust for Charles and the heirs male of his body, remainder to
Francis and the heirs male of his body, remainder to Bernard and the
heirs male of his body, remainder to Henry and the heirs male of his body,
remainder to the heirs of the father making the deed.
The father died in 1652; his wife died in 1673; the Marquess of
Dorcester, surviving trustee, assigned his estate to Marriot, in 1675;
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later Marriot assigned it to Henry now Duke of Norfolk, and Henry
by bargain and sale enrolled sold to Marriot to make him tenant to a
praecipe, Oct. 24, 1675, and next day a deed was made declaring the
recovery to be to the use of Henry and his heirs, the recovery was sufiered
accordingly; later Thomas died without issue and unmarried, in Nov.
1677 ; by whose death the earldom of Arundel as well as_the dukedom
of Norfolk descended to Henry; and thereupon this bill was filed by
Charles to have execution of the trust in his favor.
The case was argued by several eminent counsel on each side, and
these arguments are reported at some length in 3 Ch. Cas. 1-13. Loan
CHANCELLOR NOTTINGHAM was assisted at the hearing by Loan CHIEF
BARON MONTAGUE of the exchequer, Loan CHIEF JUSTICE Noarn of the
common pleas, and Loan CHIEF Jusrron PEMBERTON of the king’s
bench. The better parts of their several opinions delivered when they
met, March 24, 1681, the day appointed for judgment in the cause, are
given below.
MONTAGUE, C. B. [* 15]
* * * The plaintifE’s bill is to have
execution of the trust of the term of the barony of —-—-—, to the
use of himself and the heirs male of his body. This I conceive was op
posed by the counsel for the defendant upon these grounds: 1. That
by the assignment made by Marriot to my Lord Duke Henry, the term
was surrendered and quite gone. 2. The second ground was the com
mon recovery suffered, which they say barred the remainders which
the other brothers had, and so also would be a bar to the trust of this
term. 3. And the other ground was, that the trust of a term to Henry
and the heirs male of his body, until, by the death of Thomas without
issue, the earldom should descend upon him, and then to Charles, is a
void limitation of the remainder.
As to the first, that by the assignment of Marriot to Henry Howard,
the whole term was surrendered, and being so, surrendered, hath no
existence at all; that I find was barely mentioned, and I think cannot
be stood upon. For this, the term by surrender is gone indeed and
merged in the inheritance ; yet the trust of that term remains inequity;
and if this trust be destroyed by him that had it assigned to him, this
court has full power to set it up again, and to decree the term to him
to whom it did belong, or a recompense for it. Therefore, I think that
stands not at all as a point in the case, or as an objection in the way.
[On this point the chancellor and other judges agreed with Montague.]
[*16] As to the next thing, the common recovery now sufiered by
the now duke, that doth bar the remainders to the other brothers, and
also the trust of this term? That I conceive to be so in case this can
be interpreted to be a term to attend the inheritance; and indeed in
the reciting part the deed doth seem to say that it was intended to
attend the inheritance. But by that part of the deed which followeth
after n0w this indenture witnessetli, there it is limited that the term
should be to Henry Howard and the heirs male of his body until such
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time as the honor of the Earl of Arundel, by his elder brother’s death
without issue, should come to him; then to the plaintiff, which doth
convey the estate of the term in a different channel from that in which
the inheritance is settled; and taking this deed all together, it doth
limit this term in such various estates, that it can no way be con
strued to be a term attending the inheritance; and then, I conceive,
the recovery doth not bar the trust. For the recovery would bar the
incident to any estate, as this would do here, if it attended the inherit
ance; but being only a term in gross and a collateral thing, I conceive
the recovery has no operation to bar the trust in the term. [On this
point the other judges agreed with Montague.]
Then the case singly depends upon the third point: Whether the
trust of a term thus limited to Henry Howard and the heirs males of his
body unt_il his brother die without issue, whereby the honor came to him,
with such contingent remainders over, be a good limitation—this is the
question. * * * I am of opinion that these limitations to the young
er brothers upon this contingency are absolutely void in the first crea
tion, and are gone without the surrender; and that upon this recovery
Henry Howard, now Duke of Norfolk, ought to have the trust of the
whole term. The expositions of devises of terms, or the dispositions of
the trusts of terms, have proceeded by many steps to higher degrees
than was at first thought of by the makers. It would be too long to give a
distinct history of it; but it is so plain that it is now a resolved and
decreed thing and settled, therefore, it were in vain to tell you the steps
taken towards it. That the devise of a term and the limitation of a trust
of a term to one and the heirs of his body is good, though Burgess’s
Case was only for life, the cases are very full in it. On the other side,
where there is a limitation of a term to one and the heirs of his body,
there a positive limitation of the estate over, after his death without is
sue, that I think also is as fully declared to be void. [Here his honor
reviewed the cases of Jenkins v. Kennish, in the exchequer; Leventhorp
v. Ashby (11 Car. 1, in King’s Bench), 1 Rolls Abr. 611; Sanders v.
Cornish, Cro. Eliz. 230] [*18] But now the doubt in this case that
is made ariseth upon this point, that this limitation over to the brothers
is upon a mere contingency, and whether that be good, I think, is the
main question. And truly, upon the reasons of Child and Bailie’s
Case [ante p ]
,, I cannot think it is a good limitation. [Here
his honor reviewed Child v. Bailie; Rhetorick v. Chappell, cited ante
p. ; Gibson v. Sanders ; Jay v. Jay, Stiles 258, 274; and
Pells v. Brown, ante p. ]
* * * If you admit a limitation of a
term after an estate tail, where shall it end? For if after one, it may
as well be after two; and if after two, then as well after twenty. For
it may be said he may die within twenty years without issue; and so
if within 100 years; and there will be no end, and a perpetuity will follow.
It was said that at the bar, it will be hard to frustrate the intention of
the parties. To that I answer, intentions of parties not according
to law are not to be regarded. It was the intention in Child and Bailie’s
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Case, that the younger son should have it; and so in Burgessis Case it was
the intention the daughter should have it. * * * [*20] It has also
been objected, but then here is a contingency that has actually happened,
upon Thomas’s death without issue and so the honor is come to I-Ienry.
I say the happening of the contingency is no ground to judge. * * *
So then for that I think these expositions have gone as far already as
they can; for my part I cannot extend it any further. And therefore
I conceive in this case, the plaintifi has no right to this term, but the
decree ought to be made for the defendants.
NORTH, C. J ., * * * I conceive the rules of law to prevent per
petuities are the policy of the kingdom, and ought to take place in this
court as well as any other court. So I take it then, that the trust of a
term is as much a chattel, and under consideration of this court, as
the term itself. And, therefore, I cannot see why the trust of a term
upon a voluntary settlement should be carried further in a court of
equity than the devise of a term in the courts of [*21] common law.* * * Now let us see, and a little consider what those rules are, and
how they are applicable to this case. * * * It is clear there can be
no \direct remainder of the trust of a term upon an estate-tail. The
question then is, whether there can be any contingent remainder, for
this case depends upon that consideration ; that is, it is limited upon
a contingency, if such a thing should happen in the life of a man, and
so it is a springing trust and good that way. My lord, I take it in
this case, where there can be no direct remainder there can be no con
tingent remainder, though it happen never so soon. Therefore, if a
term be limited to one and his heirs of his body, and he die without
issue of his body within two years the remainder over, there can be no
remainder over, there can be no such remainder limited at all, and there
fore no contingent remainder; for this remainder is limited at the end
of an entail, and that is so remote a consideration, that as the law
will not suffer a direct remainder upon it
,
so upon a contingency neither.
* * *
[* 22]
* * * The rule. in Child and Bzu'1ie’s Case [ante
p. ] is firm, that the expiring of the limitation of a term in tail
without the life of a man will not make good a limitation of the re
mainder over ; which I hold to be a good rule ; and the reason of it,
I conceive, will reach to this case. * * * So that I think the whole
term is swallowed in the estate-tail upon this consideration; and there
can be no remainder of it
,
no executory devise, nor any springing trust
to Charles upon this contingency. And, my lord, upon that reason, I
think this settlement fails, and is disappointed as to the younger brothers.
# * *
PEMBERTON, C. J . [* 23] * * * I do first think that the Earl
Arundel did certainly design, that if my Lord Maltravers should die
without issue male, whereby the honor of the family should come to
my lord duke that now is
,
Charles should have this estate; and his
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intentions are manifest by creating this term, which could be of no
other use but to carry over this estate to Charles a younger son, upon
the elder son’s dying without issue. And I do think truly that this was
but a reasonable intention of the father. For there being to come with
the earldom a great estate that would well support it, it was but
reason, and the younger sons might expect it
,
that their fortunes might
be somewhat advanced by their father in case it should so happen. It
was a reasonable expectation in them; and truly I think it was the plain
intention of the earl. And there is no great question but it might
have been made good and effectual by the limitation of two terms;
for if one term had been limited to determine upon the death of Thomas
without issue, and that to be for the now Duke of Norfolk, and another
term then to commence and go over to Charles, that would certainly
have been good and carried the estate to Charles upon that contingency.
But as this case now is
, I do think that this way that is now taken is not
a good way nor a right way; for I take this limitation to Charles to
be void in law. And as to that I know there is a famous difference of
limiting terms that are in gross,~and terms that attend the inheritance.
As to terms that are in gross, I think it will be granted (because it hath
been settled so often) they are not capable of limitation to one after
the death of one without issue. * * * This term here doth partake
somewhat of a term in gross, and somewhat of a term attendant upon
an inheritance; and if there should be such a limitation admitted such
a foreign limitation as this is (I call it foreign, because [ *25] it is
not that which goes along with the inheritance)—if that be allowed,
we know not what inventions may grow upon this. For I know men’s
brains are fruitful in inventions, as we may see in Matthew Manning’s
Case [ante p. ]. It was not foreseen nor thought when that
judgment was given, what would be the consequence, when once there
was an allowance of the limitation of a term after the death of a person.
Presently it was discerned, there was the same reason for after twenty
men’s lives as after one; and so then it was held and agreed, that so
long as the limitation exceeded not lives in being at the creation of the
estate it should extend so far. That came to grow upon them then ; and
now if this be admitted, no man can foresee what an ill effect such an
ill allowance might have. There might such limitations come in as
would encumber estates, and mightily entangle lands. This is certain,
such an allowed limitation would add a greater check to estates than ever
was made by limitations of inheritance; for when an estate of in
heritance was limited to a man and his heirs males of his body, with
remainders over, and a term was limited accordingly to wait upon the
inheritance ; in that case, he that had the first estate-tail, had full power
over the term, to alienate it if he pleased. * * * But now if this limit
ation in question were good, then Henry could not part with it; be
cause it is to him and his heirs males of his body under a collateral
limitation of his brother’s dying without issue. * * *
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Loan CHANCELLOR NOTTONGHAM. * * * These indentures are both
sealed and delivered in the presence of Sir Orlando Bridgman, Mr.
Edward Alehorn, and Mr. John Alehorn, both of them by Lord Keeper
Bridgman’s clerks; I knew them to be so. This attestation of these
deeds is a demonstration to me they were drawn by Sir Orlando Bridg
man. * * *
The whole contention in the case is to ‘make the estate limited to
Charles void—void in the original creation; if not so, void by the common
recovery suffered by the now duke, and the assignment of Marriot. If
the estate be originally void, which is limited to Charles, there is no
harm done. But if it only be avoided by the assignment of Marriot,
with the concurrence of the Duke of Norfolk, he having notice of the
trusts, then most certainly they must make it good to Charles in equity;
for a palpable breach of trust which they had notice. [*28] So that
the question is reduced to this main single point, whether all this care
that was taken to settle this estate and family, be void and insignificant;
and all this provision made for Charles and the younger children to
have no effect.
_
. I am in a very great strait in this case. I am assisted by as good
advice as I know how to repose myself upon; and I have the fairest op
portunity, if I concur with them, and so should mistake, to excuse myself,
that I did errare cum patribus. But I dare not at any time deliver
any opinion in this place, without I concur with myself and my con
science too. * * * Whether this limitation to Charles be void or no
is the question. Now, first, these things are plain and clear; and by
taking notice of what is plain and clear, we shall come to see what is
doubtful: 1. That the term in question, though it were attendant upon
the inheritance at first; yet upon the happening of the contingency,
it is become a term in gross to Charles. 2 That the trust of a term in
gross can be limited no otherwise in equity than the estate of a term in
gross can be limited in law; for I am not setting up a rule of property
in chancery other than that which is the rule of property at law. 3. It
is clear that the legal estate of a term for years, whether it be a long
or of short term, cannot be limited to any man in tail, with the re
mainder over to another after his death without issue; that is flat and
plain, for that is a direct perpetuity.‘ * * * 5. If a term be limited
to a man for life, and after to his first, second, third, &c., and other
sons in tail successively, and for default of such issue the remainder
over; though the contingency never happen, yet that remainder is void,
though there were never a son then born to him, for that looks like a
perpetuity; and this was Sir William Backhurst his Case [16 Jac. 1,
1 Mod. 115]
* * * 7. If a term be devised or the trust of a term
limited to one for life, with twenty remainders for life successively, and
all the persons in esse and alive at the time of the limitation of their
estates; these, though they look like a possibility upon a possibility,
‘But see such an executory devise in Stanley v. Baker, ante p. 232.
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are all good, because they produce no. inconvenience, they wear out in
a little time with an easy interpretation; and so was Alf0rd’s Case. I
will yet go further. 8. In the case cited by Mr. Holt, Cotton and
Heath’s- Case [Rolls Abr., tit. Devise, 612], a term is devised to one for
18 years, after to C his son fpr life, and then to the eldest issue male
of C for life ; though C had not any issue male at the time of the devise
or_ the death of the devisor, but before the death of C, it was resolved
by Mr. Justice Jones, Mr. Justice Croke, and Mr. Justice Berkley,
to whom it was referred by the Lord _Keeper Coventry, that it only
being a contingency upon a life that would be speedily worn out, it was
very good; for that there may be a possibility upon a possibility, and that
there may be a contingency upon a contingency is neither unnatural
nor absurd in itself. But the contrary rule given as a reason by my
Lord Popham in the Rector of Chedington’s Case [1 Coke 156], looks
like a reason of art; but in truth, has no kind of reason in it; and I have
known that rule often denied in Westminister-hall. In truth every ex
ecutory devise is so, and you will find that rule not allowed in Blanford
and Blanford (13 Jac. 1), 1 Rolls Abr. 318; where he says; if that
rule take place it will shake several common assurances; and he
cites Paramour and Yardley’s Case in the Commentaries [2 Plowd.
Com. 539], where it was adjudged a good devise, though it were a pos
sibility upon a possibility. * * * [*34]
* * *
But now let us, I say, consider whether this limitation be good to
Charles or no. It has been said: 1. It is not good by any means;
for it is a possibility upon a possibility. That is a weak reason, and
there is nothing of argument in it; for there never was yet any devise
of a term with remainder over, but did amount to a possibility upon a
possibility, and executory remainderswill make it so. 2. Another thing
was said: It is void, because it doth not determine the whole estate,
and so they compare it to Sir Anthony Mildmay’s Case [ante p. ,
6 Coke 40], where it is laid down as a rule, that every limitation or con
dition ought to defeat the entire estate, and not to defeat part and
leave part not defeated; and it cannot make an estate to cease as to
one person, and not as to the other} But I do not think that any case
or rule was ever worse applied than that to this; for if you do observe
this case, here is no proviso at all annexed to the legal estate of the
term, but to the equitable estate that is built upon the legal estate unto
the estate to Henry and the heirs males of his body, to attend the in
heritance, with a proviso if Thomas die without issue in I-Ienry’s life
and the earldom come to Henry, then to Charles; which doth determine
the estate to Henry and his issue. But the other estate given to Charles
doth arise upon this proviso; which makes it an absurdity to say, that
the same proviso upon which the estate ariseth should determine that
estate too. [*35] 3. The great matter objected is
,
it is aginst all
‘As to the rule that a condition cannot operate to determine part only of
the estate, but must determine all or none, see further in Colthurst v. Bejush
in, ante p. ; Sco1astica’s Case or Newes v. Lark, ante p.
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the. rules of law, and tends to a perpetuity. If it tends to a perpetuity,
there needs no more to be said; for the law has so long labored against
perpetuities, that it is an undeniable reason against any settlement
if it oan be found to tend to a perpetuity, therefore let us examine
whether it do so; and let us see what a perpetuity is, and whether any
rule of law is broken in this case.
A perpetuity is the settlement of an estate or an interest in tail
with such remainders expectant upon it as are in no_ sort in the power of
the tenant in tail in possession to dock by any recovery or assignment,
but such remainders must continue as perpetual clogs upon the estate.
Such do fight against god; for they pretend to such a stability in human
affairs as the nature of them admits not of; and they are against the
reason and the policy of the law, and therefore not to be endured. But
on the other side, future interests, springing trusts, or trusts executory,
remainders that are to emurge and arise upon contingencies, are quite
out of the rules and reasons of perpetuities, nay, out of the reason
upon which the policy of the law is founded in those cases, especially,
if they be not of remote or long consideration, but such as by a natural
and easy interpretation will speedily wear out, and so things come to
their right channel again.
Let _us examine this rule with respect to freehold estates, and see
whether there it will amount to the same issue- There is not in the
law a clearer rule than this, that there can be no remainders limited
after a fee simple; so is the express book, case, 29 Hen. 8, 33, in my
Lord Dyer [ante p. ] But yet the nature of things, and the
necessity of commerce between man and man, have found a way to
pass by that rule, and: that is thus: either by way of use or by way of
devise. Therefore, if a devise be to a. man and his heirs, and if he die
without issue in the life of B-, then to B and his heirs; this is a fee
simple upon. a fee-simple, and yet it has been held to be good. My lord
chief baron did seem to think that this resolution did take its original
from Pells and Br.own’s, Case [ante p. ]; but it did not so, the
law was settledl before. You may find it expressly resolved 19 Eliz. in
a case between Hinde and Lyon, 3 Leonard [64] (which, of the books
that have lately come out, is one of the best); and it was there ad
judged to be so good a limitation that the heir who pleaded reins peer
descent [nothing by descent] was foroedl to pay the debt. And it had
the concurrance of a judgment in 3.8 Eliz., grounded upon the reason
of Welloek and Hammond’s Case [ante p. 150] cited in Boraston’s
Case [ante p. 212] where it is said, Croke Eliz. 204, in a devise it
may well be that an. estate in fee shall cease in one and be transferred
to another. All this was before Pells and Br0wn’s Case [ante p. ],
which was in 18 Jac. [1]. It is true, it was made a. question afterwards
in the sergeants’ case. [*36] But what then? We all know that is
no rule to judge by; for what is used to exercise the wits of the scr
geants is not a governing opinion to decide the law. It was also ad
judged in Hil. 1649, when my Lord Rolls was chief justice, and again
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in 1650; and after that, indeed, in 1651, it was resolved otherwise in
Jay and Jay’s Case [Stiles 258]. But it has been often agreed that
where it is within the compass of one life, that the contingency is to
happen, there is no danger of a perpetuity. And I oppose it to that
rule which was taken by one of the lords the judges, that where no re
mainders can be limited no contingent remainders can be limited, which
I utterly deny; for there can be no remainder limited after a fee-simple ;
yet there may a contingent fee-simple arise out of the first fee, as hath
been shown.
Thus it is agreed to be by all sides in the case of an inheritance. But
now, say they, a lease for years, which is a chattel, will not bear a con
tingent limitation in regard of the poverty and meanness of a chattel
estate. Now as to this point. The difierence between a chattel and an
inheritance is a difference only in words, but not in substance, nor in
reason, or the nature of the thing; for an owner of a lease, has as
absolute power over his lease, as he that hath an inheritance has over that.
And therefore where a perpetuity is introduced, nor any inconvenience
doth appear, there no rule of law is broken.
The reasons that do support the springing trust of a term, as well
as the springing use of an inheritance, are these:
1. Because it hath happened sometimes, and doth frequently, that
men have ‘no estates at all but what consist in leases for years. Now it
were not only very severe, but (under favor) very absurd, to say that
he who has no other estate but what consists in leases for years shall
be incapable to provide for the contingencies of his own family, though
these are directly within his view and immediate prospect. And yet if
that be the rule, so it must be; for I will put the case: A man that
hath no oth'er estate but leases for years, chattels real, treats for the
marriage of his son, and thereupon it comes to this agreement: these
leases shall be settled as a jointure for the wife, and provision for the
children. Says he, I am content, but how shall it be done? Why, thus:
You shall assign all these terms to John A. Stiles, in trust for yourself
and your executors if the marriage take no effect; but then, if it takes
effect, to your son while he lives, to his wife after while she lives, with
remainders over. I would have anyone tell me whether this were a void
limitation upon a marriage settlement, or if it be, what a strange ab
surdity is it
,
that a man shall settle it if the marriage take no effect,
and shall not settle it if the marriage happen.
2
.
Suppose the estate had been limited to Henry Howard and the
heirs males of his body till the death of Thomas without issue, then
to Charles: there it had been a void limitation to Charles. If then the
addition of these words: If Thomas die without issue in the life of
Henry, &c. have not mended the matter, then all that addition [*33]
of words goes for nothing, which it is unreasonable and absurd to think
it should. ¢
3
. Another thing there is
,
which I take to be unanswerable, and gather
it from what fell from my Lord Chief Justice PEMBERTON; and when
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I can answer that case, I shall be able to answer myself very much for
that which I am doing. Suppose the proviso had been thus penned:
and if Thomas die without issue male, living Henry, then the term
or 200 years limited to him and his issue shall utterly cease and de
termine, but then a new term of 200 years shall arise and be limited
to the same trustees, for the benefit of Charles in tail. This he thinks
might have been well enough, and attained the end and intention of the
family: because then this would not be a remainder in tail upon a tail,
but a new term created. Pray let us so resolve causes here, that they
may stand with the reason of mankind, when they are debated abroad.
Shall that be reason here that is not reason in any part of the world
besides? I would fain know the difference, why I may not raise a new
springing trust out of the same term, as well as a new springing term
out of the same trust. That is such a chicanery of law as will be laughed
at all over the Christian world.
4. Another reason I go on is this: That the meanness of the con
sideration of a term for years, and of a chattel interest, is not to be re
garded. For whereas this will be no reason any where else; so I shall
show you, that this reason, as to the remainder of a chattel interest,
is a reason that has been exploded out of Westminister-hall. There
was a time, indeed, that this reason did so far prevail, that all the judges,
in the time of my Lord Chancellor Rich, did, 6 Edward 6, deliver their
opinions, that if a term for years be devised to one, provided that if
the devisee die living J. S., then to go to J. S.; that remainder to
J. S. is absolutely void, because such a chattel interest of a term for
years is less than a term for life, and the law will endure no limitation
over [1 Dyer 74b, ante p. 231]. Now this being a reason against sense
and nature, the world was not long governed by it; but in 10 Eliz., in
Dyer [fol. 277], they began to hold that the remainder was good by de
vise; and so 15 Eliz. seems to [Dyer 328], and 19 Eliz. [Dyer 358]
it was by the judges held to be a good remainder; and that was the
first time that an executory remainder of a term was held to be good.
When the chancery did begin to see that the judges of the law did
govern themselves by the reason of the thing, this court followed their
opinion. The better to fix them in it
,
they allowed of bills by the re
mainder man to compel the devisee of the particular estate to put
in security that he should enjoy it according to the limitation. And for
a great while so the practice stood, as they thought it might well, be
cause of the resolution of the judges, as we have shown; but after this
was seen to multiply chancery suits, then they began to resolve that
there was no need of that [*34] way, but the executory remainder man
should enjoy it
,
and the devisee of the particular estate should have no
power to bar it. Men began to presume upon the judges then, and
thought if it were good as to remainders after estates for lives, it would
be good also as to remainders upon estates tail. That the judges would
not endure; and that is so fixed a resolution, that no court of law or
equity ever attempted to break in the world.
,,
/"
_
.
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Now then we come to this case, and if so be where it does not tend
to a perpetuity, a chattel interest will bear a remainder over, upon the
same reason it will bear a remainder over upon a contingency, where
that contingency doth wear out within the compass of a life; otherwise
it is only to say it shall not because it shall not, for there is no more
inconvenience in the one than in the other. Come we then at last to
that which seems most to choke the plaintiff’s title to this term, and
that is the resolution in Child and Bailie’s Case [ante p. ]; for
it is upon that judgment it seems all conveyances must stand or be
shaken, and our decrees made. * * * First, it must be observed, that
the resolution there did go upon several reasons which are not to be
found in this case. * * * Secondly, at last, allowing this case to be
as full and direct an authority as is possible, and as they would wish
that rely upon it; then I say: 1, the resolution in Child and Bailie’s
Case is a resolution that never had any resolution like it before nor
since; 2, it is a resolution contradicted by some resolutions: and to
show that that resolution has been contradicted, there is ( 1) Cotton
and Heath’s Case [Roll. Abr. t. Devise 612.] * * * but (2), to come
up more fully and closely to it
,
and to show you that I am _bound up by
the resolutions of this court, there was a fuller and ‘flatter case, 21 Car. 2,
in July 1669, between Wood and Saunders [1 Cases in Ch. 131]. The
trust of a long lease is limited and declared thus: to the father for
sixty years if he lived so long, then to the mother for sixty years if
she lived so long, then to John and his executors if he survived his father
and mother, and if he died in their lifetime having issue, then to his
issue, but if he diewithout issue living the father or mother, then the
remainder to Edward in tail. [*36] John did die without issue in the
lifetime of the father and mother, and the question was, whether Ed
ward should take this remainder after their death; and it was re
solved by my Lord Keeper Bridgman, being assisted by Judge Twisden
and Judge Rainford, that the remainder to Edward was good; for
the whole term had vested in John if he had survived; yet the con
tingency never happening, and so wearing out in the compass of two
lives in being, the remainder over to Edward might well be limited
upon it. Thus we see, that the same opinion which Sir Orlando
Bridgman held when he was a practicer and drew these conveyances
upon which the question now ariseth, remained with him when he was
the judge in this court, and kept the seals. And, by the way, I think
it is due to the memory of so great a man, whenever we speak of him,
to mention him with great reverence and veneration for his learning and
integrity.
They will perhaps say: Where will you stop if not at Child and
Ba-ilie’s Case? Where? Why everywhere where there is any inconven
ience, any danger of a perpetuity. And wherever you stop at a limita
tion of a fee upon a fee, there we will stop in the limitation of a term
of years. No man ever yet said a devise to a man and his heirs, and if
he die without issue living B, then B
,
is a naughty remainder ; that
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is Pells and Br0wn’s Case. Now the ultimum quod sit, or the utmost
limitation of a fee upon a fee, is not yet plainly determined; but it will
be soon found out if men shall set their wits on work to contrive by
contingencies, to do that which the law has so long labored against.
* * _>
l=
Therefore my present thoughts are that the trust of this term was
well limited to Charles, who ought to have the trust of the whole
term decreed to him, and an account of the mean profits for the time
past, and a recompense made to him from the duke and Marriot for
the time to come. But I do not pay so little reverence to the company
I am in, as to Tu11 down their solemn arguments and opinions upon
my present sentiments; and therefore I do suspend the enrollment of
any decree in this case as yet.
_ But I will _give myself some time to
consider before I take any final resolution, seeing the lords, the judges,
do differ from me in their opinions. _
[On the day appointed by the chancellor for final judgment May
13th, 1682, counsel for the Duke of Norfolk begged permission to be
heard further, and by grace of the chancellor, the case was continued
from time to time till June 17th, 1682, at which time it was argued at
some length, and then the following opinion and decree given by the
lord chancellor.]
LORD CHANCELLOR NOTTINGHAM. I am not sorry for the liberty
that was taken at the bar to argue this over again, because I desired it
should beso ; for in truth I am not in love with my own opinion. * * *
It will be good for the satisfaction of the public in this case, to take
notice how far the court is agreed in this case, and then see where
they differ, and upon what grounds they difier, and whether anything
that hath been said be a ground for the changing this opinion. The
court is agreed thus far: [*48] That in this case it is all one, the
limitation of the trust of a term, or the limitation of the estate of a
term, all depends upon one and the same reason. The court is like
wise agreed (which I should have said first, to dispatch it out of the
case, that it may not trouble the case at all) that the surrender of
Marriot to the Duke of Norfolk, and the common recovery sufiered by
the duke, are of no use at all in this case. For if this limitation to
Charles be good, then is this surrender and the recovery a breach of
trust, and ought to be set aside in equity; so all the judges that as
sisted at the hearing of this cause agreed. If the limitation be not good,
then there was no need at all of a surrender to bar it
,
nor of the common
recovery to extinguish it. But then we come to consider the limitation,
and there it [is] agreed all along in point of law, that the measures
of the limitations of the trust or a term and the measures of the
limitations of the estate of a term, are all one and uniform, here
and in other cases, and there is no difference at chancery and at common
law, between the rules of the one and the rules of the other. What is
good in one case is good in the other. And therefore in this case the
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court is agreed too, that the limitations made in this settlement to
Edward, &c., are all void; for they tend directly and plainly to per
petuities, for they are limitations of remainders of a term in gross after
an estate-tail in a term, which commenceth to be a term in gross when
the contingency for Charles happens. _
Thus far there is no difference of opinion; but whether the limita
tion to Charles if Thomas die without issue living Henry, whereby
the honor of the earldom of Arundel descends upon Henry—I say,
whether that be void too is the great question of this case, wherein we
differ in our opinions.
It is said that is void too. And yet (sever it from the authority of
Child and Bailie’s Case, which I will speak to by and by) I would be
glad to see some tolerable reason given why it should be so; for I agree
it is a question in law upon a trust, as. it would be elsewhere upon an
estate; and so the questions here are both questions of law and equity.
It was well said, and well allowed by all the judges, when they did allow
the remainders of terms after estates-tail in these terms to be void. I
shall not devise a term to a man in tail with remainders over. The
judges have admirably well resolved in it; and the law is settled; and
Matthew Manning’s Case [ante p. ] did not stretch so far, because
this‘ would tend to a perpetuity. Now, on the other side, I should
fain know, when there is a case before the court, where the limitation
doth not tend to a perpetuity, nor introduceth any visible inconvenience,
what should hinder that from being good. For though if there be a
tendency to a perpetuity, or a visible inconvenience, that shall be void
for that reason; yet the bare limitation of the remainder after an estate
tail which doth not tend to a perpetuity, that is not void. Why? Be
cause it is not? I dare not say so. See then the reasons why it is so.
[*49] The reasons that I lie under the load of, and cannot shake
off, are these: The law doth in many cases allow of a future con
tingent estate to be limited, where it will not allow a present remainder
to be limited; and that rule, well understood, goeth through the whole
case. How do you make that out? Thus: If a man have an estate
limited to him his heirs and assigns for ever (which is a fee-simple),
but if he die without issue, living J . S., or in such a short time, then
to J. D., though it be impossible to limit a remainder of a fee upon a
fee, yet it is not impossible to limit a contingent fee upon a fee. And
they that speak against this rule, do endeavor as much as they can to
set aside the resolutions of Pells and Br0wn’s Case [ante p. ],
which (under favor) was not the first case that was resolved; for, as
I said before, when I first delivered my opinion, it was resolved to be
a good limitation, 19 Eliz., in the case of Hinde and Lyon, 3 Leonard
64; which, by the way, is the best book of reports of the later ones
that hath come out without authority. If that be so, then where a
present remainder will not be allowed a contingent one will. If a lease
for years come to be limited in tail, the law allows not a present re
mainder to be limited thereupon, yet it will allow a future estate arising
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upon a contingency only, and that to wear out in a short time. But
what time, and where are the bounds of that contingency? You may
limit, it seems, upon a contingency to happen in a life. What if it
be limited, if such a one die without issue within 21 years, or 100 years,
or while Westminster-hall stands? Where will you stop if you do not
stop here? I will tell you where I will stop. I will stop wherever any
visible inconvenience doth appear; for the just bounds of a fee-simple
upon a fee-simple are not yet determined; but the first inconvenience
that ariseth upon it will regulate that.
First of all then, I would fain have anyone answer me, where there
is no inconvenience in this settlement, no tendency to a perpetuity in
this limitation, and no rule of law broken by the conveyance, what
should make this void? And no man can say that it doth break any
rule of law, imless there be a tendency to a perpetuity, or a palpable
inconvenience. Oh, yes, terms are mere chattels, and are not in con
sideration of law so great as freeholds or inheritances. These are words,
and but words; there is not any real difference at all, but the reason
of mankind will laugh at it. Shall not a man have as much power over
his lease as he has over his inheritance? If he have not, he shall be
disabled to provide for the contingencies of his own family that are
within his view and prospect, because it is but a lease for years and
not an inheritance or a freehold. There is that absurdity in it which
is to me insuperable; nor is the case that was put, answered in any
degree. * * * [*50]
* * *
But I expect to hear it said from the bar, and it has been said often:
The case of Child and Bailie is a great authority. So it is. But this
I have to say to it: First, the point resolved in Child and Bailie’s Case
was never so resolved before, nor ever was such a resolution since. Pclls
and Brown’s Case was otherwise resolved, and has often been adjudged
so since. In the next place, I will not take much pains to distinguish
Child and Bailie’s Case from this, though the word assigns and the
grant of the remainder by the mother who was executrix, are things
which Rolls lays hold on as reasons for the judgment. But I know not
why I may not, with reverence to the authority of that case and the
learning of those that adjudged it
,
take the same liberty as the judges
in Westminster-hall sometimes do, to deny a case that stands single
and alone of itself. And I am of opinion the resolution in that case
is not law, though there it came to be resolved upon very strange cir
cumstances to support such a resolution; for the remainder of a term
of 76 years is
‘
called in question when but 15 years of it remained, and
after possession had shifted hands several times, and therefore I do not
wonder that the consideration of equity swayed that case. But I put
_i
t upon this point, pray consider, there is nothing in Child and Bailie’s
Case that doth tend to a perpetuity, nor anything in the settlement of
the estate there, that could be called an inconvenience, not any rule
of law broken by the conveyance; but it is absolutely a resolution
262 RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES.
quia volumus; for it disagrees with all the other cases before and since,
all which have been otherwise resolved. [*51] But it is a resolution. I
say, merely because it is a resolution. And it is expressly contrary to
Wood and Sanders’s Case [1 Ch. Cas. 131], which no art or, reason
can distinguish from our case or that. For here is that case which was
clipped and minced at the bar, but. never answered. Wood and
Sander’s Case is this: to the husband for 60 years if he lived so long,
to the wife for 60 years if she lived so long, then if John be living at
the time of the death of the father and mother, then to John, but if he
die without issue living father or mother,‘then to Edward. Suppose
these words living father or mother had been out of the case, and it
had been to John, and if he die without issue, then to Edward. will
any man doubt but then the remainder over had been void, because it
is a limitation after an express entail? How came ~it then to be ad
judged good? Because it was a remainder upon a contingency that
was to happen during two lives, which was but a short contingency,
and the law might very well expect the happening of it. Now that is
this case, nay ours is much stronger; for here it is only during one life,
there were two. The case of Cotton and Heath [Rolls Abr. t. Devise
612] in Rolls comes up to this: A term is devised to A for 18 years,
the remainder to B for life, the remainder to the first issue male of B;
which is a contingent estate after a contingency, and yet it was ad
judged good, because the happening of the contingency was to be ex
pected in so short a time. Now that case was adjudged by my Lord
Keeper Coventry, Mr. Justice Jones, Mr. Justice Croke, and Mr.
Justice Berkley, as Wood and Sanders’s Case was by my Lord Keeper
Bridgman, Mr. Justice Twisden, and Mr. Justice Reinford. So that
however I may seem to be single in my opinion, having the misfortune
to differ from the three learned judges who assisted me, yet I take my
self to be supported by seven opinions in these two cases I have cited.
If then this be so, that here is a conveyance made which breaks no
rules of law, introduces no visible inconvenience, savoirs not of a per
petuity, tends to no ill example, why this should be void, only because
it is a lease for years, there is no sense in that.
Now if Charles Howard’s estate be good in law it is ten times better
in equity. For it is worth the considering, that this limitation upon
this contingency happening (as it hath, God be thanked), was the con
siderate desire of the family, the circumstances whereof required con
sideration, and this settlement was the result of it
,
made with the best
advice they could procure, and is as prudent a provision as could be
made. For the son now to tell his father that the provision that he
had made for his younger brother is void, is hard in any case at law;
but it is much harder in chancery; for there no conveyance is ever to
be set aside where it can be supported by a reasonable construction, and
here must be an unreasonable one to overthrow it. [*52] I take it then
to_ be good both in law and equity; and if I could alter my opinion,
I would not be ashamed to retract it; for I am as other men are, and
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have my partialities as other men have. When all this is done, I am
at the bar desired to consider further of this case. I would do so it I
could justify it; but expedition is as much the right of the subject
as justice is
,
and I am bound by Magna Charta, nulli negari, nulli
difierre justitiam. I have taken as much pains and time as I could to
be informed. I cannot help it if wiser men than I be of another opinion;
but every man must be saved by his own faith, and, I must discharge
my own conscience. * * * I must decree for the plaintiff in this case,
and my decree is this: That the plaintiff shall enjoy this barony for
the residue of the term of 200 years; the defendant shall make him
a conveyance accordingly, because he extinguished the trust in the other
and the term, contrary to both law and reason, by the merger and
surrender and common recovery;_a.nd that the defendants do account
with the plaintiff for the profits of the premises by them or any of them
received since the death of the said Duke Thomas, and which they or
any of them might have received without wilful default; and that it
be referred toOSir Lacon William Child, Knight, one of the masters of
this court, to take the said account. * * *
[This decree was reversed in the high court of chancery May 15, 1683
b
y Lord Keeper North, on bill for review filed by defendants herein;
and that decree of the high court of chancery was reversed and the
above decree of Lord Chancellor NOTTINGHAM afiirmed by the House of
Lords, June 19th, 1685, on appeal by Charles Howard.]
GORE v. GORE, in Chancery, referred to the judges of the King’s Bench, in
1722 and 1733—2 P. Wms. 28, 2 Strange 958, 10 Mod. 501, 2 Kel. 254, 2
Barnard K. B. 209, 229, 355, 5 Gray’s P. C. 166. Abridged from P. Wms.
and Strange.
This case came on before Lord Chancellor Maeclesfield, who referred
it to the judges of the king’s bench for their opinion. William Gore,
being seised in fee, devised to trustees and their heirs to the use of the
trustees for 500 years, to raise younger childrens’ fortunes and pay
debts, and after the determination of that estate, then to the first and
every other son of Thomas Gore (devisor’s eldest son), in tail male, re
mainder to Edward Gore (devisor’s second son) in tail male, remainders
over. At the death of the devisor, Thomas was a bachelor, but afterwards
married and had a son; and upon this two questions arose: 1, whether
this son of Thomas could take; and, 2, in whom the freehold vested at
the death of the devisor.
The judges certified their opinion as follows: “We have heard counsel
on both sides on the question above specified, and having considered
the same, are of opinion, that the devise of the manors above mentioned
to the first son of Thomas Gore is void, because he cannot take by way
of remainder, for that there is no freehold to support it; nor can he take
b
y
way of executory devise, because it is‘not to take place within that
compass of time which the law allows: and we are also of opinion, that
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the freehold of the same manors, on the death of the devisor, were vested
in Edward, the second son. JOHN PRATT [C. J .], LITTLETON PowLs, R.
EYER, J . FoRTEsoUE ALAND [J J .], 1722.
Loan MACCLESFIELD expressed some dissatisfaction with the opinion of
the judges, saying that though the law might be so, yet the term of 500
years being but a trust term, and so to be considered in equity as a
security only for money, was not to be so regarded, at least in equity.
as to make the devise over void. After which the son of Thomas came
to agreement with his uncle Edward, which was confirmed by the
court.
Afterwards Thomas had a second son, and died, and this second son
brought the matter up again in the chancery ; and Loan KING, now being
Lord Chancellor, sent it a second time to the court of king’s bench, and
the justices this time certified against the opinion of their predecessors,
as follows: “Upon hearing counsel on both sides, and consideration of
this case, we are of opinion, that the devise of the manors of Barrow
and Southley to the first son of Thomas Gore is good by way of ex
ecutory devise, and that the freehold of the said Manors, on the death
of the devisor, vested in his heir at law. IIARDWICKE [C. J .], F. PAGE,
E. PROBYN, W. LEE [JJ.], Jan. 26, 1733.
This being certified, the cause was set down before LoaD TALBOT, after
Trinity term, 1734, who declared his agreement in opinion with the
last certificate, and made his decree accordingly. Loan RAYMOND was
also of the same opinion.
_
TIIELLUSSON v. WOODFORD, in the House of Lords, 1805.—1 B05. & Pul.
N. R. 357, 11 Ves. 212, Cruise Dig. tit. De/vise 524, 5 Grays P. C. 530.
This is an appeal to the House of Lords by the complainants in a
bill in chancery, and seeking a reversal of the decree (reported in 4
Ves. Jr. 227) of the chancellor dismissing the bill. Decree affirmed.
The complainants are the sons, widow, daughters, and husbands of the
daughters of Peter Thellusson ; and the defendants are the trustees under
his will; and the bill seeks a construction of the will and an adjudica
tion that the trusts are in violation of the rule against perpetuities, and
therefore void. The testator being seised of vast estates, real and per
sonal, and having three sons (Peter, George, and Charles) a wife, and
several daughters, made his will, dated April 2, 1796; by which he
gave to each of his children, besides small annuities, sufficient to make
the portion for each son £23,000, and each daughter £12,000, previous
advances being reckoned as part of such portions; gave £22,000 of bank
stock and £600 per annum long annuities, to his children, subject to
a life interest to his wife; and gave all the residue of his estate real and
personal to the defendants herein, the survivors and survivor of them
and the heirs of the survivor, in trust to permit his wife to use and
occupy the capital mansion and grounds and the furniture, horses,
books, &c., thereon during widowhood; he then directed that on the death
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or marriage of the widow the trustees should sell such premises and
property and that the proceeds should be considered a portion of the
residue of his personal estate. The residue of his personal estate he
gave to the same trustees in trust to invest the same in freehold estates
in fee in England, and that the rents and profits of the other lands
owned by him and the lands so directed to be purchased should be
regularly collected by such trustees and accumulated and invested until
the death of the last of the children and grandchildren of the testator
in being at his death or born in due time afterwards; and he directed
his trustees, on the death of such survivor, to divide the residue of
the estate real and personal and the accumulations into three lots of
equal value, and give the first choice of the three to the then eldest
surviving male issue of the testator’s son Peter, in tail, with divers
remainders over; the second choice in like manner to the eldest male
descendant of testator’s son George then surviving, in tail, with like
remainders over; the remaining lot to the eldest male descendant of
testator’s son Charles then surviving, in tail, with remainders over ; with
remainders over as to all the lots to the king or queen of England on
failure of issue of such sons.
The property subject to the trust consisted of land in England of the
annual value of £4,500, and of land in the West Indies and personal
property estimated at above £600,000 value.
The trustees filed a cross-bill praying that the trusts be established
and carried into execution. Both the original and cross-bills coming
on before Lord Loughborough, assisted by Richard P. Arden (master
of the rolls), Buller and Lawrence, JJ., at Lincoln’s Inn Hall, Dec.
5th, 1798, were heard on that and several subsequent days. On Feb.
19th, 1802, the chancellor pronounced his decree dismissing the original
bill and establishing the .trusts as prayed in the cross-bill on appeal
to the House of Lords, the case was argued at the bar of the house
on several days by Mansfield and Romilly for the appellants, and by
Att. Gen. Percival, Sol. Gen. Sutton, and Pigott, Richards, Alexander,
and Cox, for the respondents. After the argument the following ques
tions were submitted to the judges on motion of Lord Chancellor Elden:
1. A testator by his will, being seised in fee of the real estate therein
mentioned, made the following devise :—I give and devise all my manors,
messuages, tenements, and hereditaments, at Brodsworth in the county
of York, after the death of my sons, Peter Isaac Thellusson, George
Woodford Thellusson, and Charles Thellusson, and of my grandson
John Thellusson, son of my son Peter Isaac Thellusson, and of such other
sons as my son Peter Isaac Thellusson may have, and of such sons
as my said sons George Woodford Thellusson and Charles Thellusson
may have, and of such issue as such sons may have, as shall be living
at the time of my decease, or born in due time afterwards,
and after the deaths of the survivors and survivor of the several
persons aforesaid, to such person as, at the time of the death of the
survivor of the said several persons, shall then be the eldest male lineal
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_
descendant of my son Peter Isaac Thellusson and his heirs forever.—At
the time of the testator’s death, there were seven persons actually born
answering the description mentioned in the testator’s will, and there
were two in eentre sa mere answering the description, if children in
ventre sa mere do answer that description; all the said several persons,
so described in the testator’s will, being dead, and, at the death of the
survivor of such several persons, there being living one male lineal
descendant of the testator’s son Peter Isaac Thellusson, and one only;
Is such person entitled by law, under the legal effect of the devise
above stated, and the legal construction of the several words in which
the same is expressed, to the said manors, messuages, tenements, and
hereditaments at Brodsworth?
_
2. If at the death of the survivor of such several persons as afore
said, such only male lineal descendant was not actually born, but was
in ventre sa mere. Would such lineal descendant when actually born be
so entitled?
The unanimous opinion of the judges was pronounced as follows by
LoRD MACDONALD, C. B. [*385] The first objection to the will is
,
that
the testator has exceeded that portion of time within which the contin
gency must happen, upon which an executory devise is permitted to be
limited by the rules of law, for three reasons. First, because so great a
number of lives cannot be taken as in the present instance to protract the
time during which the vesting is suspended, and consequently the power
of alienation suspended. Secondly, that the testator has added to the lives
of persons who should be born at the time of his death the lives of persons
who might not be born. Thirdly, that, after enumerating different classes
of lives during the continuance of which the vesting is suspended, the
testator has concluded with these restrictive words, “as shall be living
at my decease, or born in due time afterwards,” and that as these words
appertain only to the last class in the enumeration, the words which are
used in the preceding classes being unrestricted, they will extend to
grandchildren and great-grand children, and their issue, and so make
this executory devise void in its creation, as being too remote.
With respect to the first ground, viz. the number of lives taken. which
in the present instance is nine, I apprehend that no case or dictum has
drawn any line as to this point, which a testator is forbidden to pass.
On the contrary, in the cases in which this subject has been considered
by the ablest judges, they have for a great length of time expressed them
selves as to the number of lives, not merely without any qualification or
circumscription, but have treated the number of co-existing lives as
matter of no moment; the ground of that opinion being, that no public
inconvenience can arise from a suspension of the vesting, and thereby
placing land out of circulation during any one life, and that in fact the
life of the survivor of many persons named or described is but the life
of some one. This was held without dissent by Twisden, J ., in Love v.
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Wyndham, 1 Mod. 50, twenty years before the determination [*386]
of the Duke of N0rfolk’s case, who says that the devise of a farm may
be for twenty lives, one after another, if all be in existence at once.
By this expression, he must be understood to mean any number of lives,
the extinction of which could be proved without difficulty. When this
subject of executory trusts came to be examined by the great powers of
Lord Nottingham as to the time within which the contingency must
happen, he thus expresses himself: “If a term bedevised, or the trust
of a term limited, to one for life with twenty remainders for life, suc
cessively, and all the persons are in existence and alive at the time of
the limitation of their estates, these, though they look like a possibility
upon a possibility, are all good, because they produce no inconvenience;
they wear out in a little time.” With an easy interpretation, we find
from Lord Nottingham what that tendency to a perpetuity is, which
the policy of the law has considered as a public inconvenience, namely,
wherean executory devise would have the efiect of making lands unalien
able beyond the time which is allowed in legal limitations, that is
,
beyond
the time at which one in remainder would attain his age of twenty-one,
if he were not born when the limitations were executed. When he de
clares that he will stop where he finds an inconvenience, he cannot con
sistently with sound construction of the context, be understood to mean,
where Judges arbitrarily imagine they perceive an inconvenience, for
he has himself stated where inconvenience begins, namely, by an at
tempt to supersede the vesting longer than can be done by legal limita
tions. I understand him to mean, that wherever courts perceive that
such would be the effect, whatever may be the mode attempted, that
effect must be prevented; and he gives the same but no greater latitude
to executory devises and executory trusts as to estates tail. This has
been ever since adopted. In Scatterwood V. Edge, 1 Salk 299, [ante
p. ] the court held, that an [*387] executory estate, to arise within
the compass of a reasonable time is good as twenty or thirty years so is
the compass of a life or lives, for let the lives be never so many, there
must be a survivor, and so it is but the length of that life. In Hum
berston v. Humberston, 1 P. Wms. 332 [ante p. ] where an at
tempt was made to create a vast number of estates for life in succession,
as well to persons unborn as to persons in existence, Lord Cowper re
strained that devise within the limits assigned to common law convey
ances, by giving estates for life to all those who were living (at the
death of the testator,) and estates to those who were unborn considering
all the co-existing lives (a vast many in number) as amounting in the
end to no more than one life. His Lordship was in the situation alluded
to by Lord Nottingham, where a visible inconvenience appeared. The
bounds prescribed to limitations in common law conveyances were ex
ceeded, the excess was cut off, and the devise confirmed within those
limits. Lord Hardwicke repeats the same doctrine in Shefiield v.
Lord Orr-erg, 3 Atk. 282, using the words life or lives without any
restriction as to number. Many other cases might be cited to the
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like effect, but I shall only add what is laid down in two very modern
cases. In Gwrnall v. Wood, Willes, 211 Lord Chief Justice Willes
speaks of a life or lives without any qualification; and Lord Thur
low, in Robinson v. Hardcastle, 2 Brown Ch. Cas. 30, says that
a man may appoint 100 or 1000 trustees, and that the survivor of
them shall appoint a life estate. It appears then, that the coexisting
lives, at the expiration of which the contingency must happen, are
not confined to any definite number. But it is asked shall lands be
rendered unalienable during the lives of all the individuals, who com
pose very large societies or bodies of men, or where other very ex
tensive descriptions are made use of? It may be answered that when such
cases occur, they will, according to their respective circumstances,
[*388] be put to the usual test, whether they will or will not tend to
a perpetuity, by rendering it almost, if not quite, impracticable to as
certain the extinction of the lives described, and will be supported or
avoided accordingly.
But it is contended, that in these and other cases the persons, during
whose lives the suspension was to continue, were persons immediately con
nected with or immediately leading to, the person in whom the property
was first to vest when the suspension should be at an end. I am unable to
find any authority for considering this as a sine qua. non in the creation
of a good executory trust. It is true that this will almost always be the
case and mode of disposing of property, introduced and encouraged
up to a certain extent, for the convenience of families, which in al
most all instances look at the existing members of the family of the
testator and its connections. But when the true reason for circum
scribing the period, during which alienation may be suspended, is
adverted to, there seems to be no ground or principle that renders
such an ingredient necessary. The principle is, the avoiding of a
public evil by placing property for too great a length of time out
of commerce. The length of time will not be greater or less, whether
the lives taken have any interest, vested or contingent, or have
not; nor, whether the lives are those of persons immediately connected
with or immediately leading to that person in whom the property is
first to vest, terms to which it is diflicult to annex any precise meaning.
The policy of the law can no way be affected by those circumstances,
which_I apprehend looks merely to duration of time. This could not
be the opinion of Lord Thurlow in Robinson v. Hardcastle, nor
is any such opinion to be found in any case or book upon this subject.
The result of all the cases upon this point is thus summed up by
Lord Chief Justice Willes (Willes 215) with his usual accuracy and
perspieuity: “Executory devises have not been considered as mere pos
sibilities, but as certain interests and estates, and have been resembled
to contingent remainders [*389] in all other respects; only they have
been put under some restraints to prevent perpetuities. As at first
it was held that the contingency must happen within the compass of
a life, or lives in being, or a reasonable number of years; at length it
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was extended a little further, namely, to a child in ventre sa mere
at the time of the father’s death; because, as that contingency must
necessarily happen within less than nine months after the death of
a person in being, that construction would introduce no inconvenience,
and the rule has in many instances been extended to 21 years after
the death of a person in being, as in that case likewise there is no
danger of a perpetuity.” Comparing what the testator has done in the
present case with what is above cited, it will appear that he has not
postponed the vesting even so long as he might have done.
The second objection which has been made in this case is, that the
testator has added to the lives of persons in being at the time of his
decease, those of persons not then born. It becomes, therefore, nec
essary to discover in what sense the testator meant to use the words
“born in due time afterwards.” Such words, in the case of a man’s
own children, mean the time of gestation; what is to be intended by
these words in this will must be collected from the will itself. It
may be collected from the will itself, that by those words the testator
meant to describe the period of time within which issue might be
born during whose lives the trust might legally continue, or, in other
words, whom the law would consider as born at the time of his de
cease. Now these could only be such children of the several persons
named as their respective mothers were ensient with at the time of
his death; or, he may have meant to use the words, “due” as denoting
that period of time which would be the necessary period for effecting
his purpose. This is probable from his using the same word, as ap
plied to the time during which the presentation to the advowson of
marr might be suspended [*390] without incurring a lapse. That a
child in ventre sa mere was considered as in existence, so as to be capable
of taking by executory devise, was maintained by Powell, J ., in the case
of Loddington v. Kime, 1 Ld. Raym. 207 [ante 190], upon this ground,
that the space of time between the death of the father and birth of the
posthumous son was so short that no inconvenience could ensue. So
in N01'thy V. Strange, 1 P. Wms. 340, Sir J . Trevor held, that by a
devise to children and grandchildren an unborn grandchild should
take. Two years after Lord Macclesfield in Bnrdett V. Hopegood,
1 P. Wms. 486. held that where a devise was to a cousin, if the testator
should leave no son at the time of his death, a posthumous son should
take as being left at the testator’s death. In Wallis V. Hodgson, 2
Atk. 117, Lord Hardwicke held that a posthumous child was entitled
under the statute of distributions and his reason deserves notice.
“The principal reason (says he_) that I go upon is, that the plaintiff
was in ventre sa mere at the time of her brother’s death, and conse
quently a person in rernm natura; so that by the rules of the common
and civil law she was, to all intents and purposes, a child as much
as if born in the father’s lifetime.” Such a child, in charging for
the portions of other children living at the death of the father, is
included as then living, Beal V. Baal, 1 P. Wms. 244, and so in a.
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variety of other reports. In .Bassett v. Bassett, 3 Atk. 203. Lord
Hardwicke decreed rents and profits which had accrued at a rent-day
preceding his birth to a posthumous child, and since the stat. of 10
& 11 W. 3, c. 16, such children seem to be considered in all cases
of devise, and marriage or other settlement, to be living at the death
of their father, although not born till after his decease. It is other
wise considered in the case of descent. In Roe V. Quarterly, 1
Term 630, the devise was to Hester Read for life (daughter of Walter
Read) and to the heirs of her body; and for default of such issue,
to such child as the wife of Walter Read is now [*391] ensient with,
and the heirs of the body of such child, then to the right heirs of
Walter Read and Mary his wife. It was contended that the last
limitation was too remote, as coming after a devise to one not in be
ing, and his issue. But the court said, that since the stat. of King
William, which puts posthumous children on the same footing with
children born in the life-time of their ancestor, this objection seemed
to be removed, whatever was the case before. In Gulliver V.
Wickett, 1 Wils. 105, the devise was to the wife for life, then to the
child, with which she was supposed to be ensient, in fee, provided
that if such child should die before 21 leaving no issue, the reversion
should go to other persons named, The court said, if there had
been no devise to the wife for life, which made the ulterior estate
a contingent remainder, the devise to the child in ventre sa mere
being in futuro, would have been a good executory devise. In Doe v.
Lancashire, 5 Term 49, the court of king’s bench has held that
marriage and the birth of a posthumous child revoke a will, in like
manner as if the child had been born in the lifetime of the father.
In Doe v. Clarke, 2 H. Bl. 399, Ld. Chief Justice Eyre holds, that
independent of intention an infant in ventre sa mere, by the course
and order of nature, is then living, and comes clearly within the
description of children living at the parent’s decease; and he pro
fesses not to accede to the distinction between the cases in which a
provision has been made for children generally, and where the testator
has been supposed to mark _a personal affection for children who hap
pened to have been actually born at the time of his death. The most
recent case is that of Long v. Blackall; there the court of king’s
bench had no doubt that a devise to a child in ventre sa mere in the
first instance was good, and a limitation over was good also, on the
contingency of there being no issue male, or descendant of issue male,
living at the death of such posthumous child. It seems then, that if
estates [*392] for life had been given to the several cestuis qui vie
in this will, and after their deaths to their children, either born or
in ventre sa mere at the testator’s death, they would have been good.
No tendency to perpetuity then can arise in the case of such lives
being taken, not to confer on them a measure of the beneficial in-.
terest, but to fix the time during which the vesting of the property
which is the subject of this devise, shall be protracted; inasmuch
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as the circulation of r_eal property is no more fettered in the one case
than in the other. It is, however, observable that this question may
never arise, if it shall so happen that the children in ventre matris at
the death of the testator shall not survive those who were then born.
The third ground of objection depends upon_ the application of the
restrictive words which are added t othe enumeration of the different
classes of persons during whose lives the restriction is suspended. This
objection I conceive will be removed by the application of the usual
rules in construing wills, to the present case. First, where the in
tention of the testator is clear, and is consistent with the rules of law,
that shall prevail. His intention evidently was to prevent alienation
as long as by law he could; if then it is to be supposed that the re
strictive words are to be confined to the last of seven different descrip
tions of persons, and that the testator intended to leave the four
descriptions of persons which immediately preceded this 7th class,
without the benefit of such restriction, although they equally stand
in need of it
,
we must do the utmost violence to all established rules
on this head.. That construction is to be adopted which will support
the general intent. The grammatical rule of referring qualifying
words to the last of the several antecedents, is not even supposed by
grammarians themselves to apply when the general intent of a writer
or speaker would be defeated by such a confined application of them.
Reason and common sense revolt at the idea [*393] of overlooking
the plain intent which is disclosed in the context, namely, that they
should be applicable to such classes as require them, and as to the
others to consider them as surplusage; if words admit of more con
structions than one, that which will support the legal intention of the
testator is in all cases to be adopted. I do not trouble your lordships
with any observation upon the objections arising from the magnitude
of the property in question, either as it now stands, or may hereafter
stand, or as to the motives which may have influenced this testator,
nor his neglect of those considerations by which I or any other in
dividual may or ought to have been moved; that would be to suppose
that such topics can in any way affect the judicial mind. For these
imperfect reasons, I concur with the rest of the judges in offering this
answer to your lordships’ first question.
With respect to your lordships’ second question, the objection to
such child being entitled must arise from an allowance having been made
for the time of gestation at the end of the executory trusts. It seems
to be settled that an estate may be limited in the first instance to a
child unborn, and I apprehend to the first and other sons in fee as
purchasers. The case of Long v. Blackall, 7 Term 100, seems, to
have decided that an infant in ventre matris is a life in being. The es
tablished length of time during which the vesting may be suspended
is during a life or lives in being, the period of gestation, and the
infancy of such posthumous child. If then this time has been al
lowed in some cases at the beginning, and in others at the termina
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tion of the suspension, and if such children are considered by the
construction of the Stat. of 10 & 11 W. 3, c. 16, as being born to such
purposes, what should prevent the period of gestation being allowed both
at the commencement and termination of the suspension, if it should
be called for? In those cases where it has been allowed at the com
mencement, and particularly in Long _v. Blackall, [*394] it must
have been obvious to the Court that it might be wanting at the ter
mination, yet that was never made an objection. In Gulliver V.
Wiekett, the child which was supposed to be in ventre sa, mere might
have married and died before 21, and have left his wife ensient; in
that case a double allowance would have been required, yet that pos
sibility was never made an objection, although it was obvious. In
Long v. Blackall, according to the printed report, the prices point
was not gone into. But it is plain that the attention of the court
must have been drawn to it for the learned judge who argued
that case in support of the devise, expressly stated “that every
common case of a limitation over, after a devise for a life in being.
with remainder in trust to his unborn issue, includes the same con
tingency as was then in question; for the heir for life may die leav
ing his wife ensient, and the only difierence is that the period of
gestation occurs at the beginning instead of the end of the first legal
estate. It must have been palpable that it might possibly occur at
both ends. Every reason then for allowing the period of gestation
in the one case seems to apply with equal force to the other, and
leads the mind to this conclusion, that it ought to be allowed in
both cases, or in either case but natural justice in several cases having
considered children in ventre sa mere as living at the death of the father,
it should seem that no distinction can properly be made, but that in the
singular event of both periods being required, they should be allowed,
as there can be no tendency to a perpetuity.
Judgment aflirmeol.
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